

Organization and Regulatory Base of Primary School Education in Israel: Specifics of Teaching Bedouin Students in Primary School

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Abstract

After the establishment of the state, there was a radical change in the life of the Bedouin Arabs in the Negev. They were not allowed to continue their traditional way of life in a short time. Bedouins are a destitute minority in a Western-oriented country. This change created the need for a formal education system that would deal with the new reality. Formal education became a prerequisite for the success of the Bedouin Arabs to adapt to the changes that have changed their lives due to the need for assimilation, partially or fully, in the Israeli economy for their livelihood. However, the formal education system is a fairly new framework in the Arab-Bedouin community in the Negev. Bedouin education frameworks were not formal, and the young men and women were educated through observation of adults and active participation in everyday life. The influence of the control system is so strong that teachers and education administration personnel are kept in the system of Arab education is afraid to even openly criticize the Ministry of Education. For example, in an article published in the Jerusalem Post on 14 December 2005, dealing with the sub-conditions at the school in one of the recognized Bedouin settlements in the Negev, the administrators and teachers agreed to speak only anonymously.

Keywords: Israeli education, Bedouins, Arab-Israelis, primary school.

1. The historical developments of the educational system of the Bedouin sector in Israel

After the establishment of the state of Israel, there was a radical change in the life of the Bedouin Arabs in the Negev. They were not allowed to continue their traditional way of life in a short time. Bedouins are a destitute minority in a Western-oriented country.

This change created the need for a formal education system that would deal with the new reality. Formal education became a prerequisite for the success of the Bedouin Arabs to adapt to the changes that have changed their lives due to the need for assimilation, partially or fully, in the Israeli economy for their livelihood.

However, the formal education system is a fairly new framework in the Arab-Bedouin community in the Negev. Bedouin education frameworks were not formal, and the young men and women were educated through observation of adults and active participation in everyday life (Abu-Saad, 2007, 2011).

The indifference shown by the state authorities towards the education of Arab-Bedouin children in the Negev and lack the interest in formal education in the Bedouin community itself meant that the education system among the Bedouins, it did not develop for a long time, even after an education law was enacted compulsory (1949).

The number of schools was very limited during the military regime (1966-1948), and most schools had only four grades (1st-4th). The average number of students in the school was about 40 (Abu-Saad, 1991).

The school was at a low level, and the state authorities did not make a serious effort to enforce the mandatory education law required. For example, in the school in 2015 there were 350 students enrolled in the schools out of 2,000 children in compulsory education age. In the space of one year, 220 students who attended the schools (that is, 37% of the students) dropped out (Sabirsky, 1990).

A well-known problem in Bedouin education is the subject of girls' studies at school, which was particularly problematic. In traditional Bedouin society, women were prohibited from leaving the family environment. The families preferred not to risk their honor and did not allow their daughters to come into contact with boys from other families and tribes.

The Israeli Ministry of Education, for its part, did not bother to establish separate schools for girls in the Bedouin sector, because such separation is also practiced in the state-religious sector and the ultra-orthodox sector. Therefore, the Bedouins in the Negev showed more opposition to girls' studies in schools than to boys' studies.

During the military government, Bedouin students who were interested in continuing their studies went to schools in Arab settlements in the triangle or the north of the country, but they accepted permission to leave the area involved many difficulties, and only a few students succeeded in doing so (Abu Saad, 2004, 2007, 2011; Boyel (Lustick, 1980, 2011).

The number of students enrolled in Arab-Bedouin schools remained low until 1966 (The end of the Israeli military government). After that, when the movement restrictions were lifted, the situation began to change. The Bedouin Arabs established contacts with Arab settlements in Galilee, in the center, and in the mixed cities, where the educational system was more established.

Also, the more the Bedouin Arabs were exposed to what was going on in Jewish society and became more involved in the state's economy, the more it became clear to them the importance of formal education to adapt to the new way of life.

After the 1967 war, a meeting of the Bedouins in the Negev with their relatives and sons was also possible for their tribes in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, from which they had been cut off since 1948.

