

Integration of Arab-Bedouin Minorities in the Israeli Education System

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Abstract

The integration of minority groups into Israeli society is necessary to maintain and reproduce the link between education and the country’s economic and professional capacity. The attitude of the educational system towards the Arab-Bedouin community as part of Israeli society has been controversial for many years and has been evaluated by educational experts. The potential of learning and education as a means of advancing the Arab-Bedouin minority society is poorly reflected in the state’s educational policy, and the contribution of its adaptation to the process of modernization and integration into the labor market has been insufficient. In this paper, we present an updated picture of the major changes in the development of the minority population, focusing on the Bedouin society and its civic-cultural integration process. It also examines the educational aspects of the interaction between investment in educational infrastructure and the exploitation of the economic and professional potential of the Bedouin community.

Keywords: Israeli Arab-Bedouins, Israel studies, social integration, minority studies.

1. Introduction – The social integration of Israel’s minorities: the political dimension

The status of members of Arab society in Israel, including their personal and collective rights and obligations, was shaped under the conditions of the Arab-Israeli conflict that preceded the establishment of the Jewish state (AGBARIA & MUSTAFA & JABAREEN, 2014). In the early years of the Jewish state’s existence, the political institutions decided that Palestinians who remained on its territory after the war would be citizens of the state, and that Palestinians who left Israel would not be allowed to return. In official documents, Israel is defined as the state of the Jewish people, which does not correspond to reality, as Jews make up only 75% of the citizens. The other 25% are Muslims - 17%, Christians - 1.9%, Druze - 1.8% and “others” - 4.3%: national, religious or ethnic minorities in Israel. Since the establishment of the State of Israel, the groups have undergone many changes (ABU-ASBA & FRESCO & ABU-NASRA, 2013; ARGOV, 2016). The desire to integrate minorities into the emerging Israeli society has been the subject of many statements by leaders and ruling parties but has not led to any discernible results. The author of the dissertation wants to justify his thesis: every minority group faces numerous difficulties, obstacles in its relationship with the majority society (ABU-ASBA & FRESCO & ABU-NASRA, 2013).

Some difficulties are caused by discrimination. The Citizenship of Israel Law and the Law of Return define Israel as the state of the Jewish nation, whether living in Israel or not. This discriminates against minorities in Israel because the land is defined as belonging to those who can live elsewhere and not to those who live in the country (a relative of a Jew can immigrate to Israel, while a relative of an Arab or Christian cannot). State symbols, for example, do not allow minorities in Israel to feel part of the state (because an Arab or Druze would have a hard time singing about the “Jewish soul song” of the anthem or connecting to the “menorah” symbol). The scholar Al Hajj, addressing the subject of problematic relations with some state institutions, such as the Jewish Agency or the Jewish National Fund, whose land is sold to members of Jewish society to make the State of Israel as Jewish as possible, notes that this practice is a form of discrimination (AL-HAJJ, 2003). Generalizing such practices, we argue that the attitude of members of minorities in Israel towards the state, as well as within the groups themselves, can be problematic. (AYALON & SHAVIT, 2004).

Y. Jabareen and A. Agbaria in the paper: “Education on hold: Government policy and civic initiatives to promote Arab education” (AGBARIA, 2017), point out that many representatives of the Arab community want to know and speak Hebrew and want to integrate into Israeli society. At the same time, scholars acknowledge that members of this community have feelings of frustration with discrimination and national feelings that allow them to identify with Palestinians. The Bedouin are marked by loyalty to the state and enlistment in the army, difficult struggles with state authorities and the law over their living areas in the Negev, where high involvement in crime is observed. Druze and Circassians serve in the IDF, although they too often face discrimination and socioeconomic disparities from the majority Jewish population” (BLASS & SUSSMAN & TZUR, 2019). The author identifies the political motives of the majority population, the government, which is not interested in taking steps to integrate minority populations, including Bedouin society. One obvious reason is ideological, expressed by the statement: Israel is the home of the Jewish people.

Bedouin community land issue. According to Z. Bekerman and G. Horenczyk, the Bedouin of the Negev are the only Israeli Arab group that, despite being displaced from their original lands at the establishment of the state, despite being almost forcibly relocated to urban areas, still have considerable land ownership (BEKERMAN, 2008). It is a legal-political belonging that the state officially denies in principle but recognizes in practice. And yet, members of Bedouin society in the Negev (the southern region of Israel) are the only large Israeli group that can be said not to be defined as a community entitled to adequate living conditions. In this context, A. Efrati argues that since 1948 the Bedouin have been struggling not only to gain state recognition of their ownership of land, but also to receive government services like those offered to other Israelis, so that they can maintain community life, work, education and ordinary cultural life. And while the Bedouin struggle, all Israeli governments are constantly working to drive them off their lands and gather them into as few settlements as possible (EFRATI, 2017).

A. Agrabia in his monograph *Informal education in Palestinian society in Israel* analyses the Israeli reality, noting the economic inequality and missed opportunities for intergenerational mobility in the minority society, highlighting the Bedouin society. The scholar argues that by using appropriate actions, the governmental system can close the gap between the ideal of equal opportunities and the distribution of opportunities in practice. Although it seems over the years that this topic is urgent, the increasing economic gaps in Israel over the past three decades (1990-2020) have reduced the effective ability to provide equal opportunities in accessibility to education and fulfilment of peripheral potential, especially in Bedouin society (AGBARIA, 2017).

N. Naser Najjab in his paper “Palestinian education and the “logic of elimination” argues that Israeli governments exclude the Bedouin from their development plans, as if they were a group that Israeli society and economy do not need (NASER-NAJJAB, 2020). Those Bedouin

living in unrecognized settlements exist in a kind of legal-political bubble. “These Israelis are forbidden to form permanent residences, they are denied the basic right to register their place of residence on their identity cards, they are excluded from local government plans, they are forbidden to exercise the basic political right to choose, including in local government, they are forbidden to receive government services, they are forbidden to exercise the basic right of home ownership, and in fact in this reality they receive educational services that are not anchored in a standardized curriculum similar to all groups in Israeli society (NASER–NAJJAB, 2020). In contrast, the Bedouin who have moved to the urban settlements that the government has planned for them live in a kind of political-economic bubble of their own: on the one hand, they lack the proper infrastructure systems and jobs that would allow them to conduct economic activity according to standards. to live like the nearby Jewish settlements; on the other hand, even recognized Bedouin settlements, as well as unrecognized ones, are generally not included in government development plans, both national and for the Negev region. Today, the Bedouin lack community resources for economic development and are low on the government's priorities. At the same time, the population of the Negev, which makes up about 25%, is a weak and fragmented population, with each group working to promote itself without cooperation with its neighbours. In such a situation, the Bedouin are the biggest losers, but the entire population of the Negev loses with them in the long run (SHAHOR & SIMONOVICH, 2021; SHMUELI & KHAMAISI, 2021) (GALILY & SCHWARTZ, 2018).

2. The religious dimension of discrimination

Y. Gabay noted that the State of Israel recognizes the freedom of worship of Arabs and Druze, their right to honour their holidays on time and in accordance with their decrees and rites. This right is reflected in the amended Hours of Work and Rest Law, which lists the holidays and important dates of all religions recognized by the state as days of rest (GABAY, 2009). And the Israeli Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1988 prohibits an employer from discriminating in employment on grounds of nationality or religion. The Ministry of Religious Services allocates budgets for the construction and maintenance of religious institutions and houses of worship (mosques and churches), but there is no equality in these budgets because Arabs receive only 2.8% of the ministry's budget. Marriages and divorces in Israel are governed by the religious laws and religious institutions of each religious group. Freedom of religious worship is reflected in the 1967 Law for the Protection of Holy Places. Economic aspects of discrimination and employment. One of the central points of contention, which some identify as the main variable causing discrimination in education policies, is the economics of discrimination (ARLOZOROV, 2016). The study: ‘Employment Discrimination in Israel. A Differentiated approach’, conducted by R. Hermon et al. in 2018, highlights discrimination against minorities in Israel (HERMON & PORAT & FELDMAN & KRICHLI–KATZ, 2018).

Scholars state that approximately 21.5% (2022 data) of the country's population are minorities, mainly members of Arab communities, the largest national minority (OECD, 2021). Members of this community suffer discrimination in various areas, including the labour market. H. Yahel has noted that beyond the profound general inequality, there is no dispute that discrimination against minorities also exists at all stages of the hiring, promotion and even firing process (YAHIEL, 2021). V. Lavy does not dispute this statement but complements it with the results of the existing reality analysis of 2018, adding that occupational inequality is the main cause of poverty among the Arab population (LAVY, 2008).


According to him, the labour force participation rate among men - members of minorities in 2019 was 79% compared to 86% among Jewish men, and the labour force participation rate among minority women was only 37.1% compared to 76% among women in the Jewish community.

