Multifaceted Middle East – Religion, Ethnicity, Politics and Terrorism

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Foreword

The Middle East is one of the most turbulent regions in the world. Any upheaval there reflects not only on the neighboring regions, but also on the whole world. Such a thesis is true because of the incredible heterogeneity of the local society. The twisted social and political amalgam is shaped by different ethnicities, religions, races, peoples, civilizational behavioral paradigms, state traditions and models. It seems that this conglomerate could not be able to be "forged" in a specific logical framework in the manner that we, in the neighboring European continent, have theorized and proposed in multi-volume scientific studies.

The Middle Eastern statehood is quite different from that set up by Europeans. Traditions and history from the past, present and future, influence the states dividing the northern from the southern coast of the Mediterranean Sea. All this would not be of much importance to the surrounding regions if the Middle East was not one of the largest sources of migration flows in the world. The inability of the peoples of the Middle East to build stable and prosperous states has led millions of people from this region to leave their homeland and seek refuge and a decent life in the neighboring, economically and politically stable, but demographically dying states. The main recipient of those fleeing the Middle East is the neighboring European continent. We witnessed millions of former citizens of this region, now citizens, permanent or illegal residents of European countries, who walked to the streets of Europe, demonstrating their emotions regarding the latest war in Gaza. On the 100th day of the Gaza war, there were such demonstrations in 30 countries and 145 cities around the world. It would not be wrong to say that they exert enormous pressure on European voters, who determine the profile of their national governments, as well as the future institutions of the European Union. Taking into account the fact that in recent decades the dynamics of the system of international relations have turned the Middle East into one of the world's energetical, financial, transport, military strategic and political centers, it is

necessary for the European Union to maintain priority relations with the leading regional factors. For this reason, we European scientists must contribute to the improvement of our research and analysis of the processes taking place in the Middle East social genesis. This is our professional and public recognition and obligation.

The book I present is a collection of the topics that I have developed within COAS e-conferences. At the same time, in the present study "Multifaceted Middle East – Religion, Ethnicity, Politics and Terrorism" the previous articles are supplemented and updated. My contention is proved by the fact that each one of them can become the subject of a separate independent monographic analysis. Against the background of constantly renewed empiricism, the blitz analysis and the corresponding conclusions also change their final form and content.

The goal of every scientific research is to find out both theoretical dimensions and concrete scientific-applied results. This academically ordered body of knowledge and hypotheses should be oriented for the benefit of the broad readership – state institutions, civil structures, academic environments and, above all, the student community – the holder and the indicator of the future development of each scientific division.

1. The emergence of the Islamic Messiah Al Mahdi and his "ideal" state

1.1 Introduction

Many modern preachers, clerics and thinkers are trying to find the signs of the appearance of the expected messiah given by Sharia texts and their interpretations by Islamic legal authorities. Thus, they create their own geopolitical versions, explaining modern political dynamics, based on their aspirations to build the ideal state formed under the light of the crescent. The dispositions of the Sharia norms are explained in a way that forms a logical-looking version of the emergence of a universal just state, led by the expected savior – Imam Mahdi.

If politicians are relatively flexible or refrain from such explanations, taking into account the socio-economic and political realities of their time, then the Ulema are freer to do so – they have no political responsibility and are free to indicate geographical locations or dates. associated with the appearance of the messiah, who are quickly exposed as a lie or an obvious manipulation. However, the latter has a strong enough influence for a relatively long time, both on politicians and on public opinion – it is able to reproduce enough unexpected and radical consequences.

For example, Madeleine Kasab, a researcher at the University of Leiden in the Netherlands, divides the signs of the Mahdi's appearance into well-known (already quoted in the main Sharia and interpretive medieval faqih texts) and the detailed features derived from individual Islamic preachers. The main reason for the emergence of the Messiah is the spread of injustice and corruption in various forms around the world.[1] According to the author Ali al-Husseini, the most characteristic of the total crisis in society are "constant blasphemy, de-Sharia lawmaking, ignoring Sharia schools, destroying religious temples,

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[1] The Dawa Network, Abdul-Fattah Hamdash, There Is Only One Event for Mahdi to Appear, 01.10.2017.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ymND7DomW4U, 25.12.2020.

killing Muslims and clerics, the silence of scholars for good, total and evil, the spread of homosexuality, adultery, and the complete decline of morality."[2] Interpretations of the appearance of the Messiah by two Sunni preachers, Sheikh Mohammed al-Arifi and Omran Hussein, are interesting. They say he will be Sunni. They explain this fact by the fact that he will appear in Mecca. Local Muslims, professing Sunni, will oblige him to accept their way of preaching Islam. They shed light on the fact that the Mahdi is a member of Ahl al-Bayt, the family of the house of the Prophet Muhammad. The two Sunnis are of the opinion that no Shiite can carry the message of universalism and is able to create a world state. According to al-Arifi, in just one night, Allah will inspire the Messiah and prepare him for his task. The preacher is of the opinion that the Mahdi will be born an ordinary man, but will suddenly become the Messiah. God will change his status in just one day[3] (see Chukov, 2021).

1.2 Al Mahdi

Such reflections are intended to prepare Muslims to be constantly ready for the appearance of Al Mahdi Al Montazar, the expected messiah. The most important characteristic of the Messiah is that people will oblige him to accept their devotion, not impose it on them. Muslims will point to him, and he will not declare himself as such.

Among the detailed features of the appearance of the messiah are some contemporary events that are "embedded" within the dogmatic texts of medieval historical texts. One such event is the assassination of former Iraqi President Saddam Hussein. The latter is described as a "caliph",[4] after whose elimination, an energetic Shiite cleric will emerge

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[2] Al Husseini, A., Who Guaranteed Nasrallah's Advent? How Did He Meet Mahdi? Orient Net, 03.11.2014, http://www.orient-news.net/ar/news_show/82399, 25.12.2020.

[3] The Truth-Seeker, Alsheikh Muhammad Alarifi, The Appearance of Mahdi Series, First Part, 24.09.2014.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XEQa5SoDLF8, 25.12.2020.

[4] Saddam Hussein is also identified as Ace Safiani. Former terrorist number one Abu Musab Az Zarqawi, who was killed by the Americans in 2006, is also a candidate for the post. He is one of the most sworn enemies of the Shiites. The reason for this statement is that the birthplace of I Zarqawi – the city of Zarqa in northern Jordan is relatively close to the valley of Wadi al Yabis, from where,

who will gain great influence in Iraq. It is about the Iraqi opposition Mokdata al Sader. The latter is recognized as the powerful figure who comes after the "caliph", whose appearance is a medium-tall, black-haired man who is ravaging Iraq and causing suffering to the people of the country. Then the Mahdi appears[5] (see Chukov, 2021).

Preacher Abdul Fatah Hamdash claims that "the caliphs are fighting for the treasures of the Ka'bah." He thus explains the split in 2017 between the member states of the Gulf Cooperation Council.[6] The Sunni preacher went on to say that Iraq would be besieged by Iran and Syria by the "Romans." Under the latter, he perceives a mixed group of foreigners, formed by representatives of Europe, the United States and Russia.[7]

There is a clear discrepancy in the interpretations of Shiite and Sunni messianic visions. By using identical terms, they give them different content. For example, if there is a consensus on Saddam Hussein that he falls into the category of al-Safiani, it is not the case with Syrian President Bashar al-Assad. For the Sunnis, he provoked the fit, civil war in Syria and also embodied the sinister As Safiyani. Along with that, he is part of the other factor involved in the battle for Sham, Syria. It is about al-Companions, friends, followers. For Shiites, this term symbolizes the black (Abbasid-Shiite) flags and are respectively carriers of a positive connotation. In contrast, Sunnis find the opposite meaning in the word. They find arguments for this thesis by claiming that the

according to Sharia sources, al-Safiani will appear. For more information, see: Abd Muhammad Hasan, Iqtaraba al-zuhur, Dar al-Mahajja al-Bayda, Beirut, 2006, pp. 125, 133, 25.12.2020 (see Chukov, 2021).

[5] Lovely Land, Conversations of a Group of Sheikhs, About a Tall Man before Mahdi, Al-Sham Sufyani, 05.01.2018, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jDKC6bSJtdU, 25.12.2020.

[6] It is about the split between Saudi Arabia-the United Arab Emirates-Bahrain and Egypt, on the one hand, and Qatar, on the other. For more information see: Hennessy-Fiske, M., Arab Nations Cut Ties to Qatar, Deepening Rift in the Persian Gulf, The Gazette, 5.06.2017, https://www.thegazette.com/subject/news/nation-and-world/Arab-nations-cut-ties-to-Qatar-deepening-rift-in-Persian-gulf-20170605, 16.03.2021.

[7] Abu Anas, Abdul-Fattah Hamdash, We Are at the End of Time, the Conclusive Evidence of the Appearance of Mahdi, 15.11. 2016, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MTCQNQQ9Ots, 25.12.2020.

word al-ashab is composed of almost the same letters as the word "asad" (in Arabic "lion"). In this logical plane, the Sunnis are convinced that this animal symbolizes the violence and persecution of civilians. Another anti-Assad argument is the appearance of Bashar Assad. He is tall, has blue eyes and blond hair, which Sunni interpreters of messianism suggest is different from the locals[8] (see Chukov, 2021).

According to the current commander of the elite Al-Quds Brigade of the Islamic Guards Corps (KIG), General Ismail Kaani, the real reason for the US invasion of Iraq in 2003 was to capture Imam Mahdi. In 2015, he noted that This happened after the US military contingent heard the calls of the Iraqis. "Oh, God, hasten the appearance of the Mahdi." The Americans realized that if he showed up, then the Shiites would defeat them. to reveal the identity of the Messiah. Kaani claims that this is why the Americans conducted long interrogations with those arrested.[9]

1.3 The "ideal" state

The Arab Spring is also framed in the process of the Mahdist emergence. However, Sheikh Omran Hussein expects the real appearance of Imam Mahdi to come with the end of the Saudi regime. One is immanently related to the other, as the Saudi dynasty rules the indicated place of appearance of Imam Mahdi – Mecca.[10]

In the popular Shiite view, the Mahdi is a vengeful figure who will first take revenge on those Sunni Muslims who prevented Ahl al-Bayt from the ruling. Practically Sunnis and Shiites argue over whose Messiah he is. As noted, the idea exists in both denominations, but the figure is different. The Messiah takes on a different profile. The Persian Ibrahim Amini collects stories from several Shiite imams, including Ali ben Abi Talib, Hassan ben Ali, Hussein ben Ali, Ali ben Hussein, Ja'far

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[8] True Promise is close, Hasan Altuhami, "The Last Sign for the Appearance of Mahdi – the Events of Syria," 15.08.2017,
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RfXNwapc3BY, 27.12.2020.

[9] Al-Khatib, M., Musaid Suleimani Yakshifu Kaifa Bahatat America an "al Mahdi."

[10] ZeLZaLFlasten, Omran Hussein, after Foreseeing the Arab Revolutions, Foresees the Moment When Mahdi Will Appear, 22.08.2011,
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=v4SUOOI5418, 25.12.2020.

as Sadiq, Musa al Kazam, in which he clearly rejects any is a link to the expected Messiah, outside the group of Ali ben Abi Talib's successors. According to the Iranian researcher, the latter says: "The Messiah will appear at the end of time from us. There can be no Mahdi in a nation that does not expect him."[11] The dispute is of great importance. It depends on the nature of the Messiah what his deeds and functions will be. It also means what the future ideal state he is fighting for will look like.

Classical sources suggest that Mahdi will turn humanity into a huge Islamic state. At the same time, the Messiah will be especially ruthless towards existing Islamic religious educational and pilgrimage facilities. He will destroy the mosques because they have become very luxurious and are not real places of worship. The Mahdi will kill the ulema because they have failed to establish a just and correct Islamic order. In any case, the appearance of the Mahdi will lead to a sharp and total break with existing Islamic norms.[12]

When the Messiah appears, prosperity and comfort will prevail in people's lives. So great will be the "abundance and grace that twenty people will share the consumption of one pomegranate".[13] The nations will declare allegiance to the Mahdi and fight him in the name of God's commandments. According to Sheikh al-Arifi, the Messiah will conquer Constantinople and then head to Rome and then to all of Europe. The conquests will continue until the Dajala arrives – i.e., the false Messiah.[14] Then Christ will rise, come down to earth and kill Dajjal. He will then pray in Jerusalem. But he will be behind the Mahdi, who will

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[11] Amini, I., Al-Imam al-Mahdi, The Just Leader of Humanity…. *op. cit*., https://www.al-islam.org/al-imam-al-mahdi-just-leader-humanity-ayatullah-ibrahim-amini/chapter-2-pseudo-mahdis, 25.12.2020.

[12] Cook, D., Studies in Muslim Apocalyptic, Darwin Press, Princeton, 2002, pp. 232-236.

[13] The Truth-Seeker, Alsheikh Muhammad Alarifi, The Appearance of Mahdi Series, First Part, 24.09.2014. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XEQa5SoDLF8, 26.12.2020.

[14] Alwatan Channel, Faith Program, Mansour Al-Hassani, Nabil Al-Awadi, Promised Mahdi and the False – pseudo Messiah and the Descent of Isa Jesus, Son of Mary, 16 March 2014. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dW1gmfs-MKk, 26.12.2020.

also pray. This is a clear indication that Israel will surely be destroyed by the Mahdi, as the joint prayer of the Messiah and Christ will not take place in occupied Jerusalem.[15]

An interesting point is that, in fact, Sunni predictions about the Mahdi are much more strongly injected with anti-Semitism. They, in turn, influence Shiite folk beliefs about the expected messiah. In fact, this is the difference between the judgment and the content of Sunni and Shiite messianism. The former emphasizes the destruction of Judaism as a religion, and then this will happen to its followers. Sunni Kuwaiti preacher Nabil al-Audi noted: "The Mahdi will meet with the mujahideen in Damascus. Syria will return to Muslim rule only when the Jews are eliminated. Even trees and stones will say, "Oh, Muslim! There is a Jew behind me. Come and kill him."[16]

Under the influence of authoritative Sunni preachers and faqihs, a modern rearrangement of priorities is reproduced in modern messianic Shiite perceptions. It is about the gradual surrender of As Safiani as the main prototype of evil, at the expense of Dajala, who is practically absent in traditional Shiite scriptures, although nowadays the figure is gaining more and more popularity in modern Shiite apocalyptic materials. In medieval Shiite texts, the figure of Mahdi is much more closely associated with his opponent, As Safiani. However, modern Shiite radicals are already shifting their focus to Dajala. In fact, stories about him become tools for demonizing the West as a whole, which is routinely portrayed as the incarnation of the Antichrist. In addition, Dajala himself came very close to the notion of the Jews. In fact, the development of such views has become the basis of strong anti-Israel attacks. Only years ago, this strong anti-Semitism and the approach to the destruction of the state of Israel, respectively, did not exist. Historically, it has not been in the interest of the Shiite religious leadership or al-Hauz al-Ilmiya for the Shiite religious-academic institution to promote apocalyptic expectations (see Chukov, 2021).

In the recent past, religious authorities have tried to govern "popular" Mahdism by focusing and directing messianic expectations to the more distant future rather than the immediate one. A strong and

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[15] *Op. cit.*

[16] *Op. cit.*

influential religious leadership could achieve this, as traditionally the return of Mahdi has never been associated with any real dates. Speculation about the Mahdi's return, when it arose, quickly shifted from al-Hauz al-Ilmiya, the Shiite religious-academic institution, to more pragmatic issues, including personal spiritual renewal or the betterment of society. However, when, to some extent, the authority of Shiite clerics eroded, popular messianic longings began to reappear. This happened at the beginning of the Baha'i movement in the 1940s.

We are currently witnessing a strong renaissance of apocalyptic beliefs in the Shiite world. The main focus is the state of Israel, not the followers of Judaism. Messianism began to "slip" out of the control of religious institutions and became a lever of influence for preachers who were not directly dependent on the state. Logically, the latter often interpret current events through the prism of socially formed populist messianism. In this way, processes known to some extent in Sunnism and Evangelism take place in Ja'farite messianism. The lowlands do not recognize the views offered by state institutions and create their own, but much more radical and elementary scenarios. These changes have important implications for Shiite social and political life. Gradually, Imamate messianism transformed from anti-Semitic to anti-Israel. The threat to the universal, social and just state of Mahdi is not the Jews as such, but their statist subject – the state of Israel. The latter is part of Dajala, the sum of all external hostile factors. It is even his vanguard, as it is located in the Middle East and in this capacity is the bearer of the direct threat against the Mahdist state.

One of the most active propagandists of the Mahdist idea in the world is the former Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad (2005-2013). His supporters go so far as to claim that he is the world representative of Mahdi. He left letters to the Messiah in the mosque in the holy city of Jamrakan, ordered the streets of Tehran to be cleared quickly because of the impending appearance of the Messiah. According to the former president of the Islamic Republic, ISIL appeared to stop the appearance of Mahdi. The terrorist organization adopted this name (you give it as an abbreviation in Arabic) because it sounded close to that of the Shiites (neck in Arabic). Ahmadinejad notes: "My government has

followed in the footsteps of Imam Mahdi's world power."[17] During his first term, the former president predicted that "the expected Messiah will appear in four years."

Mahmoud Ahmadinejad has repeatedly stated: "The Mahdi is the one who runs the country." It even goes so far as to claim that "Hugo Chavez is one of the supporters of Imam Mahdi." He also began to talk about his meeting with the Messiah. Sheikh Al Misbah al Yazdi, a Shiite jurist-theologian, whom Ahmadinejad takes as his margin, a source of religious norms, i.e., of fatwas, notes: "We live in a time of the reappearance of Imam Mahdi, who elected Ahmadinejad president." The same was declared by one of the most famous ulema in Kom, the Great Ayatollah Mohammed Bahjat al-Fomni (1915-2009). The latter added in this connection: "The elderly of our time will witness the appearance of Imam Mahdi," without specifying the exact date.[18]

Ahmadinejad's followers formed the Khujaji movement, which promoted the Mahdi's global government. They are making a documentary called The Emergence. It discusses the role of Ahmadinejad in preparing the Middle East for the coming of the Messiah. Books promoting the occult of the Messiah are being distributed in the book market in Lebanon, Iraq and Iran. A whole section of research is being created, which we can figuratively call "Mahdology". Among the leading titles is Abdel Mohammed Hassan's "Approach the Appearance," which states the exact date of the appearance of the Messiah, namely January 19, 2008. Similar "fundamental" studies are "The Appearance of Imam Mahdi, Peace be upon him, in 2015 according to the Qur'anic Jaber al-Balushi's "Prediction", Faris Faqih's "Now You Are in the Age of Emergence," Majid al-Mahdi's "War of the Americans against the Mahdi, Peace be upon him", Shadi Faqih's "Ahmadinejad and the Future World Revolution," "Prepare, the appearance is recent" by Hussein al-Hijazi and "The Emergence" by Abdul Mohammed Hassan of Iraq.

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[17] Fadil, S., Hal Takhala al Imam al Mahdi an Ahmadi Nadjad, Jamahir Hezbollah? 27.12.2020.

[18] Biography of the Great Ayatollah Sirat Ayatollah al-Azma Ash Sheikh Mohammed Taki Bahjet (Kadasa Sirahu), Sheikh Mohammed Taki Bahyat, May His Life Be Enlightened, Wikalat al Anba Brata, 15.05.2009, http://burathanews.com/arabic/reports/66010, 01.01.2021.

It is as if all these authors have succeeded in making serious contributions to the scientific field, the author of which in Iran, as we have already noted, is considered to be Ali Shariati, namely the sociology of religion. They develop a special imaginary case – a socio-psychological concept of waiting. It is directly related to the Mahdi doctrine and can be considered in three planes:

- Cognitive impact. This means forming a culture and a mass consciousness of waiting, in order for society to take the right position towards Mahdism and the emergence of the Messiah, respectively.

- The emotional impact. This means building mental resilience and fighting against the factors that erode the perseverance in the faith of the promises of the Messiah.

- The behavioral effect. This means the development and implementation of Sharia law governing Islamic daily behavior at the level of the individual, group and society.[19]

Undoubtedly, the merits of Mahmoud Ahmedinejad are enormous for the growth of Mahdology. At the same time, it is unclear whether this is his true faith in the Mahdist idea or whether it is a matter of well-calculated and well-constructed political ambitions. His constant statements about the appearance of the Mahdi turned against him the influential stratum of senior Shiite clerics. The latter, including Spiritual Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, are beginning to suspect that Ahmedinejad is trying to attack the institutionalized post-Islamic political system of Wilat al-Faqih, the guardianship of the theologian. According to its principles, the Spiritual Leader leads the state of substitution, ie. in the absence of the expected Messiah. When the latter appears, the Spiritual Leader must cede power to him (see Chukov, 2021).

Mahmoud Ahmadinejad has the greatest credit for separating anti-Semitism from anti-Israelism as the basis of Mahdist doctrine. He constantly emphasizes the immanence of the removal of the state of Israel from the face of the earth. Such aggressive statements are usually

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[19] As Sade, M., Dirasa an taukit zahur al imam al mahdi al montazar, Study of the time of the appearance of the expected messiah, Markaz at dirasat al mokhasasa lil imam al mahdi, https://www.m-mahdi.com/main/articles-1018, 29.12.2020.

made by Iranian leaders on the day of Jerusalem, the last Friday of Ramadan. For example, in a speech at the University of Tehran on 8 August 2012, the former president stated that "Israel is a tumor education that will soon be eliminated."[20] In fact, Ahmadinejad has repeatedly stated that the erasure of Israel is one of the hallmarks of the emergence of the Messiah.[21]

Similar threatening speeches were made on the Day of Jerusalem by the Spiritual Leader of the Islamic Republic, who even set a date for the destruction of the Jewish state. In his introduction, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei always includes the following temporal explanation: "… in forty days Israel will be destroyed. "On 11 March 2021, Iranian Defense Minister Amir Khatami declared that if Israel took a preemptive strike against Iran, the Islamic Republic would wipe out Tel Aviv and Haifa." Such a threat is permanent, especially against the background of the unprecedented attack at the same time by ten drones shot down by Yemeni Hutus rebels against various targets in Saudi Arabia. In this case, however, the Minister of Defense says that this time things are serious, as the orders were given personally by the Spiritual Leader Ali Khamenei.[22]

Tehran's anti-Israelism has grown especially since the conclusion in late 2020 of the Abrahamic treaties between the Jewish state and four Arab states, namely the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Bahrain, Morocco and Sudan. Such a move is seen as a siege of the Islamic Revolution in its battle against Israel. In this regard, Tehran is particularly sensitive to the expansion of the network of Israeli embassies in Arab and Islamic countries. For example, the statement of the assistant to the Speaker of the Iranian Parliament Hussein Abdel Lahan that "the UAE and Bahrain will have internal problems due to the establishment of a peace treaty

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[20] Nadzhad yuakadu anna izrail "uoram sartani sayazilu" (Najad confirms that Israel is a tumor education "that will be eliminated"), AFP, 18.08.2012, https://www.france24.com/ar/20120818-%D9%, 30.12.2020.

[21] Abdel Hamid, A., Ama karib satushhadun zual izrail min uzhud (You will soon witness the demise of Israel), Hess Press, 13.04.2009, https://www.hespress.com/%D8%, 30.12.2020.

[22] Iran Piles on Aggression, Emboldened by US-Saudi-Israeli Restraint, Debka, https://www.debka.com/iran-piles-on-aggression-emboldened-by-us-saudi-israel-restraint/, 10.03.2021.

with Israel" is a direct threat to interference in their internal affairs.[23] Especially in the second country, there is a huge Shiite community (it is even a majority in relation to the ruling Sunni minority) that is often manipulated by mullahs in Iran.

Pope Francis' visit to Iraq in March 2021 revealed a similar attitude towards neighboring Iraq. It has acquired a historical character, as it is the first in this Arab country. The fact that more than 10,000 media outlets around the world have covered it speaks volumes about its unprecedented nature. On 6 March 2021, the head of the Roman Catholic Church led the common prayer in the birthplace of the prophet Abraham, the historic city of Ur.

Even more interesting was the meeting with Iraq's top Shiite Marj'a, Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani. The statements made by the office of the Iraqi cleric and the Vatican were in line with the spirit of understanding, tolerance in rejecting war, terrorism and violence. Apparently, this corresponded perfectly to the authority of the two spiritual leaders. Beneath the surface, however, there were certain discrepancies between the two interlocutors, whose conversation lasted about forty minutes. This is clear from comments in Tehran and pro-Iranian Middle Eastern publications. Differences in thinking have also emerged between al-Sistani and Iraqi Prime Minister Mustafa Kazimi. The latter declared on 6 March a "National Day for Tolerance and Coexistence." Najaf, home to Iraq's most authoritative religious school and Ali al-Sistani have not commented on the act.

Iraqi political circles shared aloud what the Iraqi prime minister had set as a political plan following the Holy Father's visit. The Iran-Iraq-Saudi Arabia race has always defined the profile of the leadership status quo in an important region such as the Persian Gulf. It is not just about the huge oil deposits, but also about the religious significance in the Islamic (Sunni and Shiite) world. After the elimination of dictator Saddam Hussein, the real Iraq fell into weightlessness. The competition has shifted between Shiite Tehran and Sunni Saudi Arabia. Following Pope Francis' visit, the request to rehabilitate Iraq as a regional power is

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[23] Tawakaa irani bi mashakil dakhilia fi daulatein arabian bi sabab at tatbia (Iran's expectation of internal problems of two Arab states because of peace treaties with Israel), Arab 21, https://arabi21.com/story/1342472/%D8%AA%D9, 10.03.2021.

more than obvious. A professor at Baghdad University said that if external and international factors helped, Iraq could regain its regional role in order to stabilize the region. He emphasized the fact that Pope Francis would not be able to make such a visit, either in Iran or in Saudi Arabia. He presents them as the poles of a religious, internal confessional dispute, as opposed to a moderate and tolerant Iraq.

Tehran was greatly irritated by the thesis, which is increasingly prevalent in the Arab media and political space. It is about the claim that through the Francis-as-Sistani meeting, the West has chosen Najaf's moderate school as a legitimate interlocutor and partner in the dialogue with the Shiites. Moreover, Najaf's moderate religious (and political, respectively) ideas are legitimate for Shiites, not those proposed by Kom. Interestingly, the "relevant" circles in the Islamic Republic noted that "similar speculations" behind attacks on Iran were expected.

The course of the preparations and the very realization of Pope Francis' visit to Iraq speaks of a corresponding reaction in Iran as well. It is likely that Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, who in 2004 issued a single fatwa for Iraqis to vote for the first time in a US presence in Iraq (while other religious leaders called for a boycott), made a compromise. Rather, he was subjected to strong Iranian pressure to avoid outright communist results from the Holy Father's visit (see Chukov, 2019).

Ali as Sistani was born in 1930 in Mashhad, Iran. He spent his childhood in the provinces of Sistan and Baluchistan, where his family came from and which is on the Pakistani border. Interestingly, in this administrative unit, the Sistans are a minority who speak Persian and profess Shiite Islam. The Baluchis are the majority and have their own language, but they are Sunnis. This to some extent affects the family of the future Grand Ayatollah. His father, Mohammed Bakr al-Sistani, is also a Shiite cleric, with his own religious school. The latter claims to be of the descent of the third Ja'afarite Imam Hussein ben Ali. The family lives in a specific religious environment. They are a minority in a province which, by its status, is also a minority (see Chukov, 2021).

In 1951, Ali al-Sistani came to study at the school in Najaf and remained there. Only 30 years old, he became a mujtahid, which is a higher legal dogmatic title. Interestingly, in 1993, he, an Iranian, was chosen as the highest source of religious rule-making and Grand Ayatollah of the Shiite majority in Iraq by former dictator Saddam

Hussein. This was at the expense of the incredibly popular Iraqi at the time, Ayatollah Mohammad Sadiq al-Sadr, the uncle of the current leading Iraqi politician and cleric, Moqtada al-Sadr.

The preliminary program of Pope Francis' visit includes the signing of a Human Brotherhood Document, modeled on the one signed two years ago between the Holy Father and Sheikh Al-Azhar, Sunni Ahmed Tayeb. At the last moment, this symbolic gesture falls away. Al Sistani's office added that this happened, but orally, not in writing.

The seven "noes" with which Ace Sistani saturated his position before the Holy Father are impressive. There are both politics and religion in them. "No" to the siege (of Palestine by Israel), "no" to violence, "no" to oppression, "no" to poverty, "no" to restrictions on religious freedom, "no" to lack of social justice, "No" to establish relations with Israel. At the end of this declaration is the outspoken anti-Israel position. It notes: "Many people in the world in many countries suffer from injustice, oppression, poverty, religious and intellectual persecution, from the suppression of fundamental freedoms, from a lack of social justice, especially during wars, from acts of violence, from economic siege and resettlement of many peoples in our region, especially the Palestinian people in the occupied territories" (see Chukov, 2019).

The course of the preparations and the very realization of Pope Francis' visit to Iraq speaks of a corresponding reaction in Iran as well. It is likely that Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, who in 2004 issued a single fatwa for Iraqis to vote for the first time in a US presence in Iraq (while other religious leaders called for a boycott), made a compromise. Rather, he was subjected to strong Iranian pressure to avoid outright communist results from the Holy Father's visit.

In this light, it is necessary to add that Ali al-Sistani is not a supporter of the governor theory of al-Wilayat al-Faqih al-Mutlaq, the absolute guardianship of the theologian, created as a variant of Ja'afarite "constitutionalism" by Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini. However, the Iraqi Iranian is a supporter of another version of the theory, namely Wilayat al-Faqih al-Hasa, especially the trusteeship of the theologian. It is far from the most radical denial of Iranian governing clerical

radicalism.[24]

It is more than obvious that there is Iranian pressure to thwart a peace treaty between Israel and the Iraqi state. The Baghdad presidency issued a statement saying that media statements attributed to Prime Minister Mustafa al-Kazimi that a peace treaty with Israel would be signed if agreed with the Palestinians were untrue.[25]

At the same time, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's 2008 meeting in New York with twelve rabbis from the Neturei Karta religious group is symptomatic.[26] These are Jewish clerics from the Haredite Alliance for Israel, who deny the creation of the state of Israel before the appearance of their Messiah.[27] In Iranian political and religious doctrine, "good Jews" are those who ignore the state that their fellow believers have created in the "Promised Land."

1.4 Conclusion

Along with purely utopian constructs, one can sense the ambitions to build a powerful, theocratic-authoritarian state. It outlines the basic outlines, and the specific codified laws will be the result of the benevolence of the leader. Behind the benevolent understanding of universal and social "justice" is the relentless imposition of the Islamic religion, even on followers of monotheism (see, Chukov, 2019, 2021).

However, as imaginary as the touches of the future state of Mahdi

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[24] For more information, see: Ali as Sistani gave as much as he could or as much as he was allowed, https://www.facebook.com/foreigninsider, 08.03.2021.

[25] Arriya al irakiya tanfi tasrihan haula akd itifak maa al ihtilal, the Iraqi presidency denies statements about concluding a treaty with the occupation, Al Arabi 21, 9.03.2021, https://arabi21.com/story/1341402/%D8%A, 10.03.2021.

[26] Weiss, Y.D., The Orthodox Jewish Response to the Criticism of the Iranian President, Neturei Karta International, 28.10.2005, https://www.nkusa.org/activities/Statements/2005Oct28Iran.cfm, 30.12.2020.

[27] Ahmed Najad Yaltaki Khakhamat Yahudan Juaridun Kiam Israel, Ahmedinajed meets with rabbis who oppose the existence of Israel, Al Jazeera, 25.09.2008, https://www.aljazeera.net/news/international/2008/9/26/%D8%, 30.12.2020.

may sound, apparently in the minds of its designers there is a profile of a statist construct, which suggests knowledge of the genesis and functioning of a state-building process.

