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Parmenides on the True and Right Names of Being

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Abstract

Parmenides as a knowing mortal (F I. 3) writes a philosophical-poetic account of a travelogue in which distinctive voices (F. 2) that are a mixture of myth and logos come out of an unnamed goddess (F I. 23) who didactically speaks with an unnamed young man as her direct listener and addressee (F II. 1) in order to reveal for him different spheres and routes (F II. 2) of inquiry about a specific referent. In the hybrid and tailored account of the immortal about a specific subject-matter, such as being, we can read different approaches of the thoughtful mortals through the narration of the goddess, and the idea of the immortal herself. And exactly when thoughtful mortals want to introduce their thinking and understanding of the "referent" in human lingual terms they appeal to the act of naming and making names, though there is no explicit account by the immortal about her approach for lingual expressing of the referent. Such an account gives us some useful and distinctive hints about Parmenides' conception as a mortal about naming/names which makes his conception in a specific position in regard to the other pertinent and close words, such as ἔπος/ἔπεα, ῥῆμα, ἔργον, καλεῖν, λόγος and Presocratic thinkers like Heraclitus, Democritus, and Empedocles. According to the immortal's account, in relation to naming and names thoughtful mortals can be classified mainly into two groups: (1) Those who are in Aletheia are informed of the distinctive features of the referent that is a "totality" and should be able to make "true" names for it but fail (F8. 38-39). If they succeeded, then their naming and names are true/ ἀληθῆ; and (2) those who are in Doxa think to know the features of the referent that is a "dual" and accordingly thoughtful mortals make names. Though all of names that are made are not unacceptable, one set is acceptable/χρεών (F 8. 54). As a result, we can infer that if Parmenides as a thoughtful mortal wants to express his thought about eon in lingual terms, he should appeal to naming and making names for they have specific dynamis (F IX. 2—a term that appears in Plato's *Cratylus* 394b) in communicating the nature of any specific referent. The first best situation or Aletheia is where on the basis of his "knowledge", he can communicate the distinctive features of eon in names and thereby make "true" names. Besides, there is the second best or Doxa, where he can communicate his "beliefs" about the essence and essential features of eon in names and make "acceptable" names.

Keywords: Parmenides, poem, name, naming, true, right.

Within the framework of his philosophical poem, Parmenides writes a travelogue in which a kouros narrates the speech of a Goddess who addresses him. Before considering the topic of this paper, which is our account of the mortals' approach to and engagement with the subject-matter of the goddess in the form of naming on two levels, we will pause initially to consider the texture and different manifestations of [sound and] voice that are produced by the immortals and mortals.

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In the first fragment and initial lines of Parmenides' Proem (I use Graham [2010], the First edition and translation with some corrections), we face with the specific utterance πολύφημον that primarily appears in the specific textures of Homer *(Odysseus*. 2.150; 22.376); Pindar (*Isthmians* 8.58) and Herodotus (*Book 5* Section 79 Line 4) too:

…, ἐπεί μ' ἐς ὁδὸν βῆσαν πολύφημον ἄγουσαι [Fr. 1, 2]

δαίμονος [δαίμονες], … [Fr. 1, 3]

Grammatically, in this line, Πολύφημον as a common adjective can qualify ὁδὸν or δαίμονος, although we take it with daimon. Lexically, this word is compounded from πολυ-, πολύς + φήμη and the core of its meaning as a whole lie in the meaning of the noun φήμη/speaking. The essence of the φήμη as a specific kind of speaking returns to its "origin" that is basically beyond human field and resides in the sphere of gods, goddesses, dreams, and the like. For this reason, it has specific meaning and importance for its receiver. In other words, such a speaking is basically oral and is prompted by god/goddess. It has a divine significance, apart from its meaning, that makes it somehow mysterious, private, and awesome for its recipient. At the same time, alongside this initial religious-laden connotation, φήμη has a general meaning that applies for any speaking that is not exclusively private and mysterious in its origin and for its receiver. And as a derived meaning, we have the term for an individual who is "much spoken about" and it means that he is "famous (Mourelatos, 2008: 41 n. 93; Semenzato, 2017: 294-295).

With regard to this background and the context of the second verse, if we consider the referent of φήμη to be δαίμων, it means that δαίμων, as a divinity or supernatural being that is between gods and humans, can produce specific divinely inspired utterances.

In later lines of the same fragment, in the general texture of anonymity, we face with the second specific formation of utterance by identified entities. We can see this in relation to the previous passage too:

τὴν δὴ παρφάμεναι κοῦραι μαλακοῖσι λόγοισιν [Fr. 1, 15]

πεῖσαν ἐπιφραδέως, ὥς σφιν βαλανωτὸν ὀχῆα [Fr. 1, 16]

In order to understand the meaning of the expression μαλακοῖσι λόγοισιν in Parmenides' proem, we should consider some comparative textual and philological points. First of all, we can read the same combination with one more adjective in *Odysseus* too: αἰεὶ δὲ μαλακοῖσι καὶ αἱμυλίοισι λόγοισι (*Odysseus*. 1.56). The combination of μαλακοῖσι with the plural noun ἐπέεσσιν is more frequent than μαλακοῖσι λόγοισιν (among example see Homer, *Odysseus* 10.70; Hesiod, *Theogony*. 90; *Homeric Hymn to Demeter*. 336; and Orpheus, *Argonautica*, 1093). Accordingly, it seems a good idea to compare λόγος and ἔπος, which in most English translation are translated with the same word, in order to see their distinctions and similarities. It seems that the essence of the ancient Greek word logos in the field of speech denotes to a set that choosing and putting together pertinent words of any subject-matter in order to say something is crucial. This core meaning can be detected in Parmenides' use of λόγος.

In comparison with λόγος, in the word ἔπος, that will appear in the following verses from the narrator and the mouth of the Goddess herself, the conception of the speaker who utters words of a speech or song are prominent. As a result, the meaning of this word is dependent on the context in which it appears (Cunliffe, 1924: 152, 153).

After our philological minutiae, one factor that can help us for figuring out the sense of λόγος is the existence of the μαλακοῖσι. This adjective qualifies λόγος, and as we said before, also appears in *Odyssey* 1.56. It is first used for the things that are subject to touch and means mostly soft things; then it is transformed for other entities too (such as individuals, ways of life, style, music, and reasoning) that literally are not subject to touch. With respect to its subject, it takes appropriate meaning that implies softness and gentleness in favorable or unfavorable and

biased connotations (http://stephanus.tlg.uci.edu/lsj/#context=lsj&eid=109207: 1843). Therefore, when μαλακός qualifies λόγος, it can mean speeches that are not hard and harsh but gentle, soft, and fair. But such a conclusion not sufficient, for according to the place and state of λόγος, there are three other words that add their special flavor and color to it. We begin with the word παρφάμεναι in verse 15. It is noteworthy that μαλακοῖσι together with παραιφάμενος and in relation to the words of speech appear, for example, in Homeric Hymnto Demeter. 336; Hesiod, *Theogony*. 90; and Orpheus, *Argonautica* 1093. We also encounter the second combination with—φημι after the first one, that is, πολύ-φημον in the second line of the first fragment. With regard to our former philological points about this word, here too we are faced with a specific utterance about which we know only the result, and not the content. We know that the utterance of the κοῦραι impresses its hearer and induces her to do a specific action: opening the gates. The combination of παρά- with -φημι in metaphorical sense give to this verb a crucial twist in sincere or insincere (both meanings have evidences in: Pindar, *Nemean* 5.32; *Olympian* 7.66; *Pythian* 9.43: Hesiod, *Theogony*. b90; Homer, *Iliad*. 12.249, and *Odyssey*. 2.189), and, as a result, the whole compound denotes to an utterance that wants to induce an action from a specific hearer by making a change and turning in the mind of his or her hearer—we can consider it is a kind of speech-act (http://stephanus.tlg.uci.edu/lsj/#context=lsj&eid=109207: 1843).