Table 1. Data sequence of the proportion of labour force participants 2018-2021

Year	Men's		Women's	
	Minorities	Jewish	Minorities	Jewish
2018	78%	85%	42%	77%
2019	79%	86%	37%	76%
2020	72%	86%	39%	77%
2021	73%	85%	39%	76%

Source: made by the author (Central Bureau of Statistics in Israel, 2021; BOI, 2021)

The data presented in the table above allows us to see that the gaps are maintained, even if there are some positive changes in 2019, with a decrease in employment rates in the following years. The existing employment gaps support the inability of state institutions to develop competitive minority communities in the labour market. A similar situation is found in wages. G. Yair and other scholars, note that the issue of wage differentials is one of the most significant barriers to the advancement of minority employees, as having more children in families allows less disposable income to go to private education. Thus, cyclical gaps prevail from one generation to the next (YAIR & KHATTAB & BENAVIDOT, 2003). Figure 2.1 presents data on the gender wage gap in Jewish and minority society, 2017-2021.




Source: made by the author (Central Bureau of Statistics in Israel, 2021) (BOI, 2021)

Figure 1. Wage gaps Jewish and minority employees 2017-2021 (in Euro)

We note that the gap between female and male minority representatives in average years of schooling was about two years until the early 1990s, narrowed by 2010, and then was completely erased. The improvement in minority student achievement in the education system is both quantitative and qualitative. Data from the Central Bureau of Statistics show that in the years 2000-2019, the number of students in Arab post-secondary education doubled from 95,000 in the 1999-2000 school year to 186,000 in the 2018-2019 school year (Central Bureau of Statistics in Israel, 2021). M. Justman has argued that the application of the Compulsory Education Law up to grade 12 has reduced the dropout rate in Arab schools (JUSTMAN, 2014). The rate of increase in the number of students in Arab post-secondary education (96%) is very high compared to that in the Jewish sector (71%). This has contributed to the reduction in dropout rates, but most of this change is attributed to the increase in the population at the relevant ages, for example, in the years 2000-2018 we see an increase of 68% for ages 12-17 in the Arab minority compared to only 20% in Jewish society.

Physical infrastructure development. The gaps between the Arab and Jewish education systems and discrimination in education are not only reflected in budgets and school hours (KANTOLA & KETTUNEN, 2012). Another major issue reflecting these gaps is the state of infrastructure and physical conditions in educational institutions. Unlike the distribution of budgets, which was publicly exposed in 2015, information on physical infrastructure is not analysed within the Ministry of Education in an orderly manner and therefore information is made available to the public sporadically and partially. Despite the impact of physical infrastructure and facilities on student performance, violence and safety levels, especially in weaker sectors, the Ministry of Education does not appear to have orderly and clear procedures for the establishment of sports halls and facilities, computer labs, libraries and courtyard landscaping. Even when standards exist, they are not applied in practice (JUSTMAN, 2014). The 2018 TALIS - Teaching and Learning International Survey (Talis, 2018), reflecting the reality in Israel, is an international survey conducted by the OECD. The survey focused on teacher and principal evaluations, examined teachers' and principals' perceptions of teaching and learning, classroom teaching practices, and teacher professional development. Information was collected through questionnaires administered to teachers and principals in schools. The study revealed a gap in infrastructure in Arab education and Jewish education. Figure 2.2. below summarizes the main reports from principals on the lack of infrastructure affecting schools' ability to provide quality educational services.



Source: made by the author (Talis, 2018)

Figure 2. Proportion of principals who reported a lack of resources that impairs the school's ability to provide quality teaching (in %, 2020)

The analysis of the results of the study, reflected allows us to observe that principals in Arab and other minority education face several difficulties, among which are: lack of teaching spaces, physical infrastructure, possibilities of using digital technology. In general, the number of teachers indicating the need to improve school buildings and facilities and to invest in ICT is higher in Arab education compared to Jewish education. Interestingly, Hebrew education is lower compared to the OECD average on most indicators, a figure that explains the differences in educational outcomes between the OECD and Israeli averages. The situation is even more difficult in two regions that suffer from gaps in all areas of education: the Negev and East Jerusalem. In the Bedouin settlements of the Negev in general, and in the unrecognised villages in particular, there is a land dispute between the population and the state, and this conflict has a direct impact on the construction of educational institutions. In 35 unrecognised villages with a population of around 70,000 by 2021, there are only 10 primary schools and not even one post-primary school. Pupils must walk miles or commute, often crossing country roads, to reach the nearest school. The

expensive transportation system complicates school attendance in the Bedouin regional councils in the Negev, burdens the education system in the regional councils (SAIF & HADDAD & CHAI, 2021).


Quality of teaching. Referring to the quality of teaching and other educational services, H. Super Foreman et al. note that the quality of teaching in the Israeli education system in general, and in the Arab education system in particular, is declining (SUPER–FOREMAN & EYAL & HASSAN-DAHER & FRENKEL, 2016). S. Smuha in the paper, “Do not break the tools: Arab-Jewish Relations Index in Israel 2015” argues that the relatively low quality of teaching in Israel is attributed to the many hours of teacher work, a high ratio of face-to-face teaching hours compared to the total number of working hours (including professional preparation, making lesson plans, grading tests and homework, etc.), crowded classrooms, and lack of adequately trained teachers (SMUHA, 2016). In addition, some of the findings show that the education system cannot attract quality staff, as the salaries of entry-level teachers are lower than the national average and among the lowest in OECD countries (OECD, 2019). Researchers S. Svirsky and N. Dagan - Buzaglo (SVIRSKY & DAGAN-BUZAGLO, 2009). and S. Friedman (FRIEDMAN, 2016). consider that the quality of teaching is the most important factor in assessing the quality of learning and its long-term effects. In addition, studies published by the Mofet Institute, elucidate the content of the interdependent relationship between teacher professional development and teaching quality (Mofet Institute, 2021).

The quality of teaching is important in the assessment of learning; studies show that the impact of the teaching environment on the quality of educational provision is greater among pupils from disadvantaged backgrounds and therefore investment in them is of primary significance (PISA Test, 2021). Studies examining the effect of reducing class size have also shown that this step helps to improve students’ cognitive and emotional skills and future academic achievement, particularly among younger students and students from disadvantaged backgrounds. Therefore, the level of teaching and teacher preparation is of paramount importance in Arab education and in minority communities, where most students come from low socio-economic backgrounds. A 2019 Bank of Israel survey showed that the level of mathematics and reading teachers in Israel is low both compared to other OECD countries and compared to the general population in Israel (ranked 29th out of 34) (BOI, 2021), as assessed by the International Skills Survey - PIAAC (PIAAC Israel, 2021) (Central Bureau of Statistics in Israel, 2021). Some indicators show that the quality of teaching and teachers in Arab education is below the level of teachers in Jewish education. However, in recent years, there has been an improvement in at least some indicators. This is the data reflected in the TALIS study (Talis, 2018), according to which: 58% of principals in Arab education institutions reported that the lack of licensed teachers hindered the school's ability to provide quality teaching. In Jewish education, such institutions account for -29%. For comparison, the OECD average is 21%.

Quality educational services cannot be provided in the absence of qualified teachers, a statement supported by 47% of those surveyed. 51% of teachers employed in Arab education work in schools where at least 30% of pupils come from disadvantaged backgrounds. For comparison, 29% of principals in Jewish education reported a shortage of qualified teachers teaching students from low socioeconomic backgrounds. The issue of the profile of teachers in a minority society is a major issue against which society’s ability to sustain and develop the quality of teaching can be judged. According to the Meitzav data (Indices of School Effectiveness and Growth) tests, the rate of teachers in Arab education who reported that the training process prepared them well for teaching was higher than their rate in Jewish education. The proportion of teachers in Arabic education who reported participating in professional development activities was higher than their proportion in Hebrew education (ABU–ASBA & FRESCO & ABU–NASRA, 2013). In addition, A. Argov in the paper: ‘The Development of Education in Israel and Its Contribution to Long-Term Growth’ points out that a significant proportion of teachers in Arab education value the teaching

profession as a stable career that provides job security and adequate income) (ARGOV, 2016). This figure explains, at least in part, the high demand for the teaching profession in Arab society and the low annual dropout rate of Arab education teachers.

The significance of this analysis for achieving the objectives of the research is important because of the definition of factors that can contribute through their synergy to the improvement and development of minority education. Statistical data from recent years show that the grades in baccalaureate exams and psychometric test of future teachers have been decreasing. Figure 2.3 shows the grades of teaching candidates in the three main sectors: Jewish society, Jewish-religious society and Arab society (minorities).