References

Chukov, V. (2019). The clash between Christian and Islamic religion – The State of Israel. In T. V. Petkova & V. S. Chukov (Eds.) (2019). *4th International e-Conference on Studies in Humanities and Social Sciences: Conference Proceedings*. Belgrade: Center for Open Access in Science. https://doi.org/10.32591/coas.e-conf.04.07083c

Chukov, V. (2021). *Israel between Evangelism and Jaafarism* (Shiism). [Чуков, В. Израел между евангелизма и джаафаризма. Издателство „Изток-Запад“. София. България.]. ISBN 978-619-01-0856-6. Publishing House "East-West". Sofia. Bulgaria.

2. Sunni versus Shiites – Political and/or religious anti-Semitism

2.1 Introduction

Anti-Semitism is probably the oldest hatred in history and has proven to be extremely adaptable to the times. It is "carved" and fueled by powerful precedents and inherited stereotypes. Anti-Semitism takes various forms to reflect the conditional fears and anxieties of an ever-changing world. Understood in this way, this is the modern manifestation of ancient prejudice – one that, according to some scholars, dates back to antiquity and medieval times.

2.2 Anti-Semitism

The origin and depth of anti-Semitic terminology is gaining momentum in the verbal denial of the Moravian Orientalist Moritz Steinschneider (1816-1907) by Ernest Renan (1823-1892), a prominent French expert on the history of religion, philosopher and connoisseur of Semitic languages. As the biographer of Theodor Herzel, Alex Bain, writes: his derogation from the "Semites" as a race.[28] Israeli clinical psychologist Avner Falk shares a similar view. He argues that the German word antisemitisch was first used in 1860 by the Austrian Jewish scholar Moritz Steinschneider in the phrase *antisemitische Vorurteile* (anti-Semitic prejudice). Steinschneider used this phrase to disprove French Semitologist Ernest Renan's ideas about how "Semitic races" gave way to Aryan races[29] (see Bein, 1990).

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[28] Bein, A., The Jewish Question: Biography of a World problem, Trans. By Harry Zohn, Associated University Presses, 1990, p. 594, https://books.google.bg/books?id=cQOn0y8ENg4C&pg=PA594&redir_esc=y#v=onepage&q&f=false, 11.01.2021.

[29] Falk, A., Anti-Semitism: A History and Psychoanalysis of Contemporary Halted, Praeger, 2008, p. 21,

The Prussian historian Heinrich von Treitschke had a special contribution to the spread of anti-Semitism in the second half of the 19th century. He is the author and popularized the phrase "Jews are our misfortune," which later became a Nazi slogan.[30] Anti-Semitism is transformed into a special philosophical matter, from which individual authors see individual aspects (see Poliakov, 2003).

The anti-Semitic choir has been successfully reinforced by German journalist Wilhelm Marr. He plays a key role in adapting anti-Semitism to modernity. Externally, Mar is a secular man, completely turned to the modern world. Mar flatly rejects the baseless but ancient Christian claims long made against Jews, such as that Jews were involved in the ritual murder of Christian children. Instead, he turns to the genesis of the theories of the aforementioned French Semitologist Ernest Renan. Marr rests on Renan's thesis that history should be seen as a contest between Semitic Jews and Indo-European Aryans.

Thus, he developed the thesis of the Jewish danger to Germany, which is formed on a racial basis. Mar is of the opinion that it is caused by the unchanging and destructive nature of the Jews, by their "tribal features" and "extraterrestrial nature." Anti-Semites like Mar strive for intellectual formalism, denying any connection between their own modern, secular ideology and the irrational, superstitious fanaticism of the past.[31] This is a tactic used by many modern anti-Semites who adhere to "anti-Zionism," an ideology whose exact definition is highly controversial. But this continuing hostility to Jews, which is shifting from pre-modern to modern times, is difficult to conceal in the views of a number of apologists for hatred of Jews.

In 1879, Mar published a pamphlet "Der Sieg des Judenthums über das Germanenthum" (The victory of the Jewish spirit over the German spirit), observed from a non-religious perspective, from a non-

https://books.google.bg/books?id=VWL4ja2BbnEC&pg=PA21&redir_esc=y#v=onepage&q&f=false, 11.01.20121.

[30] Poliakov, L., The History of Anti-Semitism, Vol. 3: From Voltaire to Wagner. University of Pennsylvania Press. 2003, p. 404.

[31] Philips., G., Antisemitism: How the Origins of the Oldest Hatred Still Hold Sway Today, The Conversation, https://theconversation.com/antisemitism-how-the-origins-of-historys-oldest-hatred-still-hold-sway-today-87878, 11.01.2021.

confessional point of view. In his research, he uses the word Semitismus in an interchangeable/synonymous/semantic plane with the word Judentum to denote both "Judaism" (Jews as a collective) and "Judaism" – the quality of being a Jew or a Jewish spirit.[32] This use of Semitism was followed by the creation of the term "Antisemitism", which was used to express the opposition of the Jews as a people and the opposition of the Jewish spirit in general.

Marr interprets it as a kind of expression of a process that penetrates and destroys German culture. His next brochure "Der Weg zum Siege des Germanenthums über das Judenthum" (The road to the victory of the German spirit over the Jewish spirit), published in 1880, represents a further development of Mar's ideas. There, Mar expanded the already established term "anti-Semitism" to the point of recognition and expansion beyond recognition. It inspires him with scientific potential that guarantees him immortality in a wide range of misanthropic theories.

2.3 Anti-Semitism in the Arab and Islamic world

Anti-Semitism in the Arab and Islamic worlds as a phenomenon and a subsequent process has been the subject of a long scientific debate. For example, there are many authors who argue that anti-Semitism is contraindicated for Islam. According to the commentator from *Deutsche Welle*, the German Christo Lazarevich, the proof of this is the reception in 1492 of the Jews from the Ottoman Empire, expelled from the Iberian Peninsula.[33] There are many authors from the Arab intelligentsia who support the thesis that Arabs cannot be anti-Semites because they are Semites themselves. There was no logic in such a relationship. They argue that Europe is the "factory" of anti-Semitism, spreading its "intellectual" output around the world, including in the Arab world.

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[32] For more information see Marr, W., The Victory of Judaism over Germanism, Viewed by nonreligious Pont of View, 11th Edition, trans. Gerhard Ruhringer, Bern, Rudolph Constenable, 1879, http://www.kevinmacdonald.net/Marr-Text-English.pdfq, 11.01.2021.

[33] Lazarevich, K., Wojciech, Nazar: Moada ash auropa gairu mustaurida min al aalem al islami, Perspective, Anti-Semitism in Europe is not imported from the Islamic world, *Deutsche Welle*, 31.01.2018, https://www.dw.com/ar/%D9%88, 13.01.2021.

Logically, they throw all the blame on Hitlerism and the Third Reich.[34] The opinion of some rabbis on the issue is also interesting. For example, U.S. Rabbi Mark Schneier, who observes the life of Jewish communities in five Gulf states, says he feels much safer wearing a kiba (Jewish hat) in Bahrain than in Berlin.[35]

A sharp clash of moral and political values among the Arab-Muslim elite is the question of whether anti-Semitism should be equated with anti-Zionism. If the first concept receives a public denial, there is almost a consensus on the second. For example, at the official level, anti-Semitism is strongly condemned. The statement by the most influential Islamic non-governmental organization, the World Islamic League, condemning anti-Semitism and Holocaust denial is very telling. It is about the new, pro-Western line of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, under the leadership of Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman.[36] At the same time, by the authors of the Arab countries in which the Jewish state is at war, Zionism is perceived as an instrument and symbol of Israel, built as a racist ideology in a series of wars against their Arab neighbors and in pursuing a policy of genocide against the Palestinians.[37] A similar

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[34] Khalil, F., Al Arab Samyun Moadun Lil Sam, Arabs - Semites, Anti-Semites, Al Watan, 12.03.2019, https://alwatannews.net/article/820134/Opinion/%D8%A7%D9%, 13.01.2021.

[35] Medina arabia actor aminan lil khakhamat min Berlin, Arab city is safer for rabbis than Berlin, Arab Post, 15.04.2019, https://arabicpost.net/%D8, 16.01.2021.

[36] The World Islamic League is undergoing radical changes in its role in the Islamic world. It was established in 1962 in Mecca by the Saudi government. From a highly conservative anti-Western organization, it has become an entity that promotes "dialogue of religions." For more information see: Takrim al amin al aam li rabitaal aalem al islam li mokafatihi al moadat as himself, Tribute to the Secretary General of the World Islamic League for his fight against anti-Semitism, Al Hurra, https://www.alhurra.com/saudi-arabia/2020/06/10/%D8%, 13.01.2021.

[37] A clear representative of this thesis is the Palestinian, former member of the Israeli Knesset Azmi Bashara. For more information, see: Bashara, A., A sahih inna moada as saohoniya hiya ahad al ashkal al hadita moadat as sama? Is it true that anti-Zionism is one of the modern types of anti-Semitism? ACRPS,https://www.dohainstitute.org/ar/PoliticalStudies/Pages/Is-Anti-Zionism-a-Form-of-Anti-Semitism-Anti-Zionism-as-a-Jewish-

thesis was developed in detail by Palestinian professor of modern Arab politics and intellectual history at Columbia University. He argues that anti-Semitism and pro-Zionism have always been linked.[38]

Israeli research shows that anti-Semitism is on the rise in the Arab world. The successive waves are probably related to specific events that represent the constant Arab-Israeli antagonism. Modern anti-Semitism is reaching extreme levels after a series of historical events that characterized the creation and establishment of the state of Israel. Such is the intensified migration of the Jewish population in Palestine, which began actively in the 1930s, the creation of the state itself in 1948, the triple aggression in 1956 against Egypt, in which Israel participated along with France and Great Britain, especially the Six-Day War in 1967 (when Jerusalem was occupied), then the war in 1973, the siege of Beirut and the war in 2006 (Israel-Hezbollah).

There are different types of anti-Semitism. Basically, the latter can be divided into religious, cultural, economic, racial and political. Very often the individual species can complement each other, especially the generalization of religious and racial anti-Semitism. In this light, the relevant conclusions can be drawn about the dogmatic genesis of hatred of Jews, referring to Sharia sources. The Quran is composed of two parts, depending on the place where the individual suras "descend". This is happening in Medina and Mecca, respectively.

The first group of suras, the Medes, reflects a situation in which the Prophet Muhammad must oppose his pagan relatives. He then

Phenomenon.aspx, 13.01.2021; A clear representative of this thesis is the Palestinian, former member of the Israeli Knesset Azmi Bashara. For more information, see: Bashara, A., A sahih inna moada as saohoniya hiya ahad al ashkal al hadita moadat as sama? Is it true that anti-Zionism is one of the modern types of anti-Semitism? ACRPSA clear representative of this thesis is the Palestinian, former member of the Israeli Knesset Azmi Bashara. For more information, see: Bashara, A., A sahih inna moada as saohoniya hiya ahad al ashkal al hadita moadat as sama? Is it true that anti-Zionism is one of the modern types of anti-Semitism? ACRPS, https://daraj.com/10590/, 13.01.2021.

[38] Massad, J., Pro-Zionism and Antisemitism are Inseparable, and always have been, MEE, 15.05.2019, https://www.middleeasteye.net/opinion/pro-zionism-and-antisemitism-are-inseparable-and-always-have-been, 13.01.2021.

established his community of followers and the foundation of a state in which the main opponents and open enemies were the non-believers of the three tribes of the Beni Quraysh, the Beni Nadir, and the Beni Kaynakaa, who professed Judaism.[39] The Arab scholar Mustafa Jumuah makes a detailed study of the attitude of the Prophet Muhammad towards the Jews in Medina, summarizing the conclusions of many hadiths and their interpretations on this issue. The question is important because the actions of the Prophet automatically become normative acts within the Sharia legal system. He distinguished the following actions of the Prophet Muhammad towards the Jewish Arabs in his coexistence with them in the first Islamic city, namely, restriction of their movement, expulsion, ignoring, captivity, detention and physical extermination. He concludes that these actions were justified, as the Jews always betrayed him when he fought with his pagan relatives in Mecca.[40] Moreover, they constantly violated the treaty he made with the Jews before he came from Mecca to Medina.[41]

Islamic scholar Dr. Ibrahim ben Fahed expands the casuistry of the Prophet Muhammad's relationship with the Jews by analyzing twenty proven different approaches of the Prophet to the Jews of Medina. In fact, he adds positive actions of the Prophet Muhammad during his life together between Muslims and Jews, such as helping a

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[39] For the three Arab tribes in Medina, the Beni Qurayza, the Beni Nadir, and the Beni Kaynakaa, who profess Judaism and their relationship with the Prophet Muhammad, see: Tawzi al-Yahud fi al-aalem al-Arabi, The Spread of the Jews in the Arab World, Al Jazeera, https://www.aljazeera.net/2004/12/20/%D8, 16.01.2021.

[40] Jumu'ah, M., Min Mawaqif ar Rusul Min al Yahud, From the Prophet's Position to the Jews, Al Aluka, 22.07.2017, https://www.alukah.net/sharia/0/118450/, 16.01.2021.

[41] Interestingly, the agreement between the Prophet Muhammad and the Jews of Medina became a Sharia act, which Saudi Arabia is currently expected to use as a Sharia argument for establishing diplomatic relations with the state of Israel. For more information see: Ash Shahuani, M., Attbia wa Uatikat al Madina, Establishing Relations with Israel and the Medina Document, Ash Shark, 19.08.2020, https://al-sharq.com/opinion/19/08/2020/%D8, 16.01.2021; 21.07.2020, https://arabi21.com/story/1287547, Abu Aamer, A., Mustashrik Israel: Al Saudiyun Yastakhimun An Nabi Mohammed Li Sharaana Attbia, Israeli Orientalist: Saudis use the Prophet Muhammad to legitimize the establishment of relations with Israel, Arabs 16.01.2021.

child in need, participating in a Jewish ritual, and more. However, Ben Fahed also emphasizes the ingratitude, insidiousness and negativity of the Jews towards the Muslim prophet.[42] In his lecture on the same subject, the theologian Mohsen al-Qazouini placed special emphasis on the constant verbal battles between the Prophet and the Jews. Very often they caused the latter to conspire against the Muslims.[43]

The medical suras contain texts that definitely contain distrust, violence and hatred towards those whom the Prophet Muhammad accuses of treason and attempting to kill him. Such, for example, is the one hundred and twentieth verse of the surah "The Cow," namely, "And neither the Jews nor the Christians will be pleased with you until you follow their faith." Say: "Guidance from Allah is the only guidance." And if you follow their passions after the knowledge you have received, no one will protect you from Allah and deliver you.[44]

In unison is the sound of the sixty-fourth verse of the same surah, The Table, namely, "And the Jews said, 'The hand of Allah is clasped.' Let their hands be clasped and let them be cursed for what they have said. No, His Hands are open – He distributes as He wills. And in many of them, what your Lord has sent down to you increases their transgression and unbelief. And we cast enmity and hatred among them until the Day of Resurrection. Whenever they light a fire for war, Allah puts it out. And they strive on the earth for destruction, and Allah does not love those who sow corruption."[45]

The second group of suras, namely the Meccan tone, is much calmer and more balanced. The Prophet Muhammad created his community, giving it clear religious and political horizons. This is how

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[42] Ben Fahed, I., Ashrun moukifan min lil nabi sala lah alaihi wa sallam min al yahud, Twenty Acts of the Prophet, peace be upon him, to the Jews, https://ar.islamway.net/book/29679/%D8, 16.01.2021.

[43] Al-Kazwini, M., Mohadarat at Tarih al-Islam – Mohadara 35-alaka maa al-Yahud, Lectures on Islamic History – Lecture 35 – Relations with Jews, Ahl al-Bayt Mosque, https://abu.edu.iq/islamic-sciences/courses/general-lessons/islamic-history/35, 16.01.2021.

[44] Teofanov, Tsv. Translation of the Holy Qur'an into Bulgarian, https://d1.islamhouse.com/data/bg/ih_books/single/bg_Translation_of_the_Meanings_Quran.pdf, 14.01.2021.

[45] *Op. cit.*

the eighty-second verse of the surah "The Table" sounds, for example, namely: love of believers are those who say, "We are Christians." This is because there are priests and monks among them, and because they are not proud."[46] In this light, we can divide the attitude towards the Ahl al-Kitab, the followers of the heavenly religions (Christians and Jews), reflected in the Qur'an as contradictory. Dominant versus expressing distrust and hatred towards non-Muslims following the monotheistic message. It is not just about the fatwas of such famous preachers as the former Chief Mufti of Saudi Arabia Abdel Aziz bin Baz (1912-1999),[47] but also in-depth research such as that of Ali Shuhud, which lists a long list of negative qualities of the Ahl al-Kitab, followers of celestial religions toward Muslims.[48] A special place is given to the Jews as bearers of a number of vices, among which are corruption, hypocrisy, cowardice, stinginess, betrayal and others. These "qualities" have been proven by various Quranic scholars by many Islamic scholars. One such is Abderahim al-Sharif in his dissertation "The Qualities of the Jews in the Quran."[49] It is noteworthy that although Jews and Christians should be judged on identical dogmatic criteria, the interest in Jews is greater and, accordingly, saturated with a greater dose of negativity. In the Qur'an, the word "Jews" is used nine times, while "Christians" is used six times.[50]

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[46] *Op. cit.*

[47] Ben Baz, A., Ujub adawa al yahud al mushrikin wa gairihim min al kufar, Need for hostility to Gentile Jews and other infidels, I have ben Baz, https://binbaz.org.sa/articles/56/%D9%88, 14.01.2021.

[48] Ash Shuhud, A., Moukif al Quran al Karim min al Yahud wa Nasara, The Attitude of the Holy Qur'an to Jews and Christians, Nur, https://www.noor-book.com/%D9%89-pdf, 14.01.2021.

[49] Ash Sharif, A., Sifat al Yahud fi al Qur'an al-Karim, The Qualities of the Jews in the Holy Qur'an, Ijaz al Qur'an wa as Sunnah, https://quran-m.com/%D8%B5, 14.01.2021.

[50] A distinction must be made between Yahud, Jews, Beni Israel, the sons of Israel (Israelites) and the Companions as Sabbath, the Sabbath-keepers. For more information see: Muhammad, Z., Al-Farak Beyna al-Yahud wa Beni Israel Phil Qur'an, The Difference between Jews and Israelis in the Qur'an, Al Ahbar, 10.08.2019, https://al-akhbar.com/Kalimat/274839, 14.01.2021; Fadlla, D., Al Yahud fi Nazra al Korunia, The Jews in the Qur'anic View, the site of Sheikh Hussein Fadlalla,, http://arabic.bayynat.org/ArticlePage.aspx?id=25999, 14.01.2021.

The opinion of various authors remains polarized in terms of Christian or Islamic environment is stronger anti-Semitism. The famous orientalist Bernard Lewis is of the opinion that in the vast Islamic world, hatred of Jews does not acquire constant value. It depends on the era and the specific national and regional situation.[51] According to him, the most common punishment is to obstruct Muslims from mingling with Jews. The main reason is the acceptance and imposition of interest, in the implementation of the transaction. Such was the case with the Sunni and Druze attacks in 1838 against Jewish property in the city of Safed, which is now in Israel.[52] The same can be said of the Baghdad pogrom of 1 June 1941, also known as the Fraud, expropriation. The reason for the attacks on the Jews is the coming to power in Iraq of the pro-Nazi government of Rashid al-Gilani.[53]

Iraqi researcher Arif Maaruf is of the opinion that the attack has economic roots, as Christians and a small number of wealthier Muslims have been targeted alongside Jews. However, the fact that it was performed on the Jewish holiday of Shevuot (one of the three major Jewish holidays along with Passover and Sukkot) suggests that the context of the attackers was religiously racist, openly directed at the local Jewish community.

Islamic radicals such as Yusuf Kardawi and Abdul Rahman al-Sudais are probably the flagships of Sunni anti-Semitism. The two issued fatwas described Jews as "monkey and pig followers." They are based on the sixty-fifth verse of the Qur'anic surah "The Cow," namely, "And you knew the skin of you who transgressed on the Sabbath, and we told them, "Be despised apes!" and the sixtieth verse of the Surah Table, namely, "Say: 'Shall I inform you of a greater evil than this – as retribution to Allah?" servants of Satan – these are the most miserable in place and the most deviated from the right path."[54]

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[51] Lewis, B., The Jews of Islam, Princeton University Press, Jun 1, 1987, pp. 25-26.

[52] For more information see: Mo'az, M.,Studies on Palestine during the Ottoman Period, Jerusalem: Magnes Press, 1975, p. 67-70.

[53] Maaruf, A., Farhud al Yahud .... hal madbahha kanat onsoriya ?, Farhud, (expropriation) of the Jews .... was the massacre racist? Al Badil al Iraqi, http://www.albadeeliraq.com/ar/node/1427, 15.01.2021.

[54] Teofanov, Tsv. Translation of the Holy Qur'an into Bulgarian..., 15.01.2021.

The two represent two different tendencies in radical Sunnism – the Muslim Brotherhood and Salafism. The al-Sudais fatwa was issued in 2002, and in 2017 the sheik of the Holy Mosque in Mecca and chairman of the influential Al Haramain Association, Sheikh al-Sudais, changed his mind and began praising the United States and then US President Donald Trump. At a conference hosted by the World Islamic League in New York, the anti-Semite noted the importance of US contacts with the Islamic world and interreligious dialogue.[55]

The "evaporated" anti-Semitism of al-Sudais is due primarily to the tough policies of Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, who in 2020 advocated the signing of peace treaties and the establishment of diplomatic relations between the Arab countries of the Persian Gulf and Israel. All those Saudi officials who do not agree with the new line of the Saudi government have been sent to prison.

Part of the process of "opening" the conservative Saudi kingdom to the world after 2016, stimulating interfaith dialogue, including allowing the first Christian prayer in the homeland of Islam in 2018 is the gradual implementation of full control over those three thousand influential ulemas in Saudi Arabia, which to date have been the most common source of aggressive anti-Semitism.[56]

If we have to look for any difference between anti-Semitism in Sunni and Shiite states, then by doing an in-depth analysis, we can find

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[55] Al Jundi, A., As Sudais yamtadih America …. Hakada Radda 'alaihi wa sallam, As Sudais praises America …. so the activists replied, Al Arabi 21, 17.09.2017,https://web.archive.org/web/20190410141326/https://arabi21.com/story/1035028/AF, 15.01.2021.

[56] On December 2, 2018, the first Christian prayer took place in Saudi Arabia. It is historic because the religious event is officially authorized by the kingdom's authorities. Coptic Metropolitan Ava Marcus of the Egyptian city of Shabra al-Khaima, who led the prayer, is in Saudi Arabia at the invitation of Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman. It is in response to the latter's visit to Cairo a few days ago, on his way to Buenos Aires, to the G20 summit and the meeting there with the Coptic pope and patriarch of Alexandria, Theodoros II.

The Coptic priest was allowed to carry with him all the attributes necessary for the conduct of prayer. It was held in Riyadh, the house of one of the Egyptian Christians living in the kingdom. For more information see: The Foreign Insider, 6.12.2018, https://www.facebook.com/foreigninsider, 15.01.2021.

nuances between them. This is primarily due to the status of the denominational community in the large family of Islam, on the one hand, but also a consequence of the formed ethnopsychology of the two denominations in relation to the Jews, on the other. This feature develops over time and depends on the degree of Arab-centrism applied in different parts of the vast Sunni-dominated territory. Geographically, the outskirts of Sunnistan (the former caliphate) are much more "friendly" to Jews than its center, the Arabian Peninsula. This statement sounds in line with the prophetic hadith that Al Jazeera, i.e., the Arab semi-creature is Ard al-Islam, the land of Islam. This is perceived with the elaboration and application of the Sharia norm that there can be no other religion in this territory than the Islamic one. In this regard, despite Saudi Arabia's "opening" to "interreligious dialogue" after 2016, it is unlikely that a local monarch with the title of Khadim al-Harameini al-Sharifein, a minister of the two shrines, will ever allow a temple of non-Islamic religion to be built-in within the historical borders of the Arabian Peninsula. The expulsion of the three Arab Jewish tribes from Medina, as well as the de-Judaization of Yemen, is part of this logic. Arabocentrism and the pure, normative Hanbalist school of law are the constant filters against foreign religious influences in the homeland of Islam.

One of these peripheries is the Maghreb, where in the VI century BC. the Jews arrive with the ships of the ancient Phoenician colonizers. Studies by the famous Arab scholar Ibn Khaldun, as well as a number of European scholars such as Michael Maas, Martin Gilbert, Eugene Albertini and others, describe in detail the adoption of Judaism by the Amazons in North Africa, especially in today's Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia and Libya.[57] The lack of strong Arab-centric power allows this territory

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[57] In front of the Israeli newspaper Israel Today, Israeli citizen Hueta Braun claims that she is the sister of the grandmother of the last leader of the Libyan Jamahiriya, Moammar Gadhafi. The latter converted to Islam and married a Libyan wealthy man, while Brown emigrated to the Jewish state. For more information see: Asma al hukam al arab min usul al yahudiya ... The names of Arab rulers of Jewish descent .... Al Jaras, https://aljaras.wordpress.com/2012/10/04/%D8%A84/, 15.01.2021; Al Yahud al Amazing, The Jews Amazingi, https://www.marefa.org/%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%8A%D9%87%D9%88%D8%AF_%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A3%D9%85%D8%A7%D8%B2%D9%8A%D8%BA#cite_note-3, 15.01.2021.

far from Mecca and Medina to become a favorite place for the existence of all kinds of Islamic and non-Islamic unorthodox currents and even quasi-states. An example in this regard is the Jewish settlement of Erriad on the Tunisian island of Djerba, whose synagogue Al Griba is believed to have been built in the 6th century.[58]

The same favorable conditions for the large presence of a local Jewish community provide the historical features of the development of society, the religious situation and the statist establishment in Persia. This hypothesis is very valid, especially before the victory of the Islamic Revolution in Iran in 1979. The remoteness, the historical competition with the Arab dogmatic center, the minority nature of the Shiite denomination in which there are unrecognized unorthodox remnants, mostly from Zoroastrianism, become favorable prerequisites for the reception and tolerance of religious beliefs, which do not threaten the established Iranian theocratic state.

Universal Sunni anti-Semitism is conceptual nonsense. It cannot be of the same type, rectilinear and with a permanent profile. The reason for this statement is that the view and assessment of more than one billion and two hundred million followers towards the Jews and Israel cannot be gathered in one matrix. Moreover, they are organized in different types of state models, often professing competing, or complementary/legal dogmatic schools, even though they are in the same denomination. Sunni groups form a distinct social people's psychology, their nations are characterized by different ethnic compositions and degrees of external (often European) influence. If we have to summarize, the Sunni periphery (following the example of the Maghreb and Turkey) is one step closer to the Shiite one than that of the Sunni center – the Arabian Peninsula. The periphery generates anti-Semitism, which we can define as basic, ethnic, or in other words, close to dogmatic-cultural. Hatred of Jews is fueled by personal competition and envy, which grows into a strong sense of denial and disregard for the whole community.

The most convincing argument for the genesis of anti-Semitism is

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[58] Tunisia – Alaf al Yahud Min Mokhtalih Arjaa al Aalam Yakhtafilun Fi Djerba, Tunisia – Thousands of Jews from all over the world celebrate in Djerba, Deutsche Welle, https://www.dw.com/ar/%D8%AAA9/a-43646581, 15.01.2021.

the pace of de-Judaization of the country. There were 265,000 Jews in Morocco in 1948 and 2,100 in 2019.[59] In Tunisia in 1948 there were 105,000, and in 2019 – 1,000 people.[60] In Iraq there were 104,000 in 1948 whiles in 2019 – only 10.[61] In Yemen, home to one of the oldest Jewish communities, there were 55,000 in 1948 and 50 in 2019.[62] In Algeria, in 1948 the Jewish community numbered 140,000, and in 2019 – 200 people.[63] In Lebanon, in 1948 the local Jewish community was 20,000.[64] The picture is interesting in Egypt and Syria, where there is a significant Jewish minority when Israel's independence is declared. The first Arab state was home to 75,000 and the second to 40,000. By 2019, the remaining local Jews in these two Arab countries are several.[65] The neighborhoods in which they lived no longer exist. Countries such as Libya, Sudan, Oman, Jordan and Saudi Arabia are in the same situation. Statistics show that there is not a single registered local citizen who professes Judaism.[66]

Anti-Semitism in Iran is purely political. If we have to look for a dogmatic expression of the object of the hatred of the leadership of the Islamic Republic, it would be Beni Israel, the sons of Israel, the Israelis, not al Yahud, the Jews. This is due to several factors that we can summarize schematically through the following hypotheses:

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[59] Jews in Islamic Countries: Morocco, Jewish Virtual Library, https://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jews-of-morocco, 16.01.2021.

[60] Jews in Islamic Countries: Tunisia, Jewish Virtual Library, https://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jews-of-tunisia, 16.01.2021.

[61] Jews in Islamic Countries: Iraq, Jewish Virtual Library, https://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jews-of-iraq, 16.01.2021.

[62] Jews in Islamic Countries: Yemen, Jewish Virtual Library, https://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jews-of-yemen, 16.01.2021.

[63] Jews in Islamic Countries: Algeria, Jewish Virtual Library, https://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jews-of-algeria, 16.01.2021.

[64] Jews in Islamic Countries: Lebanon, Jewish Virtual Library, https://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jews-of-lebanon, 16.01.2021.

[65] For more information on Jews in Arab countries, see: Jews in Islamic Countries: Syria, Jewish Virtual Library, https://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jews-of-syria, 16.01.2021.

[66] Jewish Virtual Library, https://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/, 16.01.2021.

- Shiites and Jews profess minority religious doctrines. Similar group status strengthens internal cohesion and solidarity with denominations that have a similar group status.

- The Ja'farites contain unorthodox religious components typical of the pre-Islamic period of the Persians. The Iranian constitution officially recognizes Zoroastrianism, which is not a heavenly religion. This religious group has the right to one member of parliament, along with Jews, and Christians (divided into different denominations). Proof is the infallibility of the leader – I have the strong charisma of the leader. This feature again stems from the minority status of the religious group. The difference between the imam and the caliph has already been discussed.

- Arabs and Jews belong to the same ethnic group / here it is raising the question of whether Jews are an ethnicity or a denomination that we leave open. The vast majority of Arabs are Sunnis and hence they are predominantly perceived as part of the same (Summit) ethnic group. Shiites are predominantly Persians. The latter are Aryans, whose language and culture are perceived as Indo-European. Ethnic differences within one country contribute to the basic acceptance of the other if the latter has no political aspirations.[67] These aspirations can be regulated, as is the case in the Islamic Republic. However, if this ethnic group creates a strong state (Israel), which is a competitor for regional leadership, then tolerance becomes intolerance. It is transformed into fierce hatred and a desire to destroy the state.

The history of Judaism in this Central Asian country has very deep roots. There are many studies on Iranian Jews. A particularly valuable source is the book *Jews and Iranians* by Esther Parisi in French in 2019. There the author makes not only a serious historical retrospective, outlining the special relations between Persians and Jews. According to him, the establishment of the Jews in Persia took place more than twenty-seven centuries ago. In 539 B.C., the great military leader and founder of the Achaemenid Persian dynasty, Cyrus the Great (559-530), conquered Babylon and freed the local Jewish population from slavery. They are leaving for today's territory of the state of Israel. The origins of the Jewish community living in Iran today are believed to fall into this

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[67] Al Gadami, A., Nahnu wa Iran. Al hala al iraniya wa al asilya allyati ..., We and Iran. The Iranian case and the issues that ....
https://books.google.bg/books?id=f=false, 17.01.2021.

category. This is how the great Jewish communities in Hamadan and Susa were formed. King Darius I (521-468 B.C.) of the same dynasty was tolerant of religious minorities. The rise of the Jews in Iran was particularly sensitive during the reign of the Qajar dynasty, which controlled Persia from 1779 to 1925. the new Muslims. "New Islam" is an Iranian term that refers to people who have recently joined the ranks of Islam. This name refers to the so-called. "Hidden Jews" who converted to Islam in Iran in the 17th and 18th centuries. These are those who are officially Muslims but continue to profess Judaism internally. Proof that the community did not allow mixed marriages, but wanted to stay "pure". The term specifically referred to members of the Jewish community in the city of Mashhad who converted to Islam in 1839. It remained relatively compact until 1890, when part of it emigrated to Jerusalem. According to the website Ad darar as suniya, by the end of the 1940s the group already had serious economic positions in the country. The rise of the Jews continued in the era of Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi (1925-1979). He turned them into full citizens, and even some began to call themselves Iranian nationalists. Thus, gradually, some local Jews, thanks to their economic positions, became close to the country's political circles.

