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Sufism and the Contemporary Macedonian Society

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Abstract

Macedonian society traditionally was area where Sufi movements were practicing their religious activities thus a specific cultural area that has its influence in creating the Sufism as a dominant religion within Ottoman Empire. Minding that historical circumstances, also considering the area placed in the center of Balkan Peninsula having the qualities of multicultural characteristics that originating for centuries back in the history of the area, in September 2017 was conducted a survey with main goal detection and realizing the possible integrative traits and positive multicultural dimension of Sufism.

Keywords: Sufism, multiculturalism, Macedonian society, semi structural survey, cultural coexistence, social change.

1. Introduction

Having in mind most of the western scholars working on this subject nowadays, finding a rather concise and pretty much less worded definition would be a next socio-cultural challenge. Yet for this occasion it would be worthy mentioning that what is a common practice in almost every explanatory review of Sufism is that this religious aspect of Islam is rather internal, more mystical dimension of what we recon today as Islam religion (Beglerovic, 2004: Signs). Sufism is pragmatically connected with formative period of Islam religion and that is an historical fact (Karamustafa, 2007: 19). History speaks that every time when this religion will face with harsh times threatening its consistence, Sufism comes on the scene making things right again. Sufism is directed towards ethical proficiency of the followers also as a teaching is dedicated towards social and individual serenity: teaching people to fight their never ending desires by achieving internal equilibrium and also teaching people to be kind among each other as all of what is created on this world is a divine creation having a divine purpose. The most profound ideal for every Sufi is divine love, love of God, love of every creation since it's a divine creation. Every single script of a Sufi says about this ideal. There are no nations, no colors, considering humans; there are just men and women. By the way this love principle doesn't stops here but incorporates everything in and on this world as a divine creation having a divine place in a divine plane that humans not necessary understand. It is good to mention that what nowadays Wahhabism understands as a Jihad is a pan Muslim movement to fight against others, the nonbelievers.

What Sufis understand under Jihad is a bit different. It is a struggle within every man and woman, within themselves, with their worst enemy as would Muhammad said, whit their soul.

Struggle with soul's never-ending desires. This struggle within is the Jihad that Sufis are teaching about.

2. Macedonian social context

Inside territory of the Republic of Macedonia, in rather isolated ambient there are two prominent Tariqas: Bektashi Tarika in Debar area, and Alawi Tarika in Struga area. With a intention in detail acquaintance with these Tariqas on the territory of Republic of Macedonia was conducted a semi structural field survey that incorporated target group consisted by members of Islamic society inside Republic of Macedonia, members of Islamic intellectual society and members of Tariqas.

Having in mind the nature of the problem at this point which is in essence a socially isolated groups not so often present in everyday social life, as a methodological frame in gathering raw data was used semi structural in depth survey. The primary advantage of in-depth interviews is that they provide much more detailed information than what is available through other data collection methods, such as surveys (Boyce, 2006: 4).

A common situation of group answer was notable to be praxis during most of the interviews so was taken measures in isolating the interviewed contestants. In essence, every single contestant was conducted under three groups of total twenty and one question which was all centered around Sufism and euro integration processes.

3. The interview

The general atmosphere during all the interviews was relaxed and the interviewees were given the time for comfort and ease while answering the questions. Some of the interviews were performed inside religious institutions where with a slight difficulty considering the curiosity of the crowd. Similarities occurred inside the educational institutions where interviews were conducted with academic society representatives. Namely, students have shown a particular interest considering the subject of the survey.

Nevertheless, the overall atmosphere was at highest level of professionalism and every one contestant gave the best of effort to contribute at the final result. Most of the records given were recorded by writing down on paper and only some were tape recorded when interviewee gave allowance.

The questions that were included in the interview, questions that were framing the conversation with the interviewees were in total twenty and one. In addition at the last page here as example are given the questions that compose the interview.

Within these twenty and one question is covered a thematic area that has three aspects. Question numbered with 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 involve the relation between Islamic society and Tariqas within Macedonian society. This thematic aspect has in expectation that interviewees will come up with a certain view on the situation of the Tariqas inside Macedonian society. Having in mind the structure of the interviewees, they are divided in three groups: representatives of Islamic society are on the one side, on the other side are representatives of Tariqas, and in the middle are representatives of academic society; what was expected here was to appear certain deviations in attitudes considering the answering questions but after summarizing the answers those expectations happened to be negligible.

Namely, interviews were conducted on each group of interviewees in the same order where the procedure started with the representatives of Islamic society with total ten in number, each interviewed independently. Next to be interviewed were members of Islamic intellectual

society, ten representatives in total, and last to be interviewed were representatives of Tariqas, eight representatives.

The first question that was asked and the question that has opened the interview were:

What is the current situation of the Tariqas as a part of Islamic society in Macedonia?

All ten representatives of Islamic society gave independently nearly the same in essence answer calming that Tariqas are well accepted as important and respected element of Islamic society and most of their praxis is included in everyday religious life.

Two interviewees, representatives from Islamic society had explained that on the territory of Republic of Macedonia certain religious activities are being performed by few Tariqas among whom are the Bektashi order which religious activities, some of them sought as slightly contrary with main teaching. Both of the interviewees were not so generous in giving the particular explanation on the subject. Another interviewee, representative from Islamic society gave the explanation how this group is practicing religious customs not autochthonous for Islam.

As one of the interviewee noted, "Islam is the religion of the truth, and the truth is that what is directed inside the holy book Quran, and this religious group, the part of Bektash order not supported by Islamic society is practicing a rather not prescribed and sometimes forbidden rituals by the Quran".

This question is pretty much intricate having in mind the specific explanation of the last interviewee representing the Islamic society and as an additional question was part of further interviews for detecting the reason for such deviations.

Some of the interviewees representing the Islamic society pointed out how Sufism is for centuries present in this area and how Tariqas are part of the Islam in this region regardless on our consideration.

A common view shared among tenth interviewees representing the intellectual society is that Tariqas are integral part of the Islamic society. One interviewee pointed how Islamic society is showing tolerance for some Sufi rituals that are unusual for popular Islam and in that manner Islamic society is keeping a low profile.

Another interviewee from the intellectual society, in a rather exhausting and overwhelming explanation that in a way incorporates the independent answers from all the representatives of intellectual society, have pointed out this tolerant attitude practiced by Islamic society. Namely, Islamic society appreciates the Tariqas for they are one extraordinary, rather charming aspect of the Islam in these areas. He further gives explanation how centuries ago these areas were place where Tesawwuf was active and these areas have their specific touch in Tesawwuf. Today that is visible at the Muslims originating from this area especially during certain encounters with Muslims that are not from these cultural surroundings, but what is notable for these last decades is a presence of a certain change: a change that tries to influence the Islamic society.

Tariqa representatives, eight in total, while giving the explanation behind the tolerant attitude of the Islamic society noted that Islam is a very old religion which in its genesis has a certain changes but it is one of a few religions of the today world that managed to withstand its authenticity; namely, cause of its strict rules on which all Muslims are subjected. One of the interviewees pointed that it is a customary for all the Sufis to pay tribute on their shepherds, at the places where shepherds are buried. Today all that is being misunderstood: the picture of this old custom that is present among all Sufi orders is shown more like idolatry and thus it goes directly against solemn basics of Islam religion. Following that, the interviewee pointed out that this is where can be traced the main reason for marginalization tactics against Bektash order. On the sub question, "Was it the Islamic society that performs a marginalization actions against Bektashi

order”, the answer was that it is a delicate situation. On the same sub question, next representative of the Tariqa pointed out that in this, current situation with the Bektashi order, what is evident is a certain amount of introversion and closeness among themselves.

One of the interviewees of the Tariqas, a member of Bektashi order, didn't give any comment on the sub questions that was considering the Bektashi order, not as much as a facial expression, but only gave answer on the written question, and that is that position of the Islamic society in this manner is close to indifference, but just at this moment though.

Are the Tariqas equally treated within Islamic society?

With this question it was meant to monitor the treatment of Sufi groups, the equal treatment as a part of the Islamic society.

The overall attitude of the representatives of the Islamic society was positive, and all the ten interviewees answered that in all the religious institutions considering the Islamic society are welcome all Muslims.

A representative of Islamic society pointed out that the prayer or *namaz*, is directed toward accomplishing peace in general, and thus divine peace. At this point all ten representatives shared the opinion that Islamic society doesn't make any separation towards Muslim followers and it's accessible to anyone who needs to open for Allah, and Sufis aren't excluded.

Concerning the treatment given by Islamic society towards Tariqas, there are minor divergences when answers given by the representatives of the intellectual society being summarized and analyzed. All ten representatives have nearly the same answers; they share same thoughts about inclusivity and no selectivity at any level shown by Islamic society in communication and general relations with all Muslims including Sufis. But among interviewees there were insinuating answers that provoked rather intricate sub questions, and this causality action led the particular conversation to expose a shared attitude which set the middle ground on possible initiative insufficiency at the general policy promoted by Islamic society. In other words, the Islamic society should make efforts in more efficient consolidation on the whole member body in general.

All eight members of the Tariqas answered that Islamic society is opened for them, but one of the interviewee pointed out the same thing that previously was explained by the members of the intellectual society, namely Islamic society should work in better consolidating activities for Muslim followers in general.

What is the current number of Tariqa followers within Macedonian society?

The interviewees representing the Islamic society didn't come up with the certain number, yet only few interviewees agreed that current number is very low like 5% from Muslim member body or even less. Members from the Tariqas that were included in the interview stated that on the territory of the Republic of Macedonia there are many Tekkes were in function are particular Sufi orders. As the biggest region they mention the Polog region where is situated the Bektashi Tekke in Tetovo, and this Tekke has also influence in nearby regions such as Struga, Debar, Kichevo, Ohrid, Prilep. Khalwati Tekke has its activities in region of Ohrid and Struga.