Source: made by the author (Central Bureau of Statistics in Israel, 2021) (CHE, 2021)

Figure 3. Scores of candidates for teaching from the three sectors 2011–2021

Figure 2.3 informs us that in the years 2011 - 2015 there was a steady increase in the psychometric score of first year students in academic colleges of education in Arab education (from 460 to 530), but since 2015 there has been a steep decline. There was a moderate decrease in state Jewish education from 2011 to 2013, but again there was a moderate decrease, while state religious education has seen an increase in the last three years after a consistent decrease in 2011. Today, the gap between first-year students in Arab education and their peers in Jewish state education is 70 points; the gap between them and their peers in state religious education is 103.

National and international test results. The Israeli Ministry of Education, like other OECD countries, assesses the achievement of primary and secondary school students using the Meitzav (School Achievement and Growth Indices) tests in which fifth and eighth graders are examined every year since 2008 (Israeli State Comptroller, 2021). One test examines students' cognitive abilities, and the results are intended to help the Ministry of Education in monitoring national trends. The Meitzav tests examine scores in several subjects, including mother tongue (Hebrew in Hebrew education and Arabic in Arabic education), English, mathematics and science, and technology (for eighth graders only). Examining and analysing the test results at minority community institutions in Israel, one can see gaps that have been large, but have narrowed over the years, and in some subjects, they remain until recent years (2018). Perpetuating gaps in education will lead to social, economic, and employment gaps in the future, which will naturally affect Israel's national economic product. Figures 2.4-2.7 show data from the main exams.




Figure 2.4. International results in English language




Figure 2.5. International results in Native language




Figure 2.6. International results in Science Technology




Figure 2.7. International results in Math

Source: made by the author (PISA, 2021)

The figures show a noticeable trend of improvement in all areas of knowledge among both Arabic speakers and Hebrew learners. The improvement in indicators characteristic of the Arab population is greater in all domains, so that while in 2008 there were large gaps between Hebrew and Arabic speakers in mathematics and English, by 2018 the gap in English had completely closed and in mathematics it had narrowed considerably. However, there is still a real gap between the two populations in this area. Unlike mathematics and English, in a mother tongue test the method of standardisation is not uniform and therefore it is difficult to compare test results in the two languages. However, even in language the improvement among Arabic speakers is greater than the improvement among Hebrew speakers in the years in question - 92 points among Arabic speakers compared to 42 points among Hebrew speakers. Thus, a comparison of the Meitzav test scores of the Arab population and the scores of the Jewish population shows that the gaps between the populations have narrowed over the years. But the data show gaps still exist, especially in English, math, science and technology. Another reality is found in the statistics on

students' socioeconomic status and its impact on test scores. When the socio-economic status of students is monitored, it becomes clear that in most subject areas there are gaps between populations.

The international tests that Israeli children take are PISA (Programme for International Student Assessment). The test used in this investigation, conducted in 2018, shows that the gaps have reached their widest. A worrying situation concerns the data on the three literacy domains: among Arabic speakers, the difficulty rate was 53%, compared to 12% among Hebrew speakers. Israel is also notable for the differences in scores between students in the Arabic and Hebrew education systems and between students from different socioeconomic backgrounds (PISA, 2021; Central Bureau of Statistics in Israel, 2021). The test results show very large gaps between the two population groups. Recall that since 2015 there has been a significant drop in minority grades compared to Hebrew speakers and, of course, a larger gap compared to OECD countries. The test scores are seen as benchmarks in judging the success that students will score in the future: in academia, in employment and their integration into society, and indirectly, they will contribute to the resilience of the economy, economic growth, employment and increased labour productivity. In this context, the Bank of Israel has stated that low PISA test scores, as well as large gaps between students, harm the economy and the resilience of the state.

3. Integration of the Bedouin community in the Israeli education system

The Bedouin population is part of the Arab-Muslim community, citizens of the State of Israel since 1954 (ALVAKILI, 2021). The academic I. Abu Saad in his work: "Palestinian education in the Israeli settler state: divide, rule and control," informs us that Bedouins constitute about 35% of the total population in the Negev district (southern Israel) (ABU-SAAD, 2019). According to the Central Bureau of Statistics in Israel (Central Bureau of Statistics in Israel, 2021), the growth rate of the Bedouin population is high compared to the Jewish society and even higher compared to the growth rate of the Arab and Muslim population, about 7.3% in 2019. The Central Bureau provides a statistical forecast for 2035, in which it indicates a significant increase in the Bedouin population in the Negev, which will be around 370-500 thousand people, depending on the rate of population decline. In each of the CBS projections for the years 2009-2059, the minority group with the highest growth rate is the Arab population, and within this, the Muslim population in the south, which is how the Bedouin society in the Negev is identified. Yeshiv, Kleiner - Kassir (KLEINER-KASSIR, 2012).

The Negev region currently includes one city, six towns and two regional councils (the municipality concentrates eleven additional recognised settlements) in which approximately 76% of the Bedouin live. The rest of the Bedouin population in the Negev lives in unrecognised settlements. Scholars A. Gardner and E. Marx point out that many Bedouin parents have realised in recent years that the key to social and occupational mobility is investing in good quality education for their children. This social perspective has already been realized in other minority societies in Israel and among policy makers. Therefore, in the decade between 2010 and 2020 the number of Bedouin students increased from 1,153 to 2,632 (GARDNER & MARX, 2000). However, the Bedouin education system still faces many challenges and difficulties (SIINER, 2014). In this context, M. Nasasra and E. BELLIS argue that currently only 22% of graduate students are eligible for the baccalaureate degree (compared to 78% in the Jewish population and 68% in other Arab groups) (NASER-NAJJAB, 2020). At the same time, the Central Bureau of Statistics shows that 29.3% of 17-year-olds are not enrolled in any form or level of education (WEININGER & WEISBLAI, 2017). Most of the school dropouts are in the transition between lower secondary school and higher grades. Dozens of students do not return to class the following year for a variety of reasons, such as learning gaps and difficulties, frequent absences, unresponsiveness to social and emotional difficulties, low parental expectations, and a desire to

seek occupational opportunities that help the family economy. Generalising the results of the statistical data analysis, the author stresses that it is essential to refer to Bedouin society separately and to focus the studies on the actual situation of the Arab community in the structure of Israeli society.

The Central Bureau of Statistics consistently classifies all Bedouin settlements in the Negev into the lowest socio-economic groups (Central Bureau of Statistics in Israel, 2021). A. Saif, N. Haddad Haj Yanya, A. Chai in the paper: "Integration of Bedouin society in high-tech and knowledge-intensive industries - a summarizing report" claim that the standard of living in all recognized Bedouin settlements and regional councils is very low - all infrastructures of electricity, water, sewage, health, recreation and education are maintained at a low level or do not exist. We observe a significant shortage of standards and professional manpower in the areas of local authority responsibility (SAIF & HADDAD & CHAI, 2021). Y. Harpaz explains that the standard of living in non-state-recognised settlements is even lower, as there is no state intervention in the physical and human infrastructure there. The rapid growth rate of the Bedouin population results in a high level of youth compared to the general population in Israel (HARPAZ, 2011). According to data from the Central Bureau of Statistics (Central Bureau of Statistics in Israel, 2021) combined with data from the Ministry of the Interior, approximately half of the population are children and teenagers aged 0-14, compared to only a quarter of the Jewish population in the Beer-Sheva district, the southern metropolis. According to Ministry of Interior data (Ministry of Interior in Israel, 2021), the high rate of children leads to a low rate of funding and public spending. In addition, poverty among the Bedouin population in the Negev is up to four times higher than among the Jewish population in Israel. Poverty signals that the Bedouin authorities' income from taxes is low and spending on public services is high.

4. Bedouin education system

I. A. Krakara explains that, as citizens of the state, Bedouins are entitled to benefit from its legislation, including education (KRAKARA, 2018). Despite equality by law, we observe significant gaps between Bedouins and the rest of the population in Israel on the issue of access to education (JABARIN & AGBARIA, 2010). The gaps are observed in the participation rate of Bedouin students in the education system. According to the 2017 report of the Israeli Knesset (Israeli parliament) Information and Research Centre, entitled "Education in Bedouin society in the Negev - update (WEISBLAI, 2017), in the 2020-2021 study year, 80,543 Bedouin students, residing in the Negev, studied in the education system, including 22,211 students in kindergartens and 42,361 students in elementary and high schools. Educational institutions serving Bedouin residents of the Negev are divided - 746 kindergartens, 147 elementary schools (some have grades I - VIII and some have grades I - IX) and 49 high schools.