Esther Parisi is of the opinion that, in general, the creation of Israel in 1948 had a strong impact on the major waves of immigration from Jewish communities around the world. The situation of the Jewish community in Iran was different. This was due not only to the active contact between the authorities in Tehran and Tel Aviv but also to the high standard of living of the minority in Iran.[68]

Despite the great change in the status of Jews in Iran since the 1979 Islamic Revolution, there has been some momentum from the legacy of past political regimes that have benefited this religious minority in the country. In the first place, according to Iran's constitution, he is officially credited as a member of the local parliament, a situation that does not exist in any other Islamic country. It complained that Jews have much better conditions for practicing technical religion than they do. According to unconfirmed information, there are 25 synagogues in Tehran and 75 across the country. At the same time, there are no Sunni mosques in the capital. According to a

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[68] Parisi, E., Les juifs et iraniens, L'Harmatan, 2019, pp. 35-61.

Kurdish opposition leader in Iran, in 2012 Sunnis must go to the Saudi or Pakistani embassy to pray.[69]

The inertia of the past is great, but over time, Iranian Jews have had to become heavily Iranianized and sealed in order to continue to enjoy some of their privileges. For example, in an interview, Iran's Grand Rabbi Yahuda Karame said that "his country has complete freedom to practice the Jewish religion." Despite official statistics on the availability of 8,800 Jews in the Islamic Republic, he claims that they are many times more. Karame is of the opinion that there are 20,000 and 25,000 people. At the same time, his thesis that "General Kasem Suleymani is a national hero who defeated ISIS" is impressive."[70]

This type of statement can be explained by the adoption of a specialized law by the Iranian parliament. The legal norm adopted in 2020 shows the strengthening of the political anti-Semitism of the Islamic Republic and its gradual transformation into a dogmatic-racial one, which is typical for the Sunni Arab countries. Journalist Meir Javendarvar told the Monitor newspaper that the new legal norm aims to cut off communication between Jewish families divided between Israel and Iran, criminalizing any contact between them. The punishment includes imprisonment, from six months to two years, or 31-74 lashes, or a fine of 20-80 million tons (about 1,200-4,800 dollars). Additional penalties are imposed, including deprivation of the accused of social benefits, state pensions and state education, for a period of between six months and five years.[71]

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[69] Bill fidio …. loan kurdi irani moarid: la masajid lil suna fi taharan, Through video …. iranian, kurdish opposition leader: There are no Sunni mosques in Tehran, Al Anba,
https://www.alanba.com.kw/ar/arabic-international-news/319837/26-08-2012-%D8%A8%D8, 17.01.2021.

[70] Goldman, M., Al Khaqham al Kabir Lil Yahud Fi Iran: Al Farik Suleimani Batal Kaumi Hazama Daesh, The Grand Rabbi of Iran: General Kasem Suleimani is a National Hero Who Defeated ISIS, translated by H. Mazahim, Al Monitor, 22.06.2020,
https://www.almayadeen.net/news/politics/1405766/%, 17.01.2021.

[71] Javendarfar, M., New Law Cuts Contacts for Families Split between Iran, Israel, 25.05.20, https://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2020/05/iran-new-law-israel-break-up-families-connections.html, 17.01.2021.

2.4 Conclusion

The strong escalation of tensions in the Middle East region after 2018 also radicalizes the Islamic Republic's hatred of Israel. Unfortunately, since 2020, there has been a process of change in Shiite anti-Semitism, which is beginning to penetrate increasingly into the bowels of Iranian society.

Anti-Semitism and anti-Westernism, divided into Sunni and Shiite, have long been subject to the following interdependence: Iranian society has traditionally favored the Western leader, the United States, unlike the ruling radicalized clergy and its state structures. This was definitely true for the generation that remembers the reign of Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi. The same hypothesis, but in inverse form, is valid for the symbol of conservative Sunnism – Saudi Arabia. Saudi society has traditionally been hostile to the Western leader, the United States, unlike the ruling dynasty. Times and politics are changing, influenced to a very large extent by the nature of power in the White House. In Tehran and Riyadh, the messages are clearly heard and decoded by the non-religious Barak Obama, the sympathizer of the strong evangelical current, Donald Trump, and the Catholic, Joe Biden. In practice, a kind of confessional "Rubik's cube" is obtained, in which the combinations of the individual squares are adjusted and a time of stabilization in the region is obtained. Unfortunately, a non-working combination may come out, which is nothing more than a highly explosive mixture for the region.

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3. Reformation, Martin Luther (1483-154), anti-Semitism and Islam

3.1 Introduction

At the beginning of the 16th century, a new socio-political dynamic was noticed. The great geographical discoveries and the new manufacturing form of production strengthened the tendencies towards consolidation of the national territories and centralization of the state administration. This caused the change in Christian ideas about the state and law imposed by the Catholic Church. This is necessary since the last presented to Europeans dominated throughout the Middle Ages. The political conjuncture forms prerequisites for the creation and imposition of a new political-legal order. In this light, England, France and Spain created numerous feudal principalities with large centralized states. Germany alone, of the major European states, remains fragmented into about a thousand feudal units. This was the reason for a weaker opposition to the traditionally strong influence of the Holy Father North of the Alps.

However, before coming to the radical Reformation in Germany, it is necessary to note the stage of "Christian humanism."[72] It is perceived as a kind of preparation for the final break with the Catholic Church, represented by the Holy Father in the Vatican. This period is represented by the ideas and teachings of Desiderius Erasmus of Rotterdam (1466-1536) and Thomas More (1478-1535). Their views are an eclectic mix of politics, philosophy, pedagogy, theology, morality, and jurisprudence, presented through the author's parables, dialogues, and annotated collections of Greek and Latin proverbs. The main works of the first are the treatises "In Praise of Madness," "Adagia," "The Education of a Christian Prince," "On Free Will" and others. The

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[72] Nay, O., Histoire des idees politiques, La pensee politique occidentale de l'Antiquite a nos jours, 2e edition, Arman Colin, 2016, p. 226-227, https://www.researchgate.net/publication/313188474_Histoire_des_idees_politiques_La_pensee_politique_occidentale_de_l'Antiquite_greco-romaine_a_nos_jours, 03.03.2023.

political-legal model that is the object of analysis is that of the empire of Charlemagne (747 or 748-814).[73]

3.2 Erasmus of Rotterdam and Thomas More

Many modern experts perceive him as a harbinger of free thought in Europe. At the same time, in principle, Erasmus remained a convinced Catholic. It is no coincidence that most of his works are studies of religious texts, especially the Gospel. Erasmus' ideal state represents the ideal Corpus Christianum.[74] The statist organism is built around Christ, who is the sole bearer of power, and his subjects are divided into three concentric circles – one large and two smaller. Closest to God is the high Christian clergy, next to them – are the minor clergy, and finally – the people. Between the two zones, which represent the ruling stratum in the state and the people, are the secular rulers. The latter, however, must rule according to God's norms. According to Erasmus, they are temporary, and the clergy – eternal. The two components of the elite (religious and secular) obey Christian morals and laws. "If the ruler is a Christian, he must follow the ideal of the Bible. In other words, he must imitate God and bear his cross first, and not aspire to the crown and the globe."[75]

Moreover, Erasmus questions the unquestioned authority of the secular leader. He challenged the principle that by submitting to the

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[73] Galily, D., The Humanism of the Renaissance as the Source of the Freemason Order, Imperial Journal of Interdisciplinary Research, Vol. 2, Issue 8, 2016.

[74] The term corpus Christianum refers to the medieval understanding of the unity of state and church, of spiritual and secular dominion. According to him, the empire and the papacy were two powers in a single republic Christiana, embracing all Christendom, whose membership was mediated by baptism. The invisible, unifying head of this corpus mysticum is Jesus Christ. It is ruled by an emperor and a pope as heads of state. For more information see: de Wall, H., Corpus Christianum, in Religion Past and Present, BRILL, 2006-2013, https://referenceworks.brillonline.com/entries/religion-past-and-present/corpus-christianum-SIM_03244#, 03.03.2023.

[75] Erasmus, D., The Manual of Christian Knight, https://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/erasmus-the-manual-of-a-christian-knight, 03.03.2023.

ruler, one submits to God: "Omnis potestas a Deo."[76] Such a formula is inadmissible since it refers to the Roman rulers, and they are pagans. Along with this, concepts such as empire, kingdom, majesty, power and a number of other state-political terms were derived from the pagan vocabulary. Adequate terms in the Christian state are "administration," "prosperity," "loyal rule," and others.[77]

The Dutch philosopher categorically rejected war as a means of resolving disputes between nations. He criticizes Niccolò Machiavelli's thesis that the natural state of man and nations is war, as it contradicts the Bible. The best regulator of human collective relationships remains Christian values. In this regard, Erasmus ignored Machiavelli's opinion that a dividing line should be drawn between politics and religion. On the contrary, he believes that politics and morality should be mixed and become one substance. In this regard, the Dutchman is of the opinion that power and the exercise of power are reduced to pedagogical functions and not to the search for specific material and social interests. The ruler rules by virtue, and his authority is legitimate when it is accepted by the subjects. According to Erasmus, the state is formed only when its ruler is educated and virtuous. The dominance of virtues and Christian culture constitute the basis of the necessity of the state-forming process. The relationship is two-way, namely, the state is proven through the Christian virtues, but the virtues also cannot exist without the state.[78]

His personal friend the Englishman Thomas More also left lasting traces in the pre-Reformation period. In his phenomenal treatise Utopia, he describes political schemes, governing structures and state institutions that do not actually exist. Entering into a sharp dispute with the authorities (King Henry VIII beheaded him), More brought to the fore the Neoplatonic dualism (bad-wrong-visible versus good-virtuous-invisible/heavenly) as the main approach in the state-forming process.

The English humanist raised the idea of a return to the Christian original sources. Inspired by them, the thinker reaches supreme

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[76] Erasmus, D., *The Education of a Christian Prince,* Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1997, p. 61.

[77] *Op. cit.*

[78] Nay, O., Histoire des idees politiques, ... *op. cit.*

erudition and succeeds in creating the perfect models of political governance and state administration. This brought the Utopians closer to the Epicureans, who believed that Christianity should return to its naturalistic foundations. More is convinced that in order to improve society, the state and the laws, first of all, man must make a revolution in his soul, since it is not subject to external pressure.[79]

Keywords for More's understanding of politics and jurisprudence are "family" and "property." In the initial stage, More, influenced by the ideas of Plato, allowed common ownership of women. Subsequently, however, he rejected the idea and raised the claim that society and the state he built was built on the family cell and traditional morality. Thus, the main unit in More's utopian state becomes the family. Most of a person's life takes place within it, and therefore the state can only intervene when an attack is made against it. All other crimes must be dealt with by a family tribunal. Thus, part of the criminal-legal functions of the state have been taken over by a family tribunal.

An important part of More's views and work is his negative attitude towards the Reformation. He found her ideas, as well as those of Martin Luther, too radical. According to him, the destruction of the Catholic Church is actually a "call for war."[80] Thus, in parallel with the strong desire to reform the Catholic Church, the Counter-Reformation also appeared. The powerful reformation movement that emerged in Germany later encountered a decisive resistance organized by the Holy Father himself.

3.3 The Reformation was a consequence of violent socio-economic and political transformations

The formal occasion of the Reformation itself was the sale of indulgences[81] and simony.[82]

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[79] Nay, O., Histoire des idees politiques, …. pp. 227-228.

[80] Wegemer, G., Thomas More: A Portrait of Courage, Scepter Pubs, 1996, p. 136.

[81] The forgiveness of sins for a fee.

[82] Buying and selling church offices. It comes from the name of Simon the Wise, who was a contemporary of the apostles. He is also called Simon the

Such collection of money, resting on a deeply corrupt basis, was argued by Pope Leo X from the necessity of the reconstruction of the church "St. Peter" in Rome. People who wanted to reform the Catholic Church saw this as a deep crisis and found corruption permeating the entire Church hierarchy, including their own Holy Father.[83]

Attempts at reform fail. Her first acts like Jan Huss and John Wycliffe are either destroyed or humiliated. It reached the Western Schism (1378-1416), the consequences of which were clashes between individual rulers and social riots. In fact, the Reformation set the religious components of the emerging nation-states.

The Reformation is a consequence of burning socio-economic and political transformations in the bowels of European society. They are helped by an unprecedented global cataclysm; a pandemic called the Black Plague. The disease was first recorded in 1320 in China. The infestation is believed to be spread by oriental fleas that survive in the fur of black rats. The latter lived in the merchant ships that traveled over 6,000 km from Europe. The bacteria causing the Black (Bubonic) Plague were transmitted by the fleas in question.

Spreading along the Silk Road, it reached the Crimea, then Europe, especially the Mediterranean region. The plague arrived in Europe in 1347. The following year it was noted in Sicily and Venice. Then Italy, Spain and France quickly flare up. By 1349, the plague had spread to Western Europe, particularly Germany, and was rapidly engulfing the population of Central Europe. In 1350, the pandemic reached Eastern Europe, and in 1351-1353 it was already in Russia.

It is estimated that about 60% of Europeans died from the plague. By the time the disease reached Europe, the world's population had

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Magician or Simon the Magus. According to the "Acts of the Holy Apostles", a book of the New Testament, he lived in the 1st century in Samaria and tried to buy a church post. Thus he created a precedent that became a practice among the clergy. The ancient Christian thinkers Justin, Irenaeus, Hippolytus and others considered him to be the originator of all church heresies. For more information see: Simon Magus, Catholic Encyclopedia, New Advent, https://www.newadvent.org/cathen/13797b.htm, 11.03.2021.

[83] Galily, Daniel. "The Apostle Peter in the Jewish Sources: 'The double agent'", In: A COLLECTION OF SCHOLARLY PAPERS IN SOCIAL SCIENCE, University of National and World Economy (UNWE), 2019.

dropped from 450 to 350 million. At the same time, 40% of the population of Egypt, 50% of Paris, and 60% of Germany met their demise. The statistics for England are similar. The plague kills one in three Englishmen. It took Europe 150 years to fully recover from the plague.

At first, many people believed that God sent the plague as a punishment for the sins of the people. Then they turn to the Catholic Church for protection, as it has been up to this point. Along with this, they accuse the Jews of being the cause of the misfortune and begin cruel persecutions of non-believers. Over time, however, the ecclesiastical institution began to lose public trust as the pandemic persisted. Up to this point, it has had a complete monopoly over public life and political processes, as it is the pillar of public trust. The Cleric can no longer explain the occurrence and cure of the plague. The priests form the so-called "front line" as they remain closest to the people. The church itself is losing its material and physical support and due to the fact that tens of thousands of its members are dying healing people.[84]

Thus, the Black Death became the cause of provoking two extremely important social consequences. First, a massive depopulation occurs, which directly reflects on the economic life of Europe. Second, a complete erosion of public loyalty to the centuries-old monopolist of European politics – the Catholic Church. Moreover, serious personnel changes are taking place in the clergy itself. The place of the deceased clerics is taken by their less educated and less prepared successors, who do not possess the moral qualities of the previous generation of representatives of the Holy See. In this way, a huge socio-political vacuum is created in Europe, the filling of which can only be realized by a factor whose real political dimension is an alternative to the theocentric state institutionalized by the Vatican.

The alternative in question had to create first a new economic environment, and then a political construction. The latter cannot be a total denial of the theocentric state, but the formation of an ideology that is religious in nature, but with a strongly de-Catholicized and respectively centralized content. Thus, the new economic order based on industrialization and mechanization had to be argued by a new,

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[84] The Reformation, http://protestantreformationcs.weebly.com/the-black-death.html, 03.03.2023.

"secular" religion, the core of which was the secularization and privatization of church orders, i.e., the abolition of the papal ritual and the creation of its familiar substitute.

Reasons for the emergence of the new socio-political-religious movement called the Reformation, as well as the specifics of the geographical spread of Protestantism, can be summarized as follows:

• The powerful wave of industrialization and mechanization created a number of industrial innovations that replaced the labor of the millions who died in the Black Death pandemic. One of these innovations is the Swedish Gutenberg's printing press. It became the cause of a wide spread of knowledge, and from there the emergence of a strong middle class that opposed the clergy and the secular aristocracy. By 1530, more than 10,000 religious publications with over ten million copies flooded the book market in Germany. In them, the reformers strongly attacked the "bad" church and propagated the "good" church.[85]

• Reformation literature spread more actively in cities with large book markets, which were also more inclined to accept the Protestant denomination, at the expense of Catholicism.

• The Ottoman-Turkish raids in Western Europe during the period 1450-1700 became one of the regulators for the momentary blunting or sharpening of the confrontation between Reformation and Counter-Reformation. According to the Turkish researcher Murad Ligun, when there was a Turkish offensive against an object in Western Europe, 25% of the conflicts between the two Christian denominations decreased.[86]

• Protestants and Ottoman Turks, professing Islam, became de facto allies against the pillar of the Christian religion – the Vatican. The period in which the two sieges of Vienna took place (the first was 1529 and the second was 1683) was the period of active attacks by Protestants against their co-religionists – Catholics.

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[85] Dittmar, J., Media, Markets and Institutional Change: Evidence from the Protestant Reformation, CEP Discussion Paper № 1267, August 2015, http://cep.lse.ac.uk/pubs/download/dp1367.pdf, 27.03.2020.

[86] Iyigun, M., Luther and Suleyman, The Quarterly of Economics, Vol. 123, Issue 4, November 2008, p. 1465-1494, https://academic.oup.com/qje/article/123/4/1465/1933179, 03.03.2023.

• Cities that were the center of a strong cult of individual Christian saints were less enthusiastic about accepting the ideas of the Reformation.[87]

The settlements in which the law or tradition was practiced, that the entire inheritance of the testator should be inherited by the first-born or the first-born daughter, were less receptive to the ideas of the Reformation.[88]

3.4 Martin Luther

The undisputed leader of the Reformation is the German Augustinian monk Martin Luther (1483-1546). In 1510 he visited Rome and was shocked by the incredible corruption that had unfolded among the Catholic clergy in light of the reigns of Popes Sixtus IV (1471-1484) and Alexander VI (1492-1503).[89] Despite the reluctance of his middle-class father, Luther studied biblical studies and later became a professor of theology at the University of Wittenberg. He has a wonderful academic career.

Luther created the leading trend in the Reformation, called Magisterial, in contrast to the Radical, symbolized by his ideological opponent Thomas Münzer (1489-1525), Andreas Karlstadt (1486-1541), the Zwickau prophets and the Anabaptists. The main difference between the two schools was whether the corruption was only among the Catholic Church (Martin Luther) or it also covered the secular rulers, who were also subject to trial (Thomas Münzer).[90]

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[87] Ekelund, R., Hebert, R., R, Tollison, An Economic Analysis of the Protestant Reformation, 1.06.2002, Journal of Political Economy, http://web.stanford.edu/~avner/Greif_228_2005/Ekelund%20et%20al%20 2002%20JPE%20Reformation.pdf, 03.03.2023.

[88] Curuc, M., S., Smulders, Malthus meets Luther: the Economics behind the German Reformation, 30.09.2019, https://docs.google.com/a/tilburguniversity.edu/viewer?a=v&pid=sites&srci d=ZGVmYXVsdGRvbWFpbnxtYWxpa2N1cnVrfGd4OjUwMWYwNTkzMGM1 MDcxNjE, 03.03.2023.

[89] Brecht, M., J. F. Schaaf, Martin Luther, Fortress Press, 1993, p. 7.

[90] The first Anabaptist preachers in Germany – were Nikolaus Storch, Thomas Drechsel and Markus Thome. That's what Martin Luther called them

The work "95 Theses Against Indulgences," written in 1517 by Luther, became a programmatic document of the Reformation. In it, he clearly states his fundamental disagreements with papal principles and practices. Its main points are:

- Forgiveness of sins is by faith, not by works. The church may not be the judge of man.

- People's relationship with God is personal and the Church cannot be theirs Intermediary.

- The authority of faith is built on the word of God and the Holy Scriptures, not on papal practice.

- Man's inner religiosity is achieved with secular orders. This means that secular authority is based on natural, not divine right.

According to Luther, the state must function on the rules of practical expediency and real interests, which are determined by reason. Along with this, the monarch is a servant and not a ruler of the people. In this way, Martin Luther calls for violence against the Church and submission to secular authority. He summarizes that, in fact, rebellion against the feudal lord is tantamount to rebellion against the Church, since the secular ruler has taken her place in the management of society and the state.[91]

Martin Luther's aspirations were shaped into a complete philosophy, which was labeled "Lutheranism." This designation was imposed by one of Luther's opponents, namely the German scholastic theologian Dr. Johann Meyer von Eck. This happened in July 1519 during the debate in Leipzig. The latter uses it with an ironic connotation, in order to suggest that Luther's teaching is heresy.[92] At this time Luther disliked the term "Lutheran," preferring the term "evangelical," which is derived from εὐαγγέλιον (euangelion), a Greek

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in December 1521. For more information see: Hughes O., O., The Shaping of the Baptismal Rite in the Sixteen Century, William Eardmans Publishing Company, Grand Rapids, Michigan, 1992, https://books.google.bg/books?id=N0oRWj1hXTEC&pg=P, 03.03.2023.

[91] Wengert, T., Martin Luther's Ninety-Five Theses: With Introduction, Commentary, and Study Guide, Augsburg Fortress Publishers, 2005.

[92] Espín, O., J., Nickoloff, An Introductory Dictionary of Theology and Religious Studies, Collegeville, Minnesota, Liturgical Press, 2003, p. 796.

word meaning "good news," i.e. "Gospel."[93]

Followers of John Calvin (1509-1564), Ulrich Zwingli (1484-1531) and other theologians associated with the Reformation tradition (Calvinism) also began to use this term. In this way, they begin to distinguish between the two evangelical groups. Other philosophers use the terms "Evangelical Lutheran" and "Evangelical Reformed" respectively. Gradually, the word "evangelical" dropped out, and from the middle of the 16th century, the Lutherans themselves began to use the term "Lutheran" for themselves. They aim to distinguish themselves from Calvinists or Anabaptists. In 1597 the Wittenberg theologians defined the term "Lutheran" as synonymous with the "true church."

An extremely important nuance in Lutheran philosophy is its anti-Semitic focus. Parallel to this, a certain sympathy is felt for Muslims. The reasons for this type of distinction between the two non-Christian monotheistic religions are both objective and subjective in nature. Luther's initial views of the Jews were not hostile. He tries to win them over to the Christian religion and therefore has a very positive view of them. Luther wrote: "Absurd theologians defend hatred of the Jews. ... What Jew would agree to join our ranks when he sees the cruelty and enmity we display towards them, and that in our behavior towards them, we are less like Christians than beasts?"[94] Luther's anti-Semitism is expressed in two of his works. The first, the leading one, is the pamphlet entitled "On the Jews and Their Lies." The second is "Of the Unknown Name and Generations of Christ," which was reprinted five times during his lifetime. The two works were written in 1543, three years before his death. It is believed that Martin Luther was strongly influenced by the Hebraist Anton Margarita's book (1500-...) "The Whole Jewish Faith." In fact, the latter is a former Jew whose father was a rabbi. He converted to Christianity and subsequently became a Lutheran. In her book, Margarita exposes the Jews and their manners, customs and beliefs. The influence of the work in question was an additional argument for Luther's preliminary anti-Semitic sentiments. The latter entered into a dispute with Rabbi Yosel of Rosenheim, who sought Luther's mediation before the Prince of Saxony Johann Frederick, but the Christian thinker

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[93] *Op. cit.*, p. 362.

[94] Luther, M., That Jesus Christ was Born a Jew, Trans. Walter I. Brandt, in Luther's Works, Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1962, pp. 200-201, 229.

refused him. The prince points to the fact that all his attempts to convert the Jews have failed.

In one of the paragraphs of "On the Jews and Their Lies" Luther suggests that they be expelled from Christendom since they cannot be converted.[95]

He openly says this: "We want to deal with them in a Christian way now. Offer them the Christian faith that they will accept the Messiah, who is even their cousin and born of their flesh and blood; and rightly, that he is of Abraham's seed, of whom they boast. However, I am concerned [that] the Jewish blood may now become watery and wild. First, you must offer them to turn to the Messiah and allow themselves to be baptized, so that one can see that this is a serious matter for them. If not, then we would not allow them [to live among us], for Christ commands us to be baptized and believe in Him, though now we cannot believe as strongly as we should, God is still patient with us. If, however, they turn, abandon their usury, and receive Christ, then we will willingly count them as our brethren. Otherwise, nothing will come of it, because they do this with great desire."[96]

The influence of Luther's ideas remained too strong even after his death. Many of the German feudal lords imposed restrictions on Jews living in their principalities. In 1572 Lutherans attacked and looted the Berlin Synagogue. The following year, the Jews were expelled from the entire Margraviate of Brandenburg, which became the cause of anti-Jewish riots in a number of German Lutheran principalities.[97] According to the American scholar of Lutheranism, Robert Michael, the works of Martin Luther became a guide for public behavior and a textbook for administrative practices in Germany, although not all princes adopted

[95] Deutsch, G., Martin Luther, Jewish Encyclopedia, St. Louis and Philadelphia: Concordia Publishing House and Fortress Press, 1955-86, http://www.jewishencyclopedia.com/articles/10196-luther-martin, 30.03.2020.

[96] Luther's Works, Pelikan, J., Lehmann, H., T., C., B., Brown, B.T.G. Mayes, Digital Download, https://www.fortresspress.com/store/product/9780800603595/Luther-Works-Digital-Download, 31.3.2020.

[97] Michael, R., Holy Hatred: Christianity, Antisemitism, and the Holocaust, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006, p. 117.

them.[98]

In this light, in 1570, pastor Georg Nygrin published "The Enemy Jew," which practically repeats Luther's views, which he espoused in his On the Jews and Their Lies.

Undoubtedly, Martin Luther's anti-Jewish rhetoric created an environment conducive to the spread of anti-Semitic sentiment throughout Germany. Lutheranism, which became the official Christian doctrine in most German regions, became a great public legitimization of the pogroms that the Nazi Party organized in the 1930s and 1940s against the Jews and their cult objects and properties. According to Michael, anyone who wrote against the Jews during the Third Reich always referred to the works of Luther.[99] English Christian Church scholar Diarmaid McCulloch argues that "Luther's 1543 pamphlet was the Nazis' operational plan for the Nazis' bloody pogrom against the Jews called Kristallnacht."[100]

Christopher Probst, in his book "Demonizing the Jews: Luther and the Protestant Church in Nazi Germany," argues that a large number of German Protestant clergy and theologians during the Nazi Third Reich used Luther's anti-Jewish writings to justify, at least in part, anti-Semitic policies and practices of the National Socialists.[101]

Still, differences remain between individual scholars of Lutheranism and Nazism regarding the roots of their anti-Semitism. If Martin Luther used purely religious arguments to condemn the Jews, the fascists of the Third Reich emphasized racial motives. Thus, at the genesis of this absentee controversy is posed a single question that many scholars of the Middle East hostile to Israel bring to the fore in their anti-Semitism, namely: "Are the Jews a confessional community or a distinct race?" According to scholars such as Roland Beighton, Paul Halsall,

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[98] Michael, R., Luther, Luther Scholars and Antisemitism, Encounter (Fall 1985), Vol. 46, Issue 4, pp. 339-356.

[99] Michael, R., Holy Hatred: Christianity, Antisemitism, ... pp. 57-60.

[100] MacCulloc, D., Reformation: Europe's House Divided, 1490-1700, New York: Penguin Books Ltd, 2004, pp. 666-667.

[101] Probst, Ch., Demonizing the Jews: Luther and the Protestant Church in Nazi Germany, Indiana University Press in association with the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, 2012.

Heiko Obermann, and others advance the thesis of a "dull" Lutheran anti-Semitism that is not constructed in an imperative form, as the Nazis did. In reality, Lutheranism issued a conditional denial of the Jews, while the Third Reich physically exterminated them. Luther tries to fight for his "pure" Christianity, in which he sets his conditions for the Jews, namely conversion and the recognition of the Christian Messiah. According to American researcher Graham Noble, Luther even "tried to save the Jews."[102]

For Luther, salvation depended on the belief that Jesus was the son of God, a belief that the adherents of Judaism did not share. Early in his life, Luther claimed that the Jews were prevented from accepting Christianity by the proclamation of what he believed. The latter believes that the "impure" gospel of the Catholic Church has turned them away and that they will respond favorably to the gospel message if it is presented to them "gently." Luther expressed concern about the poor conditions in which the Jews were forced to live and held that anyone who denied that Jesus was born a Jew was committing heresy.[103]

Martin Luther's attitude towards the Islamic religion and the Turks is ambiguous. As if it remains conjectural, difficult to understand and even contradictory. On the one hand, the view of the ideologist of the Reformation was strongly influenced by the principles of the religious-ideological rejection of other believers. On the other hand, he probably realized clearly that the Ottoman Empire was the strongest opponent militarily of his enemy, the Pope, and thus, to some extent, solved an existential question for the new Christian denomination. It is possible that the instinct of self-preservation "The enemy of my enemy is my friend" has worked. Interpretations of Luther's assessment of Muslims also remain in this dichotomous light. If European and American researchers related to clerical circles (e.g., Michael Mullett, Martin Marty, Andrew Cunningham and others) who are close to Lutheranism maintain the first thesis, while Islamic scholars or those whose publications come out with the help of Islamic means (for

[102] Noble, G., Martin Luther and German Anti-Semitism, History Today, https://www.questia.com/library/journal/1G1-83552696/martin-luther-and-german-anti-semitism-graham-noble, 03.03.2023.

[103] Berenbaum, M., The World Must Know, United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, 1991, pp. 8-9.

example, Murad Igyun, Trevor Caster and others) emphasize the second. Perhaps Volker Greifenhagen's analysis of Luther College at the University of Regina is a great attempt at mixing the two trends and finding the necessary realistic balance. The leading arguments for defending the first, anti-Islamic position of Luther are the two treatises "On the War against the Turks" (1529), "Military Oath against the Turks" (1530), and the beginning of the Lutheran hymn, which says: "Lord, keep us in Your Word and deed, restrain the murderous Pope and Turk."[104]

Perhaps the duality of the attitude towards the Turks is evident even in Luther's programmatic work, namely the "95 Theses". During the Magbur colloquium, held in the period 1-4 October 1529 (dispute between Martin Luther and Ulrich Zwingli about the real presence of Christ in the Holy Communion) Luther questioned the need to resist the army of Sultan Suleiman the Magnificent, besieging Vienna. A number of Christian thinkers see in his position defeatism in front of fellow believers. Luther recognized "the Turks as a scourge sent by God to punish Christians, in their capacity as instruments of the biblical Apocalypse, which will destroy the Antichrist, and in the latter Luther recognized the papacy and the Church of Rome."[105]

He consistently rejects the idea of a holy war, "as if our nation is an army of Christians against the Turks, who are enemies of Christ. This is absolutely contrary to Christ's teaching and name."[106]

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[104] Greifenhagen, V., Why Did Luther Want the Qur'an to Be Published? Luther College, University Regina, 05.03.2027, https://www.luthercollege.edu/university/academics/impetus/winterspring-2017/table-talks/why-did-luther-want-the-quran-to-be-published/, 01.04.2020.

[105] Cunningham, A., The Four Horsemen of the Apocalypse: Religion, War, Famine and Death, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000, p. 141, https://books.google.bg/books?id=hLxDnAMaUgQC&pg=PA141&redir_esc=y#v=onepage&q&f=false, 03.03.2023.