One interviewee, representative of Islamic society will continue that in area of Skopje, more specific municipality of Shuto Orizari is located the Rifai Tekke and in the central area of Skopje are located the Sadiyas order.

When asked about the number of Muslim followers, the representatives of the Tariqas all have answered similarly as they in number are few, they all agreed like 5% of the Muslim followers.

A part of the interviewees representing the Islamic society and part of the interviewees representing the intellectual society have pointed out the introvert character of the Tariqas within Macedonian society, and on the Balkan Peninsula as a factor for not knowing the exact number of Sufi followers in the region. It was pointed out by one representative from the intellectual society that the period of transition has influenced the relationship among people in general, society in general get encountered by people stuck with sole survival drive, and when global social, political and economic situation got changed, societies were opened for foreign influence which in return have mixed up already mixed things.

How Islamic society oversees Tariqas and Sufism?

The answers on the question 4, given by the representatives of the Islamic society are nearly the same, pointing that Islamic society accepts the teaching of the Tariqas and that this teaching is a part from the Islam religion. One interviewee was clearly saying that Islamic mysticism is an inherent part of Islam and that it was and has always been present here in this area thus Islamic society don't deny its contribution in all what Islam is.

Considering the question above, most precise and at the same, most inclusive answer was given by the representatives of Islamic society. The answers from other interviewees were in complementary coherence.

Detection for possible selective position by Islamic society towards members of Tariqa was an element inside 5th question from the interview – the last question from this thematic unit that is centered on the relations between Islamic society and Tariqas.

Namely, all the interviewees have shown that Islamic society doesn't support any selectiveness in treatment towards any Muslims including here the Tariqas. The function of the Islamic society is to collect and incorporate all the Muslim followers under the same roof – as one of the interviewee will explain. He will add here that Sufis are also Muslim followers and they are accepted by the society. Considering this question we find certain correlations with the answers from the representatives of intellectual society, and the representatives from the Tariqa respectively. What was the same point in these answers, Islamic society doesn't support any selectiveness regarding its followers.

Second thematic unit of questions was meant to detect the level of affirmation of Sufism inside Macedonian society. By this thematic unit of questions we seek to encircle thus monitor the presence of Sufism inside Macedonian society, and also the awareness of the citizens in general with cultural dimensions of Sufism and its potential benefits. Part of the questions is directed toward projection of the potential benefit of the Sufi culture in further reinforcement of the balance between cultural and religious diversity. Other part of the questions is directed in investigating the cultural and religious integration within Macedonian society mostly, but anticipating the wider region.

What are the relations between Tariqas and other religious groups inside Macedonian society?

The question under number 6 listed above, representatives from Islamic society didn't give strict answers, and so what was in common was expression of positivity while describing this relationship. One of the interviewee pointed out that Tariqas are more introvert in their public religious activities, without giving the reason for this low profile activity. Other interviewee pointed out that he never heard anything else but compliments describing the relations between Tariqas and other religious groups in the wider area of Balkans.

Analyzing the relation with other religious groups most of the interviewees representing the intellectual society pointed out that Tariqas with decades now have position themselves in rather closed, introvert position so they in general are not exposed with global social

currents and for reason of this situation the interviewees mostly traced the previous political situation in the region. One of the interviewee representing the intellectual society explained how there was moments when this closeness did paid awhile like overcome important existential circumstances, moments usually referred as religious transition by scholars. Anticipating all that, what needs here would be a certain period of time for returning back the trust and confidence among all the social elements. “What we’re talking about could be a *period of re-knowing each other*” – is what interviewee said.

The representatives of the Tariqas that were interviewed expressed a common thought describing the basis of Tesawwuf which is a mutual, respectful coexistence among each man. Although this is basically the same answer given by all eight representatives of the Tariqas, one interviewee gave a rather interesting explanation: “It’s in the core of Tesawwuf the mutual understanding and compassion among people and this is why all the differences and diversities are being accepted as a treasury rather challenge, and what is the ideological basis of Tesawwuf, it’s Islam”.

How would you explain relatively weak affirmation of Sufism in Macedonian society?

While answering the question considering the affirmation of Sufism in Macedonian society, one interviewee representing the Islamic society pointed out that Muslims have their religious life completely covered by Islamic society. Namely, Islamic community is completely dedicated on every religious aspect on which all Muslims are subjected. Nearly the same is the answer given by others interviewees representatives of Islamic society, although one interviewee gave interesting answer. This interviewee pointed out that in the last decades, the first moments of independence but also the time before it was a characteristically low level of improvement in various cultural aspects of this society in general. As a consequence of this situation of ignorance, in a case it’s reflected as a marginalization of a number of elements that for ages ago have played constructive role for this society in general. A few interviewees representing the intellectual society explained how Macedonian society was supposed to recognize those cultural aspects in the early days and moments of creation the modern Macedonian state, because at the end what we see today is only a fraction of what needs to be seen as a whole considering the Macedonian society. Tracing the problem for this situation most of the answers have found a middle ground in people’s interest. Meaning, in their nature Tariqas are closed for general public, they are like mini organizations which made their affirmation in a direct correlation with the way they perform their religious rituals etc. As a part of Islamic society in Macedonia, Tariqas are equally treated and preserved in their original form. When further questioned were the Islamic society undertakes some activities in Tariqa’s cultural affirmation – the answer was negative. The representatives of Tariqas pointed out that the current situation of Macedonian society is crisis. One of Tariqa’s representatives explained that Republic of Macedonia as a country and as society respectively is still under transition: process that just maybe hasn’t affects the whole but some parts of the social life are surely deeply affected. All overall, whole society is under crisis. A lot of things that are with existential importance are not well represented in our society. Such case is the current situation with the Tariqas. Macedonian society doesn’t have the slightest notion considering the Tariqas and Tesawwuf. These conclusions affects Christians as well as Muslims.

Is the activity of Tariqas in Macedonian society to be considered latent and if so, what are the reasons for such latency?

Considering the question 8, part of the representatives of Islamic society explained that there’s a certain correlation among some of the rituals performed by Tariqas that are closed for general public, having in mind the Dervish orders that are not completely backed up by Islamic society but are tolerated.

Some of the representatives of the intellectual society argued how Tarikas are closed orders in general aspect, that has their place within Islamic society, and their actions are prescribed by certain strict rules and on which all followers are subjected. Also there are a variety of customs and rituals that are exclusively Sufi in nature and are strictly dedicated for members of Tariqas.

Tariqa representatives, a part of them answered that Tesawwuf and the Tariqas are not well represented and all the activities remain strictly within what is known as a few folklore gatherings. But this isn't just a thing to blame Tariqas but the whole society because Tariqa and Tesawwuf aren't only doctrinaire thing, but a cultural, phenomenological, educational, etc. So the values of Tariqa and Tesawwuf should be a thing of interest for all institutions that are dealing with this matter.

Is the Tariqas subject for stereotypes within Macedonian society?

Representatives from Islamic society answered that there are no such thing like stereotypes considering the Tariqa orders inside Macedonian society. More to say, Islamic society acts in a way not to provoke any sort of discrimination or prejudicial actions considering the Tariqas or wider membership.

Similar answers gave the representatives of the intellectual society where one interviewee explained how Tariqas are closed in their religious actions but that is how they act and not a result of some stereotypes or discriminatory policies conducted by Islamic society or someone else.

One of the representatives of the Tariqas explained how not knowing the Tesawwuf in general have a consequential stereotypical praxis.

The Tariqas within Macedonian society, are they opened for just a certain group of citizens having certain ethnicity?

Chattering about actual position of the Tariqas with the rest social elements in Macedonian society, representatives of the Islamic society clarified that Tariqas are in general opened towards all social factors and social elements. One of the interviewees pointed out that having in mind the nature of Tesawwuf, Tariqas are directed towards man, people in general, and this is not only an element of Tesawwuf but of Islam in general because the Holly Quran is the last divine word that was passed by the Prophet with a mission to teach people on mutual understanding.

Another interviewee explained the openness of the Islam towards world and minding that not only Tesawwuf, but Islam as a whole is in its core opened and inclusive religion.

Representative of the Tariqas will clarify that Sufism in its teachings opens the secrets in a front of the people thus attending to express that there is no such thing as invisible but only that what man is not in power to see by the way mentioning the Sufi parole centering the divine presence at every action of man, whether it's a mindful or physical action.

Representatives of the intellectual society have their answers pointed at the same conclusion that was expressed by the representatives of the Tariqas.

How is Sufism represented inside Macedonian society?

Searching to understand the position of Sufism inside Macedonian society has directed the survey to the point where most of the answers from the interviewees were concluding nearly the same idea. That idea was the sole basis of the Sufism, its intrinsic human dimension.

When describing the Sufism within Islam, interviewees representing the Islamic society explained how that is a bit similar with the Protestants within Christianity. Sufis emit their

wisdom directly towards human mutual understanding and respect. That is why Tesawwuf is a bit closer to the modern man, having modern considerations, a man that is not completely dedicated on the religious jurisprudence and yet is a man of faith. This expression has a similarity with the answers given by representatives of the intellectual society and they will add that modern man caught inside modern current will be much easier to approach the cultural works that penetrate the subject of Tesawwuf – like it is the example with Rumi Mevlana, compared with the distinctive principles of the Sharia law.

One of the representatives of the intellectual society argued how Tesawwuf is constructed by strict rules, and yet for the sake of modernity workings of the Sufi saints, the Sufi literature, writings, poems etc where wisdom and morality are the subject, are more accessible for contemporary people.