The Bedouin Arabs in the Negev discovered that among their relatives and acquaintances from the West Bank and the Gaza Strip) who were removed from southern Israel in the 1948 war and after that by the government Israelis (were educated and earned a living from teaching, law, and the medical professions, while theirs had almost no access to formal education, and the vast majority remained illiterates. They also learned that the women in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip also acquired an education, while the women in the Negev had almost no formal education. marriage between the sons and daughters of these groups of the Arab-Bedouin community, who were separated before. Therefore, it resulted in educated women from the West Bank and the Gaza Strip moving to live there in the Negev, and these new connections greatly influenced the Bedouin community in the Negev and led to an increase in the number of boys and girls sent to schools (Abu-Saad, 1999, 2011).

With the increasing demand among the Bedouin population in the Negev for formal education the government established more schools, and education became the property of more and more people and the girls of the Bedouin Arab community in the Negev. In the late 1960s, the Ministry of Education established temporary elementary schools in all the major tribes in the Negev. In 1969, the first high school was established as a growing division in the settlement of Kasifa, and it served the entire Arab-Bedouin population in the Negev (Reichal, Neumann & Abu-Saad, 1987).

In the late 1970s, two more high schools were founded, in the first two permanent settlements established by the government for Bedouins in the Negev (Tel Sheva and Rahat), and over the years, high schools were added in the permanent settlements only. It should be noted that since the establishment of the permanent settlements that were designed for the Arab-Bedouin community in the Negev in the early 1970s, most of the investments were made in schools in these settlements, neglecting the temporary schools in the unrecognized villages.

Over the years there has been a considerable increase in the number of students in Bedouin education in the Negev, and the increase in the girl's class is the most impressive. In 1982 they studied in the Bedouin education system of 3,782 girls in the Negev, compared to 52,187 girls in 2022 - an increase of about 1,380% in 20 years. Of course, the number of schools in the Bedouin population in the Negev also led to an increase in the number of students.

2. Representations, goals, and objectives, in textbooks and curriculum

The Arab education system in Israel therefore continues to exist in the shadow of a series of political criteria, which the Arabs have no part in formulating. The Arabs were "absent" of the general Jewish-oriented goals formulated in the state education law from 1953 and the amendments to the law were drafted in 2000, and no parallel goals were ever formulated for the Arab-Palestinian education system. In the 1970s and 1980s, and in the 2005 reform of the National Education Plan, several committees were appointed that attempted to formulate unique goals for Arab education (all of which were managed by Jewish educators and policymakers). However, none of these attempts were successful, and the proposed goals were not added as an appendix to the State Education Law (Report of the Dovrat Committee, Al-Haj, 1995, 2005; 2005).

As mentioned, the Arab minority in Israel never received autonomous control over its education system. He was not allowed to determine its goals, objectives, or curricula. The Arab education system does have a separate curriculum, but it is determined by the Ministry of Education in a process in which the main participants are Jewish administrators and academics (Sabirsky & Dagan-Bozaglo, 2005; Al-Haj, 2009). This situation stands in complete contradiction to what is happening in the state-religious Jewish education department.

As is known, the State Education Law of 1953 recognized the split between religious Jews and non-Jews secular and allowed the religious to have a separate autonomous department for education within the Ministry of Education religious government. This department is physically, administratively, and pedagogically separate from the Ministry of Education the General and maintains complete independence (Svirsky, 1990, 1995); Agbaria and Jabarin, Mar'i, 1978; Swirski, 1999; Adalah, 2003; Agbaria, 2018; Arar, 2013) (Galily & Schwartz, 2021).

As mentioned, the State Education Law of 1953 emphasizes the cultivation of Jewish identity and values the Jews, but did not set any goals for Arab education in Israel, although, in the 70s and 80s of the 20th century, there were a few attempts to do so within the framework of committees led by educators Jews (Alhaj, 1996). Instead, the general and specific goals of a program the studies developed for Arab education tend to obscure and dim its formation of Arab identity, and not to strengthen it. The comprehensive goals of the educational system, as well as the specific goals of the curriculum obligate Arab students to learn about the Jewish culture and

its values, as you can see in the program the state curriculum for Arab primary and secondary schools (Marei, 1985); Shetrit, Peres, Ehrlich, and Yuval-Davis, 1970; Mar'i, 1978, Al-Haj, 2014, 1995; Agbaria, 2018; Arar, 2022).