[106] Luther, M., On War against the Turk, 1529, cit. by Brown, W., The Ten Commandments: The Reciprocity of Faithfulness, Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox Press, 2004, p. 258, https://books.google.bg/books?id=87hQ2AjcttEC&pg=PA258&redir_esc=y#v=onepage&q&f=false, 03.03.2023.

On the other hand, maintaining his doctrine of the two kingdoms, Luther supported the irreligious war against the Turks. In 1529 he actively urged Emperor Charles V and the German people to wage a world war against the Turks. Luther makes it clear, however, that religious warfare against an unknown faith is separate and must be waged through prayer and repentance. At the time of the siege of Vienna, Luther wrote a prayer for national liberation from the Turks, asking God to "give our emperor eternal victory over our enemies."[107]

In 1581 Luther wrote a treatise On the Religious Customs of the Turks. His authorship is essential since at that time a work with the content of a certain George of Hungary was published. The latter was captured by the Turks when he was 16 years old and spent 20 years in a Turkish prison. This work of Luther's is both an apologetic of Islamic religious rites and customs and an attack on Roman Catholic religious rites and customs. The author even makes a direct comparison between the two rituals. He contrasts the religious emotion, discipline, and simplistic nature of Islam with the clumsiness and obscurity of the dead ritual practices of Catholicism. However, if we were to make an explicit comparison, we would see much more hatred for the Catholic Church than sympathy for Muslim traditions and cults.[108]

The openness of the founder of Lutheranism to Islam is also confirmed by the writing in 1543 of an introduction to a translation of the Koran into Latin. The thinker himself insisted that this version of the Qur'an be published, despite the troubles that its publisher Johannes Oporines (1507-1568) had with the city council of Basel. From his letter to the commoners, as well as from the preface to the Muslim holy book, it is clear that Luther wanted the Koran to be published in order to "expose" it. In his judgment as a work, it is full of "lies, fables, and abominations compared to the Christian scriptures."[109]

Along with this, he explains the advantages of studying non-Christian religions. According to Luther, this will only strengthen "the faith of Christians against the corruption of other religions, which all

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[107] *Op. cit.*, p. 142.

[108] Castor, T., Martin Luther on Islam and the "Turks", Zwemer Center for Muslim Studies, http://www.zwemercenter.com/martin-luther-on-islam-and-the-turks/, 03.03.2023.

[109] Greifenhagen, V., Why did Luther, …. *op. cit.*

prejudge to be the work of Satan."[110]

3.5 Conclusion

Luther and his teachings played an extremely important role in creating the paradigm of interfaith relations during the Middle Ages. The Reformation was not only the cause of the Western Schism (1374-1417), which modeled relations in Europe and the Christian world. She created a system of international relations, part of whose profile leaves traces to this day. The Protestant Lutherans became one of the strongest opponents of Catholicism, breaking the religio-political unity of the Western world. Logically, they ideologized and stated their doctrine, crafting their own ritualistic and theological principles that evolved from those of the Mother Church. A very valuable feature is the fragmenting of Protestantism into multiple currents that often have common components and flow into each other. An extremely important distinguishing mark between the individual currents is the interpretation of specific perceptions of messianism and millennialism. To some extent, they become a kind of distributive mechanism for relations with non-Christian denominations, and from there for the development of a paradigm of the state's foreign policy, in the foundation of which the specific Protestant denomination stands. A very important point in Protestantism is not only the pragmatization of religious customs but also their secularization based on the characteristics of individual European nations. This is true even of individual Protestant denominations. Such are the Lutherans in Europe and those in the United States. An example in this regard is the interrelationships with Jews and Muslims. Luther sets the following gradation of his religious dislike for other denominations: Catholicism-anti-Semitism-Islam. It is possible to hypothesize that in this way Luther set the future model of multiculturalism, based on the permissibility between Protestantism and Islam, at the expense of Judaism. Perhaps there is some grain of rationality in such a statement.

Luther's hatred of the Jews cannot serve as a model for relations between them and Christians. Moreover, Luther himself cannot be a good model even for building a successful paradigm of Christian-

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[110] *Op. cit.*

Muslim relations. In fact, Luther's approach to Islam serves more as a warning to the "others," i.e., the non-Lutherans. The German theologian shows what his followers can achieve if engagement and dialogue are not achieved with them and if their positions are not accepted. Irredentist tension and destructive stereotypes of behavior follow.

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4. The clash between Christian and Islamic religion – The State of Israel

4.1 Introduction

The State of Israel is being created in 1948 by a decision of the UN General Assembly. This is an unprecedented act, as a simple state formation is formed as a result of an act of the Security Council of the Universal International Organization. However, the UN General Assembly has decided to create two countries, one for the Jews and the other for the Arabs. This dichotomous form predetermines the extremely complex genesis of future confrontations between the two warring camps. Over time, ethno-political division as a motive for mutual frustration has given way to the religious one. Politics and ideology have been replaced by religion, which explains the inability to find a reliable solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Among the many theoretical studies of radicalization and its terrorist entities, only those with a religious foundation cannot be overcome by the well-known peaceful political and diplomatic instruments used by the state institutions.

4.2 Stages of the Israeli-Palestinian clash

The Israeli-Palestinian clash went through several stages. The genesis of confrontation changes depending on internal political, demographic, ethno-confessional, social and economic factors. In the 1970s, religion took the ultimate lead over ethnicity and secular nationalism. This happened after the establishment of the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC) in 1969, and most notably after the victory of the Islamic Revolution in Iran in 1979. The state formations created by Arab nationalism failed. Thus, in the 1990s, the Oslo Accords came to an end, in which two opposing nationalist entities – the Israeli and Arab ones – represented by the Palestinian Liberation Organization, led by Yasser Arafat – found an intersection. Palestinian statehood emerged in the form of autonomy with the capital Ramallah. The weakened Palestinian secularist nationalist view had to recede.

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The secular nature of the Palestinian Authority also predetermined the nature of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The radical Sunni Hamas movement, which has ruled the Gaza Strip since 2005, is defined as a plague by the Jewish state. At the same time, it is an opposition to the internationally recognized authority of the Fatah faction in the West Bank. The increasing popularity of Sunni radicals among Palestinian society is one of the reasons why the Middle East conflict is moving forward. Hamas' policy of rapprochement with Iran and the acceptance of separate components of its foreign policy towards Israel have become an additional impetus for the theocraticization of the conflict. There was a peculiar ecumenism between radical Sunniism and radical Shi'ism. In the particular case of the newly emerged confessional mix, the Shi'ite component is leading, and the Sunni one is situationally subordinate. The reason for this is that Iran is a country with claims of regional leadership. At the same time, Hamas is a radical ethno-religious entity that, in this type of long-term confrontational process, can only accept the status of a proxy, a tool for the exercise of foreign, external influence.

The past two decades have finally shaped the internally-confessional profile of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The OIC, which is composed mainly of Sunni states, has failed to master the management of the confrontation with the Jewish state. The "Islamic United Nations," as the OIC is called, is too cumbersome an international organization to take the flag of confessional opposition in its own hands. The Shiite segment of the vast Islamic community has prevailed in

mobilization and constant confrontation with the state of Israel. Even the most powerful Sunni terrorist organizations, such as al-Qaeda and the Islamic State, did not organize attacks on Jewish statehood, despite numerous propaganda threats.

4.3 Iran and the US – The clash of Islam and Christianity

The extreme tensions created in 2019 between Iran and the United States can be interpreted by the immanent collision between the separate components of two unorthodox denominations of the Christian and Islamic religions. It has antagonistic character and mutually exclusive postulates in the philosophy of currently ruling Republicans, led by President Donald Trump, and the Islamic Republic of Iran's statistic-religious tendency.

Although apparently a clash between the two large families – Christian and Islamic, in reality, only some of them come to complete, irreconcilable mutual denial. The many attempts to organize the so-called Dialogue of Religions outlined the profile of inter-tolerance and negation between the different denominations that make up Christianity and Islam. The policy underpinned by large and sustainable countries directs and guides this type of contacts. We saw him in 2019 during a visit by Pope Francis to Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates. A visit of the Saudi King Abdullah to the Vatican in 2007 could be defined as a similar programmatic visit. The clash within and outside the two major religious families is the fiercest among the minority denominations that are radicalized to rally and attract new followers. Confrontation with the self-similar (minority radical current) in the other large religious community is a tool for survival, turning frustration into a lever for "pumping" consensus-based, mainstream, dominant currents. Evangelical communities, especially American, fall into this category with regard to Catholics, Orthodox, and non-evangelical Protestant movements. In the mirror position is the Itnaashi'iriya, the denomination of the 12, the Ja'afarites, in relation to the Sunnis and other currents in the Shiites and Haridhita.

The special treatment of Jews and Israel is rooted in early Christian Millennialism. It crystallized through the Reformation, whose elite adopted two ideas regarding Jews. The first is that the return of the Jews to the "Promised Land" is a prerequisite for the Rise of Christ. The

second is that Jews should be encouraged to embrace Christianity. Thus, they will imitate the behavior of Jesus Christ himself, who was Jewish. In this way, they will complete the cycle of transforming the Jewish people into Christian ones. By the same logic, they will cause Christ to return to earth and create the state of bliss, as biblical prophecy dictates (see Sharif, 1983).

Once set foot in Judea, the Jews will accept Christ as their savior and build the temple of God. According to American researcher Shannon Ashley, only Jews are able to reproduce true Christianity. A Jew converted to Christianity is the authentic follower of Jesus Christ (see Ashley, 2016).

These were extremely popular with English-speaking Puritans during the Middle Ages. In the seventeenth century, the English Protestant theologian John Owen remarked: "It is also given that there will be a time and a season, during the continuation of the kingdom of the Messiah in this world, in which the community of the Jewish people, throughout the world, will be called and effectively brought to the knowledge of the Messiah, our Lord Jesus Christ. Then, with his mercy, they will also receive release from captivity, restoration of their land with a blessed, prosperous and happy state" (Owen, 2000: 560).

English Protestants John Gill, Samuel Rutherford, Charles Wesley and others have similar views. Their ideological counterparts John Cotton, Jonathan Edwards and others convey the idea to settlers in America. It was not until the 19th century that this religious postulate gained political nuance.

According to French researcher Thierry Mason, the state genesis of the United States and Israel are genetically linked not only through religious thread. The two state formations are British colonies. This was done through the statistician engineering implemented at the beginning of the 17th century by Lord Protector of England Oliver Cromwell (1653-1658). According to the author, Israel is a British colony in which the Jewish diaspora in the British Empire plays a major role. The United States is also a British colony in which Cromwell sends pirate and egalitarian social strata. In both cases, it is a matter of creating a religious criterion, selected by the ruling Christian Anglican denomination in London (see Meyssan 2014).

The American theologian John Nelson Darby is considered the

creator of the so-called. American Christian Zionism. His public lectures in the first half of the nineteenth century, published in English, French and Flemish, created a strong philosophical trend among Protestant circles in America and Europe. Authorities such as Charles Spurgeon, Harati Bonar, Robert N'Chayen and others have openly advocated the return of the Jews to the "Promised Land." Among the propagandists are organizations such as the International Christian Embassy Jerusalem.

In 1818, President John Adam stated that he really wanted the Jews to establish an independent state in Israel, and he believed that they would gradually become "unitary Christians" (Kark, 1994: 23).

In 1844, a professor of Hebrew at the University of New York, George W. Bush, a distant relative of both President George H. W. Bush and President George W. Bush, published a book. It is entitled *The Vision Valley or the Dry Bones of Israel have come to life*. In it, the author criticizes "slavery that has long been imposed on Jews." He called for the restoration of the authority of the Jews over the land of Israel. According to George Bush, "once back there, most of them will embrace Christianity" (Bush, 1844: 16).

In this light, and for purely sentimental-religious reasons, in 1838 Britain established its first diplomatic mission in Palestine. It is based in Jerusalem. The Consulate is the result of the efforts of the Conservative Party MP, Lord Shaftesbury, who is a staunch Anglican evangelist (Lewis, 2014: 380).

According to English researcher Paul Merkley, the founder of modern Zionist Christianity is Pastor William Hechtler, who works as a priest at the British Embassy in Vienna. There he met and became a very close friend of Theodore Herzel, the creator of modern political Zionism and regarded as the father of the State of Israel (Merkley, 1988: 240).

For the first time, the term "Judeo-Christianity" was used in 1821 by the Irish Hebraist and Jewish missionary, Alexander McCool. It refers to Jews converted to Christianity. In 1829, the German Christian Jewish missionary, Joseph Wolf, converted to Christianity, bringing a new nuance to the meaning of the word. He believes that Judeo-Christianity must be understood as preserving some of the Jewish ritual in Christianity, in order to make it easier for Jews to join the new religion. This key term can also be found in the works of Friedrich

Nietzsche and George Orwell. The latter speaks rather in moral and ethical terms rather than in religious terms. The word used by Orwell in 1939 is a "Judeo-Christian" morality scheme (see Connely, 2016).

Judeo-Christianity is deeply rooted in American Protestant circles. The trend became active in the early 20th century, becoming one of the force majeure factors to support the creation of the State of Israel. During World War II, Judeo-Christians in the United States created two non-Jewish organizations that openly supported Zionism. It is the American-Palestinian Committee and the Christian Council for Palestine (CCP). The latter, formed mainly of Evangelical Protestants, is becoming the main Israel lobby in the United States. The CCP became the leading mouthpiece of opposition to the UN decision in 1948 to divide the city of Jerusalem into Israeli and Arab parts.

The missionary work continues and the Judeo-Christian symbiosis is permanently established as a stumbling block to American evangelical behavior. They are a serious electoral reserve and a significant player in the US elections. According to research by the famous Pew Research Center, Protestants in the United States are over 46.5% of the population. The trend is downward, but not at the expense of other religions. Evangelicals, for their part, are 25.4%, making them the largest religious denomination in American society (America's Changing Religious Landscape, Pew Research Center, Religion & Public Life. 12 May 2015, https://www.pewforum.org/2015/05/12/americas-changing-religious-landscape).

According to a study conducted by the center already cited, 82% of white evangelicals believe that God gave Israel to the Jewish people. Fewer than half of Judaism and Catholic Americans agree with this statement. According to another poll commissioned by Bloomberg TV, nearly 60% of evangelicals say the US should support Israel, even if their interests conflict with those of US citizens (see Connely, 2016).

Evangelicals in the United States are an immanent part of the Republican Party electorate. Very often, with their full mobilization, her candidate wins at the expense of the Democratic Party. Evidence from evangelical mobilization in recent successful Republican presidents shows this. For example, behind George W. Bush – a son 74% of them stand behind him. The largest mobilization of evangelical voters occurred in 2016. Then, about 85% of this electoral contingent supports

Donald Trump. During the November 2018 partial elections, the inseparable link between the current US head of state and the more radical Protestants, once more, was reaffirmed. Evangelicals are fundamentalists. He personally participated in the campaign of the Republican candidates closest to the evangelical circles, candidates for senators, congressmen, and governors. They were able to win at the expense of closer to non-evangelical circles in this political formation.

In this light, the principles, tenets, and ideas of evangelicals, including Judeo-Christian millionaire, directly reflect the foreign policy of the current US administration in the Middle East. The move of the US Embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem in April 2018 is as political as it is a religious act. That was one of Trump's election promises during his election campaign in 2016. More than 60% of US evangelicals support this political act (see Illing, 2018). "Supporting Israel is not a political issue ... it is a biblical issue," said Pastor John Hayy, founder and national chairman of Christians at the United Kingdom Evangelical Organization for Israel (see Illing, 2018).

The Islamic Republic of Iran is dominated by the Shiite denomination school of the 12 imams. The Ja'afarites, as they are called, build a religious-political management paradigm, constructed on an entirely inverse form, with that of the Evangelicals. If some associate the resurrection of Christ, the Messiah with the Jews, and Israel, then the other, on the contrary, bind the coming of their messiah, I have Mohammed al-Mahdi, with the destruction of the Jewish state. The Ja'afarites extend the scheme of confrontation with imaginary enemies. Among them, they place all their dogmatic opponents, both Sunnis, Christians and Jews. Still, Big Satan is the United States, and Little is Israel. The difference, however, is that the Ja'afarites are seeking the destruction of the elites, i.e. countries created by opponents, not followers themselves. It is no coincidence that under the current Iranian constitution, quotas have been set for minorities in the legislature, some of which are Jewish.

For example, the IRIB government website details the return of the messiah in great detail (see Lappin, 2006).

He will appear as a young, handsome man in Mecca who will rise up there. The Messiah will conquer the entire Arabian Peninsula, staying in Mecca for some time, and then going to Medina. Later, he will

conquer Syria and Iraq and eventually settle in the Iraqi city of Kufa, which is sacred to the Shiites. The Messiah will fight the Sophians.[111] In the messianic narrative of the state-run Iranian media, elements of the so-called asyah, the biography of the Prophet Muhammad and the birth of Shia in the person of its creator Ali bin Abi Talib are felt (654-661). It is noteworthy that rewriting the history of Islam, such as the Ja'afarite messiahship, is part of the aspirations of a confessional Shiite minority to become a majority in the battle with Sunni opponents. The war is against the so-called. The "mischievous elements" that the messiah will strike. One of the major battles will be the conquest of Jerusalem. The interesting thing about this case is that "Mahdi would send 10,000 people (both east and west) to kill the Safians who were in Beit al-Makdas, Jerusalem, which was currently occupied by the Zionists" (see Lappin, 2006).

Detailed scientific research of Imam Mahdi is made by an Iranian cleric, Ayatollah Ibrahim Amin. He is a member of the Council of Experts and is considered one of the main contenders for the post of spiritual leader of the Islamic Republic after the current holder, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. He was born in 1925 in Najafabad, Iran (for more biographical information, see Ayatollah Ibrahim Amini's official website, http://www.ibrahimamini.com/ar). It is often seen as more moderate among the upper class of theologian lawyers in Shi'ite Iran. In 2015, he wrote the theoretical work, "Imam Mahdi. The true ruler of humanity" (see Amini, 2015).

The book details the idea of the Messiah and the state that he will create for the Clerics of Ja'afarit. The Iranian fakih (jurist-theologian) does a very deep dissection of the genesis of Messianic thought in Muslims, distinguishing it between Sunnis and Shiites. Quite purposefully, he quotes hadith authors who refer the origins of the Messiah to Fatima Zahra, the daughter and wife of the fourth righteous

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[111] Maui bin Abbi Safian is the founder of the Omayad Dynasty (661-750), whose capital is Damascus. He embodies the Sunni dominance in the battle against the rebel Shiites. The culmination of this is the defeat that his son, Yazid bin Maui (680-683), inflicted in 680 on the successor of the first Imam and the fourth Righteous Caliph Ali bin Abi Talib (654-661). The battle is taking place in one of the Shi'ite holy cities of Karbala. For more information, see: Tabari, M., Tarikh umam wa muluk, *History of Nations and Kings, Gift of Al Nahda Al Arabia*, Beirut, Vol. 5, p. 325)

Caliph, the founder of the Shiite denomination Ali bin Abi Talib. Moreover, in the fourth paragraph of "The Invisible World and the Imam of Time," Ayatollah Amini states that Mahdi is among the heirs of the third imam, Hussein bin Ali (Amini, 2015: 62).

In the paragraph "Mahdism, Jews and Iranians," Jatollah Amini reveals why the Shiites who believe in Mahdi have a negative opinion of Jews. According to them, many Jews have embraced Islam, not for their faith alone, but for material gain and fasting. Many have achieved high status through intrigue and betrayal. The author recounts that they even deliberately entered the Islamic community to destroy it. They have caused many divisions, destruction and wars for Muslims. According to him, this is the case with the Islamic theologian Abdullah bin Saba (600-680) (Amini, 2015: 43). The latter is a former Sana'a Jew, Yemen, converted to Islamic religion (Bitar, Osman bin Afan, Al Ordon & Maktaba al Manar Lil Tibaa Walil Nashar, 1988: 67-89).

The Shiites' hatred of the Jews may well be the result of intra-confessional competition between two minorities. If the dominant Sunni majority is deliberately in control of the foundation of the state, including the top of the statistic pyramid – the Caliph, then minorities have always been a "democratic" scenery. They are seeking to fill the second-level positions of power. In fact, Shiites perceive converted Jews as an obstacle to getting posts in the statistic establishment. In the present case, there is virtually some kind of accumulation and acceleration of Shiite-Jewish frustration. Ethnicity is also added to the confessional principle. Shiite absorbs in itself the Persian and subsequently the Iranian component. This crystallized only in the eighteenth century, when the Sefewid dynasty, which ruled Iran during the period 1501-1722, adopted Shiite legal jurisprudence. The hatred of high-ranking Jews in the state hierarchy is conceptualized and transformed into the philosophy of Mahdism. Thus, the religious-governing ideology of the Shi'ite-Persian minority state becomes overtly anti-Semitic.

In his book, the Iranian theologian also addresses the issue of the residence of the 12th Imam. Ibrahim Amini rejects the theories of medieval Shiite fakhiyah that Imam Mahdi lives in al Jazeera al Khadra, the Green Island. These are two mythical, the Shiites, the city of Jabalka and Jabursa, which were located in the Eighth region (Ghaemmaghami, O. 92014: 140-141). He tries to be realistic and therefore claims that the

Messiah lives among human (Amini, 2015: 153).

It is no coincidence that the spiritual leader himself, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, claims that he met with Imam Mahdi in July 2010 without giving any details about the event. At the same time, as a direct consequence of this meeting, he claims to be the personal representative of the messiah. For this reason, all people should obey him (see Rosenberg, 2005).

The final paragraph, "The Marks for the Zuhur, the Emergence of Mahdi," summarizes and brings to the fore the Universalist, Islamist-centric and Shi-centric idea of Mahdism. According to the author, the center of the world is the city of Kom, the largest religious center in Iran. It will bring forth messages of victory for Islam worldwide, as this religion will become official everywhere. The messiah himself would set up a world Islamic government, members of which would be appointed governors of individual regions.

Through the prism of the utopias, the theoretical Ayatollah is trying to give the Mahdist state real economic and even urban development touches. Many of Ibrahim Amini's views are reminiscent of those of the "political urbanist" of ancient Greece, Hippodemus of Miletus, who carved out the "ideal city" in the 5th century BC.

> "People's economic condition will improve significantly. There will be plenty of rain to sink the earth into greenery. There will be all kinds of grains and fruits in abundance. The necessary improvements in agricultural production will be introduced. People will pay more attention to God's presence than to sins. New, innovative programs will be introduced in road construction. The main thoroughfares will be sixty yards wide. There will be so much diligence in the construction of the roads that the mosques standing in the middle will be destroyed. Walkways will decorate the streets. Pedestrians will be asked to cross roads only at the designated location, while drivers will be asked to drive their vehicles only in the middle. All windows of homes facing the street will be closed. The construction of open sewers and sewers will be prohibited. The current ones will be removed. The high mosques, as well as their minarets and the bars separating the imam who leads the prayer from the worshipers, will be removed." (Amini, 2015: 233)

The question that the author asks is: "Will the majority of the

world's population be killed?" He is seeking an answer to this complex dilemma, as Shi'a is a minority destined to rule. At the same time, he and his messiah do not want to kill the rest of the people, as this means that they will "run a cemetery." Then they would generously offer them either to accept Islam and the Shiite version or to pay the jizya tax, as the Qur'an commands for the followers of heavenly religions (Christianity and Judaism). However, in such a situation, war was inevitable as the messiah was coming to bring about a world revolution (Amini, 2015: 235).

In the views of Iranian Ja'afarit clerics, the appearance of the messiah is directly related to the destruction of the state of Israel. Not by chance, in 1979, the first foreign minister of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Ibrahim Yazdi, proposed a similar foreign policy act during the commemoration of Jerusalem Day. The latter is celebrated every last Friday of the holy month of Ramadan (see Ardalan, 2013).

After Ayatollah Ruylahlah Khomeini, the founder of the Islamic Republic, declared that the religious obligation of every Muslim was the liberation of Jerusalem, and subsequently every speech uttered on that day by the religious leader, added: "... there are forty days left the destruction of the State of Israel." Moreover, the current Ja'afaritite elite explains significant anti-Israeli events as a step towards the coming of the Messiah. These include the creation in 1982 of the radical Hezbollah movement in Lebanon, the war in 2006 between the Jewish state and Hezbollah, the continuing clashes between Israel and the radical Palestinian movement Hamas and others. The counter-actions, anti-Iran actions of Israel and the US have been explained by the desire of both countries to hinder and delay the appearance of the messiah. This is how the US military intervention in Iraq was interpreted in 2003 (see Ardalan, 2013).

Particularly active in promoting Mahdism as a doctrine of Iranian foreign policy is former Conservative President Mahmoud Ahmedinajad (2005-2013). He was strongly influenced by such Iranian secular and religious thinkers as Ali Sharia, Nawab Safavi, Jalal al Ahmadi, Ahmed Fardid and especially Ayatollah Mohammed Takki Mesba-Yazdi. In his unusual activities, for example, he wrote a letter to Mahdi, the messiah, and placed him in a well in the city of Kom with full awareness that the messiah would read it. For example, he claims that the Americans were extremely brutal in overthrowing Saddam Hussein in Iraq because they

searched for "the Mahdi file but failed to find it." Thus, in 2005, he organized the first world conference on the Mahdist doctrine, which he directly related to Iranian theocratic governing philosophy of Wahl al-Fakih, the dominance of religious power over secularism (Ahdiyyih, 2008: 27-36).

The current tensions between the US and Iran, following Washington's withdrawal from the Iranian nuclear deal, signed in Vienna in 2015, have also given new impetus to the development of Mahdist theory. According to posters distributed near mosques in the northwestern Iranian province of Zinjan, the delay in the emergence of al-Mahdi al-Montazar, the expected messiah, is due primarily to the conclusion of the Iranian nuclear program agreement. The poster depicts the spiritual leader of Ayatollah Ali Khamenei in a very close-up view, and much less so – US President Donald Trump. According to Iran newspaper, it is a public interpretation of a local leader of Ayatollah Ali Khamenei's statements on the Iranian Nuclear Program Treaty.

The Iranian print media notes that "the person who organized the posting was Ali Mohammadi – the head of one of the bases' headquarters, the Organization for the Repression Mobilization". Extremely cruel, suppressing anti-government demonstrations, the members of this pro-government militia are usually volunteers from small towns, mostly villages, with only their leaders receiving state salaries.

In an analysis of Mohammadi's actions, the media suggested that the local Islamic activist in question had influenced and practically repeated the words of Ayatollah Ali Khamenei that "the nuclear agreement would delay the emergence of Imam Mahdi" (Al Mahdi Wah al Itifaq Nahawi, Mahdi and the Nuclear Agreement, 13 July 2019, https://eldorar.com/).

4.4 Conclusion

It is apparent that visions of two minority antagonist-minded denominations clash with the assessment of the existence of the State of Israel. The first, the Evangelical, is a strong supporter of the Jewish state, and the second is the Ja'afarita, which strongly denies its existence. This type of confrontational and mutually-renouncing energy,

turned into a foreign policy of two countries with enormous potential, heralds a long and devastating fight. The problem is that they are self-generating, making US-Iran relations difficult to predict. If a confrontation schedule is to be drawn, it is zigzagging. The reason is that the social strata that bring to the top of the political pyramid in the two countries the subjects who materialize the philosophies of Judaism and Mahdism are not constantly present and often give way to their national competitors.

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5.1 Introduction

On 30 June 2014 the extremist organization "The Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant" or ISIL/ISIS has announced the establishment of a caliphate. With this act its leaders not only has shaken the region and the world, but also, they threw a strong challenge to the contemporary Islamic theologians. They formed the dogmatic case which brought to the surface of the group as a real entity which has long struggled leadership among the other terrorist formations.

After the announcement of the caliphate ISIS, it abolished "Iraq and the Levant" from its name and became the only "The Islamic state," and it does claim their uniqueness to their competitors. This terrorist organization has had a long history in Iraq. It has appeared on the map of extremist actors still living the former dictator Saddam Hussein. Its "birth date" is about 2000 and its creator is the Jordanian Abu Musaab Zarqawi. Formation begins with the name of a group of monotheism and jihad. They born in the city Zarka. The religious fanatic already gained combat experience in Afghanistan intends to overthrow the royal regime in Jordan, as it has perceived as un-Islamic. Precisely in this period has created closer links between ISIS and the most significant terrorist organization in Iraqi Kurdistan – Ansar al-Islam (AI). Subsequently, this battle Union became the backbone of the success of the idyll in Iraq. In 2003, the first mass strikes of the USA BBC have caused precisely positions against AI.

In 2005, the formation now has called Al Qaeda in Mesopotamia. Zarqawi has announced this in a letter to Osama bin Laden as a gesture of loyalty to him.

In 2006, The Al Qaeda in Iraq has declared the Islamic state in Iraq and formed a "government". Among its objectives is the announcement of the Caliphate, but then officially its leaders do not dare to do so. It has declared Ramadi city for its capital. Followed by the killing of Zarqawi in 2006 and the creation of an antialkaydist the

"Islamic councils' revival" of the local Sunni tribes, the American troops inflict a deadly blow to the Al Qaeda in the country. It has been totally marginalized as Sunni population and the majority of the rebel groups in the Central Iraq have confront to religious extremists.

5.2 The Caliphate – A stage at formation of the state and the dogmatic case

According to the theorists of the Al Qaeda the caliphate is the last stage of "maturation of the Islamic state." Perhaps, the most concentrated form a notion and a formation process for the state has developed in the study of Islamic thinker Abu Bakr Naji, *The management of a savagery*. The four stages of the Islamic formation of the state are the following (Chukov, 2007):

(1) *Stage a puncture*. Case of when they are attacking the polity institutions, the economic facilities, the production facilities, and especially those who are services for the population as the provision of electricity, the water and the supplies. The plans of the tacticians of an alkaydist have been the power institutions of the state of the sunites to be forced to withdraw them control of the national territory. This seems to be the most important stage since then outlines the actual shape of the territorial aspirations. Often behind the seemingly peripheral agglomerations or the businesses, it has concealed the desire of the jihadist tacticians to establish specific administrative center around which to form a territorial unit. The actions of ISIS in Iraq and Syria good revealed that the leadership of the terrorist group highlights the cities of Mosul and Deir Resort, respectively Iraq and Syria as both their local "capitals". Long Rakka city was been the bastion of the extremists.

(2) *Stage of uncontrolled chaos*. Case of the shaping territories which the state cannot control without it to have any real institutional control. Practically implement some kind of mixed, hybrid, secular state control. Regardless of ignoring its form and nature, the ISIS jihadists have forced to accept the consequences of management secular regime. This is especially true for the economy and with even greater force to the energy, which is the most capital-intensive sector. For example, long ISIS has controlled the three major dams in northern Syria – "Baath", "Euphrates" and "Tishrin". At the same time, they continue to function, albeit with reduced capacity. They supply electricity to consumers, no

matter that they are under state control. The most interesting is that the salaries of staff working in them continues to be paid by the government in Damascus.

The same applies to the oil production. For example, the religious fanatics sell the extracted material from their control wells in Syria of the few still operating factories and plants in the country. According to Sammy Abderrahmane from the Syrian Laboratory of Human Rights the price of a barrel of them target is reduced to 10 dollars per barrel. Meanwhile, the head of the organization the "Economic activities in Syria", Osama Kadi, believes that between the extremists and the regime in Damascus has signed a "meaningful agreement", which guarantees the purchase of Syrian oil by the government. Along with that, if buyers are Iraqi entrepreneurs who transported fuel in tanks, the price will jump to 20-40 dollars.[112] Usually, the affair in question of the Kurdish smugglers who subsequently resell to larger firms in Turkey, without the knowledge of the authorities.

(3) *Stage to management a savagery*. Implemented management of sites of the mujahideen, but outside the normal worldly standards. This stage remains unidentified and often enough some theorists even equate it to the final phase, i.e., the ideal state.

(4) *Stage of be able to*. This is the creation of an ideal medieval state, i.e., the Caliphate laws, courts, borders, and the other city regulations. ISIS medieval strictly rules only to the territories in which they believe is done unconditionally their power. So, for the first time the require public lynching militants stone the woman from the town of Tabaco, near Deir Ezor. The woman has accused of an adultery.