Representatives of the Tariqas pointed out how Sufism is on low level of presence in what is to be a public social life. And even at this low level of presence, it's with a lot of defects and misunderstandings of the essence. Namely, one of the interviewees explained that Macedonian man mostly have some notion about Sufism through the workings of Mevlana Rumi as most accessible, and some similar Sufi authors mainly from France, but all of this is pretty much below what Tesawwuf has potential for, having in mind here the positive examples with United States.

Despite the enormous affirmation that Sufis achieved inside US and Europe, why Sufism is unknown within Macedonian society?

Locating the reasons for such positioning of Sufism within Macedonian society, representatives from the Islamic society explained how the general membership of the Islamic society have their religious needs fully accommodated inside Islamic society of the Republic of Macedonia.

Sufism inside US is well supported thanks to recognition of a similar Protestant tradition that keeps the religious life as individual matter what means, further will explain the representative from Intellectual society, “people can perform their religion within the privacy of their home with their relatives, close friends, and what happens in public life is more reserve and settle approach regarding the subject of religiosity. That is one option that leads to individualization of religion experience, an experience that should be more individual then collective”.

Most of the representatives of the Tariqas had a similar explanation how Sufism represents the spiritual side of the faith and modern man that is overloaded with consumerism as a way of life there is a certain need for this spiritual enlightenment. That is the reason why Sufism is more analyzed by Western scholars. Situation with Macedonian society, sublimating the expressions one interviewee will continue, “sadly but Macedonian society just can't get off this constant transitional vortex and this is why we don't have time for much needed and valuable things in our lives”.

All interviewees were questioned about the attitude of the contemporary Macedonian society considering the Tariqas, and the representatives of the intellectual society commented that this society is in endless cycle of transition and these elements of Sufism just passes by like totally not perceived buy citizens. Another representative of the Islamic society pointed out that terminology Sufism – Islam is something equal and the same thing which is the same case with those who've heard a thing or two for Sufism.

What is the general attitude of the contemporary Macedonian society regarding Tariqas with anticipation on low acquaintance with the subject of Sufism?

Few of the representatives of the intellectual society explained how with this days modern world situation, following the Western societies quest for spirituality has entered in our neighborhood also. Similar with the Western societies, our society aims for a better life, for quality life and that's exactly the virtue of Tesawwuf. Having this attitude, spiritual awakening and investment in spiritual development, the intention is to increase the quality of life.

Pretty much interesting was the answer given by some of the interviewees pointing out that Sufism, closely examined is a little odd for average people but what was added by the representatives of the Tariqas is that older citizens mostly artisans, tradespeople recognize what Sufism have within its teaching as once authentic and rather unique trait of the oriental Islam religion. With this answer given by the representatives of Islamic society go along the answers of the representatives of the Tariqas. Namely, one of the interviewees of the Tariqas added how the older families that have grown in this authentic intercultural settlement of the twenty century or before have a notion about this aspect of Islam religion.

Were there some obstacles considering the religious activities of the Sufi groups within Macedonian society and its cultural development?

Representatives of the Islamic society agreed with their answers that there's no such thing as obstacles in religious activities of the Tariqas inside Macedonian society and its cultural development. One representative will explain how Islamic society doesn't argue with most inherent elements of Sufi tradition within Islam religion; they're given enough freedom with their praxis.

Representatives of the intellectual society explained how is needed some sort of activity plan mainly performed by the government authorities and public institutions so it could be supported the cultural elements of Sufi tradition that isn't something new in this area. The answers of the Tariqa's representatives are similar to this explanation. One of the interviewees of the Tariqas will add to this that obstacles were no reported but there is no such thing as a support.

Should Tariqas act toward increasing their efforts in potential enhancement of cultural integrations?

Representatives of the Islamic society explained how this society represents unrestricted support for all religious needs of its followers including the needs for certain affirmation etc. The only limit that is present is time and finances so Islamic society doesn't restrict if Tariqas do something on their affirmation within our society.

Part of the representatives of the intellectual society pointed out how there is a situation of different opinions within Tariqas in Macedonia. So this situation isn't something new for us because it was present also in near history. On the sub question to give a more strict explanation on this situation, one representative of the intellectual society will explain that there is a history of pondering in attitudes within Tariqas in Macedonia. Another interviewee from the intellectual society will explain this situation with long tradition of strict and heavy polarized political duality that reflects in social and cultural life for long time.

One of the interviewees representing the intellectual society will point out how Macedonian society should define its goal that will have a rather unification effect and this move is needed especially from the Tariqas that are a part of the society and it is natural to have a mutual interference between Tariqas and Macedonian society.

Similar observation was given by the representatives of the Tariqas, where one interviewee will explain pretty vividly that Tariqas should unite among themselves in a first place so they will represent Sufism as it should and then they should promote all cultural decorations of the Tesawwuf.

Could some parts of the Sufism be a part of the Macedonian everyday life?

Representatives from the Islamic society will explain that substantial part from the Islam religion is part from the everyday life in Macedonian society. Some of the interviewees explained how for years and decades before there were some praxis to minimize this centuries old tradition in interaction on Balkan peninsula but Western culture did teach us that what we are taking here isn't just Sufism or Islam or just Christianity – Orthodoxy but all that interaction between people having their own cultural traits at these areas is the true treasure and Sufism has the potential to be its authentic mark.

Representative from the intellectual society explained how elements of Sufism not only are substantial in Western societies but they are dealing with rising aspirations by common people. So this situation will get us because the message of Sufism, will point out the interviewee, "the very basis of the Sufism are the elementary human characteristics: Love, Respect, and Community".

Similar expression was given by the representatives of the Tariqas, meaning that there are elements from Sufism that are part from everyday life but the potential of Sufism can offer more.

Is Sufism capable in creating a religious and cultural balance within Macedonian society?

Representative from the Islamic society will explain that Sufism and Islam in general are directed towards religious and cultural integration and for example there are various historical situations like the Prophet Isa that is present in Christianity and also in Islam. So the potential for cultural integration was preset and is still present but it is up to us how we will use it.

Representative from the intellectual society will explain that Sufism has big potential for cultural integration. Sufism is something similar to what Protestants are inside Christianity. Sufism has more relaxed approach for the followers and people in general speaking from cultural aspect, and from religious aspect there are certain rules that are as a necessary to be followed by the believers. But the thing that touches wide popular masses is the workings from the great Sufi teachers with the message that is sent to the all people for mutual and unconditioned love and respect among each other. Other representatives from the group share this view.

Representative from the Tariqas will explain: "Tesawwuf at the same time is a cultural consolidation of the whole society and with ages inside Tariqa circles are cultivated numerous elements of mutual art and culture. Yes, of course."

Other representatives from the Tariqas gave similar answers.

Do you think that Sufism could bring relief and integration considering the religious and cultural relations within Macedonian society, closely as it is the case with USA?

Representatives from the Islamic society all agreed that Sufism as a part from the Islam has the potential to contribute in this manner.

A representative from the intellectual society described how world examples, namely USA have recognized that potential and that is the reason why they invest in that policy.

Some interviewees from the intellectual society gave similar answers with the representatives from the Islamic society and explained that Islam is a religion that aims for balanced relations in general among all people in every aspect of their social life.

Confirmed answer was also given by the representatives of the Tariqas, explaining how Sufi teaching can bring balance and mutual understanding in Macedonian society.

Will it be useful if Macedonian society take some specific actions in better affirmation on Sufism, as for example that is the case with USA?

Representatives from the Islamic society gave pretty reserved answers for this particular question which was in a way expected minding the previous answers where in more occasions on the scale were placed Sufism and Islam.

Some of the interviewees representing the Islamic society explained that in this way every man will be more useful for whole society. Namely Islam have a lot of cultural elements that bringing the message of mutual coexistence, personal and social affinities, also a simulative approach for constructive interpersonal relations. And speaking in this manner, Tesawwuf is part of the Islam and certainly its affirmation from cultural aspect, in rather refined aspect would be highly beneficial for this society.

Interviewee from the intellectual society will point out how USA entered the policy of glocalization with a few tactical moves among which Sufism stands as a very exceptional protagonist. He will add: "We are not seeking who is the brightest or smartest, it is only a situation of a circumstances where the practical mind has its lead in every aspect of what is known as a social sphere. What follows here is a transition from multiculturalism in to interculturalism and that is a process that has affected the whole region".

Similar is the answer from another interviewee representing the intellectual society who represented Sufism as extremely important moment whose integrative potential was recognized by Western societies.

Representatives from the Tariqas explained that such policy would be very fruitful for Macedonian society.

What measurements would you recommend to the cultural subject that would have result in better affirmation of Sufism within Macedonian society?

Most representatives from the intellectual society explained that most important that should be done at this very moment by the cultural institutions would be substantial efforts in preserving the Sufi objects, buildings that are in much deteriorated condition. Also, another representative will add that published cultural material from distinguished Sufi writers should be increased.

Interviewee representing the Tariqas explained: "In my opinion the state should take very seriously the phenomenon of religion and its social role. Then, of course that it should be done more efforts in further translations and publishing of the workings of distinguished Sufi writers as it is Mevlana Rumi; in this manner we could take the example with Western societies, presentation of cultural elements of Tesawwuf within society in general, etc."

4. Conclusion

Islam religion has its specific charm that was built in centuries during the Ottoman Empire, and it has its influence on Balkan Peninsula. As an Empire's religion, Sufism has its duty to affect all the various nationalities and religions that were then present in the region and to act as a peace promoter in the region. The potential of cultural integration is evident in every aspect of Sufism, beginning from its base premise which is divine love. This potential was detected by the US State Department on which was created US foreign policy in the wider region of the Middle East.