Table 2. Bedouin students and institutes recognized settlements in the Negev 2020-2021


City	Students				Institutes			
	Pre-primary	Elementary School	High School	Total	Pre-primary	Elementary School	High School	Total
Rahat	6,115	9,359	3,650	19,124	206	31	9	246
Neve Midbar	3,612	7,492	1,941	13,045	122	26	7	155
El Kasum	3,083	6,224	1,752	11,059	109	25	7	141
Tel Sheva	1,891	3,189	1,340	6,420	65	12	5	82
Hora	1,775	3,434	1,778	6,987	64	14	7	85
Araara	1,492	3,390	1,445	6,327	47	11	5	63
Kseife	1,680	3,949	1,682	7,311	53	11	4	68
Lakia	1,387	2,680	1,075	5,142	43	9	2	54
Segev Shalom	1,176	2,644	1,308	5,128	37	8	3	48
Total	22,211	42,361	15,971	80,543	746	147	49	942

Source: made by the researcher (Central Bureau of Statistics in Israel, 2021; CHE, 2021)

The findings in Table 2.2 indicate that the number of students is high compared to the supply of Bedouin educational buildings and institutes. The author, analysing the data presented in different sources, notes that the gaps are expressed in the participation rate of Bedouin students in the education system. For example, the number of students participating in secondary education in each settlement is decreasing due to the lack of cadres supervising studies in unrecognized settlements. At older ages, Bedouin children in the Negev tend to drop out of school at 2.6 times the national average (HADDAD HAJ YAHYA & VERODNITZKY, 2018). A. Handin & D. Ben Rabbi point out: the potential for Bedouin students to drop out of education is the highest among all other minority populations in Israel. By stealth, the “obvious” result of all this is that the average number of years of study in the Bedouin sector is significantly lower than in the Arab (other minority) or Jewish sector. And it was only 9.5 years of study in 2010-2012. Hidden dropout is an emotional/cognitive/ behavioural disconnect (or a combination), so students are physically at the learning institute, but do not take part in its work and do not benefit from the expected outcome of being there (HANDIN & BEN RABBI, 2016).

Academic skills of Bedouin students (undergraduate and graduate). A further expression of the gaps can be seen in the level of performance of Bedouin students compared to non-Bedouin students. S. Madhala - Brick argues that Bedouin students' grades on the MSEGI (Measures of School Efficiency and Growth indexes in Israel) tests are consistently lower than all other students in Israel (MADHALA-BRICK, 2015). Despite the relative increase in grades since 2016, we cannot indicate a clear and consistent improvement among Bedouin students due to fluctuation in performance over the years (CHE, 2021). Furthermore, O. Tirosh and Y. Eyal add that we can assume that Bedouin students' performance on international PISA tests is also extremely low (TIROSH & EYAL, 2018). Although the results of these tests, as published by the National Authority for Measurement and Evaluation in Education, do not separate the scores of Bedouin society in the Negev from Arab society, there is a breakdown that links students' scores to their social, cultural and economic conditions. O. Morgenstern et al. joins the discussion, noting that students who come from social, cultural and economic backgrounds with few opportunities receive the lowest test scores (MORGENSTERN & PONTO & ASHER, 2016). Since all the settlements of the Bedouin society in the Negev are at the bottom of the socio-economic scale in Israel, we can assume that the scores of Bedouin students are the lowest (RUDNITZKY, 2015). On the topic of discussion M. Tzuk argues that the gaps between populations are also expressed in the rate of those who are eligible for the baccalaureate degree, and even more so in the rate of those who are eligible for the baccalaureate degree who meet university acceptance standards (TZUK, 2016). In the same context, Y. Yaish reminds that baccalaureate exam grades and psychometric exam grades are the two main criteria for acceptance to most faculties in higher education institutions in Israel (YAISH, 2015).

Therefore, a matriculation diploma is a crucial factor for students who are interested in studying for an academic degree. There is an additional gap observed among Bedouin minority students in terms of their participation and success in matriculation exams. In the 2014-2015 study year, the rate of those eligible for the matriculation diploma among students studying in Bedouin settlements was 38%-57%, while the national data was 73%-94%. In addition, the rate of Bedouin students who are eligible for matriculation degrees that meet university acceptance standards is even lower, at 20%-39%, which is below the national average in Israel, which is 79%-95% (WEISS, 2017). Thus, the rate of Bedouin students was extremely low in the 2015-2016 academic year, accounting for 6.2%-9.4%, at ages 20-29 in Bedouin settlements for the bachelor's degree (ABU-SAAD, 2019). Compared to the average Bedouin in Israel which was 14% [268]. Figure 2.8 shows the baccalaureate degree eligibility rate among all 12th graders in 2013 and 2020 by education sector.



Source: made by the researcher (Central Bureau of Statistics in Israel, 2021)

Figure 8. Eligibility rate for matriculation diploma (by %) among 12th grade 2013 – 2021

The data indicate that there is a national trend of increasing enrolment eligibility rates:

1. Students in Druze education had the strongest increase between 2013 and 2021, from 53.5% in 2013 to 79.1% in 2021 (on average), i.e. an increase of 25.6% (even higher than the data for Jewish education). This change is partly related to a program operated by the "YEHOLOT" association in most Druze high schools since 2010.
2. In Arab education, despite the significant improvement in eligibility for enrolment, we note an increase of 18.2%. In the period described, the eligibility rate is low compared to Druze and Jewish education.
3. Eligibility rates for enrolment in the Bedouin education system are in line with their achievement on the SEGM (Measures of School Effectiveness and Growth) tests and lower compared to other minorities and compared to Jewish education. Note that there was some jump in 2013 from 43.6% and an increase of 15.8% to 2021 (59.4).

5. Technology education in the Bedouin community

Thanks to the efforts of the Ministry of Education over the last decade to direct students towards technological matriculation courses, we are seeing a sharp increase in the number of students from the minority population (especially students) in general and Bedouin students in particular. D.F. Shmueli and R. Khamaisi in the article: "Bedouin communities in the Negev: Models for planning the unplanned d" draw attention to the results of the structural reform of technological-vocational education, initiated in 2006 - about 40% of high schools teach for technological matriculation in 25 courses of study (SHMUELI & KHAMAISI, 2021). Since 2006 there is a sharp increase among Arab students, while in the Bedouin sector there is an increase of 248% and 190% in the Druze sector. M. Nasasra & E. Bellis note that in the Arab education sectors, in gender segmentation, unlike in Hebrew education, the rate of girls in technological education is higher than the rate of boys (NASASRA & BELLIS, 2020). Ministry of Education data indicate that in high-tech education, the rate of students eligible for the matriculation diploma in Arab and Druze education is about 90% (compared to 74% in Bedouin education). This rate is like Jewish state education, although the socio-economic background of Arab students in higher technology courses is lower than that of Jewish students. Even in comparison to the eligibility rates of matriculation in the theoretical course, the technological course is much higher. However, it

should be noted that among Bedouin and other minority students, in the medium course, and even more so in the low course, the baccalaureate degree eligibility rate is much lower, both compared to the number of Jewish and compared to Arab minority theoretical education students.

Psychometric testing and integration into higher education. According to data from the Council for Higher Education [CHE, 2021] in cooperation with the Central Bureau of Statistics in Israel (WEININGER & WEISBLAI, 2017), there is an improvement in eligibility for matriculation rates and quality of diplomas, and the gap between the Bedouin (other minority) population and Jews, especially among girls, is narrowing, but the results on psychometric exams are slowly decreasing, but they exist. Psychometric exam results and test scores clearly indicate the Arab population's desire to integrate into higher education institutions, as well as the barriers that complicate it (AGBARIA, 2017). The 2018 Arabic psychometric exam rate was 33.6% for all minorities. Specialists in the field point out that in a decade, 2008-2018, their rate increased by about 5%. It can also be seen that the examination rate of the Arab population was higher than its proportion in the population structure - about 22%. According to M. Al Hajj "this rate is not only due to a higher desire to be accepted into higher education institutions, but also to a very high rate of candidate return, about half of the exams, compared to about one third among Jews. Comparing Arabic exam grades with Hebrew test grades, it is clear why Arabic speakers tend to repeat the exam several times (AL-HAJJ, 2003).

Research conducted in 2019 by the National Centre for Testing and Evaluation [nite], which is in charge of the psychometric exam, indicated that there are, in addition to gender and language group, variables are crucial in determining the score: (1) economic status; (2) the cost of the exam preparation course; (3) father and mother's education. The candidate's socio-economic background also has a significant influence on his/her chances of getting good marks. Because of the significant gaps between the Bedouin population (and the Arab population in general) and the Jewish population in terms of their economic status and gaps in education (especially among adults), it is obvious. Young Bedouin, for example, find it difficult to achieve a sufficient score on the psychometric test.

Another study by the National Centre for Testing and Evaluation informs us that the reading time of Arabic speakers is longer than the reading time of Hebrew speakers, even when controlling for cognitive and socioeconomic variables (BOI, 2021). In addition, there have been claims over the years that the exam is culturally and gender biased, such that the proportion of weak-group applicants whose members are accepted into universities is lower relative to the proportion accepted if the exception was based on a criterion that is culturally unbiased. The psychometric exam is supposed to be an objective filtering mechanism for higher education in Israel, it is a barrier for the periphery population whose openness data is poor and leads to the perpetuation of existing gaps and even widens it.