The great discussion among the experts whether ISIS will realize this form of statehood in the Iraqi territory. The expert from the Washington Institute for Near East Policy Michael Nayts notes that the Caliphate of ISIS became the richest terrorist organization in the poorest country in the world. The organization is controlled 60% of the oil reserves of Syria and two small wells in Iraq. The potential petro-caliphate yield is about 80,000 barrels per day. By the prices on world

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[112] Al Mirsad: Daash yuibiya en naphth- assistant Suras lil tuzhar irakiyun, The laboratory: The ISIS sale the Syrian oil of the Iraqi traders Safir, http://www.assafir.com/Article /5/362439. 30.11.2018.

markets, this means about $ 8 million per day. Logically, however, this does not happen, especially after the decision of the Security Council of the United Nations purchase of oil from terrorist organizations such as the Al Nusra and the IDYLL to be declared for a crime. The responding to the State Department in Iraq, Brett McGurk notes that even before the capture of Mosul that organization had revenues per month of $ 12 million, mainly by collecting illegal charges, racketeering and by the other criminal activities (Johnson, 2014). Normally, however, to be padded claims for the statehood costs to be aimed at ensuring the needs of the population living in the areas controlled. Mostly the affair the question to ensuring the services in those the regions which have been long marginalized by the central government. Exactly in them have to create a social vacuum to be filled by Islamist organizations such as the Muslim Brotherhood, Hamas, Hezbollah, which are expanding their popularity and the public support. Currently ISIS spend its revenue target to buy the loyalty of some tribal leaders or to bribe the chiefs of the other Islamist groups, which fought a side by side in Iraq. But the biggest challenge facing the new petrol state, however, remains the decision of the Baghdad government to suspend the payment of salaries of civil servants, for unlike Damascus. If ISIS disrupt the natural daily rhythm of life of the population in these areas, very soon the Caliphate will burst as quickly the inflated balloon. According Nayts it will most likely happen, because the new country cannot compete with the Iraqi state, whose daily production of the oil is about 3 million barrels, which is about 120 billion dollars in the annual revenue.

The announcement of the Caliphate of the ISIS leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi causes many reactions and the dogmatic disputes. Among the authoritative Islamic theologians of the famous in Cairo the Al Azhar University, widespread view that the Caliphate is preaching institution, not a political one. This refers to the professor in this university Karima Ahmed due to quote the prophetic hadith: "the Caliphate according to the prophetic program, then come the kings". Thus, according to another professor Dr. Abderazak Sanhua, Caliphate in the modern world is not possible.

Another the authoritative Facchini Alawi Amin directly states that the ISIS was created by the CIA and other the Western intelligence plants to cause a civil war in the Islamic world.

The actions of the leader of the ISIS contrary to the sharia norms

and thus obtaining the dogmatic nonsense. Ibrahim al-Badri, who is the real name of Al-Baghdadi has adopted the name of the first righteous Caliph – Abu Bakr and he has declared for the heir to the ideas of Ibn Time. The latter is a Syrian theologian from XIII-XIV century. He is the undisputed authority in the Islamic dogma and a consensus he is seen as one of the ideological pillars of the Salafi current. According to Ibn Time, however, after the four righteous caliphs in early Islam (632-660) should not to talk about "The Member caliphate" and for "The Member sharia." Then the holder of power is more appropriate to name the Malik, i.e. the King, not the Caliph. He is based on the prophetic hadith "The lasted only thirty years, then comes the kingdom."

In a video of Osama bin Laden in 2005 the latter has sworn allegiance to Mullah Omar, the leader of the Afghan Taliban. He explains the case and his behavior with the texts of Ibn Time. The latter notes that "the oath be taken before the man who conquered a country among countries in the world. This is sufficient and does not require fulfillment of the other conditions, while the leader is a Muslim". Such an approach is possible only within the hanafits and the Sunnitland, is the right dogmatic school. It is a "non-Arab" Sunni school.

At the same time, the radical theologians normativists as they mostly the hanbalits the right dogmatic school, they challenge this position and note that the prophetic hadith, "The Imams are always kureysh", is mandatory and so Mullah Omar cannot be a political leader. This yields a conflict between the radical "Arab" Sunni schools (hanbalits, shafayts and malikits) and the "non-Arab" hanafits, Sunni school on the question of the political leadership. Can nearabin be a political leader?[113]

For example, the late Mufti of Al-Qaeda al-Libi Atalay noted that "the imamatat of Mullah Omar is not 'big', and he is the master of the faithful only within its territory." As a results of this, arises a conflict between the warlords – Osama bin Laden and his mufti, today a both deceased. Bin Laden said that every Muslim must to give an oath of allegiance, i.e. the political oath. Otherwise, the Muslim remains the

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[113] The Hanafit legal dogmatic Sunni school is the only the Sunni school which that allows to non-Arab to be a political leader. For this reason, the majority of non-Arab, converted to the Islam Nations adopted precisely to the hanafit. It's about the Turks, Malaysians, Indonesians, Indians and others.

Jahan, ignorant, i.e. outside the faith.

Sheikh Asim Barkaui or Abu Mohammed al Makdasi, the spiritual father of Abu Musaab Zarqawi, also criticized the announcement of the caliphate. He said: "You sons of the groups and the organizations, the warriors of Allah, to know that after the announcement of this caliphate your struggle is no longer legitimate." In the dogmatic dispute his intervene the Head of the Directorate of Religious Affairs in Turkey Mehmet Gormez. He also rejects the legitimacy of the caliphate of Al-Baghdadi. However, he makes the other position. The Turkish theologian asserts that the Iraqi nothing to do with the family tree of the Turkish sultans who were called "The Caliphs." He believes that it is the rulers of the Ottoman Empire are the legal heirs of the caliphate, which was abolished in 1924.[114] Moreover, Gormez even believes that his opinion is the fairest, as he and the Directorate are descendants of the institution Sheikh al Islam. The latter was required to confirm the legitimacy status of the Turkish sultans. So, the senior Turkish theologian has claimed to the most faithfully legal dogmatic opinion in the Islamic world on the basis of the claim for possession of the inheritance rights of the former institution of the Chief Mufti in Ottoman Turkey. So according to him, the Caliphate during the Ottoman period is completely legitimate and not "the sleep" caliphate as perceived by many Arab scholars.

The Saudi King Abdullah also is condemning the ISIS. In its statement of the religious extremism of the group, he has expressed these thoughts: "It is a shame for these terrorists, what they did in the name of religion. They killed the soul, although The Allah forbids it to be killed. I am proud of it and I distribute it. For them the religion is the pretext of innocence. They deformed perception of the religion in its purity, virtue and humanity. They stitched it all bad qualities, thanks to the actions' tyranny and their crimes."[115]

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[114] Turkey's Top Cleric Call New Islamic "Caliphat" Illegal, Today's Zaman, http://www.todayszaman.com/national_turkeys-top-cleric-calls-new-islamic-caliphate-illegitimate_353734.html, 30.11.2018.

[115] Adu Para Cada wa al ulema umma…. I appeal to the leaders and the scholars of the nation …. Al Ikaz, http://www.okaz.com.sa/new/Issues/20140802/Con20140802715656.htm, 30.11.2018.

At the same time competitors from the Al Nusra announced firmly that he would soon announce the "emirate" which to be subject to Mullah Omar, as Al Qaeda led by Ayman Zauhiri.

5.3 The military aspects of a difference between the salafit-dzhihadst and the salafit-uhabist

Early in 2014 the main sponsors of the Islamic militants in Syria – Saudi Arabia and Qatar, felt that the ISIS is not an organization which is subject to control. The several experts stressed that the staffing its conception at the end of 2011, when the Syrian regime released many convicted Islamists from a prison in Sidnaya. Even some the leaders of the rival Islamist militias in the famous prison inmates. Remain guesses why the Intelligence Damascus launches this criminogenic contingent right now moment. In some analyzes was launch the thesis that actually the Islamist regime creates The Frankenstein, to prove that his opponents are actually the Al Qaeda. The aim is to alienate the public opinion and the international opposition. The proven experts found that so far, the Syrian army and ISIS are living in the "honeymoon." The battles are mostly with other insurgent groups. Even the key military victories of the national army last year primarily have due to the "unexpected tactical retreat" of the ISIS in the construction of a common defense line on the insurgents. Then the ISIS was ruled out by a military general of the opposition. After the seizure of oil wells and the gas fields in Eastern Syria, the two armies began real battles with each other.

The former "vali" of sham the Badia created by ISIS, Sheikh Maher Abu Ubeyda maintains that in fact it was the strategy of formation. The aim is to the first subject the other Islamist organizations being forced to flow into the structure of this terrorist group. Only in a second stage, the ISIS planned clashes with the regular Syrian army. It is necessary to add one more a reason for the "absorption" of the small formations ISIS – the financial. The Pro-Saudi and the Pro-Qatari formations are dependent on the external sponsor. At the moment when the slow monthly salary dissatisfied with their pay mercenaries immediately switch to the ISIS as a solvent.

The dissident of the ISIS has predicted that this formation will quickly retreat from its positions in Syria, because "it has departed from the goals it has set itself, which has become in the militia of mercenaries,

stealing oil and left the right path." According to him, the ISIS was tricked by the money and the material benefits, attacking and conquering the only oil and gas fields in Syria. He provides that the militants would leave Syria after about a year and will focus their efforts to the Saudi Arabia. The reason for this is the fact that many members of the ISIS's were subjects of the Saudi King Abdullah. In the country they had already created a "sleeper cells" in the Qasim province and the cities Khamis machine, Dammam and Hufuf. Not surprisingly, the military commander of the organization is Saudi Arabian Shakir Uahib, the spokesperson – his compatriot, the 26-year-old blogger Abu Mohammed al Adnan.[116]

Saudi Arabia has begun to restructure the backbone of the Syrian armed opposition after their apparent losses on the battlefield by the Syrian army. The Saudi sponsors launched with the leaders of the main Islamist groups called the "Document of the revolutionary honor." In it has spoken of the unity of the Islamic opposition against the regime of Damascus. This move is actually a type of test in which select for Riyadh muzhdahidinite of "acceptable" or "moderate" and "unacceptable" or "radicals." Very end of the document calls for the support of future the "civil state," which the authors do not mean a secular state and not contrary to the Islamic law. The only organizations that refuse to sign the relevant document are the ISIS and The Al Nusra. So those who sign such a platform for the future action, distinguishing simultaneously from the regime and the al hauaridzh, sectarians (as started calling ISIS) united in the "Islamic Front."

The renowned Pakistani analyst Hamid directly Zayd said: "The idyll and the terrorist groups around them are Sunnis, Kharijites, and heretics who serve and anti-Islam imperialist agenda." It is interesting that even such the famous Islamist thinkers close to Al Qaeda as Abu Tartus Bashir and Adnan al Arur said that this organization is not

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[116] Abu Maher himself Ubeyda on July 9 declared himself the caliph of Syrians who are in the ISIS. He calls the "Caliph" Abu Bakr Baghdadi degrading circulation the "Rephidim", the denied which used by the Sunni extremists to Shiites. Apparently he alludes to some Shia regard the origin of Baghdad. Halyabi, A., Kiyadi Daash ace sabik lil Safir: Saud al hadaf al mukbel lil Kansai, Former the Head of the ISIS: the Saudi Arabia is the next objective of the organization, Safir, http://www.assafir.com/Article/5/363 602, 30.11.2018.

professes the Sunni Islam[117]. In contrast to the contradictions between the ISIS and the Sheikh Yusuf Kardaui who embodies the traditional ideological dispute of the Salafism – The Muslim Brotherhood, the last two fakihi recreate dispute between different currents inside the Salafi school – the jihadism (the deviant alkaydizam) against the Wahhabism.

Strong effect achieved and the criticism of the American Arabist-Islamist Kenneth Barrett for the no sunist reveal nature of ISIS. He reveals to these sunist practices of the ISIS, namely the rape of women by the Shia and the Christian confessions, eating the internal organs of the dead enemies, practicing the sexual jihad in which the marriage shall be terminated after 30 minutes after its consumption, crucifixion of the Christian priests, strangulation of a woman to death, the killing of civilians and mass execution of prisoners (Barrett, 2014). For some of these crimes remains highly doubt, because they have not been identified by several the authoritative information source. The conjectures remain within the terminology and conceptual profiling crimes as the author ascribes to them the Salafists-Wahhabism as a whole, it is a leading doctrine of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Barnett has not told about the Salafists-jihadism, which is another layer of the radical Islam, according to the agreed EU classification. The point is that the publication is the website of Press TV, which is an Iranian broadcast media and always sharply critical materials conceptual opponent of the Islamic Republic of Iran – Saudi Arabia. The impression remains that in this case the negation of the ISIS is based from the Shiite-dogmatic positions.

The main differences between the ISIS and the "Islamic Front" in Syria (pro-saudite) can be summarized in the following several points:

(1) The ISIS kills all who profess the differently Islam from it, even and the Sunnis. The others do not kill infidels – Shiites, Alawites and Christians, if they do not attack.

(2) The other Salafists do not kill women, children and the old people, even if their relatives were killed or a fought against them. The ISIS kills these categories of the people according the text of The Koran: "Attack them as they have attacked you". So, the ISIS has perceived the

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[117] Adnan al Arur yarud but daash, Adnan al Arur strikes the ISIS Mustashar, http://almustashar-iq.net/index.php/permalink/34689.html, 30.11.2018.

collective guilt, which as the legal institute Sharia law is a remnant of the old Islam.

(3) The ISIS organize its own state – the courts, the daily behavioral principles, the short hair for men, the full coverage of the bodies of women, the ban of alcohol and tobacco, ban on the wearing modern clothes, etc. The other Salafis are aim the first overthrow the secular regime and only later take to create a state.

(4) The ISIS does not contact into direct the military confrontation with other mujahideen who they described as "the sufficient." Generally early ones in Syria are treated only the Al Nusra. The other Islamic militias they do not trust. Over time, however, the Al Nusra themselves in a category of the apostates. The battle of the city Shahi, Syria, which is a bastion of the Al Nusra in July 2014 proves this fact. The captured fighters to Al Nusra to be forced to disarm and then to go to the ranks of the ISIS. Even they are forced to change the field and the religion training of the ISIS because the commanders of the ISIS do not trust of their training camps.

(5) The most members of the "Islamic Front" Syrians until the ISIS are Iraqis and foreigners. For example, one of the leaders of the operation to capture The Cair gas field, near the city of Palmyra, Syria Abu al Lachemann and alma Galha Abu al Alma, the latter is known for his nickname "the repentant singer." Of the nicknames of their shows that are mujahideen with German passports.

(6) The membership of the ISIS and the Al Nusra is much more complicated than in the other Islamic groups. To be accepted member of these groups require consensus of the members of the operational management. Then pass a course in the military science and the religious education, consisting of 3 to 6 months.

(7) The members of the idylls always dressed in the Afghan clothes, they never smoke and they sit not down to a smoker, they do not listen to music, they have a long hair and they are not shaved, while the other mujahideen who smoke, haircut and in to wear the modern clothes.

(8) The ISIS recognize not the national borders, while the "Islamic Front" is a Syrian and even comply with the limits of internal administrative division.

(9) The ISIS has influence in the North-Eastern Syria and parts in Aleppo, Edleb, Rakka and the Deir Ezor, and in the separate villages around Damascus. The "Islamic Front" is distributed evenly across Syria.

(10) The ISIS applies the Islamic law as soon as it considers that the priority is the creation of an Islamic state – the caliphate. The "Islamic Front" first wants to overthrow the regime of Bashar al-Assad and only later will create the Islamic state.

(11) The ISIS is trying to conquer the oil wells, as there are limited funding sources from the Persian Gulf. The "Islamic Front" applies the classic military tactic played in the formation of fronts, as it is entirely dependent on external funding – mainly from Saudi Arabia and Qatar.

(12) The mujahideen of ISIS have a great military experience, as they are former fighters in the other countries of the global jihad, namely Afghanistan, Iraq, Bosnia, Chechnya and others. The members of the "Islamic Front" gain experience from the date of the outbreak of the revolution in Syria, that since 2011.

(13) A number of the experts believe that the ISIS was created largely by the regime in Damascus and therefore fight fiercely against him. Another is the case with the regime of Nouri Maliki in Iraq, where unfolds all it's the military might.

5.4 Scars of the Caliphate state – Denial of the national identity

The ISIS in its actions is downright the xenophobic in the broadest sense. The many experts perceive it primarily as the anti-Shia organization, although their hatred against all the ethno-confessional minorities. Wherever it conquered areas populated by Shiite it's the members drove them or impose and the Christians a tax the "jizya" ever paid in the Islamic countries from all non-Muslims. A similar tactic is practiced both in Iraq and in Syria. The often actions when are against by the Sunnis who are suspected of collaboration with the rival militias. For example, were driven 31,000 inhabitants of the town of Shahi, former bastion of the Al Nusra and which was captured after the fierce battles. These actions have been taken against the population of the surrounding villages the eastern of Aleppo. On 19 July 2014 about 2,100

families were forced to leave their homes when the fighters of ISIS subject them to attacks, the kidnapping and theft of their property.[118]

However, they focus first few strikes against followers of the Christ remained in Mosul, the city of more than 30 churches. Some the Christian churches date back 1,500 years. On 19 July 2014 the extremists have driven the Christians from Mosul. In a statement published on the Internet, fanatics give 24 hours of 25-thousand followers of this religion in the city "to adopt the Islam, to pay 'jizya' (without a specified size – note. the auth.) or to leave the city." The provided an option to pay the tax only medieval figurative. In the position of the ISIS is stated that henceforth "the property of the Christians are the property of the state and that they should leave the village with their clothes." The ISIS violates sharia norm followers of the Scripture professing monotheism – the Christians and the Jews. It performed segregation gesture of marking on the door of the tabernacle of the infidel's letter "nun", the first letter of the word Christian, para shitty. Moreover, it is written the sentence "This house is owned by the Islamic state" (Masihiyun, 2014). The Archbishop to Kaldea of Iraq and the world Louis Sacco notes that this is the first complete cleansing of Mosul of the Christians.[119] Only 25 families have dared to stay in the city. Eventually, after the disapproval of the local population, especially the other Sunni insurgent groups, the Christians have defined the sum of $ 450 a month to allow them to stay in their homes.

In early August 2014 the ISIS expressed the same xenophobic attitudes towards professed the yazedit religion of the Kurdish minority, as did in August 2007 its predecessor the Al Qaida in Iraq. It is speaking of a hatred of a minority denomination in the town Sandzhar. According to some interpretations of Islamic in the question religious community worshiped the al-Shaitan, the devil, treating him like an angel with the image of a peacock. The same goes for some the Christian

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[118] Dick camel khauiya min sukaniha …..Whole the villages were emptied of their inhabitants, Habar Press, http://alkhabarpress.com/tag/%D8%B7%D8%B1%D8%AF-2100-%D8%B9 % D8, 30.11.2018.

[119] Patrick: Are Awale mara fi Tarih al Iraq. The Archbishop: For the first time in the history of Iraq. Sada al Balad, http://www.gulfairco.com/1058731, 30.11.2018.

interpretations that equate the peacock with the Lucifer. Then with the car-bombs have killed about 800 people and the attack was the bloodiest ever in the history of the Arab country. Seven years later the religious extremists destroy sacred sanctuary for the denomination as the daughter of the fourth righteous Caliph Ali bin Abi Talib – Zeinab and threaten to drive away from their hometowns around 350,000 the yazedit followers.[120]

Frankly, the anti-shariat actions of the ISIS has complement and the ethnic cleansing of the Mosul, the cleansing to aimed at the Kurdish inhabitants who profess the Islam in its Sunni form. According Side Mamuazini – the Representative of the Democratic Party of Kurdistan (Messaoud Barzani) on 22 July 2014, the extremists to do an ultimatum to nearly half a million people in the city of the Kurdish origin to leave the village or else be killed.[121] All this will cause another wave of emigration, especially to the territories controlled by the Peshmerga, the Kurdish troops.

To ask a question when it will attack the State of Israel in the Tweeter, one of the leaders of the ISIS notes that for his organization the first target are apostates, murdadiyn, i.e. Shia and the Sunni-traitors, then comes the order of the original infidels para asliyn case, i.e., the Christians and the Jews.

Already in the first days of the occupation of Mosul the extremists have created the "urban paper" kind of statute which regulates the habits and behavior of the population. In its very clearly says that from now people will live in the city as he lived in the time of Abu Bakr Kureishi (632-634). Firstly, it is a ban on alcohol, tobacco, carrying modern clothes, the women should wear the burka, to go outside the home only when needed and the prohibition to use perfumes and lipsticks. The five prayers a day are required for this purpose religious police monitor whether traders have closed their shops during the ritual. Obviously, it

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[120] Saytarat al musalahin but sindzhar... The control over armed people .... Iraq Sandzhar Press. http://www.iraqpressagency.com/?p=80149&lang=ar, 30.11.2018.

[121] Abdullah, D., Baad al masihiin daash yandor acres given Moseley, After the Christians the ISIS warns Kurds in Mosul Sharq al-Awsat, http://www.aawsat.com/home/article/143976, 30.11.2018.

is practiced in smaller cities like Rakka, while in the Mosul millionth few members of the ISIS fail to strictly follow the implementation of this religious practice. According to the story to left the town professor of history Buheyra Sabuni after the meeting with the Rector of the Mosul University, the representatives of the organization said that the first step to comply with the new conditions will be the closure of the Law Faculty and the creation of individual student flows for men and women. Furthermore, the formation specialists will review the curricula of academic institutions and if necessary, will be closed and more the faculties (Abbas, 2014).

Obviously, invention of the deviant Islam, which is practiced ISIS application except the circumcision for women (usually practiced in areas the peripheral Islam – Yemen, Nigeria, etc.) and a kind of the "janissaries' law." The caliphate in Mosul authorities have informed the population that should be factored into their ranks. The exact text of the order is: "If a family has three sons, the mandatory one must enter into the composition of the ISIS. Otherwise, the family will have to pay a monthly fee."[122]

Another perversion of the religious extremists in Mosul is the use of the "marriage jihad", a phenomenon known among jihadist groups in Syria. In 2013, the Tunisian Salafi preacher issued a fatwa under which women can perform jihad, satisfying the sexual needs of the mujahideen. It has caused dozens of the young Muslim women, mainly from Tunisia to go to Syria for the purpose. According to the Egyptian Ministry of waqfs and the prominent Islamic dogmatists it's kind of slavery and legalized trade in white flesh. In late July 2014, just before the Ramadan Bayram, the terrorists of ISIS invited residents of Mosul to provide their daughters called the "Marriage jihad."[123]

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[122] Majlis al AMH Kallik but..... The Security Council expresses concern about Akhbarak,
http://www.akhbarak.net/news/2014/07/23/4725580/articles/15947659,
Accessed 30.11.2018.

[123] Abderrahmane, W., Al aukaf al masriya. The Ministry of waqfs of Egypt Sharq al-Awsat, http://www.aawsat.com/home/article/150906, 30.11.2018.

5.5 The ethno-nationality hybrid

In essence the creation of a caliphate is a prototype of the Iraqi Sunitistan, which is derived from a kind of the Sunni intifada. The Iraqi Sunnis across its regional, professional and ideological palette are marginalized by the authoritarian government of this the Prime Minister Nouri Maliki. They asked of him his place in the power and formed a common front.

In fact, the experts say that the ISIS formed only 30% of the Sunni troops as dominant nuclei are those of the indigenous tribes, the former Baathists, the officer's army of former dictator Saddam Hussein and the several insurgent groups as the "Ansar Sunnah ace," the army "Nakshbendi", the "Tauro's tishrin" and others. Special the Sunni tribal leaders once were attracted by the Americans in the so-called "madzhalis ace sahua" the "Advice revival" which aimed to counter the Al Qaeda, i.e., the Americans paid the local sheiks and their guaranteed privacy. After their withdrawal at the end of 2011, Nuri Maliki refused to continue this practice and the consequently tribal leaders joined the Sunni extremists. It was clear the confessional confrontation – the Sunnis against the Shiites. Currently, the United States considered that they should be formed again the "Advice of rebirth." According to expert estimates they should number about 100,000 people. The issue of their funding remains open.

According to the American sources, the total number of the ISIS is about 10,000 people, 3,000 in Iraq and around 7,000 in Syria. According to a former field commanders of the ISIS Syrian Maher Abu Ubeyda, the members of the organization in Syria are no more than 10,000 people and killed in this country are about 2,000 fighters. The Moroccan Interior Minister Mohammed Hisad noted that 1,122 compatriots fought in the composition of the ISIS are Moroccans with the European passport in the organization and the other Islamist militias in Iraq and Syria were about 150-200 people. 128 people have already returned to their homeland, more than 200 were killed and more than 20 people have committed the suicide bombings. As opposed to other parts of the Arab world, the Minister Hisad noted that the announcement of the caliphate was of a great public resonance in his country. Particularly among the Salafi circles. In this respect even appears the Islamist entity whose acronym in the Arabic tries to imitate ISIS. In the Arabic language is the last DAAH and newly the Moroccan

organization called DAMS. The experts predict that stands for "The Islamic State in the Islamic Maghreb" or "the Islamic state in Egypt and the Maghreb."[124]

The sociologists add that the majority of the Moroccan jihadists are called the "Khalidzhie", i.e., Moroccans who live and work in the Gulf. In their homeland they begin to feel uncomfortable. The Moroccan scholar of the Islamist movements Idris odd notes that "the kingdom turns grave for the members of ISIS after their return home with its parties, the civil society and the moderate Islamic culture." The expert adds that the Moroccan jihadist group has come to the fore particularly in Iraq, but not in Afghanistan (Al Tahami, 2014). It is possible to created a distrust of the Al Qaeda of Zauhiri as the successor to Osama bin Laden, who personnel marginalized the Moroccan group in military operations in Afghanistan. There the subjects of the king are mostly noncoms and not actively operating on the battle line. Therefore, the Moroccans are grouped in particular of the ISIS, but not of the Al Nusra, which is indicated by the competitor and Ayman Zawahiri – the authentic representative of Al Qaeda. Thus, the ISIS advantage of the desire of those Arabs absorbed the conservative mores of the Arabian Peninsula to perform "miracles" and prove to be heroes on the battlefield.

The Chechens are specific contingent in the ranks of the Islamists in the Middle East. Predominantly the presence of this ethnic community in Syria is formed in two social groups:

(1) The former students who come to study the Islamic religion and the Arabic language;

(2) The emigrants from the Valley Panki who are undesirable of the current pro-Russian Chechen President Ramazan Kadyrov, Georgia and Russia. Initially, the leaders of the "Islamic Emirate of the Caucasus" does encourage not the young people to go to the Chechen Jihad in Syria, because they believed that it must first be free their country. Subsequently, however, encourage them, because they take their stay in the Middle East as a form of training and tempering in the

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[124] Dams but khuta daash. The DAMS through the ISIS. Al vito, http://www.vetogate.com/1088756, 30.11.2018.

real battles.[125]

The Chechens remain divided between the ISIS and the Al Nusra. The total number of Chechens in this Arab country is estimated at about 200-300 people. One of the legendary commanders of the IDYLL (the emir of the North Front) is Abu Omar al Hihani.[126] The local muzhdahidini even call it the "Defense Minister of Syria." The little battle group calls itself the "Sabri" and is also oriented towards the ISIS. At the same time, Abu Mohammed al Dagestan – the leader of the group the "Caucasus Emirate" operating in Syria, strongly supports the Al Nusra. The reason for this is that he is loyal to the Al Qaeda of Ayman Zauhiri and he is named as the Al Nusra' legitimate representative of the Al Qaeda in Syria. Heself al Dagestan sharply attacked Abu Omar al Hihani, accusing him of that he has not enough combat experience as coming to jihad in Syria.

The battle glory of the Chechens in Syria is the responsibility of the specific brigade which called the "Al muhadzherin wa al Ansar." The leader is Salahedin al sHihani and his deputy is Abu Asma al Dagestani. In early June 2014 he released a declaration. In the declaration said that despite signs he has no intention of leaving the Syrian territory and remains active on the battlefield in a battle against the regime of Bashar al-Assad.[127]

There are also small groups of the Chechens such as the "Jane paragraph hilaf," whose creator and commander is Seyfu Alla al Hihani. He was killed at the beginning of 2014. He was sworn allegiance to the

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[125] Limada yukatilun ash shishaniyun fi Surya. Why fight the Syrians in Syriaл Islamiyun, http://islamion.com/news/11501/. Accessed 30 November 2018.

[126] Abu Omar al Shisha is Georgian and his real name is Tarhan Patrikashvili. He was orn in 1968 in the village Birkiyani, Pankiskata Valley, Georgia. His mother is the Pankiskite Chechens. He professes Christianity to 42 years. He was participated in the First and the Second Chechen Wars. In 2008, he joined the Georgian army in the conflict with Russia. Then he goes to fight in Chechnya. When he was passed through Egypt and Yemen he went to join the ranks of the ISIS in Syria. They say always carries with it a suicide belt. Majali, N., Abu Omar al-spit .... Abu Omar bus Elaf, http://www.elaph.com/Web/News/2014/7/919697.html, 30.11.2018.

[127] Bayan al Awale Lil 'mukatilin al azhanib. The first declaration of foreign fighters. Safir, http://www.assafir.com/Article/5/353927, 30.11.2018.

Al Nusra, shortly before being liquidated. It is interesting to note that in April 2014 the fighting in the North-Western Syria, in particular against the city Kasab, is led by several the Islamist groups whose local warlords are Chechens. The case in point about the local emir "Ansar ah sham" Abu Musa ah Hihani on "Dzhunud ash sham" – Muslim ah Hihani.[128] Interesting is that the field commander of the "al-Ahrar ah ham" in the vicinity of the neighboring city of Latakia is the Syrian Abu Hassan at Tabucchi. He also holds a Chechen connection, because he is brother of Yasser as Suri. The latter is the only Syrian involved in the terrorist attack at the Moscow theatre "Dubrovka" in November 2012, when a Chechen extremists group led by Movsar Baraev held three days more than 850 hostages.

It is interesting that the experts talk about the Uzbek group entitled the "Imam Bukhari" and whose leader Mohammed al Tashkent also killed around Aleppo. The Chechen fighters have boasted incredible combat capability and the extreme cruelty. Among their traditions is to take not a prisoner. For example, in August 2013 namely the Chechens brigade "Al muhadzhirun not ya al Ansar" they failed due to suicide bombing to conquering the strategic Mazak airport near to Aleppo and to suspend the advance of the Syrian army. Witnesses noted that the Mujahideen have killed all the captured soldiers.[129]

After the announcement of the caliphate and call the Caliph Abu Bakr Baghdadi the Muslims to return to the lands of the Islam, the ISIS has declared that they were joined by 370 Mujahideen. Among them is the smallest terrorist organization "Abu Muhdzhen at Taifi" of Libya, which sent 50 people to the ISIS. That extremist entity participated in the battle for the Libyan city Benghazi on the side of the Islamists against the forces of General Khalifa Haftar.

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[128] Muslim al-spit He is the former Soviet troops in Mongolia. Participates in the First and Second Chechen war. He became a member of the Advisory Council of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria in the leadership of Aslan Maskhadov. Fights and legendary field commander Khattab Saudi (his real name is Tamir Sueylam) He is one of the organizers and planners of suicide terrorist attack in Vladikavkaz, North Ossetia in November 2008.

[129] Al Matar choir yadrab Mazak al Askari. The free Army struck military airport in Mazak. Al Arabiya, http://www.alarabiya.net/ar/arab-and-world/syria/2013/, 30.11.2018.