Macedonian society has a long history of wide multicultural relations. This is a social network built by vast variety of nations, nationalities, and religious varieties. Nevertheless, the late

history of the Macedonian society was the antireligious influence emitted by the previous communist regime that has its effect more or less in the mess that was evident in latter process of transition. As time progresses, people in their masses returned their religious beliefs as it was in the days before the communist regime. Thus, in these moments of religious renaissance, there were Islamic currents originating from Middle East that propagated the thought in a way that is a bit different from what was known among the older generation. Their accent was directed towards a fraction of what is Islam in its comprehensiveness. This fraction is known as *Al Islam* and it means the religious praxis. Thus, this is the second level of the fate and is occupied with the righteous way in practicing the religion directed to achieve complete awareness of the *murid*. This was such that every aspect of the religious life has a strictly prescribed way on how to be practiced. What is notable within Macedonian society, mostly within older generation, is in having a little different way of practicing the Islam religion. Islam praxis is not so evident. Yes, it is present but its awareness is on higher level. Communication with older generation Muslims is more directed on wise thoughts. It involves telling stories of great wisdom without pointing directly on mutual interreligious tolerance, but latently pointing on human coexistence. Hence, a member of the Tariqa will say, “it is the charm that Sufism gave in this region.”

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Discussing Moral Issues of Pain Language With Children

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Abstract

The full impact of moral judgment on healthcare relationships between children and people who deal with their pain in professional settings, children's patient outcomes, and children's own well-being, is yet unknown. The education on pain language needs our attention in relation with teachers, parents and supports the private language of pain as Wittgenstein has mentioned it in his philosophical research. Pain communication in everyday life, education about empathy to adults, pain language as healthcare education, are important to our research with children at the teaching methodology. We focus to cultural attitudes of people about pain, ways that moral issues represent a blind spot that merits explanation and repair. What are the words that a professional or a family person will use to explain that death is a possible fact or a danger to a child? The private language of pain, as Halliday has mentioned to his linguistic research, gives a background of a scientific approach of this quality of language education.

Keywords: pain language, education, teaching methods, values, morality, well-being.

1. Introduction

Education in Greece is connected to the value of preparing students in having all the necessary knowledge for their professional life in future and their well-being. Unfortunately, in times of crisis such as this that the Greek people faced mirrored educational needs for change in management of poverty, refugees' issues in class and discrimination, economical problems, social loss of security in everyday communication, criminality and children's violence at school and at home. This emergency case urged us to provide a methodological tool for teaching language based on how children communicate pain in health issues or out of the hospitals and the doctor's office.

The way that children remember painful situations and the way that they face and control their pain and the pain of others was the basic concern of building a vocabulary for the pain language capable to give to children the freedom to express themselves when they are in pain or the pain that they have lived in past (Halliday, 2010). Pain language as a questionnaire form to fill in their thoughts was abandoned soon. Since they preferred to draw how things happened and then describe in words and play games that was actually symbolic stimulus for them to start talking about the forbidden pain (bulling, abuse, body deformity, the stigma of the different in appearance, voice, behavior or a sickness symptom). In Greek the cultural values differ from other national environments as it is possible (Zborowski, 1952). When we want to talk about cancer we never tell the word because some people believe that talking about it with naming the problem it is making the sickness worse and the diseases stronger than the person in pain. The religion is another moral issue. Once you are in pain it is more wise to hide it such as you are responsible for

the misfortune of the pain that other reasons than you have brought the problem of pain. Pain is the brave behavior of the saints that were tortured to death so as they gain the paradise. Opinions such as these are not realized facts of modern life in the Greek society but there is always a base of moral enrollment to how a person is educated to express or hide the pain. Ancient Greek authors such as Thucydides has taught that it is not nice to show your suffering emotions to your neighbor or to make others feel sorry for you or give them negative emotions. Modern Greek language, proverbs and songs are relevant to this moral attitude. This hidden pain that is not well adjusted to the global moral issues of the right to live in luxury, the potential and the success of avoiding pain with a single pill for a headache, for example, or the pain of pregnancy with a safe Caesarean section to prefer for a child's birth came to add another management and moral culture to the traditional culture of the Greek language of pain. Although these two voices, the one that says "just pretend everything is fine and hide your pain" and the other that says "just avoid it when you can" look different the one to the other, they both have a common characteristic of an immoral management of the pain of the self and the others, the loss of honesty to respect pain, to deal with it and educate people about pain language.

Words may be more painful than any problem itself. Fear of the pain can be even more painful as an idea instead of a fact. In education we use pictures to explain things, situations, ourselves (Boroditsky, 2001). This method could be useful to be used in class with categories of pain language issues. We can teach children how to produce sentences without producing pain to the others by saying exactly the same thing. Imagine that somebody is a doctor and somebody else is a patient in role-playing games that children play at home and at school. How can you give negative information without giving a hurt attack to the patient? It is a start of dealing with difficult issues from childhood. Childhood involves pain issues anyway. Adults do not explain all of them and not to all of them. This may cause immorality in pain issues for a society.

There are cases that the willing of a person to deal with a health problem is related with the hope to keep be positive. This is the reason that many countries have austere laws on the doctor's language behavior of communication painful information. For example it may not be legal to say that "you have that health problem and next year you will die, but it is legal to say that if you don't try hard you may not be with us next year because of your health problem". Even when we deal with children that do understand but are under 18 years old it is a moral issue to decide as a legal system, as practitioners, or professionals or just people who care for the certain children how many information we can give to them about their situation, how we communicate, avoid, feel their pain and what are our language educational tools to do so. "The search for studies on moral judgment in healthcare was largely disappointing, even within the literatures on empathy and caring. The literature on difficult clinical relationships is extensive, but moral judgment is at best a secondary focus in these studies" (Hill, 2010). Since everybody is going to find himself in the pain of a hospital environment school has to speak the moral language of pain.

2. The case study of Epione

Epione (in Greek Ηπιόνη), was in Greek mythology the wife of the God of Medicine Science, named Asclepius, she was the daughter of Meropas in Kos island. We gave this name to our educational language program of pain management as long as we enrolled to a research with healthy children at three cities in Greece, at public schools and their parents and teachers (children at grades of age 6 to 15). We also worked with special education teachers, children and other people of healthcare in schools at hospitals of three cities in Greece (2012-2018). We interviewed children, parents, teachers, doctors, nurses, stretcher-bearers, friend and relatives of children in pain. In many cases we found ourselves listening to each person's private pain and memories, many times not in relevance with the child involved in our research. This gave us the knowledge that there is a lot of not communicated pain that needs to be heard and relieved. Another opponent

of this situation is the immoral attitude of media that show pain of others as a product that shells emotional involvement and excitement and analgesia to the customers as victims of TV impression that pain of others is something that you do while you are eating your lunch at home, for example, or pain can be an athletic attitude at box games or a Taurus match show at the arena.

Morality of respecting the pain of other creatures as much as our pain is another case we examined in the Greek society (Wittgenstein, 1989). There is a corpus of functions in language that are reflecting pain attitude, a cognitive schema or a grammatical metaphor. As a social implication of reference to the complexity of the pain issue: "Several factors have been identified as causes of uncontrolled and unnecessary pain, which deprive patients from receiving appropriate treatments that theoretically they have the right to access. Important factors include (with considerable regional, financial, and cultural differences) the following: (1) failure to identify pain as a priority in patient care; (2) failure to establish an adequate physician-patient relationship; or a teacher-student trust in communication; (3) insufficient knowledge regarding adequate language and behavior in pain issues; (4) concerns regarding "last-ditch" treatments of severe pain; and (5) failure to be accountable and equitable" (Carvalho et al., 2018). Findings such as these make us confront the reality of a pain identity for each language and nation, since pain is a global language for every human being to communicate and accept as an experience of the self-identity (Czerwicz & Kopańska, 2012). Actually, this language answers questions such as who I am, what it means to be alive and well, etc.

Pain language is the alphabet of a life's experience, as we assume from our perspective, (Bernhofer, 2011; Buchman, Ho & Illes, 2016; Papadopoulou, 2018).

3. Pain as love and compassion in Greek

In these terms of our research pain appears as an egocentric issue of the self rather than altruistic in human behavior, although as a theory it is respected from children and adolescents. The pain of physical catastrophes, such as conflagrations, loss of animals in a flood, is less important than the pain of human loss. These moral attitudes are always under consideration for each educational system and curriculum that is responsible to focus to humanities and the studies of a peaceful planet in well-being and respect for each other as much as that of ourselves as persons (Fabrega & Tyma, 1976; Te Boveldt et al., 2014). The value of a language education concentrated in empathy, sympathy (in Greek "sympathia" from "syn" and "pathos": passion: symponia means to be wounded together, to feel as you feel no matter what), is our suggestion through the research with children in the program and methodology named Epione in Greece. If children get educated to the vocabulary of pain, so as they can express themselves to the specialists and their familiar environment, there may be less cases of no co-operating patients and more successful doctors, less children at risk of every kind of pain. "Pain language" as Wittgenstein (1989) has mentioned at his *Philosophical investigations* and as the Australian linguist Halliday (2010) has defined in his linguistic applications, combine a secure theoretical framework which helped our program with children, and suggest a new methodology of evaluating well-being through the pain as a "friend" reminding us when something is physically or abnormally problematic. Pain is a procedure that is always with us from birth, through the crying baby scream, till the last breath of life. The moral identity of a school system is rather to explain this procedure as a positive experience and involve language experiences as a play – incidence among school mates. In Greek, the word "symponia" (to be together with pain – "ponos", derives from the verb "penomai", which means I am getting tired), for compassion names the moral opinion we try to apply as a global need for humanity on earth. In Greek language pain we should also mention that the verb I am in pain means that I do it, I do pain = ponao. It also means I love somebody – symponao, with the protheme se-you, se ponao, somehow I am in your pain – I adore you).