Integrating the Bedouin community into higher education. The development of higher education in Bedouin society in Israel is one of the challenges facing the community and the institutions of the State of Israel. About this writes H. Yahel who argues: the Bedouin society in the Negev is one of the communities facing many challenges in various fields that influence their ability to integrate into systems important for building a resilient society (YAHIEL, 2021). Integrating young people into the labour market and higher education institutions is one of them. D. Levi in the article: 'Integration of Bedouins in Higher Education' Pilot Assessment "Gate to the Academy" highlights six main reasons why members of the Bedouin community do not fully integrate into higher education, making it difficult for them to integrate further into the workforce. These are:

1. Many Bedouin face a language barrier, with poor knowledge of Hebrew, which makes it difficult for them to integrate into the education system, particularly

university education. In addition, many Bedouin also have difficulties communicating in English.

2. The cultural aspect of Bedouin integration is analysed based on the liberal approach, which recognises cultural gaps between Bedouin and Jewish students, which sometimes cause distance between the two groups and prevent optimal integration.

3. Lack of family support. Bedouin students find it difficult to cope with university life because they have not been encouraged to continue their studies.


4. Conditions for registration. Some high school students cannot take university entrance exams because their matriculation average is low, or they are not eligible for the degree.

5. Geographical distance. In most cases, the Bedouin population lives relatively far away from universities, so young Bedouin cannot study in higher education institutions.

6. Economic difficulties. Many families cannot pay tuition fees and do not see this as a necessity for them, especially for women [193, P.18].

Although over the last 15 years we have seen a real increase in the number of Bedouin community members taking part in admissions to higher institutions, there is still a gap between the majority and minority groups in access to higher education. For example, in 2009, approximately 94% of the Bedouin population who had a high school diploma, i.e. met the university admission requirements, were admitted to higher education institutions. For comparison, in the Jewish population the rate is 83% (Central Bureau of Statistics in Israel, 2021) (Ministry of Population, Immigration and Authorities in Israel, 2021). The statistics allow us to observe that the gap between Jews and Arabs (and Bedouins) is narrowing in the younger generation, so it is not surprising that the gap between Bedouins aged 25-34 and academically educated Jews is 10.4%, while the gap is 21% in the 35-64-year-old Bedouins and Jews (the older generation). According to the Council for Higher Education (CHE, 2021), in the 2018-2019 academic year, there were approximately 0.7% Bedouins (17.7% minorities in academic education) of all undergraduate students, a rate that is closer to their proportion in the population (3.2% Bedouins and 21% of all minorities). However, the rate of Bedouin students at master's and doctoral level is much lower, constituting 0.2-0.3% of all Israeli students (CHE, 2021) (Central Bureau of Statistics in Israel, 2021). The integration of Bedouin society members is increasing especially in colleges (for teaching training and academic colleges), and less in research universities.

Figure 2.9 shows the evolution and numerical withdrawal of Bedouin graduates in colleges, universities and teaching colleges between 2007 and 2021 academic years.



Source: made by the researcher (CHE, 2021; Central Bureau of Statistics in Israel, 2021).

Figure 9. The number of Bedouin graduates in each higher education framework academic years – 2007- 2021

Analysing the data in Figure 2.10, the author observes that the number of college graduates (134 in 2007 vs. 281 in 2021) is increasing, while the number of graduates of educational institutions, especially those who will go into teaching, is decreasing (198 in 2007 vs. 126 in 2021). In addition, the number of college graduates is increasing, but still in small numbers compared to other minority groups and the Jewish population. This trend of transition to studies in academic colleges and universities is welcomed. We also mention the importance of teaching studies for teachers, which together with the presence of other factors could change the situation considerably for the better. Enrolling Bedouin in universities is an existential necessity resulting also from the understanding that, Bedouin family can ensure the conditions of a decent life, subsistence and welfare, will have to master the secrets of the professions in demand in the 21st century, mainly STEM (Science, Technology, Engineering, Mathematics) professions (RUDNITZKY, 2015).

The research data justify the conclusion: the gaps are narrowing, but in addition to the various barriers, the issue of choosing study paths is a complicated challenge for young Bedouin. Indeed, the author describes the orientation of students towards educational and economic directions, pointing out that there is a “long way” to go before the graduates of educational institutions can enter the labour market. Approximately 20% of all Bedouin graduates from universities and colleges in the year of study 2020-2021 received the diploma of young specialist in the field of education and teacher training, the rest graduated from universities or academic colleges. A relatively small number of Bedouin graduates chose other fields, such as social sciences, medicine and paramedical professions, STEM professions, architecture, law and agriculture. The results of the full data analysis of the number and percentage of Bedouin graduates by learning subjects and educational institutions in all degrees and in bachelor's and master's degrees separately are reflected in Figure 2.11. We observe that in both universities and colleges in Israel, the three most common learning subjects among Bedouin graduates in the period 2020-2021 (Figure 2.11) are. (2) general humanities, (3) foreign languages, world literature and regional studies (multidisciplinary), which are not studied in colleges and are the second most common subject of study in universities. Figure/circular diagram 2.10 shows the distribution of training profession in higher education in Bedouin society during 2015-2021.

Analysis of this data allows us to provide a clear picture of a growing number of students studying professions that will not necessarily become occupations. Professions, for example, characteristic of academic fields, such as humanities and social sciences account for 37% (more than one third of graduates). Employees in these fields are expected to “develop”

professional, economic skills, a goal that is unattainable due to the presence of various circumstances, including occupational discrimination against minorities in general and the Bedouin minority in particular. The author's ideas on this subject will be elucidated in another section of the paper.

6. Informal education system

Since the mid-20th century, there has been a growing global interest in informal education, both at the research and public policy levels (SHAVIT, 2015). Y. Reiter and A. Cohen argue that informal education is characterized by freedom and an atmosphere of enjoyment, peer connections, institutional flexibility, and curricula, mainly composed of experiences. Informal education allows individuals to have a spontaneous and original expression that formal education does not necessarily allow (REITER & COHEN, 2012). A. Rudnitzky in his work: "The Arab citizens of Israel at the beginning of the twenty-first century" explains that the organizational flexibility of informal education and the programs it offers respond to the needs, values and traditions of many populations or communities (RUDNITZKY, 2014). Not surprisingly, the importance of informal education and its positive influence, especially among marginalized populations, has a clear recognition by institutions and research around the world (BEN- DAVID, 2010; BEN-PERETZ, 2001; BLASS, 2015). In this context, we recall that the Report of the National Academy of Sciences in Israel, highlighted the large gaps between the level of development of informal education in Arab society and its level in Jewish society (CHE, 2021). The gaps in educational achievement in formal education are largely explained because of socio-economic gaps. The report of the Taub Center for Social Policy Research in Israel (Taub Center, 2018), which examined the socio-economic composition of students in the different streams of education from 2004 to 2020, indicated that there is a significant improvement in the economic status of Bedouin students. In 2004, 54% of Bedouin students were in the three lowest deciles (1-3) and 32% were in the four middle deciles (4-7).

In 2020, there were fewer Bedouin students in the lower deciles, about -38%, and their share in the middle deciles increased to 44%. In fact, according to 2020 data, there is almost no difference between the share of students from all Arab education institutions (including Bedouin) in the middle deciles (44%) and the share of Jewish students in the state education system in these deciles. The large gap between the top three deciles (7-10) - 9% of Bedouin students (and 18% of other minorities) are in these deciles, compared to 45% of Jewish students. Y. Gabay notes that the gaps were expressed in the number and quality of activities, and the significant shortage of physical infrastructure in Arab settlements (sports fields, community centres and buildings for youth activities) (GRUBER, 2017). Furthermore, researchers: N. Blass, N. Sussman & S. Tzur in the study: "Segregation of students in elementary and middle schools" note that the reality in the Bedouin sector, differs more radically in all the mentioned manifestations (BLASS & SUSSMAN & TZUR, 2019). The observed gaps have an explanation: the huge gap in infrastructure and technological level between the Jewish society and the Bedouin community. Scholars also highlight cultural differences, justifying the need for education adapted to social and cultural issues.

Informal education, which operates outside school hours, is the area where the gap between Jewish and Bedouin society is widest. The Israeli Ministry of Education's SEGM (Measures of School Effectiveness and Growth - part of the requirements of the OECD educational organisation) test of the National Authority for Measurement and Evaluation in Education confirmed this situation. The 2017 test showed a significant gap in the participation of children and teenagers in leisure activities, it is a gap of 17% in elementary school, 26% in theoretical high school and 22% in high school. Further analysis indicates that the percentage of participation in Arab society is even lower (HANDIN & BEN RABBI, 2016). N. Jabarin and A. Agrabia in the paper:

“Education on hold: Government policy and civic initiatives to promote Arab education in Israel” explain that in state institutions, and especially in the Ministry of Education, it is recognized that formal education is a lever for the integration of the Arab population in the sectors of the national economy, in the future labour market, in society in general. Those responsible for the development and implementation of public policies understand that informal education plays a key role in achieving the state’s goals of developing a resilient society characterized by stability, prosperity and well-being for all citizens (JABARIN & AGBARIA, 2010).