With regard to this conception, when we refer to the verse 15, we can say that κοῦραι by their speaking and through soft and gentle arrangement of their utterances wants to make a change in the mind of Dike in order that she will perform a specific action. And it is natural that this brief persuasion demands that they have rhetorical and deliberative convincing skills that they have and apply them successfully (Mourelatos, 2008: 146, 147).

Thereby, we reach to the warm and friendly reception of the narrator by goddess and her address to him, presented in direct quotation. However, the goddess's speech is not homogenous and as a result before starting her two-level speech, she informs and even warns her listener about the specific quality of her utterances. But before we consider these two specific levels, it would be better to have a general picture of the quality of her speech. When we consider her speech, we are faced with a set of words, such as ἐρέω, μῦθον, φράζω, πολύδηριν ἔλεγχον, ῥηθέντα, πιστὸν λόγον ἠδὲ νόημα, and κόσμον … ἐπέων ἀπατηλὸν. Putting these words together as a cluster shapes an overall image of her account. I want to consider these words and their specific identity in order to reach to their appropriate equivalents and at the same time form an organic image of goddess's speech, for it is exactly here that the necessity of human naming and names and their power and standard of being true and right becomes the concern of this paper.

1. Features of Goddess' Speech

Before beginning our examination of the words mentioned above, it is necessary to say that goddess is speaking to a human being who has specific qualities. This is one of the criteria that she observes in presenting her speech to him. On the one hand, indirectly the narrator introduces himself as a "εἰδότα φῶτα", and on the other hand, the goddess addresses him as a "κοῦρος" and we know there are different translations of and interpretations about this word (for a concise literature review, see Cosgrove, 1974: 81-94). Now with regard to the core of these words and their textures in the proem and the poem as the whole, let us try to find some equivalents. If we take the derivation of the noun κοῦρος from the verb κείρω, we should consider three interconnected features of the verb: There is a supposed specific purpose for an unformed thing with specific qualities that can be transformed or worked upon and; which id brought of its indeterminate state; and becomes ready for its new function and role. In connection with the triad of purpose—potentiality-actuality in the noun κοῦρος, when we read the verses and stand back, we can see that κοῦρος is not a blank slate but has specific actualities which connects him as a human being with the other men; but he is more than common people for he can go beyond them

and become companion/συνήορος of special immortals/κοῦραι (both have close lexical homonymy though different in the essential nature [Fr. 1, 24]). By their guidance, he becomes the only and sole addressee of an unnamed goddess. Then, the goddess forms her direct and unmediated utterances in a form that is suitable for an addressee with specific capabilities, possessions, and purpose and she can guide him in order to develop and reach to his goal. This point demands to see the narrator's understanding of himself besides the conception of goddess. In this relation, we should consider εἰδότα φῶτα [Fr. 1, 3] as the lonely explicit initial self-understanding of the narrator. Then, the issue is exploring the meaningful shared idea between the conception of the narrator of himself as εἰδότα φῶτα and the goddess's appellation of him as κοῦρος. For according to the texture of the proem verses and the word philology, it seems that goddess wants to speak with to a young boy who seems unsatisfied with what has reached and has "passion" to journey the unexplored "paths". At the same time, our narrator conception of himself in the compound epithet of εἰδότα φῶτα is heuristic to get a picture of what he is and what he aspires and expected to acquire through his journey. The singular masculine noun φῶτα, which appears only once in Parmenides' poem, has a great frequency in earlier and contemporaneous ancient Greek writers. For example, if we consider it in comparison with ἀνήρ, this word denotes to a kind of vagueness, so that its suitable English equivalent is "somebody" who is alive. Here in the third verse, due to the gender of the noun-adjective pair, we say that this anybody is a "man" in contrast with any "immortal", "animal", and "woman" (compare with Frere, 2017: 136). But philosophically, such a specification is not enough and we should go further. Interestingly, according to the structure of the sentence, we see that φῶτα participates and is involved in εἰδότα and not only this word plays a crucial role in Parmenides conception of himself; but also points to the necessity of initiating his serious and purposive imaginative journey. Thus, εἰδότα works as a necessary springboard that bring "somebody" out of his in distinction and make him distinctive and concrete by putting him in another stage and grade—journey as a transformative process.

In the related literature, there are many diverse and even opposite understandings of the four appearances of εἰδότα in Parmenides' poem. By considering the other three occurrences of this word, we can reach an understanding of its meaning in relation to φῶτα. Initially, whether we connect it with the knowledge by reflection and understanding (Coxon, 2009: 272), and knowledge derived from observation (Cosgrove, 2011: 31, 32), or knowledge by inspiration, according to the context of proem and common sense, it should be a specific kind of knowledge. The specificity of the knowledge is necessary because if the φῶτα has no knowledge, he will have no interest in and motivation for journey. If, on the other hand, the φῶτα considers himself perfectly wise and knowledgeable he has no need for a journey; and if he speculates on a journey, it will not be serious but something for amusement and play. Therefore, he has some kind of knowledge that is necessary but not sufficient and he need to make a journey to acquire sufficient knowledge. This means that Parmenides as the poet-philosopher knows that he does not know something that he should know. And it is exactly here that our understanding of the goddess' speech plays a vital role for the nature of what he knows and what he does not. The importance of speech will become clear when we consider the nature of the goddess' utterance and her instruction that he should "hear"—this action is emphasized in many places without any mentioning "to see"—and "think" about it. To consider this issue, we should explore the words that goddess uses to describe what she is going to deliver to the young boy.

On the basis of the wording of goddess as it comes through the mouth of the young-boy narrator, we have extracted these basic words describing the nature of goddess' didactic speech and the haves and haves-not of her addressee too: ἐρέω, μῦθον, φράζω, πολύδηριν ἔλεγχον, ῥηθέντα, πιστὸν λόγον ἠδὲ νόημα, and κόσμον … ἐπέων ἀπατηλὸν.

We begin with the word φράζω which is simpler that in comparison with the other words of this group. In the two occurrences in the second fragment (Lines 6 and 8), this word has a simple (not complicated) and concrete (not abstract) meaning of "to show something by finger"

before "to say or declare something" (Mourelatos, 1974: 261). The next simple word, ῥηθέντα (Fr. 7, 5), does not have an established and distinctive meaning according to lexicons. For understanding its meaning, we should consider it under other more customary and usable words, such as λέγω, εἶπον, εἴρω, and the like.

Therefore, we begin with the word ἐρέω (Fr. 2, 1) with which the goddess says she wants to tell a tale. On the basis of Homeric corpus, the "verbal and relatively detailed account about anything" (Cunliffe, 1924: 114) comprises the core of this verb in distinction of the other Greek verbs related to facets of "saying". The same meaning is applicable to Parmenides poem, for we anticipate the goddess telling us a rather detailed verbal account about a specific topic which addressee can hear. Such an account of something cannot be in the form of few words or incomplete sentences, and one who wants to receive such a saying should listen to it, for ἐρέω has relation to ἀκούω/hearing and not ὁράω/seeing.

Therefore, we should expect that goddess tells a detailed tale (Fr. 2, 1). The goddess says that what she wants to present to the young-boy is a μῦθος, which should be told by her and heard by a hearer. With regard to the etymology of μῦθος as a type of speech (Barthes, 1993: 107), this means that she and her addressee are basically within the field of orality. It is natural that she delivers something verbally to an interested and apt hearer, who should listen thoughtfully. Therefore, the core of goddess' μῦθος in Parmenides (although the word is also as problematic in relation to human beings) is the oral deliverance of anything by a speaker that is received by a hearer.