4. Implications: Teaching activities in pain language

Some teaching games-activities of pain language education that children can work in general strategies are also important to be accompanied by teaching tools – appropriate textbooks, with moral issues in teaching language, and those are applied at our research as described. We give some ideas of this case, as we found as best practices in pain language, such as the following:

- Describe a pain that you have experienced or ... somebody else. Can you imagine something that can be painful, if you can't find something else?
- What would you tell your pain to do so as you feel better with whatever hurts you?
- Draw your pain as an animal. What animal that would be? Give three words that look like it.
- Who would you tell about your painful situation if you had any?
- What is the quality of a person that you would feel confident enough to talk about something that worries you?
- Find a painful story from the text that you read. Underline the phrases that show this pain (it can be in a study of real people and well known person's autobiographic painful moments in their life).
- What words would you use to say the same thing? How would you react to this problem (Discussion or diary writing) (Synonyms-antonyms, vocabulary enrichment).
- Role playing games: Separate in teams of a fiction story character that faces a realistic problem. Tell the story character what does well and what doesn't do well (reading experiential expressive language and theatre as a teaching tool).
- Argumentation and the rhetoric arts in decision making of the story character at certain crucial moments of his/her life. Debate language issues about pain in life, (figurative language in pain language semantics).

Moral issues need to be discussed among children, with children and between them:

Examples

- When the expression of the pain of others is a good thing but hurts us;
- The respect of the other's feeling against our will;
- The fear of loneliness against the need to talk about our problem;
- When I know that somebody hurts somebody else, but I don't do anything to help although I could try;
- When somebody talks in a way that hurts me, do I DO THE SAME to her/him? Or what do I do?
- Should we compromise with painful situations in order to fulfill other aims?
- To be or honest or to be kind? How can I be both without hearting the feelings of others?
- Friends are just manipulative instruments for me and ways to pass my time nicely? Moreover, when they are in trouble am I or not there for them?
- Who is an altruist? Can you find a person that is and talk about him/her, behave like him/her?
- What if you were the refugee of a war at a hostile country?
- What if just by incidence, you are not in this case but the problem, any problem of pain is out there?
- Is it ethical to be happy when somebody we don't like hurts?

- What kind of a person am I? Give names of qualities and moral dilemmas that your class would try to answer.

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Limits of Critical Theory, Critique and Emancipation in Habermas' Critique of Horkheimer and Adorno

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Abstract

Habermas' critical theory is partly an attempt to identify the limitations of critique and emancipation as espoused in the first generation critical theory of Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno. In their attempt to develop an interdisciplinary, reflexive, emancipatory and dialectical reason that is critical towards accepted realities, Horkheimer and Adorno in their monumental work *The Dialectic of Enlightenment* pictured a world trapped in instrumental rationality. Taking and revolutionizing traditional critical theory, Habermas argues that reason entails both emancipator as well as instrumental possibilities. Through an exposition of Habermas' critique of Horkheimer and Adorno in his discourse of modernity, this article argues that although Habermas successfully identifies the equation of the rational with the instrumental and offers an emancipator model in return; still he ends up not paying sufficient attention to aesthetic truth.

Keywords: enlightenment, myth, communicative reason.

1. Introduction

The philosophy of Habermas involves a general venture into the contradictions of the modern world which in its emancipatory intent to realize linguistic validation came to be interspersed with the fate of instrumental reason. As such, working under the guiding spirit of the critical theories of Horkheimer and Adorno that any serious intellectual form of discourse must enclose both deconstructive and emancipatory elements, Habermas introduces his own unique communicative paradigm. Here resisting the equation of the rational with the instrumental as developed in the monumental *The Dialectic of Enlightenment*; Habermas introduces a reconstructive process that strengthens everyday communicative action. The discussion on this article focuses on Habermas' critique of Horkheimer and Adorno's critical theory in his *The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity*.

In section one, I try to expose Habermas' discussion of Hegel as a way of uncovering the guiding spirit of the modern age as subjective freedom. Such optimism soon encounters a rebuttal in Nietzsche's radical critique of reason. Section two shows how according to Habermas' views on the fate of critical theory, Nietzschean critique soon branches out into Horkheimer's equation of the rational with the oppressive. After I summarized Habermas' picture of modernity in section three, finally, I use David Ingram's discussion to highlight the marginalization of the aesthetic in Habermas' discourse of the modern.

2. Modernity and subjective freedom

Habermas' discourse of modernity heavily relies on Hegel's conception of freedom and subjectivity. Thus, Habermas asserts that the young Hegel, witnessing the cruelties of history and its tragedies first hand, postulated reason as a tool of unification and final harmony manifested in history's contradictions. As such, most philosophies of the Enlightenment focused on the limits of reason and of human cognition, and how understanding is possible based on the self-reflecting subject. Instead, Hegel focuses on an absolute reason that underlies both individuals and societies, and brings a final harmony. According to Habermas, the young Hegel with Schelling and Holderlin in the Tübingen seminary developed a concept of public religion that stood against the current religions, Enlightenment and its orientation towards religion. For Hegel, the concretely established religions of his day were based on authority, while the Enlightenment's outlook towards religion was abstract and ideal. Instead, Hegel opted for a religion carried out through public religious ceremonies, involving members of the society and creating bonds or solidarity between individuals. Hegel focused on a religion, which is to: "present itself in public in celebrations and cults, only if it connected up with myths and addressed the heart and the imagination, could it, as religiously mediated morality, "be woven into the entire fabric of state" (Habermas, 1987: 26). Hegel applied his critique of religion to current political structures of the day, which he saw as failing to bring a harmonious relation between the individual and the state and their laws being based on authority and divorced from the communal life.

In the essay *Spirit of Christianity and its Fate*, Hegel advocates a reason, manifesting itself in a public religion and unifying subjects. This is based on a community, where a reciprocal and symmetrical relation is established between members of society. For Hegel, this is the ethical and not the moral state. Hegel meant by "ethics" a conscious membership in society and reciprocal relations amongst enlightened individuals. While by "moral", what Hegel has in mind, is a community filled with egoistic rational individuals, each competing to satisfy their needs. (Melchert, 2002: 490). So, in opposition to abstract moral laws and rights, Hegel focused on reciprocity between members of a society and punishment of those who stand against the harmonious order. Besides religion, Hegel also advanced his ideas of unity and harmony in his views on art. Art was supposed to express the truths of religion in an ethical state. But, Hegel abandoned his aesthetic ideals, after realizing that the essence of modernity is reason, and the problem of modernity is its fragmentation into three spheres. So, what was needed is not an aesthetic union, but a reason that brings together the different spheres and contradictions of history and concrete life (Habermas, 1987: 31-32).

In place of Hegel's absolute, Habermas proposes his intersubjectivist approach to rationality. This constitutes, conceiving modernity in terms of the rationalization of the lifeworld i.e. abandoning of conventional standards and pre-modern religions, traditional outlooks. This resulted in the planting of different spheres i.e. theoretical, moral and aesthetic correlating to the everyday world and its three validity claims to objective social and subjective worlds. Thus, the focus is on the lifeworld, how speech acts coordinate our social actions through validity claims, and the continual production of truth in reciprocity. This differs from Hegel's philosophy of right which holds the state as the concrete actualization of the spirit in history (*Ibid.*, 37-40). From Habermas's vantage point, Hegel's philosophy did not escape the limits of the philosophy of the subject. Reason is depicted as an overarching and overwhelming force behind the contradictions in actual history and also the various stages in the development of consciousness are devalued. So the current existing reality, which has a potential for critique is devalued, since it's held to be part of a greater whole, i.e. the progress of history towards absolute spirit. This also devalues intersubjectivity, since subjects are finite and small parts in the dialectical movement of history.

Hegel, on his essay *On the Essence of Philosophical Criticism*, elaborated two kinds of criticism. First, it's developed as a critique of degenerated, repressive current forms of life preventing progress. Secondly it emerges as a critique of subjective idealism within the

philosophies of Kant and Fichte, which resulted in various dichotomies, and failed to show the unity of human experience. Hegel. In his *Philosophy of Right* only carries out a critique towards idealist philosophies and hence focuses less and less on critique of actuality. As Habermas claims, this; “blunting of critique corresponds to a devaluation of actuality, from which the servants of philosophy turn away” (*Ibid.*, 43). Here Habermas elaborates on Schiller’s *Letters on the Aesthetic Education of Man* to show how the idea of intersubjectivity was also presented through art. Habermas acknowledges Schiller for being the first to introduce an “aesthetic critique of modernity” (*Ibid.*, 45). Schiller objected Greek poetry and art for appealing to authority of the gods and having a religious outlook. He also criticized bourgeoisie society for promoting an excessive individualism and selfishness, and also modern science which based on its abstract rules and logic negated everyday sensuous life. Instead: “Schiller stresses the communicative, community-building and solidarity-giving force of art, which is to say, its public character” (*Ibid.*, 46). Schiller’s general focus was on the tension between the passionate and material on one hand and the capacity found in understanding and imposing order in man on the other. So, Schiller in his concept of the artistic beauty or the appearance, tried to postulate how the aesthetic, frees man from both sensuous nature and capacity for reason, and instead tries to mediate the two. So, art for Schiller; “arouses a middle disposition, in which our nature is constrained neither physical nor morally and yet is active both ways” (*Ibid.*, 48).

According to Fred Dallmayr, Habermas’s critique of Hegel’s conception of modernity can be summarized by two points. Hegel tried overcoming the philosophy of the subject himself standing under or working under the premises of the philosophy of the subject and failing to project a reason that can unify humanity’s experiences. Hegelian discourse on modernity also being very abstract leads to a devaluation of the actual. Hence, it’s highly contemplative (Dallmayr, 1987: 688).