To note is the partial or the moderate support for the ISIS after the announcement of the caliphate. At this stage the battle between traditional center presented by the Al Qaeda of Ayman Zauhiri outweighed over a periphery embodied by the caliphate of Abu Bakr Baghdadi. The oath of allegiance to al-Baghdadi was declared by the group the Al Qaeda in the Maghreb under the leadership of Mufti Sheikh and the organization Abu Asim Abdullah al. Experts note that it has received a split in the ranks of extremists, as field commander Abu Musaab Abu Udud remains the loyal to Zauhiri. At the same time, support to the ISIS declared in Gaza a small group the "Ansar al beit makdas' group "Ansar al-Shariah" in Yemen led by Maamun Hatim part of the Taliban in Pakistan under the leadership of Abu Yazid al Kurasani, the part of the "Ansar al-Shariah" in Tunisia. On 25 July a small Sudanese Salafi group which was called the "Itisam was Kitab wa Sunnah" splinter in 1991 by the Muslim Brotherhood, also declared allegiance to the new caliph.

5.6 The EU current measures at fighting jihadism of the ISIS

As a nearest geographical region Europe is directly injured by the strengthening of the terrorist wave in the neighboring Middle East. For this the experts use the term "returned from ..." which to apply more to Europe than to the very Arab region and individual countries in it. The EU opposition against the jihadists in particular those of the ISIS was assigned to the group, it was headed by the chairman of the general "anti-terrorism" in the EU Gilles de Kershyov. Made the specific plan whose contents remains open. Empirical data, the analysis and targeted measures are summarized in a report in a volume of 14 pages. The document shaded signs of opposition to the EU and the jihadists and to have formulated various current proposals referred at the Union and the national level. In general terms the recommendation is to set a time-consuming job. The report noted: "The Europeans must be prepared in the long-time plan to achieve full coordination among themselves and attract their work all state institutions to allow their actions to be effective" (Ibrahim, 2014).

In late 2013 a group of the EU with de Kershyov at the head started realizing of visits in individual the member states of the union, and in some Arab countries such as Qatar, Saudi Arabia and Lebanon. de

Kirshyov requests information about the main topics of discussion "The Center for Intelligence Analysis" to the EU, even before he has meeting with individual heads of countries in the Gulf. This approach is becoming a major prerequisite for businesslike meetings, as they are cleared the burdensome political elements. Of the Europeans is clearly that always seems bifurcation the "national security – the human rights" as a severe problem in this type of conversation.

The most disappointing are the contacts in Doha. It is clear that Qatar has no intention to cooperating effectively with the Europeans. The result of the talks between the two countries is estimated to be the "complete zero." The antiterrorists EU have reached the conclusion that the reason for such behavior is that the Emirate will own internal problems with the mujahideen fighting in Syria. Their main goal is the overthrow of Bashar Assad and not that of the Emir. At the same time, Kirshyov said in his report that the "cooperation with the Qatari authorities remains necessary because this is a country which funded various groups fighting in Syria."

In turn, Saudi Arabia occupies considerably more balanced position relative to that of its neighbor. The state itself has claims to play a role in global fight against terrorism and extremism. Therefore, in 2004 an international conference the Saudi King offered to create a "Global Center for Combating Terrorism" and its headquarters is in Riyadh. In all cases, the authorities in the country remind for its proposal not so much as waiting to take the "baton" in the world in the fight against this social evil, as proof that the state not contribute to the spread of terrorism. In this case, the Saudi authorities express full willingness to cooperate to jihadists to counter in media propaganda. Riyadh has offered specific videos that are effective tools for the opposition propaganda the ideas of the radical Islamists. The Saudis have expressed readiness to send experts to work with satellite channels broadcasting from Europe and directly calling for participation in the jihad among the large Sunni communities in Europe. The EU representatives have turned their attention to the difficult fight against TV programs which are broadcast from the territory of third countries. At the same time, they reached agreement for the implementation of joint activities, including in this direction.

The particularly clear focus has been placed on the funding of the jihadist groups. The Europeans have proposed to create a "The

Roadmap" which have measures to stop the financial flows to the mujahideen. Attention is paid to the need for the legislative initiatives, particularly on the regulation of the work of charitable foundations. The latter must clearly show that they fund terrorist entities. In this regard, it should be noted that in May 2014 was held a seminar with the participation of the European and the American security experts, who have identified concrete steps in this direction. The Europeans have expressed satisfaction that they had received the promise of the American colleagues for providing effective pressure on the institutions of the Gulf States in this regard.

However, it is noteworthy that the Gulf States hold their own judgment about the actions of the Europeans in the security and defense of the human rights. The risk of conflict between the criteria of the two countries remains too high and inconsistencies are not rare. An example is when in June 2014 at the request of the Saudi Arabia leaders of the Cooperation Council of the Gulf States (CCGS) have canceled a joint meeting with the EU at the ministerial level. The reason is that the Europeans have unreasonably interfered in the internal affairs of Bahrain, because of the human rights violations in the kingdom. In fact, underlying the differences between the two organizations stand mismatches in the evaluation of specific political situations. The case in point to analysis of the events surrounding the Iranian nuclear program and priorities for dealing with the crisis in Iraq and the attitude towards the regime in Damascus. The CCGS leaders defend the view that the Europeans and the Americans are too "soft" to Iran's nuclear ambitions and the government of Bashar al-Assad.

Very important and essential measure in the European counterterrorism efforts was the compilation of the "black lists" that facilitate the adoption of decision 1,267 of the Security Council of the United Nations. This figure needs to be compiled and the national "prohibitive lists" of persons and organizations participating in or facilitating terrorist activity in Iraq and Syria. The case in point about the freezing of their funds or the ban travel across the national territories. The general concept of the EU is that these lists must be protected and applied to as many partners.

Gilles de Kershyov offers two initiatives which have been studied and evaluated by a team of the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Catherine Ashton. The first suggestion is the

"Consultative Group on Strategic links to Syria." Its leading feature is to become a kind of the "Headquarters media war against the jihadists", especially to those centers that recruit the jihadists-volunteers. The main target group will be specific the national Islamic community. The idea is to fend off efforts to send the local community members in Iraq and Syria in the ISIS and other the Islamist groups. The report recommends using to the British experience is the best in Europe in this respect. For this purpose, the EU officials have already carried out meetings with representatives of the companies "Google," "Tweeter" and "Facebook" to ask for assistance in this regard.

The second major task is to mobilize humanitarian aid to victims in areas controlled by the jihadists in Iraq and Syria. The idea is that the Muslims in the Middle East feel the help of Europe and the international community not to support extremists. The activation to raise aid going to through the "Electronic portal of the EU." In this connection it should be stepped up in various the civic and the volunteer organizations.

The EU representatives have made a number of meetings with their colleagues in the United States. All dispositions are consistent with them. The Americans said that they embrace the European mujahideen for much more dangerous to the security of the United States than their own mujahideen. This is due to the fact that the citizens of the majority of the Member States of the EU travel to the United States with the free visa. Moreover, the biggest "exporting countries" for the European muzhdahidini fall precisely in this list.

The territory of 15 Member States of the EU has already established the centers for the collection and analysis of data on all travelers to and from these countries. For this purpose, the bankroll are utilized. In this respect, the Turkey has declared that its prohibition list has about 5,000 Europeans as it is constantly updated.

The European experts have asked the Middle Eastern partners quickly and comprehensively to fill data to the Interpol for persons who are suspected of being involved in the terrorist activity.

The EU cooperation with Lebanon is rated a lake the fruitful and the behavior of the authorities in Beirut as very productive. The Lebanese authorities want to help to build a special prison to the detain muzhdahidini to be the heavy duty. Furthermore, they want to create a special military unit to monitor the borders of the state. The idea is to

prevent the passage of the mujahideen in the national territory. The special emphasis is placed on the monitoring of the middle part of the Valley Bekaa, through which goes the international road Beirut-Damascus. Also requested the financial assistance and the professionals who to build the special lifts and the dispatch points for the electronic surveillance. In parallel, the authorities have requested assistance and the adoption of the specific legislative texts as they felt that the current law on combating terrorism is outdated. The Lebanese side is asked for the assistance in the training of judges and prosecutors dealing for this complex criminal matters.

The problem with Turkey remains the most difficult to resolve. The reason for this is not only a 900 km long border with Syria. The EU has asked to Ankara to create a single operating electronic portal as a focal point for the prosecution of foreigners who have participated in the jihad in Syria. The Turkish side has given its agreement in a principle to this proposal.

The great attention is paid to the financing of terrorism in the EU report. Then in August 2010 has created a special unit to deal with this matter. Until now has more than 5,000 investigations. Moreover, the focus of attention is to increase the efficiency of customs in each individual Member State of the EU. The report notes that some of the muzhdahidinite to try to bring in their own a country the prohibited items such as weapons, an ammunition, an explosives and bankroll.

5.7 Conclusion

It is too early to say what will be the fate of ISIS and its caliphate. If no symptoms appear to strengthen internal discontent against the actions of extremists in the occupied territories, then in globally the jihadist movement in the Middle East, the jihadist movement marked the rise. The serious experts predict that hardly the pseudo state of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi will be able to survive in the medium term. Not only the people, but until recently some the allies of the Idyll began to distinguish themselves from the extremists. To expulsion of the Christians blowing up monuments of the historical and the cultural heritage of Iraq as the tomb of the prophet Yunus and several the medieval minarets apparently become the social implosion into an explosion of apparent intolerance of the terrorists. The caliphate in Iraq

and Syria are a kind of a bubble, which has blown by the paralysis of the traditional country. The new forms of the natural and the contemporary formation of state are the real brake of a constantly flowing extremism in the region. What will be the practical dimensions? To some extent, the answer to this question were given by the events in Egypt. The patriarchy, the tribalism and the radically regionalism are the strongest to distinguish the Middle East even such the agrarian societies such as those in the Latin America (Hristov, 1999). If the political culture and the specifics of the process of political sociological in the Arab societies to channel dynamics of the restructuring of the state shaped the future leader and determine authoritarianism as its natural behavioral trait.

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6. Kurdish migration waves to Rojava (Northern Syria)

6.1 Introduction

The accumulation of huge Kurdish masses on the territory of modern Syria is the result of millennial waves of migration, selected by the turbulent events in the Middle East. Famous French Orientalist Olivier Roa uses the word "macro-ethnicity" to refer to the Kurds during the French mandate in Syria.[130] To explain the meaning of the term, the researcher uses the methodological tool "comparison." In this regard, he deals with two geometrically located communities, each of which has its own structure. Roa accepts the hypothesis that the diverse internal structure of the Kurds is very similar to the incredible Central Asian ethnic palette. In itself, it is a fan of many social groups of different sizes, before flowing into the even larger ethnoreligious fan of Syria and the entire Middle East.

6.2 The Kurdish settlements in Syria

The first permanent Kurdish settlements in Syria are associated with the stay of Kurdish military garrisons in Damascus. It is about the 13th century and the wars that Saladin waged against the Crusaders. In addition, individual small groups of Kurds have often been deported outside the lands of their historic homeland. Most often this was due to punishment. This is how Kurdish communities emerged in Damascus, Horan, the northern part of the West Bank, and even in Jordan. This most often happened on the way of pilgrims traveling to the holy lands of Mecca and Medina. Kurdish troops have enforced the settlement they have inhabited, but have also provided security for the pilgrimage column. Very often Kurds from other countries have joined the Kurdish core of the local janissary corps, perceiving it as a specific social environment. Thus, over time and the constant influx of Kurds from

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[130] Roy, O. (1991). *Ethnicities and Politics in Central Asia* [Ethnies et politique en Asie centrale], REMMM. pp. 59-60; pp. 17-36.

Diyarbakir, Erbil, and Kirkuk, the famous Hai al-Akrad, the Kurdish district of Damascus, was formed. In 1930 it numbered 12,000 people.[131]

During the 17th and 18th centuries, the High Gate sought to settle by force in various areas, in accordance with its plans for a well-structured tribal settlement throughout the Middle East. For example, the concentration of the Kurds in Diyarbakir was planned by the Ottoman authorities, as it was strictly monitored by the governor Mardin. One of the areas to which some of the tribes were sent was Raqqa. However, they did not stay there for long, as apparently the land there was not suitable for grazing the herds with which a significant part of the Kurdish tribes in Syria subsisted. The High Gate often used the services of the Shamar Arab tribe, which attacked the Kurds in northern Syria when they refused to pay taxes to the sultan. An important role in warming relations between the Ottoman authorities and a kind of federation of Kurdish tribes was played by its new leader, Ibrahim Pasha. In the process of improving relations, it came to the point that Ibrahim Pasha committed himself in front of the High Gate to fill with Kurds the composition of the elite Ottoman Hamidiya, created in the late 19th century. It is no coincidence that some of these elite soldiers of the sultan joined the Kurdish uprisings against the Young Turks. According to Rondot, his successor, Mahmoud Bey has never had such authority among the Kurdish tribe.[132] This is the reason why the Kurds began to look at the sultan with hostility.

Towards the end of the 19th century, the Kurds in Damascus also established their own urban Notabilitet. These are people who manage to reach a high-status social status. Such were the landowners who managed to buy large tracts of land around the Syrian capital. In addition to the activities of such large Kurdish clans as Yusuf, Shamsedin, and Abid, a second neighborhood with a predominantly ethnic population was formed. Its name was Suk Saruja, whose name suggested that there were more people living there who were engaged in

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[131] Zelter, M., *Minorities in Iraq and Syria, Peoples and Cultures of the Middle East*, New York: Random House. 1969, pp. 17-22.

[132] Rondot, P. (1937). The hill tribes of earlier Asia. Some social aspects of the Kurdish and Assyrian populations, *Bulletin d'Études Orientales* [Les tribus montagnardes de l'Asie antérieure. Quelques aspects sociaux des populations kurdes et assyriennes, *Bulletin d'Études Orientalesq*], VI, pp. 1-49.

trade. This was the first neighborhood built in the 19th century outside the walls of the Old City of Damascus. According to the Lebanese Philip Huri, the creation of the neighborhood in question was not so much an expression of the desire for ethnic identification of the community, as the formation of a clientelistic network in the literal sense of the word of wealthy Kurdish landowners and pastoralists.[133]

At the same time, such a significant Kurdish community was formed in Syria's second-largest city, Aleppo. The internal migration waves of Afrin and Jazeera, mainly due to economic reasons, strengthened the presence of the Kurds in the village.[134] Thus emerged the Kurdish neighborhood of Sheikh Maksud, which played a key role in the division of Aleppo between the opposition and the regime in 2013-2016 during the country's civil war.

In the first half of the 20th century, it was very difficult to talk about the Kurds in Syria as a whole. It is about groups/tribe, clan, or family, as well as individuals. Ethnic qualifications remain in the background. Due to their strong fragmentation, it was much more relevant for the Kurds to have some social, political, geographical, regional, or sectarian characteristics in order to identify the group. For example, in the Kurd Doug region alone, there are reports of the existence of five major Kurdish tribes, namely the Amikan, Bian, Sheikhan, Shikakan, and Jam. Other, smaller tribes were Robaria, Harzan, Koshar, and Hastian. At the same time, there were twenty-six Yazidi tribes in the region with a total population of just over 1,000, who were vassals of the already mentioned small tribe of Robaria.[135]

This feature of the community has long influenced the assessment of external factors towards the Kurds. Such an approach has been noticeable since the time of the French mandate in Syria. Probably this feature distinguishes the Kurds from other large local communities and therefore their minority status brings them significantly more privileges.

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[133] Khoury, P. S. (1984). Syrian urban politics in transition: the quarter of Damascus during the French Mandate, *IJMES*, pp. 507-540.

[134] *Op. cit*.

[135] Lescot, R. (1940/1988). Kurd Dagh and the Moraud movement, *Studia Kurdica* [Le Kurd Dagh et le mouvement Mouroud, *Studia Kurdica*], pp. 1-5, pp. 101-26.

The authors of the in-depth study of modern Syrian Kurdistan *The question of Syrian Kurdistan – reality, history, Mythologisation* argue that in the twentieth century there are two main waves of migration to northern Syria. One is expansionist and the other is restrictive.[136] They form the current profile of the Kurdish community in Syria.

6.3 The French colonial authorities

The first took place during the French colonial mandate, namely in the period 1925-1939. The French authorities not only organized local life, but also introduced new concepts and ideas about the relationship between center and periphery, which are an important component in building each of the new power mechanisms. Instead of the traditionally strong vertical ties typical of Eastern states and, in this case, the Ottoman Empire, the colonial authorities tried to encourage an alternative model based on "horizontal, corporate, and national lines."[137] To a large extent, it is a question of institutionalizing the European formula for the nation-state in the Syrian and Lebanese case, looking for the appropriate place for minorities in it. Concretizing the place of the latter is a difficult moment of transition from the Ottoman-Turkish Millis system, in which the ethnoreligious political center is located high above the governed, to the new homogeneously built Middle Eastern states. The Kurdish community, the largest ethnic non-Arab minority in the Middle East since the first decade of the 20th century, plays a key role in the rapidly accelerating nation and state building process.

The vast majority of Syrian Kurds speak the Kurmanji dialect and practice Sunni Islam. However, there is a difference between the Turks, who are followers of the Hanafi legal dogmatic school, while the Kurds – of the Shafait. In the early twentieth century, they were concentrated in three enclaves along the northern border of the Syrian state – Jazeera, Jarablus, and Kurd Dag (Jebel al-Akrad, the mountainous areas around Afrin).

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[136] Masalat al akrad Surya – al wakaya, at tarih, al ustura, *The Question of Syrian Kurdistan – Reality, History, Mythologisation*, Markaz al Arabi lil abhat wa dirasat al siyasat, Beirut, pp. 5-31.

[137] Gelvin, J. L. (1994). The Social Origins of Popular Nationalism in Syria: Evidence for a New Framework, *IJMES*, 1994, *26*(4), pp. 645-661.

It is noteworthy that they inhabit isolated areas, either mountainous or peripheral to the center of power. The Yazidi minority, unlike their compatriots, is more "social." It is more likely to mix with non-Kurdish people, Arabs, Christians, Turkmen, and others. In this regard, the Yazidis inhabit areas along the Turkish-Syrian border. The three above-mentioned places become a kind of "corridors" to which the Kurds fleeing from Turkey head and pass.

6.4 The French colonial policy in the Middle East

The policy of complete Turkification of all communities inhabiting republican Turkey, adopted by the Young Turks and later adopted by Kemal Ataturk, is the reason for the constant riots of the resisting minorities, including the Kurds. During the period 1925-1938, they raised seventeen revolts against the assimilation actions of the Turkish national state. The uprisings began in 1925 with that of Sheikh Said Biran[138] and ended in 1938 with the Kurdish revolt of the Alevi Zaza, led by Seyed Riza in Dersim.[139] The latter was suppressed in a particularly cruel manner. In 2019, information came out that this was done with chemical weapons imported from Nazi Germany.

The Yeni Ozgur Politika and Junde Welt gazeteleri newspapers, published in Germany, published documents accusing the Hitlerite government of selling mustard gas and polyvinyl chloride to Turkey. The purchase invoices bear the signature of Mustafa Kemal Ataturk himself. According to the same information, the Nazis also sold the planes,

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[138] The Kurdish Zaza and Kormanji tribes, backed by former soldiers of the Hamidian corps formed during the reign of Sultan Abdul Hamid in 1891, revolted to restore the caliphate. This is happening in the area of Diyarbakir, Elazig, Bingöl, and Mersin. After the defeat, the survivors fled to Syria, where French authorities gave them protection. For more information see Hakan Ozeglu, *From Caliphate to Secular State: Power Struggle in the Early Turkish Republic*, 2011, p. 147.
https://books.google.bg/books?id=Cw5V1c1ej_cC&pg=PA147&redir_esc=y#v=onepage&q&f=false, 02.02.2019.

[139] Talji, M., Ezmat al-Hawiya fi Turkey: Turuk Jadida Lil Moyalaja, The Identity Crisis in Turkey: New Approaches, Cit. by Abdel Ati, M., Turkey beyna tahadiyat at tahil wa rihanat al harij, *Turkey between internal challenges and external influences*, Dar al arabiya lil ulum nashirun, Beirut, 2010, p. 97-100.

known during World War II, Heinkel He 111, with which the chemical weapons were thrown in the Kurdish areas. In July 2019, three parliamentarians from the left-wing Die Linke party addressed questions to the federal government of Angela Markel.[140]

Seyed Riza's revolt puts an end to a wave of riots by individual Kurdish tribes in southern Turkey. After each of them passes thousands of Kurdish, persecuted by the Turkish state, rebels in Syria. However, the main flow of ethnic Kurdish refugees from Turkey is directed to al Jazeera, called by the French Upper al Jazeera. The latter was later organized by the colonial authorities in the northeastern province of Hasaka. Unlike the Kurds, the Armenian refugee flow also pushed out of Turkey, is inland, and especially in major Syrian cities.[141] If the first group is somewhere around 120,000, then the second is only 9,788 people. The information is based on data from the Syrian civil register in al Jazeera until 1943.[142]

An important reference point for the direction of the Kurdish migration waves from Turkey to Syria is the line following the extension

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[140] The Kurds accuse Germany of being permanently involved in the production of the chemical weapons used to kill the Kurds. It is not only Dirsim, but also Aleppo in 1988, thrown by Saddam Hussein's government in Iraq. For more information see: Almania mutauarita fi mazjazir Dirsum wa Halebcha, Germany was involved in the massacres in Dirsum and Halebcha, *AFN news*, https://anfarabic.com/%D9%, 09.08.2019.

[141] Between 1919 and 1930, Armenians fleeing Turkey to the south were estimated at approximately 120,000. About 107,000 settles in Syria, the rest move to Lebanon. For more information see Longrigg, S., Syria and Lebanon under French Mandate, New Impression Edition, 1968, pp. 177-200. By 1940, more than 400,000 people were thought to have crossed from Turkey to Syria following the surrender of the province of Hatay (Escanderun County) to Turkey by the French colonial authorities. The Lebanese researcher of this period, Filih Huri, speaks of a similar number. For more information see: Surya wa al intidab al france: as siyasa al kaumiya al arabia 1920-1940, *Syria and the French mandate: Arab national policy 1920-1940*, translation Muasas al abhat al arabiya, Beirut, 1998, pp. 568-570.

[142] For more information in Dalil Cumhuriya Surya: Yusdar Sanauyan an Jaridatei Ahbar wa Nizam bi Dimashk 1939-1940, *Directory of the Syrian Republic*: published annually in the two newspapers Ahbar and Nizam, Damascus, 1939-1940, Damascus, Matbaa alif ba, 1940, p. 527.

of the railway connecting Europe with Istanbul and Nusaybin in the direction of Aleppo, and from there to the cities of Ras al-Ain, Darbasia, Amuda, Kamishli, and Kakhtania.[143] In practice, before the official international borders were delineated, the system of national citizenship was introduced, the first national censuses were carried out, a civil register was established, etc., these lines followed the natural flow of human migration. It has existed since the emergence of the first state formations in the region, based on purely economic and trade principles. The delineation of national borders in the region, following the Syke-Spiko Treaty of 1916, is the circumstance that gives the always existing, until now, in this part of the Middle East, economic and trade movements of huge masses of people, the status of migration wave. The thesis is that in addition to the purely political impetus to cross the Turkish-Syrian border, formed after the collapse of Ottoman Turkey, there has always been an economic factor for such movements.

The Kurds first met with French colonial troops in 1919. They penetrated relatively easily into the mountainous areas of the Kurd Doug. According to Philip Huri, it was noticeable that not only this Kurdish community but also the one in Damascus very quickly turned their backs on their former metropolis. But it also seems that despite its apparent "Arabization," it has been felt that the Damascus Kurds were not strong supporters of Arab nationalism. The Kurds form special military formations within the French army in Syria. They took an active part in the suppression of the revolt of the local Arabs in 1925.[144]

The situation with the Kurds around the city of Jarablus was a little different. A powerful tribal federation has lived in the region between the present-day city of Suruj and the Syrian city of Jarablus on both banks of the Euphrates River since the 17th century. Some of the tribalist formations were Arab. Especially around Jarablus lived about 16,000 Kurds, divided into five large tribes – Alaedinan, Bijan, Kitkan, Sheikhan, and Shedanan. When the colonial army arrived on the scene

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[143] Mardini, A. Sh., Muhafazat Hasaka, dirasat tabiya, tarihiya, bashariya, iktisadiya, tahualat wa afak mustakebeliya, *Hasaka Province, natural, historical, demographic, economic research: transformations and future perspectives*, Damascus, Wizara al saha 348. Quote from Masalat al akrad Surya … p. 20.

[144] Khoury, P.S., *Syrian urban*. p. 526.

in 1920, members of the Kitkan tribe immediately joined it. The other tribes, however, were not so friendly. Those in Urfa, Enteb, and Marash joined the units of the new Turkish republic commanded by Mustafa Kemal Ataturk. The French tried to form a local gendarmerie, including Kurds, Alawites, and Circassians. However, it was not as effective as the foreign corps in the French army as the Algerians and Armenians. This led to a great battle in Marash between France and Turkey.[145]

The strongest resistance to the French army came from the relatively large, compact Kurdish community in al Jazeera. Two region-specific factors contributed to this.

The first is that the Kurds there were heavily influenced by the Pan-Islamic propaganda of Kemal Ataturk's government. This was partly true of some Kurdish communities in Aleppo province. For example, Kurdish riots there were raised under Islamic-motivated slogans such as those for "war against infidels."[146]

The second is related to the strong instinct to uphold the specific way of life, to the resistance of the colonial desire to destroy the tribal-clan way of social organization. In fact, in relatively larger minority groups, as was the case with the Kurdish community in al Jazeera, tribalism reflexively spilled over into local patriotism. Thus, the status quo achieved by the fragile balance between the various local Kurdish tribes or between the various smaller clans in the region was equated with the ethnicity's understanding of local patriotism.[147]

However, it was applicable to the colonization troops, not to the Arabs, with whom they achieved an incredible tribalistic cocktail. In this case, N. Fucaro uses the term "Arab-Kurdish hybrid socio-political

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[145] Kerr, S. (1973). *The Lions of Marash,* pp. 195-212.

[146] Lawson, F.H. The Northern Syrian Revolts of 1919–1921 and the Sharifian Regime: Congruence or Conflict of Interests and Ideologies? in T. Philipp & C. Schumann (Eds.), *From the Syrian Land to the States of Syria and Lebanon*, Beirut, Orient-Institute, 2004, pp. 46-77.

[147] Méouchy, N. *France and Lebanon 1918-1946. The ambiguities and dynamics of the agent relationship, Damascus: French Institute of Arab Studies of Damascus* [France et Liban 1918–46. Les ambiguïtés et les dynamiques de la relation mandataire, Damascus: Institut Français d'Etudes Arabes de Damas], 2002, p. 286.

subject," in which each of the two components has its own function. According to him, the Kurds are a binary minority and the Arabs an opposition majority.[148] Thus, in al Jazeera, a multi-layered original socially constructed matrix is created, in which the three ethnic groups (French, Arabic, and Kurdish) layer a tangle of dynamic, social interrelations. In it, the external, colonial, non-Islamic, and politically powerful factor stimulates the processes of homogenization of a visibly homogeneous, politically subordinated mass. However, the cohesion between Kurds and Arabs is temporary, but it leaves a strong imprint on the way their own nationalist ideologies are formed.

The French colonial authorities played a major role in directing individual migration flows to parts of their mandated Syria. They tried to create separate territories in which certain ethnic and confessional groups would dominate. Thus, separate autonomous regions were created, which differed in the size of the territory and the population. At the same time, the French governor-general in Damascus granted varying degrees of powers to local ethnoreligious authorities. Examples in this regard are the formed confessional districts – Alawitistan (the state of Jebel Al-Alauin), with capital Latakia (1920-1936) and Durzistan (state of Jebel ad Druz), with capital Sueida (1921-1936).[149] It is noteworthy that these two large minority groups, which are part of the Arab ethnic group but do not belong to the Sunni religion, are given enormous powers by the colonial authorities. They had their own flags and coats of arms, the right to choose their own local authorities, to issue their own passports, and other similar powers within the mandated Syrian territory. The Kurds, as a compact population and independent territory, were not given this. The Kurdish ethnic territories were divided administratively, and so the Jarablus and Azaz districts were initially formed. Within the province of Al Jazeera, which included the present-day Syrian provinces of Hasaka, Raqqa, and Deyrezor, three

[148] Fuccaro, N., Kurds and Kurdish Nationalism in Mandatory Syria: Politics, Culture and Identity, The Kurds, *An Encyclopedia of Life, Culture, and Society*, Mazda Publishers, 2003, pp. 279-282.

[149] Rabinovich, I., The Compact Minorities and the Syrian State, 1918-45, *Journal of Contemporary History*, Vol. 14, No. 4, p. 690-711, 1979; Taura Jebel Druze, The Druze Mountain Revolution, Maraa Ash Shark, 1925, http://jrayed.org/Olive/APA/APRESS_ar/sharedpages/SharedView.Page.aspx?sk=60EDCCBE&href=meraatalsherk/1925/09/12&page=3, 02.02.2019.

separate administrative districts were established – Kurdish, Christian, and Arab. This happened in the 1930s, thus counteracting the aspirations of the Kurdish ethnic element to receive such administrative freedom to encourage its aspirations for future secession from mandated Syria. It is not clear exactly why the French authorities did not give the Kurds as much confidence as the Druids and Alawites. It is possible that they feared that they were too close in mentality, national ideas, and historical ties to the Turks. It is possible that they simply considered that the Kurds were not in a position to organize themselves to such a high level that they could call themselves a "state" and be granted privileges corresponding to proto-statehood. However, it is noteworthy that all the more compact minorities during the period were encouraged to create their own ethnic territories along the borders of French Syria. In this way, they become a kind of buffer and a security barrier in the event of a collision with neighbors. Alawitistan is in the northwest corner, Druzistan is in the south, and Kurdistan (al Jazeera) is in the northeast of the country.

Undoubtedly, at that time the majority of the population in al Jazeera was Bedouin, and what was settled in the urban agglomerations was relatively small. This was due to the fact that, regardless of the demarcated border, the pastoralists, who were a large part of the Bedouins, continued to search freely for their animals on both sides of the border. Usually, the climatic conditions were the ones that determined in which season of the year where they would be with their herds – in the Turkish or Syrian part.

Over time, the population of al Jazeera has multiplied. The first data were for 1938. Statistics show that then the number of all inhabitants of this Syrian region was 105,513 people. The enumerators specify that the figure does not include Bedouins, be they Kurds or Arabs.[150] In 1943 the population was already 146,001 people and annually it increased by 5.6%.[151] This was the province in mandated

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[150] Murad bek, S. (1994). Istiklal Surya: aurak dmamil murad bek, *Independence of Syria: documents of Jamil Murad bek*, Beirut, sharika al matbuat lil tauzia wa nasher, p. 81.

[151] Dalil al-Jumhuria al-Suriyah fi Fajr al-Siyada wa al Istiklal, *Handbook of the Syrian Republic on the Eve of Sovereignty and Independence*, Damascus, Dar wa Matbaa Yakza Lil Nasher, 1946, p. 536.

Syria until 1943, which saw the fastest increase in population. During this period, the French colonial authorities quickly granted citizenship to immigrants, thus trying to quell any looming social riots.

The interesting thing, in this case, was that the Kurds who took advantage of this policy of the French governor-general were much more than the Bedouin Arabs. Despite the liberal migration policy during this period, a significant part of the Arabs, faithful to their sedentary lifestyle, remained without official documents of belonging to the Syrian state. According to the authors of the collective work *The Question of Syrian Kurdistan – Reality, History, Mythologizing*, the Arabs began to be recorded en masse in the registers of Al Jazeera only in the second half of the 40s of the 20th century.[152]

French colonial policy in the Middle East relied much more on the export of its own nationalism than on the actual introduction of market economic and social relations. In the colonized area between the Mediterranean and the province of Mosul in Iraq, Paris placed a strong emphasis on its traditional "civilization" mission, which yielded much more visible results in Africa than in the Arab Middle East. However, all this led to traditional assimilation, not so much to integration.

After all, France carried out trivial colonial actions based on the principle of "divide and rule." They opposed the urban against the rural elite, the individual minorities in between, but mostly the minorities against the Sunni majority. The approach of the French colonial school in the Levant is based on the so-called "Lyautey-system" in which the main idea is to isolate the representatives of local nationalism.[153] French

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[152] Masalat Akrad Surya al – al wakaya ad tarih, p. 21.