In conclusion, the author of the thesis, a specialist in Bedouin education, analyses a series of social mobility tools practised in the modern era. In the education system the individual acquires various social, cognitive skills that help him to integrate into his social and economic environment. This understanding is common to all actors of the political process, the educational process, therefore different social groups: classes, ethnic groups, religious groups etc. are constantly fighting for the necessary resources to develop the infra-structure and provide with competent teachers in the organization and smooth running of both formal and informal educational process. field. To develop an integrated education system, one objective of which would be to reduce social disparities, it is necessary to respect the principle of equal opportunities for all players in the social process. The strength of education policy aimed at reducing gaps in education will contribute to the future reduction of social and economic inequality.

7. Analysis of the contribution of the Bedouin minority to the development of Israeli society: educational and political-economic aspects

Since the establishment of the State of Israel, the Arab population has not participated in public discussions, but changes in politics, economy and society have increased public awareness. Today, the interest of state institutions and civil society organizations in the Negev, and especially the Bedouin population, is increasing (AGBARIA, 2017). Several politicians and leaders of non-governmental organizations discuss in various contexts the contribution of Bedouin society to the development of Israeli society. Analysing the January 2021 data provided by the Central Bureau of Statistics and the Immigration and Population Authority (Ministry of Population, Immigration and Authorities in Israel, 2021), approximately 280 thousand Bedouins live in Israel. It is the youngest community in Israel, in which about 51% are children up to the age of 18. Most Bedouin live in 18 established and state-declared settlements. The town of Rahat is home to about 70,000 people; the other towns are home to about 100,000 people and two regional councils are home to another 20,000. Bedouin settlements are administered by mayors and local councils. In addition, almost 80 thousand Bedouin live outside the state-recognised settlements.

At present, the image of Bedouin society is not very positive, and some even attribute the alienation of the political institution to them. M. Avinoam and H. Levi in the article: “Bedouin of the Negev and the State of Israel”, point out that the media regarding Bedouins is only in negative contexts and portrays them as violent criminals terrorizing the south (AVINOAM & LEVI, 2012). This is one-dimensional coverage that is not only untrue but increases hostility and lack of motivation. In this context, N. Blass et al argue that Bedouin society is indeed in a problematic state and is the first to suffer from crime and violence. The best solution is to integrate its members into society and the economy. Thus, the scholars initiate a balanced discussion in which not only “Bedouin terror” is discussed (BLASS, 2017). The author, who participates in the discussion, proposes to examine the contribution of the State of Israel to the development of Bedouin society, an analysis that highlights the key points of interface, which seeks to promote society and bring it to the social, cultural, economic preparedness and competence required in the 21st century. Thus, we find that one of the main issues involving Bedouin society since the establishment of the State of Israel is the regulation of land and the urbanization of Bedouin society.

The process of urbanisation and the transition to permanent settlements. The Planning and Building Law passed by the Israeli government in 1965 stipulated that most of the uninhabited land was agricultural land, thus ensuring that every building would be considered illegal, including houses that had already been built (AYALON & SHAVIT, 2004). In this way, Bedouin settlement in all areas became illegal. In addition, as of 2021, government authorities refuse to recognize Bedouin ownership of land and do not recognize traditional Bedouin law or other evidence of Bedouin ownership of land in the Negev. When the Bedouin in the Negev concentrated in uninhabited lands, a land dispute was opened, which shapes the reality of Bedouin existence so far (GRA, 2016). H. Yahel in the article “Rural or urban? Planning Bedouin settlements” explains that today about 280,000 Bedouin live in the Southern Negev area in three forms of settlement: (1) about 35 unrecognised villages; (2) 7 planned projected towns established by the State of Israel; (3) 11 villages recognised by the state 20 years ago (in the early 2000s). The Bedouin population in the southern Negev represents about 12% of the Israeli Arab population. Although part of the state-planned urbanization process has been somewhat successful, there is a large population of tens of thousands of citizens living in villages not recognized by the state (YAHIEL, 2021). It should be noted that in unrecognized villages there are no basic services and infrastructure, and the population faces difficulties in creating a normative environment in such issues as education, better community life and adequate family life. The collective, political, social, cultural and communication reference that has “stuck” to Bedouin society by Israeli governments (for most of the years of the state’s existence) and by large population groups negatively portrays Bedouin society and other minority communities. The fact that many populations (tens of thousands of citizens) move from one place to another greatly complicates the manifestation of a sense of belonging, identification and commitment to the new place. In addition, many of them feel discriminated against because the process did not start on their own initiative, demand and were not involved in its design (BEKERMAN, 2008). With reference to the difficulties faced by the Bedouin minority, T. Y. Jabareen notes that these have varied implications in different aspects of individual and community life. As a result, many Bedouin are not in a hurry to move to these towns, so they do not prosper and have little population (HARPAZ, 2011).

The move to the new settlements required the consent of the Bedouins. Many of them refused, but it was the only option for them to have basic living conditions in the new settlement. Until the early 2000s, the transition to city living was a condition for the legality of the settlement to be recognised. An additional reason for their reluctance to move to regulated towns is related to one of the most significant characteristics of Bedouin society so far - tribal membership (LEVY, 2018).

Belonging is an important indicator of individual Bedouin life, past and present. The level of social mobility between tribes is minimal. At the same time, these processes have also weakened the status of the sheikhs, the Bedouin tribal elders, who were very important in mediating conflicts in Bedouin communities (REGEV & BRAND, 2015). After the failure of the Praver plan (2011 - government plan for Bedouin settlement), the Israeli administration started a new plan of the Bedouin Development and Settlement Authority in the Ministry of Agriculture, which aims to put an end to one of the most complex land issues in Israel - the settlement of the Bedouin population in the Negev.

Six years after the filing of the ambitious Praver Plan (2011), which sought a comprehensive solution to the problem (Central Bureau of Statistics in Israel, 2021), the Authority approves building plans for about 150 thousand housing units, of which about 40 thousand housing units have been allocated by 2021, when the five-year plan ended. Land for the remaining 110,000 units was allocated later, as requested by the Bedouin community. Resources (SAIF & HADDAD & CHAI, 2021). indicate that, because of the legal and planned availability of land, there was no need for illegal land-grabbing by the state. In the last two years (2021-2023), plans have already been approved for about 32 thousand housing units, and another 60 thousand units are

in advanced stages of planning. The Bedouin Development and Settlement Authority in the Ministry of Agriculture is responsible for the development and infrastructure work under the plan, while the construction of the house is carried out by the residents. Through the resources of the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development (Israeli Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development, 2021), the budget of the program is approximately €2.5 billion (NIS 9 billion), of which approximately €1.6 billion (NIS 6 billion) is for physical and social infrastructure development, approximately €460 million (NIS 1.5 billion) for super-infrastructure (road infrastructure and urban development), and several larger amounts for land planning and regulation and compensation for loss of private land.

The new neighbourhoods planned in the Bedouin settlements are for two population groups:

1. 65,000 Bedouin residents, who have since been living in informal settlements that the state plans to evacuate.
2. 60 thousand inhabitants in need of housing and housing in regulated settlements in unregulated housing - a result of natural reproduction that had no infrastructure planning.

That plan is called “regulation in place”, even though it often involves illegally destroying buildings and building new ones. The main new building is planned in Rahat, Hura, Kuseife, Laqiya, Arara in the Negev, Segev Shalom and Tel Sheva, and the rest in the regional council. The plan also includes the development of industrial zones in Rahat and seven other towns, which will cost €83 million (approximately NIS 300 million) by 2024 and will be planned and marketed in cooperation with the Economy Ministry.

Integration of IT professions into the professions of economic occupation. As already reviewed, there is a perceptual-cultural problem about directions of employment in Bedouin society. One of them is that they avoid working in economic professions. The occupational variety of the Bedouin population is restricted. Most Bedouins work in traditional or low-tech occupations and not in advanced occupations. Traditional occupations include farming and herding, often with little or no pay. Non-traditional occupations include construction work, auto mechanics, etc. These occupations have higher financial returns than traditional occupations.