According to this background, after the goddess brings her account under the title of μῦθος, we expect her narration to follows as a specific kind of speech, as it does [in F2, 1; F 8, 1]. In other words, when we take Homer as stating-point, we can say that for understanding μῦθος, it is necessary to have a conception of its very general etymon, and then to bring out its contextual sense with regard to specific context in which it appears. It means that, when we read Homer, μῦθος has specific lexical meaning of saying and speaking, while in different contexts it acquires different colors (Morgan, 2000: 17; Cunliffe, 1924: 274).

But it seems that Parmenides use of μῦθος is different from poet's for here the young-boy listens to the saying of goddess as authoritative μῦθος not as a passive receiver who speculates about the complete identity between what is said and the reality but as a possessor of λόγος who uses it in order to assess the μῦθος of the goddess. Nevertheless, μῦθος has no negative connotation for Aletheia for it is expressed through μῦθος, in other words, it is embedded within it. This issue again emphasizes the orality of the entire poem, which is only written afterwards.

Speaking of μῦθος leads us to consider λόγος. In addition to the previous sweet words of the Kouroi, the goddess also mentions λόγος in her μῦθος. From her position as goddess, she uses λόγος as a common thing between her and the young-boy [F 7, 5] and then connects it with νοεῖν [F 8, 50] which both have a share in the adjective "πιστός", and on the whole, she considers that her tale has this quality of trustworthiness. According to goddess' self-understanding, her oral account or μῦθος is composed of a mixture of λέγειν and νοεῖν and has the quality of being πιστός. Thus, we should consider λέγειν in its connection with νοεῖν (the oral context justifies the priority of the former over the latter) and then consider their common adjective to see what all these as a complexity mean on the level of Aletheia (Fr. 8, 50).

In other words, within the context of orality that poem is performed, μῦθος is a kind of specific "speech" with signification and message that should be delivered by "λόγος" as discourse. We will consider the different manifestations of this discourse in the goddess' account. One manifestation is the integration of λέγειν and νοεῖν with their participation in πίστις. With an emphasis on orality and speaking, it is natural that λόγος have priority, but νοεῖν comes after it as a compound of intuition and reasoning (von Fritz, 1974: 51, 52) in order to give specific color to

λόγος. But there is not complete assurance yet and, as a result, goddess links both of them to πίστις. It means that on the level of Aletheia the goddess's narration, which is a composition of her speaking and thinking (as a relatively appropriate equivalent for νοεῖν), takes its specific identity from the qualification of her saying and thinking as πίστις [Fr. 8, 50].

Here is one of the seven or eight places that we see a derivation of πειθ- in the form of an adjective. With a view to pre-Parmenides background, we can say that πίστις contains six components that interplay with each other and shape an organic whole. In analytical terms, this word is basically performative or perlocutionary (Mourelatos, 2008: 144 n. 27). It means that if we suppose two A and B parties, there is: (1) an initial promise, offer, proposal, or invitation by A to B; (2) B's endorsement or acceptance of that promise; (3) B's counter promise or pledge; (4) the continued maintenance of the relationship to the benefit of B and as the responsibility of A; (5) the continued maintenance of the relationship to the benefit of A and as a responsibility of B; and (6) the continued maintenance of the relationship as the responsibility of, and to the enjoyment of, both parties (Mourelatos, 2008: 139-140, 143). With regard to this account and genealogy of πίστις in the fields of theology and rhetoric, the equivalents of this adjective can be both "persuasive" and "faithful". It means that the goddess, in telling the tale or her oral performing, passes the young-boy through a mixture of religious initiation and reason, and as a result, demands the examination by her direct and unmediated addressee. This creates a mutual responsibility and benefit for both the goddess and young-boy (and the other readers of the poem too). It is a mutual equal movement from persuasion to faith and from faith to persuasion, which occur on the level of Aletheia as we read.

Another related phrase that the goddess uses on the Aletheia level is πολύδηριν ἔλεγχον:

…, κρῖναι δὲ λόγωι πολύδηριν ἔλεγχον (Fr 7. 5)

Here the combination of πολύδηριν and ἔλεγχον is the subject of our discussion. With a view to the thumb-nail historical sketch of the well-known words ἔλεγχος and ἔλέγχω in Homer and Hesiod and especially Pindar and Bacchylides, we can say that the core of this word in pre-philosophical meaning denotes to a kind of test and examination of things or humans in order to bring out their true nature. We examine ἔλεγχος in Parmenides' poem; it means orderly examination and testing of the available ways of thinking or options for enquiry (Lesher, 1984: 9, 16, 17). And with regard to the word πολύ.δηριν, we recognize that such a testing is full of strife and contention. This means not only that ἔλεγχος is not something acceptable, commonsensical, consensual, and for-granted but also that it has many divisions, aspects, and dimensions (*Ibid*.: 29). With such an understanding of the phrase πολύ.δηριν ἔλεγχον, we can say that goddess is using dialectic in its Parmenidean version; as a result, one aspect of his speaking is dialectical. More concretely, I mean that the ways of thinking or options of inquiry and the quality of the fragments before (with the exception of the first fragment) and after (Fr 7. 5) up to the level of Doxa—by using positive and negative and sometimes mixed combinations of them—forms a specific pattern and form that can be called dialectic (Austin, 2007: X, 3, 23).

By considering this quality of goddess expression, we come to another and final quality of her speaking to the young-boy. On the level of Doxa, we find characteristic that it is on the level of "seeming" things. As a result, the knowledge comes from thinking about such things is "uncertain and probable". It is analogous to the level of Alētheia that belongs to Being and certain knowledge and which, as we can noted, roots in πίστις. As a result of this characterization, we will expect the goddess to reflect and manifests the specific ontological/epistemological quality of Doxa level in his speaking and thinking, in parallel with the former sphere Aletheia:

μάνθανε κόσμον ἐμῶν ἐπέων ἀπατηλὸν ἀκούων. (F 8. 53)

Here the goddess explicitly speaks of the quality and arrangement of her performative

poetic speaking/ἔπος on the Doxa level through the adjective ἀπατηλὸν that means deceptive, deceivable, illusionary, and tricky (LSJ 1843, 181). Moreover, the content of the doxai is emphasized too, for here we see an ambiguity and intermingling that cannot permit us to infer absolute bright/positive/true (Alēthēs) or dark/negative/false (pseudēs) images but rather a mixture (Detienne, 1996: 134). The goddess informs her hearers of such a quality in order that they feel it in her narration and be aware of it. In other words, it means that through *apatē* of the goddess, we are witnessing a mysterious transfer of meaning from thought to expression in the play of signification that leads to probable, apparent, and likely speaking in comparing with her certain, genuine, definite speaking, and thinking (F 8.50).

2. Parmenides anonymity and time framework

In reading the poem, we see there is no explicit mentioning to Parmenides; he is voiceless, silent, and does not speak for himself. It seems that being anonymous in name and speaking has some relation with Parmenides' conception of the philosophy manifest in the form of his poem. In other words, for understanding the rationale of his anonymity, it is necessary to make connections between his conception of philosophy and performance of such a conception in the oral and written forms, while remembering the specific and common characteristics of the didactic epic poem, as it is considered by Osborne (1998: 24, 26, 31).

Initially, I think through his elaborate anonymity (I have taken the idea from West, 2000: 99), Parmenides wants to introduce "knowledge" as a kind of "listening" to oral presentation (in comparison with "speaking"), in which the listener reflects on what hears by his or her own thoughts and then send it to memory. As a result, it is necessary that Parmenides shows and actualizes his idea about knowledge as listening. We can see that he does it through creating a friendly and personal relation between the goddess and any hearer like himself. It means that as a didactic performance, Parmenides himself experienced it in the past, or experiences it at any time and that the performance will be repeated by any reader of his poem in the future. In other words, in the mutual correlation of listening and anonymity, what Parmenides says and replies is not important. Instead, it is crucial to provide and facilitate such a cordial individual connection for any addressee, so that each individual undergoes alive, internal, practical, and personal journey. The experience is perceived as "oral", because during her speech the goddess speaks repeatedly and exclusively of an alive "hearing" in relation to her "voice", because "knowledge" resides in "listening" and not "seeing". We may understand this in relation with Parmenides poetical writing in space, because it is transmitted and narrated by the other intellectual authorities not himself and should be read aloud in order to be heard (West, 1995: 47- 49).