One of the things unique to Hegelian philosophy is the fusion of the “popular” and “academic” conceptions of philosophy. While Kant maintained a distinction between philosophy as it is conceptualized commonly and as it is practiced by intellectuals, Hegel succeeded in bringing and analyzing the current, existing condition in his own philosophy and hence abolishing the hitherto distinction between worldly and academic concept of philosophy. After Hegel’s death, philosophy came to be practiced by academicians in institutions and universities theoretically, and amongst other things this resulted in philosophy, losing its connection with the everyday world, and the introduction and application of the various sciences to conceptualize and analyze the world. This changed for Habermas, in Heidegger’s *Being and Time*, when Heidegger tried to lay out the everyday structures that ground “Dasein”, and hence the use of philosophy in deciphering concrete structures. Also, the Hegelian Marxists using Weber’s analysis of Marx tried to reestablish the link between philosophy and the concrete with a “theory of reification” and establish links between “economics and philosophy” (Habermas, 1987: 53). Also from Husserl to Foucault, philosophy has tried to reestablish its link with the given, by way of a critique of the sciences.

Still, all these attempts are different from Hegel, since beyond trying to conceptualize current history in philosophical themes, Habermas sees in these various ventures, an advocacy of the end of philosophy discussions in different ways. The end of philosophy discussion is an attempt to put an end to philosophy as it is traditionally practiced and culminated in the current scene. Of course, there are diverse orientations here. For instance, in Heidegger traditional philosophy failed to reflect on being as such and instead focused on particular entities. In young Hegelians philosophy as practiced hitherto was meditative and hence needs to stay in touch with the particular and concrete.

3. Nietzsche and the radical critique of reason

In Nietzschean philosophy, Dionysus represents the passionate tendencies in human beings. As a god it never arrives. So the tendencies it represents i.e. the passionate and emotional are realized in the space it leaves through artistic practices. The idea of Dionysus as the coming god who presents himself with absence was according to Habermas, also developed in early Romanticism. Accordingly, the idea of Dionysus was taken as an equivalent for Christ as the messiah who comes in the future and is currently absent (Habermas, 1987: 91). This absence creates a space in this world where the promises of the Enlightenment, and the infinite worth of individual, its interrogation of tradition and affirmation of its rights, will be realized. So, Nietzsche recognizes how Wagner takes up the romanticist theme of fulfillment in this world through absence, of the other-worldly, and thereby rejects the latter's approach. This is since, for Nietzsche all forms of other worldliness end up in a negation of this life and the degradation of it as fleeting, finite, and so on. Accordingly, "the mature Nietzsche recognizes that Wagner in whom modernity is almost 'summed up', shared with the romantics the perspective on the still to come fulfillment of the modern age" (*Ibid.*, 92).

One of the things that Nietzsche maintained in his *Birth of Tragedy* is the Schopenhauerian insight that the principle of individuation has limitations. For Schopenhauer, going beyond Kant's identification of the noumenal as the "unknowable" one could attribute the noumenal world to the world of will. In the phenomenal world, the principle of individuation makes it possible for individuals to grasp the world by applying space and time. But, beyond this, the world of will manifests itself in the individual in form of excessive desires and inclinations, resulting in feeling of pain and suffering. Schopenhauer provided a disinterested art and contemplative life as an alternative. Later, Nietzsche rejected Schopenhauer's approach claiming that it denies the basic nature of life as will to power, or endless desire to impose meaning and order on things, and instead simply tries to affirm the pessimistic side of life (Love, 1986: 39). In his aesthetics, Nietzsche focuses, according to Habermas, on how the individual in the "aesthetic phenomenon", sets himself free from norms, conventions and values, and generally goes beyond cognition, language and reason (Habermas, 1987: 93).

One of the things that Nietzsche takes from the Romantics is the differentiation of the aesthetic from those of science, morality and other realms, and also an emphasis on how it steps outside the bounds of reason. This aesthetic ideal focuses on ancient Greek tragedy, the identification of the aesthetic with the non-rational and emphasis on how Dionysus brings in a passionate, fragmented, non-cognitive element to reality. Nietzsche for Habermas introduces a new kind of critique of modernity, one that tries to step outside of reason, in order to critique reason. Hence:

Subject-centered reason is confronted with reason's absolute other. And as a counterauthority to reason, Nietzsche appeals to experiences that are displaced back into the archaic realm-Experiences of self-disclosure of decentred subjectivity, liberated from all constraints of cognition and purposive activity, all imperatives of utility and morality (*Ibid.*, 94).

What Nietzsche, would like to bring into the scene with his art is the value of life. How the world as a chaotic, non-theoretical realm of experience, witnessing both joy and suffering and resisting inclusion into a grand theory, original plan, or final goal, is to be deciphered through an oriented outlook towards the world.

4. Horkheimer, Adorno and the dialectic of reason

In Horkheimer and Adorno's critical theory, myth gains its identity standing in relation to enlightenment, and vice versa. The enlightenment's rise for Horkheimer and Adorno is related to a superseding and surpassing of mythic grounds. "Enlightenment has always taken the

basic principle of myth to be anthropomorphism, the projection onto nature of the subjective. In this view, the supernatural spirits and demons, are mirror images of men who allow themselves to be frightened by natural phenomena” (Horkheimer & Adorno, 1982: 6). By using Homer’s *Odyssey*, Horkheimer and Adorno tried to depict a subject who has managed to control the world but is at the same time at wars with himself. Odysseus tries to exercise theoretical and practical knowledge over the world by increasing his understanding of the environment and also by practically being able to control his surroundings. But the more he manages in controlling the world, the more he is depriving his nature. The basic ability of humans to relate to the world in general by experiencing it is replaced by an instrumental relation that tries to manipulate the world. So, “Odysseus’s loss of pleasure in the world entails loss of experience of the world as substantively meaningful” (Sherratt, 2000: 34-35).

Hence, Habermas claims that, for Horkheimer and Adorno, the price of being enlightened is that of exploiting everything and being unable to cognize the world without utility. Further, the modern world is not fully divorced from mythical backgrounds, since as a project it can only be defined in its exclusion of the pre-modern. Emancipation and maturity come at the price of suppressing one’s inclination towards experiencing the world. Hence; “the compulsion toward rational domination of externally impinging natural forces has set the subject upon the course of a formative process that heightens productive forces without limit for the sake of sheer self-preservation, but lets the forces of reconciliation that transcend more self-preservation atrophy” (Habermas, 1987: 110).

For Horkheimer and Adorno, humanity’s attempts at survival led in the final stage to an instrumental rationality that damaged other ways of relating to the world of objects and other subjects, and managed to establish instrumental rationality as the only way of relating to the world. What’s further expected of Horkheimer and Adorno, according to Habermas, is to show how this instrumental rationality managed to contaminate the modern value spheres of science, morality and law, and art. Here in relation to science, Horkheimer and Adorno are convinced that modern science’s insistence on exclusively cognizing and theorizing that which is to be exploited and utilized, is best depicted in positivistic orientations to science. Instead of trying to conceptualize things generally in terms of “their social, historical and human significance”, positivism aimed at pinning down the exact properties of things and entities, so that they can be utilized (*Ibid.*, 111).

Horkheimer and Adorno extended their critique of positivism, to science in general, by claiming that all the sciences are arenas of instrumentality. Accordingly, “enlightenment behaves toward things as a dictator toward men. He knows them in so far as he can manipulate them. The man of science knows things in so far as he can make them. In this way, their potentiality is turned to his own ends” (Horkheimer & Adorno, 1982: 9). Also, in relation to morality and law, Horkheimer and Adorno expressed their doubts toward a supreme authority that can be used as a criterion, emanating from either religion or pure reason itself, and instead focused on how relations of instrumentality and domination characterize the moral and legal spheres. Finally, art instead of trying to declare its autonomy and reflexivity towards other spheres, has on the contrary tried to imitate and ally itself with the truths of the instrumental sciences, law and morality. This is best depicted in mass culture which organizes the masses into a dominant ideological structure.

As such:

The culture industry perpetually cheats its consumers of what it perpetually promises. The promissory note which, with its plots and staging, it draws on pleasure is endlessly prolonged; the promise, which is actually all the spectacle consists of, is illusory: all it actually confirms is that the real point will never be reached, that the dinner must be satisfied with the menu (Horkheimer & Adorno, 1982: 139).

If this is true, then Habermas thinks that, the intersubjective communicative processes based on validity claims have been undermined. Weber's rationalization of the lifeworld and emergence of the three value spheres and the correlating validity claims in everyday world will all be undermined. Habermas admits that in modern capitalist societies the inclination towards minimizing all questions to issues of one's own interest and generally the interest to preserve oneself has increased. Still, the production of truth through distinct validity claims and the kind of "give and take" ethos between the three validity claims and the three value spheres haven't completely been undermined. Hence, "the dialectic of enlightenment does not do justice to the rational content of cultural modernity that was captured in bourgeois ideals (and also instrumentalized along with them)" (Habermas, 1987: 113). Habermas further asserts that, the rationality of modern sciences goes beyond the utilizable, and the universal basis of law and morality have been realized in various global, regional and national institutions and laws, and the reflexivity of modern art that take the subject beyond an instrumental rationality, all haven't been exhausted.

Habermas goes on to look at what animated Horkheimer and Adorno's critique of Enlightenment, and in relation to this, why they had to abandon Marx's critique of ideology. In mythical thinking and mythical societies, what is emphasized is how things stand in an intrinsic relation to the whole. Amongst other things, this excludes any division between one and others, and one and the objective world. In this context, "only demythologization dispels this enchantment... the process of enlightenment leads to the desocialization of nature and the denaturalization of the human world" (*Ibid.*, 115). In "demythologization", the role of tradition is undermined, norms, conventions and rules are replaced by contestable claims to truth instead of a unitary whole, the world becomes differentiated into that of objects, norms and subjective, one. As Weber has shown, this "demythologization" results in the freeing of the lifeworld from the power of tradition, and in turn, the planting of different claims to truth, relating, to the objective, social and subjective worlds. So, where does the critique of ideology fit under this type of analysis?