Both types of professions require a relatively high level of qualification, but are not high-tech and have no development horizon, so minors are often integrated into these professions at the expense of their studies, even though it is prohibited by law. The absence of economic professions prevents Bedouins from competing for better social integration. It is about the quality of living conditions that allow adequate economic existence, social-cultural integration into Israeli society, connection to the effects of globalisation and escape from poverty. New research initiated by the Edmond de Rothschild Foundation - ERF (Edmond de Rothschild Foundation in Israel, 2021) found that of the 350,000 people employed in the high-tech industry in Israel (in July 2021) only 50 are from Bedouin society. According to research initiated by this foundation, which works to bridge the gap in Israeli society through accessibility of higher education, Bedouin education has a low level and harms the level of knowledge and basic skills of young children, and the result is: that only 50 Bedouins are employed in high-tech.

The study also shows that only 135 Bedouin students in the 2020-2022 academic year are studying for a degree in high-tech professions in academic institutions, of which 60% to 70% drop out without a degree. Despite the great need for employees in the high-tech industry, even upon graduation, Bedouin academy students face many difficulties integrating into the field. Both official resource data - from the Ministries of Education, Economy and Employment, the Innovation Authority, academic organizations and civil society organizations, and about 40 interviews (qualitative research) of Bedouin high-tech experts and employees were used in the calculation. According to the research, poor basic conditions harm and reduce the abilities of

young Bedouin to be enrolled and graduate from academic studies to integrate into science in general and high-tech in particular.

Other challenges faced by young Bedouin are lack of experience and unfamiliarity with the high-tech world, conservative discourse, few job opportunities in their home area (mainly in southern Israel), lack of relevant personal connections and few success stories. All these form additional barriers that prevent young Bedouin from integrating into a suitable workplace. The latest (2021) State Comptroller's report states, "In order to ensure the continued definition of the State of Israel as a "start-up nation," the relevant government institutions should address... removing barriers to achieving the goal ... of integrating populations that are currently underrepresented and, in general, can be said to be excluded from it: primarily lacking representation of women, but also of Arab and ultra-Orthodox Jewish populations", and the Bedouin population is the largest of the populations excluded by the state (Israeli State Comptroller report, 2021).

8. Women's employment in Bedouin society

The Bedouin population in southern Israel is characterised by low employment rates compared to the general population in Israel. The employment rate of Bedouin men in the south at the main employment ages was 72% in 2020, 14% lower than the rate of the general population of men in Israel (84%). The Bedouin women population has the lowest employment rate in Israeli society. In 2020, about 34% of Bedouin women at prime employment ages were employed, compared to 76% of the general population of women in Israel. It is known that employment by Bedouin women increased significantly between 2005 and 2020 – from 6% to 34%. The Israeli government decided in July 2010 (updating the 1994 decision) to set employment targets for Arab women, thanks to OECD experts and professional assessment. It was noted that the low rate of integration of Arab women in general, and Bedouin women in particular, into the country's workforce is damaging Israel's economic potential. The occupational target set for Arab women aged between 24 and 65 was an integration rate of 41% into the labour force in 2020. The parallel target for Arab men was 78%.

In addition, in recent years, due to the crisis, caused by the "COVID-19 Pandemic", there has been a severe decline in the employment of Bedouin women, which is damaging their professional status and erasing many of the modest achievements of the last decade. Also, H. Yahel notes that the employment target was set as part of a national policy aimed at reducing the employment gap between groups and, at the same time, achieving the national per capita employment rate of the 15 developed countries (YAHIEL, 2021). In the areas: centre and north, in the Haifa region there is a significant destination approach. However, in the south, where most Bedouin women live, there is no improvement.

The 2017-2021 five-year plan for the Bedouin in the Negev includes employment promotion activities, including investments in the planned direction and employment centres. Recently, information has become public that employment rates among Bedouin aged 25-54 have increased: among men there is an increase from 58% in 2010 to 72% in 2020, and a parallel increase among women of up to 34%. The Brookdale Institute (FRIEDMAN, 2016). Indicated that among Bedouin women with an academic education (from age 13) the employment rate in 2020 was relatively high, up to 80%. However, among Bedouin women with only 12 years of education the employment rate was low - 22%, and among Bedouin women with 11 years of education or less the employment rate was lower – 11%. Therefore, the author concludes that education, period of study, have a major significance in employment. We note in this context that many women, who have not had the opportunity to pursue academic studies, cannot contribute significantly to improving the living conditions of their own families or to the development of the community economy.

Average wage for the Bedouin minority. The employment rate is not only material for comparison, for calculating the percentage of employees among the majority and minority groups, it is also expressed in family income. The small wage that a Bedouin employee earns is divided for many people, the average Bedouin family in the southern district has on average – 6.19 people, while an average Jewish family in this district has only 3.45 people.

Table 3. Comparison of average wages between Jewish and Bedouin settlements 2021 (in euros)

Cities	Average wage for a month (Men's & Women's)	The rate of employment up to the minimum wage
All Israel	2,676 €	39.4%
Jewish cities		
Beer Sheva	2,537 €	39.3%
Dimona	2,633 €	37.1%
Arad	2,179 €	44.4%
Mizpah Ramon	2,071 €	47%
Beduin cities		
Rahat	1,588 €	56.7%
Hura	1,783 €	50.6%
Kseife	1,761 €	50.3%
Harahra	1,711 €	53.8%
El Kasum	1,576 €	56%
Neve Midbar	1,584 €	54.7%

Source: made by the researcher (Central Bureau of Statistics in Israel, 2021) (BOI, 2021)

Analysis of the data allows the author to observe differences of about 50% on average between the wages of the Jewish and Bedouin sectors. By correlating the data with the needs of the family, in terms of number of people, we understand how deep poverty is in Bedouin society. The column on the right shows the number of employees earning the minimum wage and Bedouin society has a big “advantage” over Jewish society. There is no Bedouin settlement that employs less than 50% above the minimum wage. Looking at women’s wages, the average monthly wage (according to data from the Central Bureau of Statistics) for employed women in Bedouin settlements in the Negev was €1,453 in 2020, a nominal increase of about 1.6% over 2019, compared to the wage of employees in Israel, which was €2,370, which has a nominal increase of 7% over 2019.

The occupational situation of the active Bedouin population allows us to see that most Bedouins are employed in traditional occupations that do not require knowledge and skills, such as high technology and progress.

9. Employment centers for Bedouin society

The Israeli administration has decided to support the institutions with the opening of employment centres to improve the professional skills of Bedouins. The “Rian” occupational guidance centre programme is part of a wider programme established following four government decisions to promote employment of the Arab population in Israel. As part of this program, it was decided to establish 21 employment centres, 8 of them for the Bedouin population in the Negev (Ministry of Finance in Israel, 2021). The centres provide individual guidance and services to participants and work to establish regional and urban infrastructure to promote employment:

1. Services for the participant

- Building career plans that include initial placement, training and promotion to a quality job.
- Monitoring the work of workshops to prepare for various jobs and develop the necessary skills.
- Work skills courses such as: computer knowledge and use and English language skills.
- Presentation of designated vocational training courses.
- Implementation of programmes to promote business start-up and accompany small and medium-sized businesses offered by the “Maof Centre”.
- Assisting in connecting to the workplace and placing the individual in a role that matches their skills.

2. Work with employers

- Develop links with employers and build the employer base in the settlements;
- Tailor training to employer needs;

3. Community employment development

- Develop cooperation to promote employment with community stakeholders: public institutions (such as local authority, community centres) and third sector organisations;
- Build a ‘sharing network’: an aspect of influencing people in the community who promote the work of the centre to create local leadership.

In addition to the director’s work, it was decided to open training and placement centres for potential Bedouin minority labour.

Table 2.4 shows the contribution of the State of Israel to the training model of Bedouin society.

Table 4. National training program for Bedouin society – 2018

Program number	Training model	Description	Program operator – model	Supervising body	Funding factor
1.	Budgeted trainings	Study class for required profession – general	Business factor by tender	Vocational training department	The Ministry of Work and welfare services
2.	Business courses	Study class for required profession – general	Business factor	Governmental supervision	The Ministry of Work and welfare services
3.	Intra-factory training	Training within work – individual	Integrating factory	Vocational training department	The Ministry of Work and welfare services
4.	Class in factory	Training class within the employer	Employers	Vocational training department	The Ministry of Work and welfare services
5.	Apprenticeship training	Apprenticeships in work	Employers	Vocational training department	The Ministry of Work and welfare services

6.	Training vouchers	Training course by candidate selection	Training factors	Governmental supervision	The Ministry of Work and welfare services
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Source: made by the researcher (Ministry of Finance in Israel, 2021).

From the table it can be understood that the Israeli administration has “woken up” in recent years (2010) and understood that it is necessary to integrate the Bedouin minority into Israeli society to gain their trust and economic-occupational cooperation. M. Tzuk argues that knowing and analysing Bedouin society, these solutions are not “magic”, therefore a more extensive program is needed (TZUK, 2016). The author explains in the article: “The politics of equality in the education system: the Arab and Bedouin sectors in Israel” (ALVAKILI, 2020) that the gaps are so deep, after so many years of neglect, that ‘the cosmetic solut‘on of training is not enough, and its contribution will be minor. She argues that there are social, cultural barriers that prevent large enough parts of the population from finding the necessary “engine of growth” in government solutions.