We can say that Parmenides inheritance of oral performance from Homer enhances this issue and negates any distance and gap between what the goddess says/does and what we try to think/say/act because she is speaking directly to her audience without any mediation by Parmenides; in such a context, the important issue is presenting and communicating the truth about the intended subject-matter. And it is exactly the purpose of Parmenides that provide a favorable and suitable context so that truth easily transported to the interested individual in the future rather than to account for his own idiosyncratic ideas, reactions, questions, and answers—although I do not negate this fact that goddess speaking is double (Tarrant, 2000: 79-80 – though this is said in relation to ancient conceptions of mouthpieces in Plato's dialogues).

Although, we and Parmenides are equally the target group of the "goddess" speaking, here in this paper, we are searching for Parmenides' reflections. As a result, we should look for Parmenides' own hints that can be explored and thought about. It seems that the places in which we see two explicit, distinctive, and discontinuous interventions (in fragment 8: 39, 51) of "human" ideas into the goddess' speech and performance are exactly those places that we should seriously attempt to extract Parmenides' thought. From grammatical point of view, the qualities of these

interventions are very complicated, for both of them are presented in the simple past tense.

The Aletheia level denotes to a truth that should be a norm, and as long as other people do not hear it, they cannot shape their true ideas and decisions. Thus, after the communication such an idea to the other people by Parmenides, the use of future tense is more acceptable. But how using simple past tense can be justified because it means that they have heard it in the past and goddess is accounting a passed issue.

In comparison with Aletheia, Doxa level denotes to the common ideas of the people either before or after revelation of goddess, so using past tense is justifiable. But in both cases, people are reacting to the thought of Parmenides after he has communicated the idea. That is, unless we think that the time frame is not pertinent to the discourse of the goddess, what she says to Parmenides individually is revealed for the other people too. In other words, if this journey is something personal, how are the other people simultaneously informed of its content and reacting in the form of naming? Unless we say that the past and future time frames are intermixed or unrelated in the goddess speech or, that she mentions the future because her path has not been communicated to the other human yet, we cannot speak of their responses and reactions unless we delete time and conclude that all things are present for the goddess.

3. Who speaks for Parmenides?

Although such a question is normally considered in relation with Plato's dialogues but we can trace Plato imitation back to Parmenides poem (Miller, 1999: 259-264). In the case of Plato, both the internal differences between what Plato has Socrates say to different interlocutors and the differences between Socrates's comportment and the comportments of other protagonists (Parmenides, the Eleatic Visitor, Timaeus, Critias, and the Athenian Stranger) make evident that we cannot assume that any one of these protagonists, Socrates included, may be identified with Plato; this is of course reinforced by the fact that at least twice he has his interlocutors mention "Plato"; once explaining why he is absent from the group (*Phaedo*) and once referring to him as present and ready to pay a fine in Socrates's behalf (*Apology*). What is more, within single dialogues, Plato has Socrates speak differently in different parts of the same dialogue, that is, in different phases of his educational encounter with his interlocutor. All of this means that as readers interpreting the dialogues, we are faced with the task of reading between the lines, that is, distinguishing the surface or explicit meaning of the protagonist's words, recognizing the dramatic context to which his speech belongs and understanding the way it is attuned to that context, and identifying the inexplicit commitments and insights that guide Plato in designing both this context and the protagonist's speech.

I think that the case of the poem of Parmenides is both the same in some ways and different in others. The narrator is, I take it, the kouros whom the goddess addresses near the end of Fragment 1. But he puts the goddess's speech to him in direct discourse, and this seems designed to give us the strong impression that we hear her words directly, with no framing or distortion by the kouros, from the end of the first fragment through the rest of the poem. Nothing I can find in the text suggests that the kouros alters her words either intentionally or unintentionally in his report of them. This means that we need not read between the lines of her speech in order to try to identify a meaning deeper than what the kouros reports that she says to him—with one important exception. When at the end of the eighth fragment, she declares that she will "end her trustworthy speech and thought concerning truth" and teach the kouros "the opinions of mortals", she warns the kouros that, since from "now on" she will be presenting not the truth but only the best of what we mortals think (why the best? because to learn it will prevent him from being "outstripped" by any other "thought of mortals" [8.60] —so this is as close to the goddess's standpoint as mortals can come without her intervention), he must "pay heed to the deceptive order of [her] words" (8.50-52); accordingly, from 8.50 on, hence in all of the fragments from nine

to nineteen, we do have the task of distinguishing what the goddess explicitly says and the truth that she knows but withholds.

If these thoughts are correct, then there is nothing in the text of the poem that suggests that we should distinguish what the goddess is reported as saying in the so-called "truth" section of the poem (fragment 1.24 through 8.49) from what Parmenides regards as the truth. In this sense, it is safe to say that, "the goddess speaks for Parmenides" in B1.24-8.49. In reading fragments 8.52-19, however, we should qualify this. Here, though the goddess still speaks for Parmenides, she—and he—speak not what they regard as the ultimate truth but only the best of mortals' opinions (personal correspondence with Professor Mitchell Miller. See also Cherubin, 2001: 279 n. 5).

4. Human naming

During her speech, goddess pauses in two places in order to mention to the approach of the distinctive group of fallible-in-thought mortals/βροτός (Frere, 2017: 137, in distinction of two other family words φώς and ἄνθρωπος) to naming on the both levels of Aletheia and Doxa. Therefore, response of the intellectually fallible mortals to the subject-matter of being on the levels of necessity and contingency is narrated by the action of naming and its result, names. The presence of being and its properties prompts naming on the side of those groups of human beings who are neither wise men/φώς nor mortal living beings/ἄνθρωπος but some intellectually fallible mortals/βροτός. According to this classification, naming is not a shared concern of all men but a section of human beings who think in a specific way/βροτός. If, in this vein, we take Parmenides as the reference of the phrase "εἰδότα φῶτα" at the third line of the first fragment, it means that naming is not his concern too!

For considering naming by the intellectually fallible mortals/βροτός, we will consider the narration of goddess about a pre-language substantive subject on the one hand, and then the lingual reaction of the aforementioned mortals when they are on the way of Aletheia and Doxa on the other hand. As it is, goddess' speech and human receptions denotes the existence of a pre-linguistic Ursprung, which functions as a foundation for any thinking; speaking and naming that comes after and over it. Interestingly, such a conception of being leads and calls on *physis*. Up to this section of our paper, *physis* has not been mentioned, but here is the exact place that it should be come on the scene: being that is the end result of its becoming. In this vein, while the root of the word denotes to grow the word as a whole denotes what is. Because on the one hand and at the core, goddess and Parmenides are speaking of being as an immaterial that emerges of itself and has abiding sway. On the other hand, if we take *physis* in its broad initial immaterial meaning of what comes-out-in-itself from-itself (Heidegger, 2000: xiii, 15,16, 64) and thereby all other beings come into being after it, then the emergence of all other things is dependent on this unique-conclusive *physis*. Thus, we see that there is an analogy between being and physis (that is not concealed in Heidegger, see Vick, 1971: 145, 146) and it is according to such a conception that we consider Parmenides as the first poet-philosopher of *physis/physiologos* who connected a metaphysics with an epistemology.