[153] Hubert Liotti (1854-1934) was a French general and creator of a special approach in the French colonial school. He was the first governor-general of Morocco to rule in the light of the local Moroccan sultan (1912-1925). His management methods were perceived as very successful and applied in other colonies. He believes that military force should be used only as a last resort, as it is expensive and alienates the local population. He aims to win over local leaders and erase the social divisions that already exist in society. Liotti claims that he can receive the status of a legitimate ruler when he controls public authorities. Having won the trust of local tribal chiefs, he worked to create modern infrastructure – roads, medical and educational institutions, agricultural facilities, and more. All this is combined with respect for local customs, institutions, religion, and language. He obliged the French

colonial policy in the Middle East was based on completely opposite principles to that of Britain's rival in Iraq. London sought the support of the Sunni community, while Paris sought the support of non-Sunni minorities – Alawites, Druze, Christians, and others. The slogans raised by Arab nationalists to create Arab unity were perceived by the French colonizers as a hidden tool of their British rivals to damage Paris' ambitions in the region. However, this also left lasting traces in the policies of the two colonial states. France remained in the minds of the peoples of the Middle East as defenders (and dissenters) of minorities, while Britain – of the Arab nation-state, and subsequently of those circles that later embraced the ideas of Islamic (especially) Sunni radicalism.[154]

After 1943, the independent Syrian government tried to change migration policy in areas with a compact Kurdish population. It made an effort to quickly establish control over local registers. However, this did not happen to him quickly, as the final and complete withdrawal of

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governors-general to learn the local language and to respect the local religion. Although the Lyautey system has been touted as humane, it essentially encourages paternalism and exploitation. The system works well to deal with traditional societies that have relatively underdeveloped political systems but are unable to overcome the resistance of nationalist movements. For more information see: Verlin, P., Privilege and Power in North Africa, *Journal of International Relations*, 18.03.2015, http://www.sirjournal.org/research/2015/3/18/privilege-and-power-in-colonized-north-africa, 21.02.2019; Slavin, D. H. (2001). Colonial Cinema and Imperial France 1919-1939. In *White Blind Spots, Male Fantasies, Settler Myths*, The John Hopkins Univ. Press, p. 120.

[154] Such sentiments in Middle Eastern society were aided by the five-volume Memoirs of Mr. Humfer in 1888. According to them, this agent of the British services acknowledged his role in creating a conservative Islamic movement called Uhabism. According to experts, the real author of the study is the Turkish traveler and military Ayyub Sabri Pasha. Rather, this work reflects the intensification of the struggle between Ottoman Turkey and Britain to win the sympathy of the Arabs seeking their independence in the late nineteenth century. For more information see: Kitab Mudakriyat al Jesus al Britani Hamfer maa music al harakat al Wahabiya Mohammed bin Abdel Wahab, *Book of Memoirs of the British Agent Humfer with the founder of Wahhabism Mohammed bin Abdel Wahab*, Sahnun, http://www.souhnoun.com/%D8%A7, 11.02.2019.

French troops took place only in April 1946. However, the national government tried to obtain all the documentation, especially that concerning the Bedouins, as far as the colonial authorities were able to register them. The Syrian government feared that the former metropolis could use this information to stimulate separatist sentiment in this part of the country. These were mainly the Assyrian-Christian and Jurassic communities, which were the subject of special encouragement for the acquisition of Syrian citizenship by France.

6.5 The migration flow to Syria

At the beginning of the transition period 1943-1946, the new rulers in Damascus quickly began to apply a restrictive policy towards migrants coming from Turkey, but there was no significant restriction of the flow to northern Syria. In fact, the momentum was so great that the only thing the Syrian authorities did was to suspend the entry in the official register of new residents of the Syrian Arab Republic. However, at the end of 1947, these actions of the government in Damascus began to bear fruit. Al Jazeera's population growth has dropped to about 1% a year. According to statistics, the Kurds already numbered 151,946.[155] In the next five years (1947-1952) the pace of the immigration process increased again, but with moderate values. It became 1.3%, with a registered Kurdish community of 162,145. This was mainly due to external migration and not to natural growth.[156] It should be noted that these are official statistics, without taking into account the unregistered, be it those who settled in the cities or the Bedouins, whom no government could force to obtain documents.

The migration flow to Syria directly depended on the political, economic, and social situation in neighboring Turkey. In a worsening situation, a huge group appeared there, wanting to cross the border and

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[155] Hana, A. F. Malamih min tarih al filahiin fi al uotan al arabi wa nidalihim fi kutr ala arabi as suri, *Scars from the history of the settlement in the Arab homeland and their struggles in Syria*, Damascus, Dar al baat lil tibaa, Tom 4, p. 293.

[156] Sukan wa al ahual al madania: adad al sukan dzhumhuriya al arabia as suria, *Population and marital status: population of the Syrian Arab Republic*, Aleppo, Dar al-Dad, 1953, p. 209.

which the Syrian authorities usually tried to bring back to Turkey. A very strong factor for Kurdish immigration to Syria was the compulsory military service in Turkey. For this reason, the young people who were to enter the Turkish barracks were particularly active. In fact, there was a kind of migration rotation of Kurdish groups between the two neighboring countries.

Something like the secondary resettlement of these Kurdish masses was reproduced, as some of them were sent not to their native places, but too large cities in the north such as Ankara and Istanbul. The main reason for this was that their houses were destroyed by the Turkish authorities in order not to return once they had left. The Kurds, who still managed to escape forced return to Turkey, usually followed their tribal, clan, or family ties to settle in one of Syria's three already established Kurdish enclaves. Thus, individual Kurdish villages or urban neighborhoods were "transferred" from Turkey to the Arab country. On the other hand, however, this population became a prerequisite for the emergence and accelerated development of hitherto unknown crafts in Syria. There was also a rapid development of agriculture, whose main engine was the Kurds who emigrated from Turkey. In the 1950s, northern Syria marked the characteristics of an economic boom that required more and more labor, which in turn was located in the southern regions of Turkey.

A classic example in this regard is the accelerated development of cotton production. In the 1950s, there was an increased demand for world stock markets due to the three-year war on the Korean Peninsula (1950-1953). The land in northern Syria has proved very suitable for sowing this technical crop, which has led many entrepreneurs and investors to attract additional labor. The agricultural workers were of different ethnicities – Kurds, Arabs, and Christians. At the same time, the leaders of two large Kurdish tribes, namely Malia and Huirkia, turned mainly to their compatriots in Turkey. They signed a contract for the provision of labor with the leaders of the leading company "Asfar wa Nudjar".

Thus, the latter undertook to provide more competitive pay and working conditions in the area of the city of Ras Al-Ain to the members of the Kurdish tribe in question, which inhabits mainly southeastern Turkey. Moreover, tribal chiefs began to compete in this occupation and even began to call them "cotton sheiks." The latter received a high social

status, which directly made them the last between the Kurdish tribes and the political regime in Damascus.

At the same time, the expanded commercial railway station in Kamishli, the city became the subject of a serious influx of economic immigrants. In the early 1950s, it had a population of over 30,000. This fact made it the economic center of the region and the future capital of Syrian Kurdistan. Once in Syria, the Turkish Kurds did their best to meet the conditions for obtaining Syrian citizenship. For them, the Arab country was a kind of "paradise" compared to the extremely difficult living conditions they had in Turkey.

Serious social transformations began in Syria in the 1950s, thanks to dynamic agrarian reforms. The stratification among the farming class has already become visible. A stratum of landowners also emerged, including large Kurdish owners. The agricultural infrastructure is constantly being improved. For example, in 1951, the pumping stations doubled to 5,068. Irrigation of thousands of hectares of Syrian fertile land, more than half of which was along the Euphrates and Al Jazeera rivers, was ensured.

The Syrian authorities continued to take all possible measures to limit the immigration of Turkish Kurds and encouraged the settlement of Arabs in this most northeastern region of the country. The rulers of Damascus feared ethnic-separatism. The latter believed that many soldiers in the Syrian army, recruited since the French term, have Turkish roots, but have successfully disguised their Turkish names.

The Syrian government feared that Kurdish migrants and Turkish officers who hid their real names could create many headaches for the independent Arab state if they united in their actions. In addition, participants in the highly destabilized regime in Damascus under Hosni Zaim, Hashim al-Athasi, Fawzi al-Sulu and Adib al-Shishekli (1949-1954) had doubts that it was the Kurds who would be the target of active communist propaganda in Syria of the USSR. Moreover, the latter two were Syrian Kurds formed as officers in the former French colonial army.[157] However, they didn't rule differently from the other Syrian presidents who came to power through a coup.

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[157] Al Aluani, R., Adib ash Shishakli rajol al hadidi, Adib Shishekli – the Iron Man, Jirun, https://geiroon.net/archives/66625, 10.02.2019.

6.6 Conclusion

As the country's health system has improved, the average age of the Syrian population has been gradually increasing. During the period 1952-1963 al Jazeera was constantly in the first place of all provinces in the country in terms of population growth. In a period of seven years, it has almost doubled. For example, in 1952 the total number of people living in this northeastern part of Syria was 162,145, while in 1959 they numbered 293,140. In just four years, the registered population of al Jazeera was 316,083. Thus, for the period under review, the population there increased by as much as 3.6%. According to the Ministry of Interior, the demographic situation there is an unprecedented example, as Al-Jazeera had the highest population growth rate in the world.[158] Thus, gradually, at the end of the fifth decade of the twentieth century and the beginning of the sixth, official documents in Syria began to mention the existence of two categories of citizens, namely those living in Syria and Syrian citizens. At the same time, there was talk of "extraordinary statistics," the purpose of which was to provide information both to those who have regular documents and to those who obtained passports illegally. All this was due to the fact that the Syrian authorities began to automatically refuse to grant citizenship to the incoming Kurds. Initially, this happened after a period of five years, but over time it was extended to ten years.

Thus, in the 1960s, a stratification began within the Kurdish Syrian community itself. Those who have lived in this country for centuries have been grouped mainly in large cities, mostly Damascus. They were radically different from those living in the areas bordering Turkey. Normally, over time, they will be classified as "internal" and "external."

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[158] Takrir Halat al amn al aam, *Report on the State of Public Security*, Damascus, Al Wizara at Dahiliya, 1963, p. 23-24.

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7. Kurds – "External" and "Internal" in Syria, Khaibun's Organization and "Arab Security Belt" (Security Belt Forces)

7.1 Introduction

During the period 1958-1961, in which Syria became part of the United Arab Republic (UAR), a new wave of migration from Turkey to the Arab country was observed.[159] The fertile agricultural lands of northeastern Syria have become a real "Eldorado" for the poor peasants in Turkey. The announced agrarian reform in the United Arab Republic, dictated by the strong aspirations of the new authorities for social justice and the raised socialist slogans, attracted many agricultural workers from neighboring Turkey. Thousands of Turkish Kurds took advantage of the principles of the new state, which made no ethnic distinction between candidates for the acquisition and cultivation of Syrian land. If the latter were of an age that required compulsory three-year military service in Syria, they were happy to join the army. The reason is not only the huge difference in the conditions of service in the Turkish and Syrian armies, but mostly due to the fact that after the barracks they received a military ID. It became a kind of document for a legal claim to stay in the Arab country. This approach to staying in Syria was much safer than looking for two witnesses to prove to the authorities that the migrant candidate was their relative.[160]

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[159] The United Arab Republic (UAR) is a union between Egypt, ruled by Gamal Abdel Nasser, and Syria, whose president is Shukri al-Qatli. In the late 1950s, the Syrian political and military elite feared the growing influence of the Syrian Communist Party, chaired by Khalid Baghdash. He seeks unification with Egypt to avoid communist rule. At the same time, the strong bureaucratization and domination of the Egyptians in power quickly severed Egyptian-Syrian ties. On the 28th of September, 1961, the Syrian army staged a coup and declared an end to the UAR. For more information see: Cumhuriya al Arabiya al Mutahida, United Arab Republic, Al Maarifa, https://www.marefa.org/%D8%A7, 11.05.2020.

[160] A conversation with the manager of Hasaka Adel Miro in February 2009, after which the implementation of the so-called "Extraordinary statistics".

7.2 The Kurdish migration wave

The Kurdish migration wave came under full control during the first two years of the UAR's existence, as a result of close co-operation between local units of the Interior Ministry and the Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP), established in 1957. This marks the beginning of the modern Kurdish movement in Syria. In practice, a kind of political deal was made, namely untying the hands of the KDP for active work with the Kurds, including those in Turkey, against the inclusion of the latter in the ideas of power in Damascus. The Voice of the Kurds radio station was even unveiled.[161] The cooperation between the newly formed Kurdish political entity and Damascus' rulers was short-lived as the KDP gradually changed its attitude towards the Egyptian-Syrian state. Only two years after its official formation, this party was banned by the authorities and the leadership was brought to justice. However, for the first time, a fact was heard in the courtroom that the authorities in Damascus ignored. During his trial, the general secretary of the outlawed party, Nuredin Zaza, formulated the problem with the so-called "Foreigners from Turkey." He accuses the Syrian state of not granting citizenship to Kurds who migrated from Turkey to Syria for several generations. According to him, there were hundreds of thousands of applications for citizenship.[162] Zaza also accused the institutions of allocating land for dishonest behavior towards the Kurds.

Despite the formalized principle of equality between applicants in the areas south of Hasaka and between Hasaka and Tel Kodjak,

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Quote from Masalat al akrod Surya – al wakaya, at tarih, al ustura, The question in Syrian, p. 28.

[161] Darwish, A. Adua ala haraka al kurdiya fi suriya, ahdat citrat 1956 - 1983, Light on the Kurdish movement in Syria, the events of the period 1956-1983, 2005, pp. 14-27; Jamil Pasha, K., Masalat Kurdistan: 60 aaman al nidal al kurdi al musalah dida al ubudia, Beirut, 1997, pp. 12-17.

[162] Zaza, N., Hayati al kurdija au sarkha ash shaab al kurdi, My Kurdish life or the cry of the Kurdish people, Erbil, dar al fares, pp. 129, 137, cit. Masalat al akrad Suriya – al wakaya, at tarih … pp. 29-30.

preference was given to the Arabs.[163]

The clash was both ethnic and social. The organs that distributed the land gave it to those who cultivated it. Most agricultural workers at the time were from the Arab slap tribe, while in many places it was formally owned by Kurdish sheikhs. In the spirit of socialist propaganda, the authorities in Damascus claimed that the redistribution actually expressed "the social struggle of ordinary Arab peasants against the Kurdish kulaks." There is no consensus on this controversial topic by various researchers. Authors close to Damascus, such as Ahmed Mardini, claimed that Kurdish peasants also received plots of land if they cultivated them, while pro-Kurdish experts such as Ismet Wiley claimed otherwise.[164]

7.3 The principle "The land is on this one, that processes it"

After Syria's withdrawal from the UAR, the content of agrarian reform has changed.

Between 1961-1963, the authorities stopped applying the principle: "The land belongs to the one who cultivates it." Maaruf Daualibi's nationalist cabinet in Damascus (1961-1962) replaced the rule of "fair distribution of land" with the law on "fair distribution of the population."[165] Then the Syrian government decides to implement a new demographic policy. Although the majority of Al-Jazeera villagers had been cultivating the land for years and had Syrian identity documents, the government began to describe them as "Turks."

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[163] Zaza, N., Hayati al kurdija au sarkha ash shaab al kurdi, My Kurdish life or the cry of the Kurdish people, Erbil, dar al fares, pp. 129, 137, cit. Masalat al akrad Suriya – al wakaya, at tarih … pp. 29-30.

[164] Mardini, A., Muhafaza al Hasakah: dirasat tabiya, tarikhiya, iktisadiya, tahuilat wa afak mustakebeliya, Hasaka district: natural, historical and economic research, future horizons, Dimashk, ouzarat as sahafa, 1986, pp. 86-87; Wiley, I., Al Masala al Kurdia fi Surya, The Kurdish Problem in Syria, Lajnat difaa an hukuk ash shaab al kurdi, 1968, p. 15.

[165] Dr. Maaruf Dawalibi, Ahbab al Keltawiya, http://www.alkeltawia.com/site2/pkg09/index.php?page=show&ex=2&dir=dpages&cat=520, 11.05.2020.

The reason for this was their Turkish origin. Tensions between the government and local Kurds escalated when security forces began forcibly removing peasants from their lands. For a very short period of time, Agriculture Minister Saeed Seyed suspended the law due to the possibility of destabilizing the entire country. However, this lasts for a relatively short period of time. On the 16th of April, 1962, the new Prime Minister Beshir al-Azma, who came to power in a coup, continued his moderate policy towards the Kurds.[166] He was a supporter of the ideas of the United Arab Republic and nationalized the Saudi bank Al Ahly. At that time, the first oil deposits were discovered in al Jazeera. Al Azma refused to outsource their exploitation to a joint Saudi-American holding company. His successor as prime minister, Khaled al-Azm (1962-1963), quickly changed the situation. He quickly restored restrictions on the Kurds in al Jazeera. In this light, at the end of 1962, the actual population of the city of Hasaka was 340,000, while the number registered in the official registers was only 305,000.[167]

On 5 October 1962, the government of Prime Minister al-Azm began the so-called "Emergency census" in Hasaka province. The order is related to the annulment of all civil registers of the population in this part of the country compiled so far. The local authorities had to establish the number of both Syrian citizens and "foreigners." The last category included all persons who had been entered in the registers after 1945. To that end, the Ministry of the Interior gave the opportunity to all those living in the territory of the province in question to gather evidence of their "legal citizenship" for one month. The latter could not be substantiated by testimony based on family, clan or tribal ties. In this way, all Kurds who emigrated to Syria from Turkey after Syria's independence became "foreigners." Most of them had settled along the Syrian-Turkish border, especially between the villages of Ras al-Ain and Maliki, in the extreme northeastern part of the country.[168]

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[166] Al Huri, M., "Jil al hazima min dakira" or Beshir al Azma. "The Generation of the Memorial Pogrom" by Beshil al-Azma. London, Al Hayat, http://www.alhayat.com/article/968129, 23.08.1998.

[167] Makdul, D., Tarih al-Akrad al-Hadith, Contemporary History of the Kurds, translated into Arabic by Rajal Mohammed, Beirut, Dar al-Farabi, p. 256.

[168] Makdul, D., Tarih al-Akrad al-Hadith, Contemporary History of the Kurds, translated into Arabic by Rajal Mohammed, Beirut, Dar al-Farabi, p. 708.

The census itself was led by Hasaka Governor Saeed Seyed. The latter was the brother of Jalal Seyed, one of the founders of the Ba'athist Arab Socialist Party and a representative of the nationalist movement in it. Saeed Seyed believed that the UAR's policy of agrarian reform was tantamount to "stealing land from the Arabs." The latter, however, allowed "Kurdish Turks" to remain if they changed their status as "land users" into its owners. He hypothesized that Kurdish villagers had illegally leased land from the state. If they wanted to legalize their property and become Syrian citizens, they had to borrow from the National Bank. It was £ 3,000 a year. Thus, a huge loan of about 40,000 pounds was obtained on average for the entire time during which the Kurdish peasants cultivated the land. To this end, a law was passed in February 1962.[169]

Logically, the amount proved prohibitive for the Kurds, who were forced to borrow en masse. Their lands became the property of the bank. Due to the stalemate, the authorities were forced to reduce the monetary obligations of the mass-ruined Kurds to 15,000 pounds.

After all, the idea of the government in Damascus was to give priority to the Arab ethnic group in the region far from the capital, regardless of the instruments of state policy. The "extraordinary census" resulted in the government declaring 85,000 people living in Hasaka province as "foreigners – Turks." This represented 27% of Al-Jazeera's total population, which turned out to be 302,000.[170]

The paradox, however, was that as a result of these measures, prominent Syrian politicians and officers were deprived of Syrian citizenship. Such were former Deputy Prime Minister and Minister-elect Abdel Baki Nizamadin, as well as his brother General Taufik Nizamadin,

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[169] Al Jarida Ar Rasmiya, Official Gazette, no. 19/1962, p. 519.

[170] Barut, M. J., Mashrua Surya 2025: Idtizhahat at Tahuil as Sukania wa al Majaliya al Mokhtamala Kilil al-Aqdain al Kadimein, The Syria 2025 Project: Directions for Probable Demographic and Sectoral Change in the Next Two Decades, Damascus, 2008, p. 402, cit. Masalat al akrad Surya – al waakaya, at tarih, p. 35.

former Chief of the General Staff of the Syrian Army (1955-1957).[171]

The paradox came that members of one family were qualified differently. For example, one brother was a Syrian and the other a Turk.

In early November 1962, Hasake Governor Saeed al-Seyed and Interior Minister Aziz Abdul Kerim wrote a special document on the population of Al Jazeera. The main thesis of the government report is that "the migration of Turkish Kurds is a threat to the stability of Arab Syria."[172]

The practical implementation of this document is a forced Arabization of the region. It includes various measures, namely:

- marking the internal borders of the area by digging trenches;
- the creation of a border police that is "nationally loyal;"
- stimulating the nationalization of lands owned by Kurds;
- increasing the income of the sheikhs of the Arab tribes and attracting members of these tribes to "agrarian reform;"
- the delay in complaints lodged by Kurds related to "agrarian reform" and others.[173]

7.4 Political power

The political power established after the Ba'athist coup on 8 March 1963 promised that the land would be given to the peasants who cultivated it, whether they were Arabs, Kurds or other nationalities. However, the leadership of the new ruling party in Hasaka has a different opinion. It drafted a document, the essence of which was "the eradication of the Kurdish population from the Al Jazeera region." The new element in it is the forcible study of this ethnic group in the interior of the country, not its expulsion to Turkey. The idea was mainly to stop the policy of building new schools and other educational centers in Al Jazeera, to expel dual citizenship holders to another country, to suppress local Kurds economically by giving priority to Arabs in hiring

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[171] Shabab, MR, Siirat al Munadil al Kurdi Sabri Osman "Aro", Biographical Essay on the Kurdish Freedom Fighter Sabri Osman "Apo", Beirut, 2000, p. 34.

[172] Statements at Said as Said, Al Ayam, November 6, 1962.

[173] Al Ayam, 7.11.1962.

temporary and permanent workers, pitting some Kurdish clans and tribes against others, settling members of the Arab slap tribe in places close to the border furrow, turning the northernmost parts of Al Jazeera into military front, and not in places suitable for peaceful economic activity, through the creation of military facilities and barracks in which servicemen serve – Arabs, not Kurds and others. The project of creating "armed, collective Arab farms" was interesting. These are detachments of Arabs in the border areas who were not only the owners of the land, but also the only ones who had the right to vote.[174] Practically, the Arabs became complete monopolists of economic and political activity in the region. All other ethnic groups were expelled or marginalized.

The project for the creation of the so-called the "Arab Security Belt" began in 1966. It is directly linked to the construction of the great Euphrates Dam on the Euphrates River by specialists from the former Soviet Union. According to a document prepared by the chairman of the Regional Branch of Peasants, the area of the "belt" in question was over three million decares. Geographically, it was situated between the village of Al-Maliki (Dirik) to the administrative border between the provinces of Hasaka and Raqqa and between the villages of Tel Jalila and Rajan. It was about 300 km long and about ten kilometers wide.[175] In principle, the Kurds who lived there had migrated to Syria from Turkey and Iraq. Their number was about 25,000, who were listed in the registers as "foreigners" because they had no documents from the Syrian state. In a way, they occupied territory that was parallel to the Syrian-Turkish border.

The creation of the huge dam forced the authorities in 1969 to seize the lands of about 20,000 families, forcing them to emigrate down the Euphrates. Moreover, special settlements were built for them, offering them an agrarian way of life organized in the style of the Soviet collective farms. Members of the two Arab tribes, Al-Walid and Bushaaban, flatly refused to leave the region. Then the government

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[174] Hilal, M., Dirasat al muhafazat Al Jazeera min al nauhi al kaumiya, al ijtimaiya wa as siyasia, Studies of Al Jazeera County from a National, Social and Economic Perspective, 1963, pp. 30-40.

[175] Takrir Rais Al Maktab Al Filahiin Al Kutri, Report of the Chairman of the Regional Branch of the Peasants, December 1966, Quote by Masaalat al-Akrad Surya, The Kurdish Problem in Syria, p. 40.

forcibly evicted them, but they did not go to Hasaka to the east, but to the southeast to the village of Shamia, in the direction of the Syrian desert. Thus, some of them fell into the so-called "Arabian Belt", and others went directly to the city of Raqqa. In time, all the Arabs who remained around the Euphrates Dam left their lands, forced by the Damascus authorities. In 1973, it was estimated that about 4,000 Arab families settled in the Arabian belt region, which was about 24,000 people. However, 42 villages were formed in the area in question, with two-thirds being Kurdish and the remaining one-third being Arab. Thus, despite the desire of the authorities in the "Arab belt", the Arabs remained a minority, as they failed to expel any Kurdish peasants. It is as if in this project two types of nationalism, Arab and Kurdish, collide purely materially. Perhaps the only consequence is the rise of a strong sense of self-preservation and a logical defensive response by the Kurds towards the Arabs for the protection of al-Jazeera's "bastion." It is possible that this type of feeling and action is dictated by a similar, catastrophic for them, type of "ethnic cleansing", realized in Turkey by its rising nationalism. The difference between the two types of nationalism is purely idolatrous. The Turks are Kemalist, while the Arabs are Ba'athist. The Arabs even lost the toponymical battle. The renamed settlements were not accepted by the Kurds and they managed to impose them on the majority of the population, despite their official new names imposed by the authorities. The Arab Security Belt project failed because the Arabs were not numerous enough, even motivated to "melt" their deep-rooted local Kurds. With the arrival of President Hafez Assad in 1969, the repressive policy against the Kurds in question came to an end. This was due to the divergent policies pursued by the two neighboring Ba'athist regimes, the Syrian and the Iraqi. The Syrian head of state was forced to comply with the Kurdish-friendly behavior of his counterpart, Saddam Hussein. The latter encouraged those opposed to the traditional Kurdish parties in northern Iraq through material benefits – public works, positions in the administration and others. Damascus' clashes with Ankara have also contributed to the failure of the Arab security belt. The reasons were related to Syria's challenge to Turkish sovereignty over the province of Haty (Escanderon), as well as tensions over the use of the Tigris and Euphrates waters. The formal end of the project marks the formal embrace between the government in Damascus and the Kurdish Workers' Party (PKK), which has become an

instrument of Syria's pressure on Turkey.[176]

7.5 Genesis of Syrian Kurds

Over time, the genesis of the Syrian Kurds has been profiled into two huge social groups, briefly classified as "internal" and "external." The criterion of their formation process is not only the time, but also the place where the nucleus consolidates. In these two groups ferments a different way of life, social structure, but also the more important social and political behavior. Among the "internal", the family behavioral framework was imposed, and hence a relatively greater freedom and range of social contacts. This was typical of the people who lived in the larger settlements. To be clearer, we can define them as "citizens" or "civilized."

At the same time, their peripheral counterparts or "outer" Kurds adopted the tribalistic behavioral matrix. The periphery has forced them to stay in larger social communities in order to better protect themselves and survive the constant external threats. Moreover, the strong ancestral spirit that dominated the Kurds in Diyarbakir and Bitlis in Turkey, in Sulaymaniyah, Ravandiz, Amadia and Sinjar in Iraq and Ashnay, Arumia and Kermanshah in Iran is carried over into the psyche of the Syrian "foreign" Kurds. Probably retrograde social-power paradigms continue to strongly influence the Kurdish tribal amalgam. It is about the social filling of the former strong Kurdish feudal formations that existed on the territory of modern Turkey, such as in Diyarbakir, Bhutan, Bahdinan and others.

Practically in Syria, regardless of a single ethnic origin, the two Kurdish groups occupy different places in the public, social, cultural, economic and political life of the country. The "inner," "urban" Kurds are fully integrated into the state institutions of the Arab state. They find their social place among the Syrian middle class, mostly finding its professional field in the circles of traders and entrepreneurs, as well as

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[176] Ali, H., Maasa Akrad Surya, The Tragedy of the Syrian Kurds, Kotobarabia.com, p. 12, https://books.google.bg/books?id=_5NYy0HbN0YC&printsec=frontcover&hl=bg&source=gbs_ge_summary_r&cad=0#v=onepage&q&f=false, 01.08.2019.

among civil servants in municipal, state and military institutions.

The "inner" Kurds have long been part of the Syrian statist establishment and in this capacity have contributed to the resistance against French colonialism. In 1920 they were in the forefront in the battle against the army of General Henri Hugo (1876-1946). The latter fulfilled the mandate of the Sykes-Pico Treaty, under which France and Britain divided the Arab Middle East territories of the Ottoman Empire. Before that, they joined the ranks of the Great Syrian Uprising (1925-1927), which the Syrians raised against the French occupation. They became one of the most active Syrian citizens in party politics. It is noteworthy that a significant number of them join opposition parties in power, such as the Syrian Communist Party. One of its wings was even chaired by the Kurdish Khalid Baghdash (1912-1995), ideologically linked to the countries of the former socialist camp.

The "external" Kurds do not participate in and do not go through the mobilization-psychological filter of the cited major socio-political social trials in Syria, which contribute to the formation of a specific political culture and state thinking. Moreover, they themselves are too heterogeneous and do not form a single social body. By the 1920s, approximately half of them practiced a semi-Bedouin lifestyle in Al Jazeera. The other half, mostly living in the Amouda region, live a sedentary life, earning a living. Conservative livelihoods contribute to the resilience of conservative tribal traditions and the low-status social image of this part of the Syrian Kurds. They can rightly be called "peripheral Kurds," not only because of their mentality and ethno psychology, but also because of their place of residence on the political map of the Arab country. The remoteness of Al Jazeera, the heart of the "outer" Kurds from the capital Damascus, which is the center not only of the political and spiritual life of the country, is the reason for the low pace of economic development and respectively the relatively low standard of living. The unsatisfactory level of social services and especially the isolation during the winter period due to the bad climatic conditions contribute to the ethno-political differentiation of the region. It is logical that such a type of peripheral socio-economic status should push the locals to turn to other, closer geo-economic centers and to normally receive political ideas and views from them. In the light of these thoughts, it is natural that among the Syrian "peripheral" Kurds, political currents and subjects should emerge that are by their nature

predominantly connected with neighboring countries, and not so much of a national character. This feature of Syrian society has been used extensively by the French colonial authorities. The latter have perfectly manipulated the Kurdish peripheral masses, perceiving foreign influence, in order to strike or at least fend off the strong national anti-colonial sentiments and resentments, the source of which were the big cities. In this sense, the "external" peripheral Kurds opposed their compatriots living in the center of the nation-state.

A classic example in this regard is the establishment in 1927 of the organization "Khaybun" (in Kurdish – "be yourself") in the Lebanese city of Bamhadun, which is 13 km from Beirut. The French colonial authorities formed an anti-Ottoman Kurdish-Armenian irredentist organization. The leader is the Kurdish nationalist Mamduh Selim, and a representative of the Armenian nationalist party, Tashnak Vahan Papazyan, was elected to the leadership along with his colleagues from other Kurdish organizations. The aim of the rebels was to support the revolt in Ararat, which in 1927 declared the Ararat Republic. According to Nelida Fukaro, Khaibun's creates modern Kurdish nationalism. The majority of Kurdish intellectuals in it have pro-Western views and try to form their own nationalism, but in the same way as the nationalist ideological currents already established in the West. The idea is to adopt the Western form of nationalism and combine it with Kurdish tribalism of existence and way of thinking. Interestingly, the Kurdish creators of Khaibun set foot on religion to attract followers. They succeed even by hybridizing the ethno-religious message with that of another ethnic group and another religion. In this particular case, the political engineering of French colonialism, which is waging war against Turkey, is evident.[177]

The operational plans of the organization in question are interesting. They want to liberate all Kurds in Turkey by bringing them together. At the same time, Al Jazeera, which is located on Syrian territory, is perceived as a huge rear or a kind of command headquarters of the Turkish-Kurdish national liberation movement. Thus, the "foreign" Kurds create a buffer territory that creates an economic and

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[177] Fetula, D., Yakza al akrad: tarih siyasi, 1900-1925, The vigilance of the Kurds: political history 1900-1925, Erbil, dar al naris lil tibaa wa nasher, 2002, cit. by Masaalat al-Akrad Surya, The Kurdish Problem in Syria, p. 47.

social environment that acts as a springboard for the design and implementation of the politico-military plans of the Kurdish national movement in a neighboring country. In fact, the Khaybun became an outspoken weapon in the hands of France, which until the 1930s fought Ataturk Turkey to fix the border between it and mandated Syria. The entire border, from the city of Jarablus to Dirik, was turned by this organization into a front line in order to ease the pressure on the Republic of Ararat. However, control of the Kurdish rebels is so great that the Khaybun is conducting more combat operations on Turkish territory than on Syrian territory. At the same time, the leaders of the organization are forced to reside in the interior of Syria.