As Habermas sees, it's only in the context of the rise of the value spheres of science, morality and laws and art replacing the power of traditions and myths, that one could make a critique of ideology, or question the extent to which the claims of the autonomous value spheres are contaminated by private or specific interests and agendas. Hence, "if one describes the process suspended between myth and enlightenment in this way, as the formation of a decentered understanding of the world, the place where the procedure of ideology critique enters into this drama can also be specified" (*Ibid.*). In the critique of ideology, the production of truth is seen in terms of the powers that influenced the production of the claims to truth. Thus, ideology critique tries to undermine the status of the so called value spheres, as being free of uncritical accounts and solely being based on the force of reason. Habermas marks, the ideology critiques or the questioning of the various spheres of the modern project as its moment of reflexivity or being aware of its own historical background and reflecting on this. This changes for Habermas, when reason itself is questioned or the issue whether reason itself can liberate humanity or when the aporia of what it means to reason are emphasized. But, what animated such a critique of reason itself? For Habermas, it's the frustration of Horkheimer and Adorno, in the failure of Marxist philosophy and its intentions. These include the inability of the masses to stage a revolution in the West, and the dominance of Stalinism and fascism, in soviet Russia and Germany respectively (Habermas, 1987: 116). Hence for Horkheimer and Adorno; "the impression could indeed get established in the darkest years of the second world war that the last sparks of reason were being extinguished from this reality and had left the ruins of a civilization in collapse without any hope" (*Ibid.*, 117).

Initially, Horkheimer and Adorno took on Marx's critique of ideology with their insight that philosophy usually ends up affirming the status quo and that it's not equipped with the necessary tools to revolutionize existing states of affairs. So, from Marx, Horkheimer and Adorno

took the insight that the dominant ideas, institutions and frameworks are those of the powerful social class and that critique should be aimed at exposing how so-called “emancipatory” theories and structures that supposedly stand for the whole society, in practice only serve the privileged few. This Marxian orientation guided the Frankfurt school’s critical social theory’s interdisciplinary approach to society in the 1930s. But in the 1940s, this critique of society, turned from what reason serves in society, to what reason has led humanity to in general. Hence, Horkheimer and Adorno “pushed for a radicalization and self-over-coming of ideology critique, which was supposed to enlighten the Enlightenment about itself” (*Ibid.*, 118).

Horkheimer and Adorno, abandoned Marx’s critique of ideology, since it was able to unravel not the destructive path that reason itself has led humanity into in its attempt to dismantle irrationality, but, how reason is directed by specific values and interests in a particular context. So, Horkheimer and Adorno moved to Nietzsche’s critique of reason. Habermas sees the position of Horkheimer and Adorno towards Nietzsche’s “will to power” and his critique of reason, as being “ambivalent”, they accepted Nietzsche’s general critique of reason, and reason’s fusion with domination and resulting in instrumentality. Still this proved problematic since, if all reason is repression then what about the reason of critical social theory? So, Horkheimer and Adorno were trying to find a space within which their critical, reflective and emancipative reason towards society can be justified (*Ibid.*, 120). One of the areas where there is a strong relation between Horkheimer and Adorno, and Nietzsche is in relation to the development of subjectivity. According to Nietzsche, the development of “consciousness” coincided with the suppression of basic human instincts being expressed in the form of will to power. For Horkheimer and Adorno, the modern subject is the one that has suppressed its “id” in favor of “ego” in Freud’s terms. As Freud has it, in modern subjectivity, the id’s inclination to “experience objects as pleasurable and also, importantly, as meaningful” (Sherratt, 2000: 532) has been suppressed by the ego’s drive to preserve the self by exerting control, and instrumentally manipulate things.

Further, Nietzsche, Adorno and Horkheimer, share the idea that behind the modern sciences, morality and religion, lies humanity’s urge to preserve itself, and the manifestation of humanity’s endless drive towards the world, manifesting itself in an instrumental relation to the world (Habermas, 1987: 122). Habermas claims that in Nietzsche, notions like the contestation of validity claims, and generally truth, are abandoned to that of the “will to power” and the ability to impose meaning. Nietzsche expounds his analysis of the will to power and its degeneration into ascetic ideals in his *Genealogy of Morals*. In this work, Nietzsche tried to make a historical analysis of different conceptions of the moral. He further claimed that the development of different civilization and their moral conceptions is related to a unique class of society which establishes its hegemony, affirms life, and conquers the environment making itself the source of moral values. In his survey of the cultural history of humanity, Nietzsche identified two major types of morality, i.e. “master” and “slave”. “Master” morality is characterized by moral agents who know they are the “measures” of things, they affirm their biological instincts for power and thereby impose meaning on things. On the contrary, we find in “slave” morality one which is populated by individuals who have no respect for life, strife, struggle and competition. So, with his genealogy; “Nietzsche has in hand the conceptual means by which he can denounce the prevalence of the belief in reason and of the ascetic ideal, of science and of morality, as a merely factual victory (though of course decisive for the fate of modernity) of lower and reactionary forces” (*Ibid.*, 126).

5. Communicative rationality as the “unpursued” path in modernity

For Habermas one common way of justifying the sciences is to see them as the logical implications of the subject’s reflection. Thus, the sciences are understood as the results of the subject’s attempt to understand itself and the world. Still this has resulted in the long run in “scientism”; the idea that the natural sciences provide the only available route to knowledge. Foucault rightly asserted this for Habermas. Still, he did not adequately address the extent to

which his own genealogy detaches itself from the other sciences and there by succeeds in establishing its status as a value free unmasking methodology. In the final analysis, Foucault's genealogy for Habermas turns out to be everything that it has criticized of the various sciences. Hence: "presentism, relativism, and cryptonormativism are the consequences of his attempt to preserve the transcendental moment proper to generative performances in the basic concept of power while driving from it every trace of subjectivity. This concept of power does not free the genealogist from contradictory self- thematizations" (*Ibid.*, 294-95).

As an alternative, Habermas proposes a new reading, a new critique of the human sciences and of reason that would go beyond the aporias faced by the radical critics of modernity from Nietzsche, passing down to poststructuralism. The radical critics of modernity failed to recognize that there was a possibility of another critique of subjectivity and hence an alternative to it, within the philosophical discourse of modernity. From the young Hegelians, Nietzsche, all the way up to poststructuralism, there was an alternative of a communicative rationality which was not pursued, and Habermas tries to reconstruct this path. Thus he remarks, "it behooves us to retrace the path of the philosophical discourse of modernity back to its starting point- in order to examine once again the directions once suggested at the chief crossroads. This is the intention behind these lectures" (*Ibid.*, 295).

Hegel and Marx try to step outside of the confines of the philosophy of the subject by envisaging an ideal where under the state or communism, citizens will become equal, free, and realize their potentials, cooperating with one another. Heidegger and Derrida should have avoided appealing to ontico-ontological significance of a being that can give an insight to Being itself as such, and a heterogeneous state determining all meaning. Instead they should have resorted to the communicative paradigm. In Heidegger, Dasein has a unique place as a being that interrogates Being as such, and thus was taken as a point of departure. Habermas urges the interlocutors in the philosophical discourse of modernity to abandon the subject-object metaphysics, where the subject is oriented towards an objective possible state of affairs, and instead tries to strengthen the communicative action taking place between individuals in modern societies. Hence, he remarks, "I have already suggested that the paradigm of the knowledge of objects has to be replaced by the paradigm of mutual understanding between subjects capable of speech and action" (*Ibid.*, 295-296).

Habermas sees in Heidegger, Derrida and Foucault a rejection of the subject that establishes its primacy by its reflection on the world. But, whereas Heidegger and Derrida tried to make some compromise, by establishing the Dasein Analytic, and show how the subject participates in a Heterogeneous deferred meaning formation; Foucault on the contrary tried to completely denounce the subject in placing it under concrete, material, and specific power/knowledge relationships. From Habermas's point of view, the divisions between empirical and transcendental, Being and beings, noumenal and phenomenal, all point to the fact that, the reason of the modern project is 'exhausted'. All these distinctions are attempts to preserve the philosophy of the subject under different formulations. Some situated the subject as locus of possible cognition. Others show that the subject is completely autonomous, while there are also some that place the subject under different repressive relations. But all these are exhausted for Habermas since no attempts have been successful to come up with a strong alternative. The solution is making the move to communicative rationality and intersubjectivity. Hence Habermas remarks that, "[t]he paradigm of the philosophy of consciousness is exhausted. If this is so, the symptoms of exhaustion should dissolve with the transition to the paradigm of mutual understanding" (*Ibid.*, 296).

Habermas summarizes most of the ideas raised in his *The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity*, in a chapter *Conceptions on Modernity: A look back at two traditions*; in a later work entitled *The Postnational Constellation, Political Essays*. In this chapter, Habermas tries to show

why the discussion of modernity was clearly articulated in philosophical circles, by trying to address three major issues. These are:

- (1) When, and why, did philosophers become interested in the interpretation of the specific condition of modernity? (2) Why do these philosophical interpretations take the form of a critique of reason? (3) Why did philosophy ultimately cede the ongoing task of an interpretation of modernity to social theory? (Habermas, 2001: 130-31).