When particular human beings hear or read about to be that takes multiple phonetical appearances and linguistic modalities, such as πλήθω, τελέθω, and the like through the mouth of goddess, we expect that they say something to themselves or others as their receptions and conceptions of these different forms. Although silence has the virtue of making the continuation of the goddess narration possible, this is not the norm. Thereby, some thoughtful mortals break their silence by saying something after learning of a being that comes into being and is revealed through speaking as a specific being. Therefore, it is through true speaking (as a being) that thinking about being becomes manifest. Being then in turn becomes the subject of true speaking and thinking. But it is like our usual way of speaking and thinking and it is not limited to the

goddess and Parmenides.

At the same time, in reading the poem, we see that within Aletheia level in Fr. 8. Line 17 for the first time in the whole of poem, goddess, in a specific road of inquiry and not generally and unconditionally (Cherubin, 2001: 294) speaks of being unthought/ἀνόητον: being unnamed/ἀνώνυμον. In the initial phase of introducing such an order between thinking and naming (in their positive forms), any alternative is possible, and it would be better to consider them in paratactic form (for this as a form of composition in the whole of the poem, see Mourelatos, 2008: 3-4). The relation between two words is very important for our paper; it is also an enigma that should be worked on in its own terms in human beings and Parmenides. In the goddess' first mention of naming, she brings it both in a paratactic relation with thinking in a negative form. Accordingly, she has in her mind a specific relation between νοεῖν : νεμεῖν that makes them distinct of the other pairs and then in affirmative terms we can say, if thinking/conceiving/knowing: naming.

Thereby we should consider the paratactic form of thinking: naming" in order to figure out perception of goddess and specific groups of intellectually fallible mortals who make names in the both spheres of Aletheia and Doxa. From our perspective, different modalities of "to be" in the Greek syntax can be the beginning block for anyone who wants to speaks of them. In hearing and reading them, the listeners and readers face problems they have never confronted, as a result, it is a new experience for them (otherwise there is no valuable novelty). It means that the speech of the goddess/Parmenides about the modalities of "to be" leads its listeners to think and then have conceptions about them. We, in turn, read and see both their thinking and speaking in the form of written words in a specific language. Thus, where there is nothing or when nothing is said by the goddess/Parmenides about modalities of "to be", it is unthought and unnamed. But when it is said in order to show conceptions of these linguistic forms, thoughtful though fallible mortals are mainly divided into two specific groups, although both of them recourse to *onoma* as a general word, far away from Plato and Aristotle conceptions, for giving phonetic manifestation (Heidegger, 2000: 61) to what is in their thoughts.

In addition, speaking of two levels necessitates choosing an appropriate method. As a result, we use the two-level model as it is introduced and used initially by Holger Thesleff in 1999 for Plato dialogues. This ontological view, which functions as a thought-experiment, is not pointedly dualistic and includes pairs of asymmetric hierarchical contrasts which are internally complementary and mutually associative. Neither level exists in isolation from the other: There are not two separate worlds, conflicting dynamic centers, or cosmic opposites. One level is good and leading and the other is less good and oriented to the former (Thesleff, 2000: 59, 60; Thesleff, 2002: 1). Therefore, modalities that are spoken by goddess work as the cause and lead some thoughtful human beings towards name-making as a revelation by means of sound (phone) in relation to and about being on the two levels of Aletheia and Doxa.

This interpretation is justifiable when we are working in the framework of an organic, ordered, sequential hypotaxis but in "thinking: naming", this is not the case. In this specific and crucial spot of the poem, we observe two parallel words that are juxtaposed with each other without any punctuation marks to show their relation. Accordingly, they should be translated and interpreted paratactically. This means that the syntactic and logical relations of these two words are open and cannot be put in a tight closed box. As a result, we can say that of "the two or more things (or ideas) that might be logically or otherwise connected with each other are each viewed separately, and the beholder or narrator is aware of only one at a time—parataxis in various forms" (Perry, 2016: 493; and Notopoulos, 1949: 10).

Before speculating about thinking in the oral performance context of the poem, we expect that specific types of saying be considered and emphasized as starting blocks before we reach thinking. For example, on the first line of the sixth fragment, we face with the word "saying"

in the form of λέγειν. This opens the subject of goddess speech in relation to thinking. Besides, goddess articulates her different modalities/names of being. This signifies that she wants to articulate into names what he perceives as the *physis* of "to be". It also suggests that name and naming is not restricted only to human field (about modalities as names, see Goff, 1972: 77). In this regard, if we limit ourselves to the same sixth fragment, then by names of being, I mean ἐὸν [Participle]; ἔμμεναι [Epic Infinitive]; εἶναι [Infinitive]; and ἔστιν [Verb present indicative active 3rd singular]. Each one has its own specific syntactic/philosophical implication for what goddess perceives and thinks of the being *physis*. Therefore, in the context of orality, λέγειν lays out being open and in other words state it and, as a result, it has a relatively defined relation with perceiving/thinking but the relation of thinking with naming, on the other hand, is narrated in paratactic order.

Apart from λέγειν, another word for saying that is used by goddess in relation to νοεῖν is φημί (F. 8 Line 8). The verb φημί alone covers 39 pages of the first part in Fournier (1946) in distinction of the other Greek words for saying. On the basis of exploring its different uses and forms, its core denotes not to any kind of saying but a kind of saying that comes from a definite idea or belief. Its speaker wants to declare and disclose something important and determinate (Buck, 1915: 126, 127; http://stephanus.tlg.uci.edu/lsj/#context=lsj&eid=113269: 1843). Therefore, φημί is basically a statement and report in the form of saying, rooted in and analogous to the opinion of a speaker. As such, it stimulates thinking in its hearers and readers and so cannot be a trivial, unimportant, unthought, and usual saying.

Now, with regard to our clue in the 70th verse of the eighth fragment, it is appropriate to consider the meaning of "νοεῖν" more deeply and then turn to its paratactic and parechesis relation with "νεμεῖν" that is the concern of both divine and thoughtful human mortals.

It is granted that when goddess says (equivalent for both λέγειν/φημί) different modalities of being, the mind of the young boy or any other thoughtful mortal becomes stimulated and blooms. It means that in the context of orality, thinking/conceiving/knowing does not have an independent and autonomous position, but derives from something external, that is, the speech of goddess about being and its modalities. Therefore, the initial feature of νόησις as verbal noun is dependent on receiving and internalizing the modalities of "to be" that are spoken/said by goddess.

The modalities of being which the goddess reveals for the first time are intuitive, ambiguous, and unclear for human beings. They should thus be reasoned and explained in order to become clear, distinct, reasonable, and understandable (von Fritz, 1974: 52). Interestingly, he narrates the intermixture of these two elements in νοεῖν with the dominance of reasoning. In the initial lines of the eighth fragment, which points to the rationale and standards of human naming, we see that on the favorable and recommended route of goddess describes thinking on the divine level together with its requirements δίκη, μοῖρα, θέμις, and ἀνάγκη. These functions as the framework of thought and naming (f.8: 13-15; 29-32; 36-38). In other words, it seems that she wants to make connection between thought with signs. The qualities of these signs (according to Nagy, 1983: 36-44 include: plurality, diversity, the ability to be decoded, recognizable, noticeable, non-forgettable, and interpretable). These qualities make them apt for the formation of thinking. As a result, the qualities work as "route signs" of Aletheia so that thinking reaches its object, being. Thinking is therefore both passive and active. It is passive when it receives the right signs, and it is active when it is more cognitive and works on signs. Moreover, without any exception, goddess and humans need "route signs" in order to continue their walk toward being. We should note, however, that all these distinctive signs are not suspended in the air but placed within a specific frame with four specific divine elements. And it is ideal that they have meaningful and organic relations with the route signs (Cherubin, 2001: 297, 298 n. 24). But it is not always so. According to the goddess, there can be unwelcoming relations among attributes/predications (Santoro, 2011:

247, 248) and between the rout signs and the elements that according to her give an elenchic quality to her speaking within Aletheia πολύδηριν ἔλεγχον ἐξ ἐμέθεν ῥηθέντα (F 7.5). The young boy and any listener or reader should be aware of these relationships.