External influence on the structure of the organization should not be exaggerated. It is noteworthy that all Kurds, members of the Khaibun leadership, are part of the former elite of the Ottoman Empire. With the advent of the "modern" Turkish state, they have lost the favor of the authorities, and hence their social status and financial status. Thus, their battle is not only against the state of Ataturk and its army, but is a desire to carry out their own rehabilitation. This is the reason for the collapse of the Kurdish organization, despite initial successes. The strength of the structure is due to their ties to the Kurdish tribes living in the border areas. At the same time, collective leadership and rapidly emerging personal differences erode the organization. Two pairs of brothers, namely Jaladat and Kamran Badarkhan and Kudri and Akram Jamal Pasha, face each other. In fact, they carry old enmities between two Kurdish clans, dating back to the Ottoman Empire. For example, the former are the successors of the Kurdish rulers of the Emirate of Ben Omar, while the latter are the successors of the Kurdish Emirate of Diyarbakir. Each of the two local dynasties claimed historical leadership of Kurdish society. According to left-wing Kurdish researcher Rustom Mahmoud, the elite composition and the lack of political messages to the socially disintegrating Kurdish agrarian society are among the reasons for the failure of the first-ever Kurdish political movement.[178]

It can be argued to what extent the thesis is not strongly ideological, applying the analytical methodology of left-wing

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[178] Mahmoud, R., Al-Kawaid al-Izhtimaiya Lil Ahzab al-Kurdish as Surya, The Social Foundations of the Syrian Kurdish Parties, Al-Jumhuria (2 min 2), 04.08.2015, https://www.aljumhuriya.net/ar/33717, 08.08.2019.

researchers. It is indisputable, however, that in the present case tribalism and clannishness prevailed over the processes of strict hierarchization of the social structure characteristic of European societies at that time. Even today, almost a century later, tribe, or rather communality, in terms of spirit, behavior, and real status, has influenced the Syrian Kurds.

7.6 Khaibun's organization and its fate

The fate of the Khaybun's organization shows the contradictory development and the constant ideological and tactical clash between the "internal" and the "external" Kurds. The confrontation is based on the genesis of the ambitions of individual leaders, namely common Kurdish or national (be it Syrian or Turkish). In fact, the opposition has become even more complicated, as tribal frictions generated by the tribalistic social composition of Kurdish society have been at the bottom.

The split between Kutb Kudri Jamil Pasha, on the one hand, and the alliance between the Badarkhan clan and the Huirkiya tribe, led by Haju Aga, who migrated from Turkey to Syria in 1932, on the other, outlined the profiling of parts of the growing Kurdish community in Syria. Two currents are emerging that reflect the nuanced behavior of the Syrian "foreign Kurds." The former continues to view Turkey as its "homeland" and the latter "Syrians" and succumbs to the policies of the French authorities, who see an end to their colonial presence in Syria. The union of the Badarkhan and Haju aga clans became the material expression of the French aspirations for the creation of regional formations independent of the central government in Damascus. A petition signed by 100 prominent Al Jazeera figures calls for the creation of an "autonomous Kurdish-Christian province under a French mandate" similar to those created in Druzistan and Alawitistan. One of the reasons given is that it is a "group that belongs to the Aryan community and the Kurdish nation and is clearly different from the Syrian citizens from inside the country." The document also says that if this formation receives "special rule," its tribes will be indebted to France forever. It is noted that "they will be joined by all residents of the territories along the railway line, leaving Turkey."[179] The project received

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[179] Al Huar, no. 65, Summer 2007, pp. 75-87.

strong support among local Kurds, but ultimately failed as the majority of Christians living in the region boycotted it.

7.7 Conclusion

The Khaybun's project is subject to conflicting assessments. Pro-Kurdish authors greet him and speak with sympathy for him. Such is Ristum Mahmoud. He said it was the first political organization set up by Syrian Kurds. This proves the emergence of a growing socio-political consciousness. He defends this thesis, despite the fact that the project was created with an Armenian political party and was implemented outside the national borders of Syria.[180] At the same time, pro-government and Damascus-loving experts argue that the seeds of Kurdish separatism in Syria were actually visited at the time. Such is the researcher at the Center for Arab Studies and Policy Studies, Mohamed Barut, author of a detailed study of the Al Jazeera region.[181] Particularly characteristic of Arab nationalist authors is the connection of Al Jazeera with the plans of external, colonial factors. For example, the above-mentioned researcher maintains that Al Jazeera was targeted for the resettlement of Palestinians to Lebanon and Syria after the Peel Commission's decisions in 1937 to divide British Palestine[182] by

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[180] Mahmoud, L., Al-Kawaid al-Izhtimaiya Lil Ahzab al-Kurdish as Surya, The Social Foundations of the Syrian Kurdish Parties, Al-Jumhuriya, https://www.aljumhuriya.net/ar/33717, 4 August 2015.

[181] Mohamed Jamal Barut is a well-known Syrian researcher who authored an encyclopedic study of the Al Jazeera region. The title of his monograph is *Historical Contemporary Creation of Syrian Al Jazeera: Issues and Forms of Transformation from a Bedouin to a Civilized State*, published in Doha, Qatar, in 2013. According to journalist Mahmoud Abbas of the pro-Saudi website Ilaf, he changed his affiliation. to several political currents (Ba'ath, the Syrian Communist Party, and the pro-Qatari Syrian opposition since 2011), he is an expression of the Arab nationalist current in Syrian science on the Kurdish question. For more information see: Abbas M., Min Jinayat Mohammed Jamal Barut, From the Crimes of Mohammed Jamal Barut, Ilaf, 12 May 2016, https://elaph.com/Web/opinion/2016/5/1088127.html.

[182] For more see: British Policy in Palestine, 1937-38: From the Peel to the Woodhead Report, *Bulletin of International News*, Vol 15, No 23, https://www.jstor.org/journal/bullintenews, 23 November 1938.

intensifying the activities of the Jewish Agency for Israel,[183] Israel and as a result of policy of the United States during the period 1949-1954.[184]

The assessments still remain mutually exclusive. Moreover, the confrontation in scientific and political assessments of Al Jazeera's condition is intensifying, especially in light of the practically existing independent Syrian Kurdistan, Rojava. At the heart of these two groups of researchers remain differences in the interpretation of the term "local population." The two ethnic groups, the Kurdish and the Arab, claim not only property but, above all, the exercise of legitimate sovereignty over the same territory.

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[183] For more see: Jewish Agency for Israel, http://archive.jewishagency.org/demography/content/23586, 31.08.2019.

[184] Masalat al akrad Surya – al waakaya, at tarih, p. 52.

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8. Socio-economic and spiritual-religious specifics of the Syrian Kurds

8.1 Introduction

The dominant agrarian livelihood of the "Foreign Kurds" stimulates the preservation of the tribal-clan profile of their social structure. This directly reflects on the stability and strong resistance of the specific conservative political culture in which the political center is differentiated, due to non-social parameters. If religion (in a nuanced degree, ethnicity) plays a major role in the formation of the nation-building and state-building process among neighbors, Arabs and Turks, then in the Kurds, especially the Syrians, a similar function is played by the family cell. The conservative way of eating nourishes and cement for a long time the marginal social environment in which the family and the commune are brought to the fore. The family and the commune, which manage to most successfully optimize the results of agricultural activity, in which the presence of physical strength is a major factor.

On the other hand, pushing religion into the background as a mobilizing factor opens the way to orthodox Islam and more moderate forms of religion such as at turuk as sufia, the sophite orders. The strong display of detribalization and gender equality among the Syrian Kurds is not a consequence of purposeful public policy, but rather a remnant of the existence of a family cell in which women give their equal share in the final agricultural production. The archaic-conservative tradition is the reason for, de facto, the increased role of women in government, politics and defense, not the accelerated emancipation that Western societies achieve after a long and painful social process.

8.2 The Syrian Kurds

Among the livelihoods of the majority of Syrian Kurds, the so-called valley agriculture. Due to the uncharted terrain, in the regions of Hasaka and Kobane (Ain al Arab) the production of cereals and cotton is leading, while in Afrin, industrial crops, mostly olive trees. However,

thanks to the flat terrain and lush pastures, the oldest livelihood of the local population remains cattle breeding in the first two areas. It is difficult to say whether political or economic reasons prevailed in the relocation of huge Kurdish pastoralists from Turkey to Syria. Within the former Ottoman Empire and before the drawing of the current national borders, the owners of the huge herds sought pasture for them without encountering any difficulties.

They traveled hundreds of kilometers within the territory of the current Syrian Al Jazeera. The tradition has continued since the creation of modern Turkey and mandated Syria. In fact, similar seasonal movements of huge herds, which is one of the main stages of cattle breeding within the former Ottoman Empire, are observed in other provinces, including the Balkans.

8.3 Kurdish agglomerations

Employment in various branches of agriculture also has an impact on the way of life and socialization of the various masses of the "external Kurds." Cattle breeding, grain and cotton production, typical of the Hasaka and Kobane regions, support the components of the Bedouin way of life. The situation is different in Afrin, where most people make a living from mountain fruit growing. They build the model of living in agrarian conditions.

The combination of livelihoods and specific terrain does not allow the outer Kurds to historically create large agglomerations and acquire an urban behavior profile.[185] This explains the lack of the appropriate institutional and civic culture and the value system, which are force majeure reasons for the delay of state formation and the collective sense of need for one's own state.

It is an interesting fact that the process of "enclosing" the Kurdish masses in Turkey has been brutally interrupted by the suppression of the Kurdish uprisings by the Kemalists. The latter, building the new Turkish state, slow down the natural and logical social processes

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[185] Mahmoud, R., Al-Qa'aed al-Ijtima'iya Lil Azab al-Kurdish as Suriya, / 1 mi2 /, The Social Foundations of the Kurdish Syrian Parties, 1 of 2, Al Jumuria, https://www.aljumhuriya.net/ar/33686, 12.08.2019.

characteristic of a certain ethnic group.

Moreover, Turkish nationalists see the socialization of the Kurds in their country and the formation of a civic environment among the Kurds as the engine of constant riots, even though they are led by feudal-tribalist leaders. For the bearers of a kind of civic consciousness and education, formed in the educational institutions of the Ottoman Empire, especially in Istanbul and spread in the large Kurdish agglomerations such as Diyarbakir, Syria is a place of protection. As already noted, the protection of the ethnic minority is strengthened by France's special colonial policy, which emphasizes the rights of oppressed minorities in the former Ottoman state rather than cooperation with the majority, as the rival British Empire did.

A classic example in this regard is the family of Hajju aga al Hafirki, who in 1926 settled in the region of Kahtania, east of the town of Kamishli. In the 1950s, he played a major role in socializing and enclosing the Kurdish masses living in the region.[186]

8.4 Armenians and Christians – Assyrians

Other minorities, with whom circumstances force them to live together, also play an important role in the socialization of the Syrian Kurds. It is about the Armenians and the Christians – Assyrians. Their religious temples – the churches become an educational and institutional-forming subject, regardless of religious differences. Particularly pronounced is the influence of these two groups in the province of Hasaka, in which Christians are becoming a factor that has contributed to the promotion of a sedentary lifestyle of Kurdish Bedouin pastoralists. Their livelihood and way of life became a role model for the low-status Kurdish masses.

Even more noticeable is the influence of the Armenians on the Kurds in Afrin, who until the mid-1950s accounted for about a third of the city's population and actually gave the settlement its true appearance. The latter dominated not only economically, through

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[186] Auda or Hadith Burhan Galayun an al Kurd fi Suriya, Return to Burhan Galyayun's speech on the Kurds in Syria, Ilaf, www.elaph.com/Web/opinion/2012/4/732072.html?entry, 27.04.2012.

traditionally active crafts, but through their leading role in the health, spiritual and cultural institutions of the city.

8.5 The specific religious institutions of the Kurds

The dominant Islamic religion, the accepted Sunni legal dogmatic school, and the specific religious institutions of the Kurds are also important factors in secularizing and "enclosing" the community. Not so much the Arabs in general as the Turks influence the way the Kurds practice Islam. However, they adopt the Shafi'i doctrine of Sunnism, unlike the Ottoman Sheikh-ul-Islam, which practices the Hanafi legal dogmatic tendency.

On the one hand, this sharply distinguishes them from the Turks, but on the other hand, it brings them closer to the Syrian Arabs, among whom Shafayt is as widespread as Hanafi.

What is interesting in this case is that the minority status of the Kurds pushes them to practice the Islamic religion, according to the ritual and institutional symbolism of the most tolerant legal dogmatic tendency in Sunni Islam, namely Hanafi. This is a fact, although they are collectively followers of Imam Idris al-Shafai, whom Islamic theologians describe as a "centrist" who perceives certain components of a more radical Arab-centric Islam[187] (see Chukov & Georgiev, 1997).

Among the Kurds, the Teket and the Sofite orders performed rather social functions, which was the original reason for their appearance. Teketo, an outspoken socio-religious complex that includes not only the mosque but also the madrasa, the students' boarding school, as well as the living quarters for the imam-teacher and his support team, is a kind of irredentist call against the official authorities. The emergence of teketes and sophite orders is an institutional and ideological-organizational irredentist reaction of low-status social groups against the ruling aristocracy in the Islamic State. Such are the minorities who were placed on the deep periphery of the Arab-Muslim

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[187] For more on the legal dogmatic schools in Islam, see: Chukov, V., & Georgiev, V. (1997). *Philosophy and Theory of Islamic Law*. Publishing house Lik. [Чуков, В, & Георгиев, В. Философия и теория на ислямското право, Издателска къща. Лик].

caliphate, but also later, after the establishment of the Ottoman Empire. It is no coincidence that teketes appeared only in the 15th – 16th centuries.

The Ottoman authorities built teketes almost forcibly in the Kurdish regions in order to exercise strict control. They put at the head of this institution a loyal sheik of power. Often under his leadership, there was a small military unit created by his followers.

In practice, the latter were his students, who were later sent to remote villages to perform the same functions as their teacher. The formed religious elite did not only deal with the clarification of the issues of Islam but also exercised political, economic and social functions. However, according to the genesis of Sunni Islam, the foundation of governing philosophy was based on a kind of "Caesar-Papist" principle. Religion and its institution were subordinate to the state and its institutions. Thus, the Kurdish sheiks logically formed in the tekke obeyed the local secular rulers – tribal rulers.

The point is that the Kurds themselves adopted religion through this instrument. Moreover, like many societies peripheral to central, Arab-centric Islam, such as those in Central Asia, Albania, Mauritania, Sudan, and some African and Asian countries, sophistry has become the dominant form of religion among the Syrian Kurds. This phenomenon intensified greatly between the 1940s and 1960s. This was explained by the entry of communist ideology into Syrian society and in particular the targeted propaganda of the local Communist Party among minority communities.

The egalitarianism preached by the communists ideologically coincided with some of the social ideas of sophistry. The Syrian authorities themselves encouraged this process, as the ideological communist-sophist nonsense opposed Kurdish nationalism and irredentism, which Ba'athist strategists openly call "separatism." Sophism remains deeply rooted in Kurdish society in Syria, as it models and generates a kind of second-tier (after the tribal factor) political elite. Such are the Khaznaueihi, Abu Musa and other clans, often nominating members of the Syrian parliament.

An exception is the Madrid movement (1930-1940, in Afrin / Kardak, led by Sheikh Ibrahim Khalil Say Oglu, a member of the

Naqshbandi Order, who studied Islam in Homs and Damascus.[188] He himself was born in Izmit in 1898 and is of Turkish origin. In 1930, he succeeded in drawing dissatisfied with both the French colonial rule and the large landowners in the region. Stepping on religion, through the slogan of fighting al-kufar, the infidels, they demand the abolition of secular laws. Along with them, purely social demands appear. Such are the removal of the dowry in marriage, the fair distribution of land and others.

The Marids have established close ties with the Syrian national movement. Thanks to him and his constituents, the leader of the tribe, Sheikh Hussein Auni, twice became a member of the national parliament in Damascus (1932 and 1936). Turkey is trying to steer the movement toward purely religious foundations that bring it closer to the essence and platform of the Muslim Brotherhood Islamists.

This is a fact, despite the fact that in Turkey Ataturk is making anti-religious reforms and creating a secular republic. Gradually, the matriarchs transformed into the local, for Afrin, branch of the oldest Islamist movement. Ankara claims to annex Afrin and the region to the Turkish republic. They were dropped when France granted it to the county of Hatay / Escanderun. In 1940, the colonial authorities sent an army unit, including fighter jets, to crush the Maridite revolt. Sheikh Khalil himself fled to Turkey. Despite the disappearance of the organized Madrid movement from Afrin, Turkey has created civic movements based on it – the Kurdish Youth Club and the Community of Intellectuals.

Through the aforementioned civilian entities, Ankara is trying to maintain and spread pro-Turkish sentiment among this city, whose ethnic composition is 95% Kurdish. These historical events more than half a century ago gave aspirations and created preconditions for February 2018 for Turkey to carry out the military operation "Olive Branch" with the claim that it gives power to its true owners. The presumption is that the pro-Turkish militia members of the Free Syrian Army are in fact the heirs of the Madrid movement.[189]

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[188] The word maridin means "followers" or "supporters" in Kurdish.

[189] Karma, A., Kaifa Astakhdim Turkey al maridi wa al ikhwan fi ikhtirak al mujtamaat al kurdija, How Turkey uses Mariditism and the Muslim

Another important factor for the social mobility of Syrian Kurds, operating since the early twentieth century, is the uncertainty of the Turkish-Syrian border. For about two decades, this population did not know what their nationality was. In 1921, the Fraclin-Bouillon Agreement, also known as the Ankara Agreement, was signed between the modern Turkish state and France.[190]

Eventually, the final delineation of the Turkish-Syrian border took place in 1939, when Paris ceded the Hatay / Escanderun district to Ankara. The constant relocation of the border furrow has eroded the effectiveness of the territorial component as part of Kurdish nationalism, but at the same time catalyzed its ethnic element. The ethnoreligious population (Kurds, Arabs, Christians, Assyrians, Jews, Armenians, Turkmen and others) living in these areas felt that the lack of a fixed political boundary stimulated a sedentary lifestyle among some local groups. Bedouin Arabs and constantly migrating Kurds, permanently expelled Assyrian Christians and Armenians were placed in an equally difficult social situation.[191]

8.6 Conclusion

The main conclusion that can be drawn is that the Kurds in Syria are failing to create a large urban agglomeration, which pushes them to be constantly associated with the agrarian way of life. Even the small towns that are being formed do not get a real urban look, as their inhabitants had numerous relatives who remained to live in the countryside. Such a summary is valid for at least one century.

It was not until the 1950s that the town of Kamishli began to make an exception with a population of over 100,000. Two decades later, Hasaka and Afrin, who make up more than 50 percent of the Kurds, gained the same status. Over time, a belt of settlements was formed, with a population of between 50,000 and 100,000 people such as Kobane,

Brotherhood to infiltrate Kurdish communities, Al Hafriyat, https://www.hafryat.com/ar/blog/%D9, 24.10.2018.

[190] For more information see the Franco-Turkish agreement from Ankara, http://www.hri.org/docs/FT1921/Franco-Turkish_Pact_1921.pdf, 14.08.2019.

[191] Mahmoud, R., Al kawaid al izhtimaiya lil azab.

Amuda, Maliki. This feature requires the creation of civil-administrative structures to meet the social needs of the population. Such were schools, cultural centers, cinemas, theaters, numerous restaurants and others. With their appearance, the role of tribal leaders is reduced. The population itself is employed mainly in the industry and services sectors. The role of ecology is also growing significantly.

The 1960s laid the foundations for civic education in Syrian Kurdistan. The first manifestations were in the 20s, but of very modest size. The creation of relatively large cities, and especially the formation and activation of Kurdish national parties, are pushing the civic education process forward. This feature becomes a prerequisite for the flourishing of the so-called. "Kurdish national consciousness," linking in one educational system the three historical cantons in Syria, namely Al Jazeera, Kobane and Afrin. Such a process was impossible until the long distances along the entire Turkish-Syrian border (almost 900 km) were covered by suitable road arteries. Part of this collective consciousness of the Kurds in Syria was expressed in the knowledge of the Kurds in neighboring Turkey and Iraq. To a large extent, the socialization of the Syrian Kurds as a community was due to the parties.

Such is the case with the first Kurdish political party, the Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP), established in 1957. It is the result of the activity of an initiative committee whose members lived in Al Jazeera, Kobane, Afrin, Damascus and Aleppo.[192]

However, such initiatives were not enough to complete the process of full socialization of the Kurds in Syria. For example, the authorities in Damascus preferred to integrate the Kurdish elite into the already established Syrian one, rather than stimulate the formation of a separate socio-cultural body. Practically, by the beginning of the 19th century, a nation-building Kurdish national culture had failed to emerge in Syria. On the surface of the vast national socio-economic space emerges only the highly relevant political activity, especially in the security sector. Probably the events of 2004 in Kamishli are the factor that strongly mobilizes the civic energy of the Syrian Kurdish community so that for

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[192] https://www.enabbaladi.net/archives/145121, 23.04.2017.

the first time it acts as a single civilian entity.[193]

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Chukov, V., & Georgiev, V. (1997). *Philosophy and Theory of Islamic Law*. [Чуков, В, & Георгиев, В. Философия и теория на ислямското право, Издателска къща. Лик]. Publishing house Lik. Sofia. Bulgaria.

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[193] It is a clash between football fans of teams from Kamishli and Deyrezor, which acquires an ethnic tone. On 12 March 2004, at the Kamishli Stadium, Arabs raised photos of Saddam Hussein and Kurds raised the flag of Kurdistan. The confrontation lasted six days and spread to Damascus, as well as to neighboring cities between Kurds and local Arab tribes. Kurds attack the ruling Ba'ath party's office in Kamishli and destroy a statue of former President Hafez Assad in the city. Authorities are sending an army to quell the unrest by force. For more information see Humeidi, I., Ahdat al-Kamishli... The events in Kamishli, Ash Sharq al-Arabi, http://www.asharqalarabi.org.uk/paper/s-akhbar-m-a-q.htm, 14.03.2004.

Summary

The Middle East is a region with huge "event" potential as it generates social processes whose resonance far exceeds its geographical boundaries. Unfortunately, the flow of information over the past few decades has shown that negative news is broadcast far more often than positive news. Underlying this is a combination of massive demographic growth, unsatisfactory economic performance, low living standards, slow or no political reforms, and constant social implosions. In fact, in front of the largest public group in the Arab countries, such as the youth, two political and social alternatives are profiled, namely the embrace of radical Islam or emigration to more attractive countries, in the specific case to the neighboring European continent. The geographical proximity between the two shores of the Mediterranean Sea turns the Middle East (actually in its two-component image – the Mashreq, the real Middle East, and the Maghreb, North Africa) into the biggest exporter of political and economic turmoil for Europe, including the most attractive global regional organization – the European Union. Firstly, the Arab world is an exporter of human potential, which is difficult to integrate into the dynamically developing European society, and secondly, Europe needs this human contingent, as it is the fastest-ageing continent. The "import" of Middle Easterners is a guarantee for the sustainable development of the European economy. Thus, migration, against which all member states of the European Union are fighting, converts, to some degree, to the real fuel that maintains the high standard of living of these Europeans.

The Middle East is extremely diverse from an ethnic, religious, racial, and regional point of view. This performance directly affects social, economic, and political uncontrolled pluralism. As a matter of fact, the first echelon of mentioned factors set up the centuries-old socio-political tradition, outline the intra-state hierarchy, sculpt the concrete statist establishment of individual nation-states, as well as the regional Middle Eastern geopolitical architecture. The states in the Maghreb and the Mashreq models rely on a different social-state genesis, directly related to the complex centuries-old statehood process.

The Mashreq is the place from which the original source of the Islamic religion springs. The three shrines of this religion are located there: Mecca, Medina, and Jerusalem, while the latter became the epicenter of world monotheism. Thus, much closer to Jerusalem locates the individual social group or the state, more radical is their social behavior, and insolvable are the erupted conflicts due to their religious background. Evidence in this regard is the war that broke out in Gaza, but also the ramified conflicts in Yemen, Syria, Iraq, and Iran.

Judaism, Christianity, and Islam are Abrahamic religions. It should come as no surprise, then, that all three beliefs contain compelling yet contradictory views of how human history will end. This is so because the Bible says that God's promises to Abraham contain universal and eschatological dimensions. Followers of the three religions consider themselves inheritors or benefactors of these promises. Their modern adherents think of the world around them in terms of how to realize these promises and prophecies.

The three Abrahamic religions contain eschatologies that trigger the modern world's political dynamics. Judaism, Christianity, and Islam each created their own visions of messianic prophets who foretold the coming of the Golden Age and the establishment of God's kingdom, and hence the end of history. In general, their apocalyptic predictions have many elements in common. One of these elements is the use of force to remove those who deviate from the path of orthodoxy. It is not so much the prophets themselves, from Isaiah to Muhammad, who command our attention, but rather the schools formed to interpret their words. Each of the religious beliefs created its own fundamentalist current, that is, groups of followers who hold to the literal interpretation of the prophecies. Over time, the radicals split off from the moderates, who modified the individual interpretations and predictions. It is not uncommon for already-formed schools to come to serious collisions, not only verbal ones. Under certain circumstances, clashes can turn into political ones. However, the most important thing is to stimulate trends that carry an openly ecumenical charge. They are a pledge for an optimistic interpretation of religious texts and ultimately contain the potential to transform them into constructive foreign policy decisions.

These religions are so influential in shaping the relevant statist philosophy and state-building process that they create a coherent core of the national foundation. There are not a few scientists who share the

opinion that precisely the eschatological elements of the professed religion set up or predict the future, and not rarely a specific national cause as well. Visionary is related to the crafting of many important components of foreign policy, namely the creation of a national ideal, national honor, and even national dogma. Often, it is eschatology that "summons" from the past faith, hope, and expectation for the arrival of good and, respectively, outlines the contours of the ideal state. All these elements have the tendency to turn into the present in a struggle for peace, freedom, democracy, and the search for cooperation in the face of new partners and allies.

At the same time, however, eschatology can "summon" the opposite side of the coin, namely skepticism, hatred, aggression, and destruction. The return of Christ and the establishment of the "Golden Age" are born in his battle against the Anti-Christ and his "Axis of Evil." The expression was first used on January 29, 2002, by President George W. Bush in his State of the Union address. This comes less than five months after the attacks of September 11, 2001. This phrase has been constantly repeated during his administration. In doing so, President Bush designates foreign governments that sponsor terrorism and wish to create weapons of mass destruction. The idea of naming such an axis is intended to unite and mobilize Americans and Europeans against common enemies in the fight against terrorism. At that moment, the countries targeted by the American head of state were Iran, Iraq, and North Korea. In response, the Islamic Republic of Iran created its own alternative, a political alliance it called the Mihuwar al muqawama, Axis of Resistance. It included Iran, Syria, and his proxies, such as Hezbollah, Hamas, Houthis, and Iraqi Shia militias.

It is more than obvious that the current, officially declared war in Gaza and the undeclared Israeli-Iranian war on the territory of Syria and Iraq is a conflict with potential for a supra-regional war. In its lens is the city of Jerusalem, in which the three Abrahamic religions built up their dogmatic rules. However, if an obstructionist or antagonist type of messianism is embedded in the military strategic concept or in the foreign policy plans, the regional clash can reach unsuspected extensions. However, this is possible if the local ruling class's ambitions aim to possess weapons of mass destruction. The crisis surrounding Iran's nuclear program is a classic example in this regard. The problem is not the program itself, but the character of the country that has

aspirations to create a nuclear bomb.

Believers in those nations, states, and religious groups that find themselves under the domination of another state, marginalization, or collective failure tend to radicalize their interpretation of the prophecies. Often, political experts describe them as "failed entities." Despaired, they indulge in violence, becoming collective "suicide bombers." For them, the status quo is neither acceptable nor likely to improve, and so they are "overshadowed by God's destructive decree." These countries and circles are beginning to recognize "Satan at work" in the world. Radicalism "inflames" their consciousness and changes their behavior, "inflating" some national ethno-confessional exclusivity. In practice, this amounts to upholding doctrinal orthodoxy under the pretext of awaiting God's apocalyptic judgement by the end of history. The state, if it has enough combat-capable armed forces, can complicate the conflict situation, especially if its leader is charismatic enough and claims to have a monopoly on the interpretation of prophetic commandments. It is triggered by manipulating the believers, inciting them against the "heresy" of others. Even such a situation can amount to incitement to suicide bombings, precisely by pointing out the supposed intervention of God. Loyalty to God goes hand in hand with suspicion towards humanity. There is a consensus in the interpretation of ancient prophecies that the end of the world will involve godlessness, deceit, and tyranny. If this is not the case, then no intervention will be necessary.

This common feature of the two tendencies mentioned in the interpretation of the prophecies within Abrahamic beliefs does not have an imperative profile. The division into "moderate" and "radical" eschatology is relative, since within a religious belief there are different denominations that produce different variations. Thus, for example, in Europe and especially in the United States, moderates and radicals of various religions mix with atheists and agnostics. Within their own synagogues, churches, and mosques, these Jewish, Christian, and Muslim believers pray side by side with their co-religionists, who have different views on the moderate and acceptable interpretation of prophecy. It is not a surprise, for even within the views of a single believer, interpretive tendencies can become intertwined or contradict each other. It is possible for a believer to have been a moderate and become a radical, or vice versa. However, the latter is rather possible on a theoretical level, since we rarely observe similar processes. Extensive

research was conducted in this regard so that each nation reached its own conclusions and shaped its own de-radicalization's module. Such a generalization is not only valid for Europeans and Americans. Countries such as Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Yemen, and Iraqi Kurdistan elaborated serious programs for individual or collective – family deradicalization.

The often-clichéd cultural perception invented models and conclusions in order to marginalize certain beliefs. For example, some radical Christians were presented as illiterate and backward. At the same time, Muslims whose imaginations are saturated with apocalyptic dogmatic ingredients are believed to be misled by manipulative and malevolent clerics. Ultra-orthodox Jews are perceived, in parallel, as spiritually poor and uneducated. None of these schematic images are accurate. In reality, both moderates and radicals of any religion can be educated and tactful, but also superficial and immoral. Cases where their behavior is the result of direct inheritance from the family, the school, or the surrounding social environment are not excluded.

The Middle East and the local national communities created there in the middle of the 20th century are divided between religion and ethnicity. Certainly, these two factors play the leading role in the multi-levelled nation-building process. If they were only them, then, to some extent, the Middle Eastern society would resemble the European one. It seems that the politico-economic engineering of the Prophet Muhammad in the 7th century, introduced within the Arabic pagan community through the Islamic religion and directed against the tribal genesis of society in the Arabian Peninsula, is uncompleted so far. The palpable shadow of the local Arab tribes' remnants not only forms the local social specificity but also remains one of the reasons for the slow pace of the social transformation as well as the respective political and economic reforms. The three factors mentioned – religion, ethnicity, and tribal structure – co-exist in Middle Eastern sociality, either at the protagonist or antagonist level.

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Multifaceted Middle East – Religion,
Ethnicity, Politics and Terrorism

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