Chronologically speaking, Habermas dates the use of the word modern to “late fifth century”, where Christianity tried to distinguish itself from the “pagan Roman past” (*Ibid.*, 131). What especially interests Habermas is how the term modern subsequently comes to signify the notion of a present and supposedly radical moment which tries to detach itself from the alleged backward and unenlightened state of the past. Further, the establishment of the uniqueness of the present was to be affirmed by seeking an enlightened, glorious moment to be pursued. This is seen in how the renaissance tries to appeal to the glorious moment of enlightened Greece, and hence detaches itself from the past. Habermas further notes that “around 1800” a consciousness of modern time began to emerge, which instead of trying to appeal to a glorious past, divided history into ancient, medieval and modern, and then tried to establish the present as the modern which surpasses the darkness of the medieval stage.

In the aesthetic quarrel between the protagonists of modern and ancient art, the issue of modernity was further articulated. Its only at the beginning of the nineteenth century that philosophy tried to conceptualize the modern, as its subject of thought, as such. This is signified in Hegel’s philosophy that located the modern, in terms of how the present moment is clearly established in the great achievements in history like the French revolution that stood contrarily to medieval past and also the idea of a novel stage in human history where all contradictions were to be resolved. Accordingly; “history is now experienced as an all encompassing, problem generating process, and time as a scarce resource for mastering the problems that the future hurls at the present this head long rush of challenge is perceived as the ‘pressure of time’” (*Ibid.*, 132).

Concerning the second issue, one of the problems modernity was faced with, was evolving its own criteria of right and wrong. Since modernity equated the medieval age to blind submissions to authority and tradition, it equates its vision with those of reason. Philosophy was particularly trying to articulate where the progress of humans by the power of reason was going and should go. Habermas claims, “as the custodian of reason, philosophy conceives modernity as a child of the enlightenment” (*Ibid.*, 133). Finally, for Habermas, Max Weber traces the origin of modern society to a process where traditions of authority and religion were replaced by a culture that solved basic issues by a reason divided into the “value spheres” of science, morality, and art. But for Weber, this process soon resulted in an instrumental rationality under the apparatus of “state and economy”. While the state institutes a system where individuals are grouped under their specific tasks, the economy utilizes this specified labor under different forms of productive processes in the capitalist era. In this scenario, the only emancipatory ideal was held to be, “the strong, self-reliant subject.., in lucky instances, succeed in forming a coherent life project of its own, in opposition to a rationalized, and fragmented society” (*Ibid.*, 140).

Weber’s themes of the subordination of individuals under larger structures of repression was to be further developed by Horkheimer and Adorno amongst others, who portrayed a society trapped by instrumental rationality and how reason which is the only emancipatory ideal proved difficult in the final analysis. The instrumental rationality functioned through the various sciences, arts, morals, laws, entertainment, and so on, to create a society full of conformists. Out of this aporia, the critique of modernity comes to the point that, it has to give up either the empirical analysis exposing how the modern project practically functioned, or the theoretical critique of reason, equating reasoning with instrumentality as such. Hence, “[t]he end of the cooperative division of labor between philosophy and social theory means uncoupling a criticized

self-understanding of modernity from an empirical observation and descriptive account of its tendencies to social critics" (*Ibid.*, 142).

Weber's empirical explanations of a society trapped under an instrumental rationality, were divided into and hence further developed by, "rational choice theory" which characterizes modern individuals as employing strategic actions aimed at achieving individualistic interests, and "systems theory" portraying how various structures functioned to dictate individuals (*Ibid.*, 142). In philosophical circles, in Heidegger and Wittgenstein, "reason is equated with operation of an objectifying and manipulating understanding with "representational thinking" and philosophical abstraction with the controlling power and discipline of self-maintaining, narcissistically self-assertive subjectivity" (*Ibid.*, 143).

The ideas of Heidegger and Wittgenstein are being echoed in postmodernist attempts at a critique of modernity. Habermas summarizes his critique of postmodernism by claiming that its critique of reason and specifically modern reason as anarchistic and repressive representing hidden intentions and motives is too exaggerated to the extent of not being able to recognize the positive sides of the Enlightenment. Further, even to assert that there are diverse rationalities embedded in particular contexts the postmodernist needs to go beyond relativism and assert that reason is universally embedded in various contexts. Hence, "to interrupt its own self preferentiality, a relativistic position must make an exception of the stated principle of incommensurability, precisely in the performative act of asserting it" (*Ibid.*, 150). Habermas in turn, proposes his communicative rationality that looks at everyday practice, communicative action, and tries to identify what made this communication possible, at what background it's being conducted, and how it furnishes a theory of rationality based on the raising and contestation of various claims to truth.

6. Modernity and the aesthetic

Having considered Habermas' critique of Horkheimer and Adorno, let's try to analyze the place of the aesthetic in his discourse. In most philosophical orientations, the aesthetic is usually reduced to either a fancy contemplation raising issues that have no real value, or a dangerous realm that could damage discussions of knowledge or social and political thought. What is the role of the aesthetic in Habermas's discourse of modernity? Here, I will use David Ingram's essay *Habermas on Aesthetics and Rationality, Completing the Project of Enlightenment*, to point out some of the difficulties found in Habermas's views on the aesthetic. As Ingram sees it, compared to the works of other members of the Frankfurt school of critical theory, Habermas hasn't made the aesthetic a crucial aspect of his theories on modern society. Habermas acknowledged the aesthetic as hosting a distinctive form of rationality within the general rationalization of the lifeworld.

For Ingram, at the heart of Habermas' discussions of the aesthetics, is found the division of four periods through which modern art developed. First, in the "Renaissance", art and the aesthetic become separated from tradition, and religious authority. Secondly, towards the end of the 18th century, art was to become embodied in certain institutions like "museums" and practices like "theatres". Thirdly, in "late romanticism" art become highly divorced from moral, cognitive, political and other spheres. Finally, art became disseminated through "introduction of dynamic mechanisms of artistic reproduction such as film, radio and television" (Ingram, 1991: 70). Generally, what one witnesses in modern art, for Habermas is how art has become freed from conventional religious authority and was established as a sphere where aesthetic issues were debated. To this extent, it has become "worldly". But, because of movements stressing the intrinsic worth of art and its separation from theoretic practical affairs, modern art also has a 'transcendent' facet (*Ibid.*, 71). The attempt to free art from ideological interests and establish its status as a separate domain led to art being more and more divorced from everyday life.

For Habermas, both art for art's sake and art as a way of effecting instrumentality are results of the colonization of the lifeworld. The former being an attempt to free art of any interests and herald its genuinity, while the latter shows how art has been ideologically manipulated. As a solution, Habermas locates aesthetic rationality, as one of the validity claims raised in every communicative interaction, which is "an expressive claim to truthfulness" (*Ibid.*, 78). Still, Habermas maintains that subjective claims to truthfulness does not sufficiently lead to areas of inquiries or concrete structures providing stocks of materials and also doesn't have a strong capacity for solving society's problems as the claims to truth and rightness does. This for Ingram, "[d]eprives society of perhaps the only medium capable of communicating aesthetic discoveries gained in rational discourse to social agents engaged in every day moral/conversation" (*Ibid.*, 79). Habermas also needs to explain how the act of expressing one's subjective claims is related to art. Further, in every day communication we usually act in order to accomplish our own goals, and the extent to which our subjective claims could be universalizable is questionable.

As Ingram sees it in Habermas' works like *What is Universal Pragmatics*, there was no distinction between poetic language and every day normal language, and it was debatable whether the three distinct validity claims are found in both kinds of language. Acknowledging this, Habermas for Ingram, tried to incorporate three new ideas in his theory. These include, first, arguing that language's function also includes "a poetic disclosure of the world". Secondly holding that validity also includes "non pragmatic expressive and evaluative claims". Thirdly, developing an idea of aesthetic critique "that deviates in important respect from the standard model of argumentative rationality" (*Ibid.*, 80). Habermas argues that while artistic and poetic uses of language also operate in everyday language, the main goal of interlocutors is to communicate by raising distinct claims to truth. Poetic usages of Language are taken out from normal usages of language, and are employed in such a way as to pose new ideals and perspectives. Still, poetic language is "parasitic" and reducible to the normal usage. Habermas also argued that the poetic function gains its status in its ability to pose new alternatives. This is the extent to which this perspective has an ability to go beyond the situation in which it was articulated. In other words, its degree of "worthiness", needs to be taken into account (*Ibid.*, 82; Habermas, 1987: 203). This clearly shows that Habermas wants the aesthetic to be rational or that which can be contested. Habermas admitted that the poetic function gazes at the whole, but still this experience is subordinated and reducible to everyday normal language.

What we can learn from Ingram's insights into Habermas's view of the aesthetic is that Habermas continually tries to restrict the aesthetic experience by, subordinating the poetic function of language to the normal one. Habermas also argues that even though the aesthetic gazes at the whole this is limited compared to the rationality of other validity claims. Because the poetic function is derivative, the ideals it poses are continually subjected to the rationality of the validity claims. The aesthetic which usually excites the passions of individuals is subordinated to an argumentative rationality. Also, Habermas did not realize that the poetic function offers a critique that usually appeals to passions and emotions, and posits ideals that revolutionize existing affairs. Hence the poetic function goes beyond the normal usage of language in its ability to grasp the whole at once, whereas the validity claims are oriented towards only one aspect of reality at a time. Also making the aesthetic disputational, disempowers the power of art to incite passions and emotions and pose radical ideas.

7. Conclusion

As Habermas sees it, inheriting Nietzsche's will to power and the totalized critique of reason, Horkheimer and Adorno depicted a world where an individual is trapped in instrumentality. Such form of critique transitions from a Marxian critique of ideology to a Nietzschean critique of reason. Here the dilemma lies in reason being the only tool of critique, but still ending up being instrumental. Although Habermas rightfully identified the limitations of

such a project, his linguistic alternative exhibits a tendency to marginalize the aesthetic for the discursive and thereby situating the aesthetic on the poetic function of language which is suppressed in everyday discourse.

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