According to the core (Fr. 8) of the Aletheia level, the thoughtful mortal walkers should internalize the signs of being which are given on the way and spoken out through the catalogic/categorical speech of the goddess when she informs receivers of the attributes and predicates of all-inconclusive being: That is both the beginning/subject and ending/object of speaking-thinking-speaking.

Now with reference to the format "thinking: Naming" in their positive terms (Fr. 8, 17), it seems natural that when the receivers of being want to communicate their conception of being to themselves or others, it is necessary to speak and use language give phonetic/verbal clothing to their mind's conception of being (there is a similarity with Gorgias original conception). Here the main issue is solely the will of human beings to give phonetic materialization to the content of their mind (correct or wrong). Therefore, the usual antitheses that can come to our mind, such as onoma-ousia, onoma-ergon, onoma-rhema, and the like are irrelevant (Woodbury, 1958: 145; compare with Nussbaum, 1979; and Traglia, 1955). Before this materialization, all-inconclusive being with its specific elements (Fr. 8, 3-38: unborn, impressible, indivisible, cohesive, immobile, unchanging, not incomplete) has only cognitive existence in mortal fallible minds. It will, however, take another kind of existence, realized by its phonetic formation from mortals' mouths (See the later reflection of this notion in: Plato, *Sophist* 261e). Such aphonetic realization has a broad sense and cannot be restricted to phonology and the subsequent developments and restrictions of this word. What the goddess says in elenchic format about being and its different modalities, mortals receive, consider, and then put in phonetic clothing. We should know that the goddess' elenchic way of speaking makes name-making a very difficult and complex venture. It means that thoughtful mortal beings try to present such phonetic manifestation through making-names. We use "name" here both as a comprehensive general word (Vlastos, 2008: 373, 374) and in its generic sense as signifying and naming something/the named (Ademollo, 2015: 34) before its differentiation and distinction of the other related words, which happens on two levels.

It should be noted that the recourse of human being to name can be considered a basic phase in the development of the Greek thought (Jaynes, 2000: 135). Besides, against the initial and older meaning of name and naming, in Parmenides, we see the transition of name as *nomen proprium* (proper name) to name as *nomen appellativum* (word); and as a result, we have the reflection of this status in the denominative verb ὀνομάζειν too. Interestingly, such a happening denotes to the conception of Parmenides of sentence as a compound and not monolithic whole consisting of some specific elements, one of which is name with a specific identity (Gianvittorio, 2013: 14, 26). This identity is now a new factor in understanding human conception of being that will be discussed in what follows. For Parmenides, name has extension and application that is embedded and presupposed in all of the four pertinent fragments (Fr. 8, 38; Fr. 8, 53, Fr. 9, 1; Fr. 19, 3). In addition, when we become more specific about naming, we find that Parmenides mentions and considers another element that clarifies his conception of naming (this issue is on the second level, Doxa): the δυνάμεις: καὶ τὰ κατὰ σφετέρας δυνάμεις ἐπὶ τοῖσί τε καὶ τοῖς, of any name (Fr. 9, 5) το ἐπίσημον: τοῖς δ' ὄνομ' ἄνθρωποι κατέθεντ' ἐπίσημον ἑκάστωι (Fr.19, 5). Accordingly, when we put these observations together, we can say that for Parmenides, a name is a phonetic/verbal construct with a specific δύναμις in relation to different named things. In light of this definition, we will now consider this specific element of name.

With regard to the use of the term "*dynamis* of names" (whether in the same form or by implication and indirectly with different meanings in ancient Greek thoughts on language (in Lysias; Herodotus; Plato and Aristotle, see Ademollo, 2011: 176-177), what can be Parmenides particular conception of *dynamis* in relation to name? An initial hypothesis might connect the

dynamis of names with Parmenides' conception of being (Owens, 1975: 22; Woodbury, 1958: 154). Therefore, by onoma in its translation as "name" and not "noun" or "word", we want to say that name has the capacity to take being as its referent that has also a dynamic meaning (Woodbury 1958: 149, 151). This is a property unique to names and is absent in the comparable words with name.

Therefore, any name has a distinctive capacity/value that makes it name. In the context of classical thoughts, this means that a name conveys particular information about its pertinent referent. Parmenides wants to clarify the mentioned idea by the word ἐπί.σημον. This word generally refers to the specific signs and marks that come upon or after a particular object and give to it authority, formality, credit and value, otherwise they give opposite qualities. Grammatically, ἐπίσημον is an adjective here, in predicative position relative to ὄνομα, and means "as a sign", "as a mark". The preposition epi-presumably points to the relation to the object: "as a sign"/mark for (Epi + dative is used in this way with such verbs as onomazein or kalein). Therefore:

τοῖς δ' ὄνομ' ἄνθρωποι κατέθεντ' ἐπίσημον ἑκάστωι. (Fr. 19. 5)

And on them men laid down a distinguishing name for each.

We should consider this image of name and naming within the two level-model of Thesleff (1999) as a heuristic guide, in distinction to a sharply dualistic model. There we are faced with the asymmetric contrast of Aletheia / Doxain a hierarchical order in which one is primary in all senses, but the latter is also necessary and prerequisite for the world as we have it. If the upper primary level is true and good, the lower secondary level is not necessarily bad or failed, but rather less good and oriented to the former.

Now we will consider naming and names on the first level/road that is the route of all-inclusive or necessity being:

… τῶι πάντ' ὀνόμασται,

ὅσσα βροτοὶ κατέθεντο πεποιθότες εἶναι ἀληθῆ, (Fr. 8, 38, 39)

… Of this [being] all those [names] have been named,

As the mortals laid down, trusting them to be true: (Fr. 8, 38-41—Considering the Greek verb onomastai as a double nominative: Burnyeat, 1982: 19 n. 22)

According to these lines, after the revelatory and elenchic narration of goddess about being through its different modalities in the divine context, some thoughtful mortals hear such an account about being and attempt the difficult task of making names for this whole, which contains specific elements (compare: Diels, 1910: 7) and functions as the foundation or substance for any other being in the world. More concretely, they attempt this by making different names (Owens, 1975: 22, 23; Vlastos, 2008: 367 as the title of his paper denotes) in the form of four emphasized connected infinitives (by τε καὶ), such as γίγνεσθαί τε καὶ ὄλλυσθαι, εἶναί τε καὶ οὐχί,καὶ τόπον ἀλλάσσειν διά τε χρόα φανὸν ἀμείβειν (Fr. 8, 40-41). In their initial phonetic encounter, human beings want to "refer" to and give some information about one all-inclusive unit that is "already" there (ὑπάρχειν). By moving on the road of Aletheia, that is embedded in elenchic speech they designate it. More importantly, the vocables that human lays down in the form of names should have the power to distinguish the relevant specific "given" unit (ὑπάρχειν) from other comparable similar or opposite entities, otherwise they have not fulfilled their function and value as names. In this case, they would not be suitable names at all, since a name should name something—in Greek, "name" as a noun and "to name" as transitive verb has close etymological relation with each other. This means that thoughtful mortals are "on" the proper road of Aletheia, even though it is possible to make mistakes (fallibility) when devising different names to express their understandings of goddess' account. They may make wrong though meaningful names (Vlastos, 2008: 372) with all-

inclusive being as referent. In other words, it seems that the names that are made by some thoughtful fallible mortals cannot mark off all-inclusive being as is narrated by the goddess. She speaks of a whole with specific constituents or signs and the names only refer to a whole.