Development of educational infrastructure – a research topic that highlights the state of the Bedouin formal and informal educational system. This reality starts with the analysis of the infrastructure and ends with the analysis of the recorded results, with the quality educational services offered by the educational institutions. O. Tirosh and Y. Eyal in the article: “Socio-economic measures for the Bedouin population in the Negev” argue that the Bedouin society suffers from poverty and the Bedouin settlements are classified in the lowest socio-economic group (TIROSH & EYAL, 2018). As a result, the quality of life in Bedouin settlements is low, the level of resident services is low, there is a serious lack of infrastructure. E. Weisblai, in the article: “Education in Bedouin society in the Negev – update” defines the problem of educational integration as a social-existential necessity, mentioning that the Arab-Bedouin population in the Negev is characterized by a low level of education, approximately – 9.7%, almost twice as high as their rate in the Arab population (5.0%) and five times higher than their rate in Jewish society (1.9%). In addition, the rate of higher education graduates (university and non-university) in the Bedouin sector (8.4%) is lower than their rate in the Arab population (13.8%) and more than 4 times lower than their rate in the Jewish population (36.5%) (WEISBLAI, 2017).

These shortcomings are reflected in the education system, whose unprofessionalism is expressed in several ways, first of all, outdated teaching methods are highlighted, which are based on memorization and do not encourage the development of creative, critical thinking, which is necessary for baccalaureate exams and even more so in higher education. Additional expressions of the unprofessionalism of the system are lack of talented manpower (kindergarten teachers, schoolteachers, educational counsellors, regular visiting officers, pedagogical guides and educational psychologists), lack of talented management, supervisory and controlling factors, lack of adequate learning facilities, and lack of community involvement and support. In her article: “Integration or Segregation in Societies (Case Study of the Education System in Israel)”, the author of the thesis argues that these problems in the education system make it difficult for Bedouin society to integrate into the labour market and Israeli society in general. In this context, it is advisable to solve the problems analysed before the gaps multiply their influence. It is important for higher education to stimulate the promotion and explain the significance of higher education for the development of Israeli society and the Bedouin community (ALVAKILI, 2021).

The author is convinced that in the last decade the state has made efforts to increase the number of Bedouin students in higher education institutions, but the rate of students in universities and academic colleges is lower than that in Arab and Jewish society. Young Bedouin need academic support, from the selection stage of study subjects in high school, through admission to higher education and later to entry into the labour market. In the last few years, several individual projects have started in Bedouin society to strengthen STEM studies, the integration of mathematics, science, engineering and technology, with the aim of higher

technology studies in universities and colleges. Only about 3% of Bedouin students enrol in these projects. Nothing is known about the effectiveness of the programmes. The study “Education in Bedouin society in the Negev – update” gives us the opportunity to understand that there is no correlation between these programs, that there are no interfaces and cooperation between them (SHLITA, 2021). The reasons are objective for the Bedouin society and set barriers for the development of the skills of Bedouin youth. Here are some examples of development barriers:

- Difficulty in recruiting teachers, there are more problems in recruiting professional teachers in their field, especially in advanced technology, physics, biology, where there are not, they often return to the north after a period of work in the Negev, so there is little investment in their training.
- Limited number of students: only a limited number of students are accepted into the programme, representing only some potential students. Of note is Rahat, where only two students are selected from each class. Local authorities and parents are asking to increase the number of students in the centres of excellence.
- Exceeding the maximum number of students in the class: sometimes the school or the parents press the coordinator and guide, and the number of students exceeds the maximum number in the class.
- Delay in purchasing equipment for the centre’s work due to delay in submitting the centre’s request to the local authority.
- Difficulty in transport: the transport problem is not fully solved in the programme, so a student without transport cannot participate in the programme.
- Lack of linkage with other programs: there is no continuous program for centre of excellence programs, even there are fewer talented and excellence programs in different classes and settings. For example, the Negev Ministry’s program of excellence and the development of the Gali periphery, which targets students in grades 9 to 12 and has many centres in Bedouin settlements. There is no cooperation between programme operators.

Analysing the information about the programs that the State of Israel supports for the development of the Bedouin society, the author of the thesis notes the presence of actions in the Israeli policy, oriented towards the integration of the members of the Bedouin community into the Israeli society. Comprehensive actions are also needed, and a profound process of combining national and community challenges is important to enable minorities in general and Bedouins in particular to assimilate the conditions by which they can provide themselves with a better quality of life on an individual and community level.

10. Conclusion

Defining the status of Arab society in Israel, based on knowledge of their personal and collective rights and obligations, developed against the background of the Arab-Israeli conflict that preceded the establishment of the state. In the early years of the state’s existence, a policy of cultural separation between the Jewish people, Jewish society and members of minorities – Arab society – was approved. This was a starting point, developed into policies of discrimination against the Arab minority in various areas, including issues of religion, investment and urban development, the economy and, obviously, the issue of education. For a long time, state institutions did not adequately appreciate the dangers, the threats coming from the marginalization of Arab minorities. It is only in the first decades of the 21st century that researchers are observing important changes in the public policies of the State of Israel, aimed at narrowing the gaps between the ethnic minorities and the majority group in all areas of social life, including the provision of quality educational services.

The author of the PhD thesis pays particular attention to the gaps in living conditions and employment. The conditions of employment are assessed, for which young and old people from Arab minorities, particularly – Bedouins, need to be well educated, qualified. In reality, for the development of skills required by employers, there are insufficient conditions for training and education, especially, in the Negev region. For a consistent change in the situation in the field of education, integration of marginalized minorities, investments are needed in housing development, solving the problem of residential land, creating jobs, developing infrastructure. The author presents a list of reference points, which expresses the discrimination of minority groups, marginalised and even excluded from the life of Israeli society. In the article: “Educational systems of minorities in the world” [9], the author of the thesis mentions that the Arab community, the largest minority population in Israel, has been discriminated against for years, without any justification, and the Bedouin society, concentrated in the south of the country, suffers most from all aspects of discrimination. This conclusion is justified based on analysis of statistical data, set out in numerous tables.

The author presents the situation in providing schools, sports fields, and rest areas for students, a segment in which there has been neglect for years in areas populated by minority groups. In all the topics under analysis, the author applies comparative analysis to illustrate the existing gaps. It is noteworthy that the physical infrastructure in Jewish society is by a considerable margin compared to the OECD average, despite the large investment in the education budget.

Focusing on the analysis of the real situation of the Bedouin community, the author observes that the biggest gaps between Bedouin and Jewish society. The cultural gaps regarding settlement patterns have been the focus of several programs, through which the government has tried to address the problem, but none of them have been welcomed by the Bedouin community. To this day, this reality damages the economic, educational and professional status of the Bedouin community and places their young people at the bottom of the social ladder. Graduates of the education system have insufficient skills to integrate into higher education in economic professions.

The author points out that the Bedouin community, in recent years, has become aware of the significance of social integration through training and education, because of which engagement in economic professions leads the whole community to a decent life. Therefore, it started cooperating with the leaders of change, supporting an accelerated process of urbanization of Bedouin society. In addition, the state has launched many projects that promote and focus on defined populations within Bedouin society, from kindergarten ages to adults in demand for professional, advanced training. One of the target groups of the programmes is the female population in Bedouin society. Various processes take place within this group, the common denominator of which is the empowerment of women, their preparation for various occupations and their integration into the labour market. Another group is made up of teachers, trained to educate and train the younger generation.

In addition, the author mentions many other projects, which aim to establish vocational training centres and develop urban infrastructure to provide an advanced set of services and commerce that will attract a Jewish population. The training programmes offer various options for the Bedouin community to move forward and out of the circle of poverty in which they find themselves. In his article: “The Arab Minority and the Jewish Majority in the Israeli Educational System” [7], the author concluded: In the period 2021-2022, the Bedouin community does not have the resources to enable their economic development. At the same time, the southern population constituting about 25% is weak and segregated, where each group works to advance, without cooperation with its neighbours. The author adds that in such a situation, the Bedouin are the biggest losers, but the entire population of the country has to lose as well.

With reference to the state's contribution to the development of the Bedouin community and its integration into the education system, the author raises the issue of empowerment in STEM studies. Based on the research, the author concludes that Bedouins need academic guidance from the choice of high school subjects, through the stages of admission to higher education institutions, and then into the labour market and back to the stage of advanced studies. In recent years, the Bedouin Society has launched several projects to improve STEM studies, the combination of mathematics, science, engineering and technology, targeting higher technology studies at universities and colleges. The experience gained in implementing these projects, which cover about 3% of students, does not provide enough information to assess their effectiveness.

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