The Arab students are required to spend many study hours studying the culture and Jewish history and the Hebrew language (in total) are assigned to these subjects more hours of Arabic literature and Arabic history). They are also required to develop identification with Jewish values and promote Zionist aspirations at the expense of developing awareness of their nationalism and a sense of belonging to their people. Arab national identity is emphasized much less, and the Palestinian identity does not receive any kind of recognition (Mari, 1985; Sheetrit, Mar'i, 1978; Al-Haj, 1995; 2014).

Also, the main goal of studying Hebrew and Judaism in the Arab education system is not to develop cultural competence within Jewish Israeli society, but to force the Arabs to understand and sympathize with the Jewish-Zionist goals and blur their national identity. (Mar'i, 1978; Al-Haj, 1995; Swirski, 1999; Agbaria, 2018; Arar, 2022).

The Arab education system in Israel institutionalizes to a large extent the fear of the Israelis from the past, from the Palestinian cultural and national identity, and as we know, prohibits teachers in the Arab schools from talking about current affairs. This lack of content and experiences cultural and national relevance from the Arab schools leads the students to look for other sources to satisfy their needs, for example, on social networks. for example, Samia Sharkaoui's personal story: "The house drew me to my roots, the school, consistently and by herself, ripped me off. Over the years I look back with a smile at how he succeeded in the house at the end. Education is the magic word and the keyword. That's where you need to take your tool the light and heavy work and continue working."

Peres, Ehrlich, and Yuval-Davis criticized the Ministry-imposed curriculum education about the Arab schools because it is trying to "instill" patriotic feelings into the hearts of the Arab students by teaching Jewish history. They also voted on the absurdity inherent in the expectation that "the Arab student [...] will serve the state not because it is important to him and meets his own needs, but because it is important to the Jewish people" (Peres, Ehrlich & Yuval-Davis, 1970).

The curriculum in the Arab schools maintained and preserved over the years the lack of reference to Arab culture, in general, and the lack of involvement in politics the contemporary one, in particular. For example, the curriculum does not deal in any way with the specific social, cultural, and educational needs of the Bedouin Arabs in the Negev, who are gradually becoming an urban population whose economy is a modern economy, western and hi-tech. The failure to address their social and political affairs and the contemporary nature of the Arabs in Israel greatly weakens the relevance of the educational experience for the Arab students, so much so that he threatens to keep them away from home the book (Mar'i, 1978; Brown, 1986; Abu-Saad, 2019; Agbaria, 2018; Arar, 2022).

This neglect reflects the very low priority that the state authorities give to Arab students – the entire Arab education system remembers their announcements and the publicity of senior officials in the Ministry of Education as a sort of footnote. For example, a server the former educator Limor Livnat announced in June 2001 that she would like to see "there is no even one child in Israel" who will not receive "Jewish and Zionist knowledge and values" at school (Fisher-Ilan, 2001) and within the Jewish Home party headed by Naftali Bennett (who was the Minister of Education from May 2015 to June 2019) states that "the most urgent task ours is the establishment of a unit for Jewish-Zionist education in the state schools in the country Israel [...] The Jewish Home will lead a national plan for a Zionist Jewish identity which will strengthen all students from first grade to twelfth grade" (Alder, 2015). In other words, Zionism became an ideological mechanism that promotes policy decisions aimed at ensuring that the Jewish identity

of the state will remain at the forefront of all state institutions, especially in the field of education (Sheps, 2019).

3. Budget inequality, politicization, and control of the education system

The budgets of the Arab education system are very poor compared to the Jewish education system and very far from meeting her basic needs. For example, a high school student in the stream in 2020, the religious state received an average annual budget of NIS 40.8 thousand – budget 26% higher than the budget received by a Jewish student in the state stream (32.4 thousand NIS), and 46% of the budget received by an Arab high school student (NIS 27.9 thousand) (Detal, 2021).