According to this interpretation, through the account of goddess/Parmenides, we are informed of the efforts of thoughtful though fallible mortals who are on the route of Aletheia. In order to signify the Ursache that goddess introduces, a group of thoughtful mortals laid done/κατέθεντο different meaningful names. They consider them trustable and dependable true names for distinguish this principal referent from all other referents.

Some points need mentioning. With regard to this early introduction of the verb κατέθεντο before shaping of the afterwards antitheses, it would be better to translate this verb "to lay down" in order to avoid misunderstanding and also to convey its compound form in Greek (Diels, 1910: 8). With regard to the revelation of the being from the goddess and the presence of thoughtful mortals on the true route, without reducing true to orthotēs / right (Heidegger, 1993: 447), they venture to make human names. Therefore, they are not on the wrong way and making wrong name, otherwise they were completely out of route. More precisely, when we consider the human made names, it becomes clear that the power of name has not succeeded in distinguishing το ἐὸν from its other referent rivals since these nominees do not contain the specific elements of their principal referent. Thereby we say that although the names of mortals on the true way of necessity signify a whole as referent, the components or *Merkmalsmatrix* (Kraus, 1987: 90) of these names has no similarity with the signs of the goddess' referent. If this is the case, we can make a distinction between *Bedeutung*/reference and *Sinn*/sense and say that the four mortal-made names are true in their referent but not in the components that make its meaning (Frege, 1997: 152, 181-193).

According to our selected model, we consider the second level/route as doxa/appearance that is oriented to the primary path and includes different multiple conflictual possibilities/dia.kosmon eoikota (Fr. 8, 60. in Mourelatos, 1974: 318). And among these para.doxai, we are informed of one outstanding example of a dualism (Vlastos, 2008: 375) in relation to name-making. In other words, mortals on the Aletheia route ventured to make four names in order to signify their principal referent and give some information about it. But Aletheia is not the only route, for according to the Parmenides' poem, there is also the route of contingency. On this road too mortals make names:

> μορφὰς γὰρ κατέθεντο δύο γνώμας ὀνομάζειν· (Fr. 8, 53)
>
> For they made up their minds to name two forms,

The sense of the verse is awkward and enigmatic, but ultimately it shows how thinking happens as a human action and how any thinker should manipulate names in order to set down a thought—Gorgias treatise is the best example of this idea (Mourelatos, 1974: 228; Woodbury, 1986: 2-4). In comparison with the Aletheia route, it might mean that human mind/gnomon governs and gains a basic secular role and function in relation to name-making (*contra* Woodbury, 1986: 3) without the overall divine elements and framework that functions on the first divine route. But a goddess who belongs to the level of necessity wants to reveal and speak of the different possibilities in the forms of *doxai* that can exist on the human level of contingency (Cherubin, 2005: 11). Because of this differentiation, the goddess informs that her speech is deceptive/ἀπατηλὸν (Fr. 8, 52) and critical/-ἐν ᾧι πεπλανημένοι εἰσίν- (Fr. 8, 53) either from herself or Aletheia-oriented human beings. These qualities are in connection with the human naming and, as a result, we should consider human naming on the level of doxa that is narrated by goddess within it. In comparison with the previous reference of the goddess to the quality of her speech on the divine necessity level (7.5), on the human level of contingency she mentions to the nature of human opinions and one of the prominent ones which she critically informs us of the quality of human opinions that is reflected in her narration. Thus, on the human level of

contingency, she resorts to one of the famous doxai/appearances of fallible mortals (Fr. 8, 51). As a result, the goddess as a divine being wants to re-narrate a specific human endoxa that like any other endoxa is on the border between right and wrong and has the capacity of deceiving—although this does not mean that it is completely false (Cherubin, 2005: 13 n. 27), as immediately she mentions. Thus:

> κόσμον ἐμῶν ἐπέων ἀπατηλὸν ἀκούων. (Fr. 8, 52)
>
> hearing the deceitful order of my speaking.

The goddess says that on the second route or level, we should expect to hear human endoxa from her mouth. The evaluative aspect of the goddess narration is revealed in the negative form of the word χρεών (which in its positive meaning denotes a necessity that comes from within and which can be the result of interests, inclinations, ideas, and appropriations) in distinction of δεῖ (which comes mostly of the external environmental and situational constraints that are outside of being) (*pace* Benardete, 1965: 285, 288). In other words, doxa or endoxa exists in an interworld. As a result, it is not completely right or wrong and should be examined so that these two aspects may be distinguished and differentiated.

On the level of doxa/appearance, thoughtful mortals proceed in their minds to name two forms/μορφὰς that then becomes clear that they want to name two nominees/δέμας (Fr. 8, 55; 59) that each one is composed of specific signs/σήματ (Fr. 8, 55), although from the perspective of goddess and Aletheia route they are one, that is: light. Thus, on the doxa route, it is possible that human beings put their mind together and make two distinctive names as external forms in order to signify their two distinctive internal referents/constructions (like the relation of façade with a building). According to this order we read:

> τἀντία δ' ἐκρίναντο δέμας καὶ σήματ' ἔθεντο (Fr. 8, 55)
>
> χωρὶς ἀπ' ἀλλήλων, ..., (Fr. 8, 56)
>
> they distinguished contraries <u>in body and set signs</u>
>
> apart from each other, ...
>
> μορφὰς γὰρ <u>κατέθεντο δύο γνώμας</u> ὀνομάζειν (Fr. 8, 53)
>
> For they <u>made up their minds to name two forms</u>,

In comparison with the first divine Aletheia level, on the second human Doxa level, we are informed of two sets of which are "made" by thoughtful mortals. These forms are not given by the goddess bur are human made. Each one is imputed with specific distinctive signs, so mortals want to signify them through making two distinctive names. It seems that human beings have found something in names that can be applied to distinctive things and objects, such as night and light with the expectation that these can signify one referent from its opposite. But from the perspective of goddess and humans who are Aletheia-oriented, there is no successful differentiation on doxa level between being/light and non-being/night. But mortals think that they have succeeded in making a distinction between two referents and consequently, in making a unique name for each of them. As we mentioned before, it is exactly on this level that we are informed of the power and value of any name for the first time (Fr. 9, 4-5), that a name makes its referent distinct by designating unique signs for it.

But there is a problem on the doxa or contingency route that affects mortals name-making. The goddess has a specific kind of discourse that is different from mortals' doxa. However, she tries not mention to her own true ideas or mention to them as thin as possible (Fr. 8, 54). Thus, she wants to re-introduce and re-represent mortals endoxa on a level that is, in comparison to the first road of necessity, the route of contingency. According to her narration, one of these mortal contingencies is the contrasting forms of light and night. According to goddess perspective, if we

consider light as a reflection of being and night as a reflection of non-being the first one is thinkable and right name (meaning of χρεών in the context of language) but the second one is unthinkable and wrong name. From the goddess' view, thoughtful mortals have gone astray by making two names, instead of one. Therefore, the thoughtful mortals' name for light (not night) as the secondary referent on the second contingency route that reflects the being as the primary referent on the necessity route is a right (not true) name.

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Education and Resentment

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Abstract

That the world is awash with resentment poses a genuine question for educators. Here, we will suggest that resentment can be better harnessed for good if we stop focusing on people and tribes and, instead, focus on systems: those invisible norms that often produce locked-in structures of social interaction. A "systems lens" is vast, so fixes will have to be an iterative process of reflection, and revision toward a more just system. Nonetheless, resentment toward the status quo may be an important element in keeping that otherwise tedious process going, with the caveat that resentment is only productive when it is combined with reason, and that, therefore, educators, rather than privileging *participant reactive attitudes*, ought, instead, to promote *participant reactive reasoning*, as the latter can be a genuine force for both personal and interpersonal growth, while the former might very well do the reverse.