According to data from the Ministry of Education, the Arab education system also receives fewer training days, fewer resources for developing unique programs, fewer supervision hours, and fewer budgets for struggling students, in addition to the lower investment in non-formal education.

At the same time, the Arab education system suffers from a severe lack of physical infrastructure basics - for years there has been a severe shortage of standard classrooms, annex rooms, libraries, computer labs, science labs, sports halls, and infrastructures and digital technologies. The damage to disadvantaged populations is particularly great, and their possibility to enjoy such infrastructures at home is even more limited (Abu-Saad, 2011, 2015; Haddad Haj-Yahia et al., 2021; Nasr-Abu Elhija, 2021; Chase Him et al., Arar, 2022; 2022).

Allocating equitable resources to the Arab education system is particularly important due to the poor economic situation of most Arab local authorities, and the inability of many parents in Arab society to finance private expenses for education. In 2017, the total private expenditure on education—parental payments, after-school activities, and equipment—was 749 NIS per month on average per student in state Hebrew education, 625 NIS in state-religious education, 430 NIS in ultra-orthodox education and 296 only NIS in Arab education (Haddad Haj-Yahia et al., 2021).

The lack of adequate representation of Arabs in the senior management of the Ministry of Education is also seriously damaging to the functioning of the Arab education system and its ability to promote and empower the minority the Arabs in Israel. The Arabs are “present” but “absent” within the administration of the Ministry of Education the main one, where the important decisions are made. For example, there is not even a district manager Arab, and only recently appointed to the office of Vice President and Head of Technological Education Administration Arab, although there are many talented Arab educators who can fill positions many seniors are very successful (Abu-Saad, 2015, 2021).

Also, there are still few Arabs employed in senior positions in the central headquarters of the Ministry of Education in Jerusalem and the seven districts of the Ministry of Education. This fact limits the Arabs’ contribution to the ministry’s many educational and pedagogical programs; remainder therefore, as Dafna Golan-Agnon (2004) pointed out, the lack of Arab representation at the highest levels of the Ministry of Education prevents Arab schools from accessing many educational programs which are not mandatory (Abu Saad, 2005; Golan-Agnon, 2006; 2021).

According to some scholars, the exclusion of Arabs from senior positions in the public education system stems from the will to maintain control over the Arab minority. The management and teaching powers were determined first and foremost according to political considerations and not according to professional considerations. If so, the Arab education system is not autonomous in any sense whatsoever.

The employment of teachers, managers, and supervisors in Arab schools is ultimately given in the hands of the Central Ministry of Education in Jerusalem. The training and certificates in themselves are not enough for Arab citizens in Israel to get a teaching position. Before receiving them to work in the education system, they are required to undergo – without their knowledge – also a classification procedure security and receive a secret seal from the Shin Bet. In jobs that require an open tender, such as teacher positions and management or supervisory positions, candidates in Jewish schools are required to present certificates attesting to their education, training, and experience only.

On the other hand, in the Arab education system, the requirements are completely different. Shin Bet representative in the Ministry of Education he serves on the appointment committee for the Arab education system, and without his approval – which is based on a security check by the Shin Bet – it is impossible to enroll an Arab school teacher, manager, or supervisor. The candidates themselves are completely excluded from this process, and they do not have any way to challenge the decision (Golan-Agnon, 2004; Abu Saad, 2015, 2021; Storm, 2001; Ettinger, 2004; Ron, Al-Hajj, 1995; Golan-Agnon, 2006; Agbaria, 2020; Mustafa & Jabareen, 2014; Agbaria, 2018; Arar, 2022).

In conclusion, the influence of the control system is so strong that teachers and education administration personnel are kept in the system Arab education is afraid to even openly criticize the Ministry of Education. For example, in an article published in the Jerusalem Post on December 14, 2005 dealing with the sub-conditions at the school in one of the recognized Bedouin settlements in the Negev, the administrators and teachers agreed to speak only anonymously (Halkin, 2005).

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