Keywords: resentment in the classroom, tribalism, shaming, systemic lens, participant reactive attitudes, participant reactive reasoning.

"True compassion is more than flinging a coin to a beggar; it comes to see that an edifice which produces beggars needs restructuring."[1]

Martin Luther King

[1] https://www.reddit.com/r/quotes/comments/16ynd4/true_compassion_is_more_than_flinging_a_coin_to_a/
From his 1967 book *Beyond Vietnam*.

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- Dealing with resentment in education.
- Shaming is counterproductive.
- Resenting the system instead of people and tribes.
- Participant reactive reasoning instead of participant reactive attitudes.

1. Introduction

In his now famous paper *Freedom and Resentment* (2005), Peter Strawson makes the case that we "mark" the freedom of others by evaluatively-tinged "participant reactive attitudes," such as resentment (p. 8). Strawson contrasts participant reactive attitudes with what he refers to as an "objective attitude" (p. 8). According to Strawson, "to adopt the objective attitude to another human being is to see him, perhaps, as an object of social policy; as a subject for what, in a wide range of sense, might be called treatment; as something (. . .) to be managed or handled or cured or trained" (p. 9).

Though Strawson's goal was to show that the human commitment to participant reactive attitudes rendered a belief in pan-determinism virtually impossible, for many, the ultimate value of Strawson's argument was its implicit endorsement of an attitude that, heretofore, many considered negative, i.e., resentment. Since it signals that the resenter views the resented as free, surely, resentment is a good thing.

But is it?

Certainly, the world is awash with resentment: women against men; non-whites against whites; indigenous people against colonizers; LGBTQ folks against cisgender, straight folks; the poor against the rich; the young against the old; the Catholics against the Protestants; the Muslims against Jews; the Shia against the Sunni; the Tutsis against the Hutus—the list goes on.

So, if one is alive, one cannot help but bump up against resentment. For educators, this poses a genuine question. How should educators handle resentment? Should they ignore the elephant in the room? Should they put a halo around resentment as the right and proper attitude to adopt if one feels victimized? Should they view resentment as an impediment to personal flourishing and as such attempt to deconstruct it?

These are the questions that will be tackled here. We will begin by a brief overview of the natural roots of tribalism and the inevitable inter-tribal attitudes of resentment that it fosters. On the assumption that the human species would be better off without the negative impact of tribalism (e.g., war, oppression, etc.), we will then briefly analyze the degree to which shaming the "winner" might or might not move us toward the goal of pan-human peace.

We will then suggest that resentment can be better harnessed for good if we stop focusing on people and tribes and, instead, focus our energy on systems, i.e., those invisible assumptions, rules, and norms that often produce locked-in structures of social interaction. We will argue that a 'systems lens' is inevitably vast and that, therefore, we need to get comfortable with the fact that fixes for that system must be an iterative process of reflection, and revision toward an ever more just system, with amelioration of the worst-off being a priority (Rawls, 1972), but that, nonetheless, resentment toward the status quo may be an important element in keeping that otherwise tedious process going. Finally, we will argue that it is only in combination with reason that resentment has the freedom-producing qualities that Strawson suggests, and that, therefore, educators, rather than cushioning or privileging *participant reactive attitudes*, ought, instead, to promote *participant reactive reasoning*, as the latter can be a genuine force for both personal and interpersonal growth, while the former might very well do the reverse.

2. Tribalism, though natural, is problematic

All homo sapiens are born with the proclivity to divide those they meet into "us" and "them," a fact supported by a vast amount of evidence in Joshua Greene's book *Moral Tribes: Emotion, Reason, and the Gap Between Us and Them* (2014). Greene argues that this finding should not be surprising, as tribalism affords humans a giant evolutionary advantage. Since evolution is inherently competitive, being able to see *some* others as members of my tribe, opens up the possibility of *within-group cooperation* in an effort to *outcompete* members of other tribes. In other words, biologically speaking "humans were designed for cooperation, *but only with some people*. Our moral brains evolved for cooperation *within groups*" (p. 23). Cooperation evolved, in other words, not because it is "nice," but because it confers individuals a survival advantage. "And thus, insofar as morality is a biological adaptation, it evolved not only as a device for putting Us ahead of Me, but as a device for putting Us ahead of Them" (p. 24).[2]

Despite its biological basis, however, Greene recognizes that tribalism in our overcrowded world is threatening the overall welfare of the human species; as Greene writes, "Today, our most formidable enemy is ourselves" (p. 348). Greene thus argues that, in order to combat this natural tendency to see those of other tribes as enemies, we must seriously engage in the sort of "slow thinking," suggested by Daniel Kahneman (2011), in order to move beyond our natural intuitive tendencies to divide one another into groups. We must think instead in terms of a "metamorality" that recognizes that we humans (if not all living things on planet earth) are on the same team (Greene, 2014: 345). His hope is that we create a global tribe—not to gain advantage—but simply because it is good (p. 353). Or, one might add, thinking of all of humans as being the same team is necessary for our combined welfare.

David Brooks, in his book *The Second Mountain: The Quest for a Moral Life* (2019) also makes the plea that we ought to dampen down our tendency to cluster into tribes. Thus, he argues that "Tribalists seek out easy categories in which some people are good and others are bad. They seek out certainty to conquer their feelings of unbearable doubt" (p. 35). And he goes on to point out that tribal ties are not the same as the bonds of community. "Community is connection based on mutual affection. Tribalism. . . is connection based on mutual hatred. Community is based on common humanity; tribalism on a common foe." Brooks describes tribalism as "a community for lonely narcissists" and that, these days, partisanship for many people is not about which political party has better policies, but picking sides between "the saved and the damned" (p. 35).

3. But intertribal resentment seems justified

Our tendency to identity as a member of a group and attempt to outcompete other groups prime us to be *resentful* of groups that threaten, or outcompete our own group, whether those groups are historical or presently active. As such, any person advocating for pan-human cooperation and/or connection needs to first recognize and figure out how to deal with the emotional warfare that arises as the inevitable result of the present or past inequity that exists between various groups.

Resentment has been a focus of many philosophers. Strawson, as mentioned earlier (2005) argued that as humans, we cannot help but display "participant reactive attitudes," such

[2] Henri Tajfel (1982), famous for his Social Identity Theory, also highlights how group membership has evolved to be an important part of individuals' sense of self-worth and self-esteem. Our innate desire to be part of a group leads to stereotyping, i.e., both the exaggeration of the differences between groups or the exaggeration of the similarities between those within a group.

as resentment, toward perceived transgressions, nor should we! Strawson's thesis is that participant reactive attitudes are critical to maintaining functional human relationships, as they keep the human commitment to freedom (and therefore responsibility) alive. It is precisely by being resentful of another's inconsiderate or vicious behavior that one testifies to the fact that one believes that the other is free to do otherwise. To feel nothing would be to see the other as incapable of controlling their behavior. That is, it would be to see the other as merely a determined object among other determined objects in the world, such as atoms or many nonhuman animals.

Following Strawson's lead, Jeffrie Murphy, in his article "Forgiveness and Resentment" (1982), argues that resentment signifies that one views a perpetrator of a perceived harm as responsible and so, in that sense, shows respect for the other by viewing them as a moral agent (p. 505). Amplifying the message, Katie Stockdale, argues in support of the notion of "collective resentment" (2013), that, even if one has not oneself suffered harm, it is legitimate to feel resentment on behalf of a group that has suffered systematic harms. She uses as her prime example indigenous resentment toward what she refers to as "settler Canadians." Stockdale also quotes Glen Coulthard, who argued, during a public talk at the University of British Columbia in 2011, that resentment is a pathway to self-determination that moves away from Indigenous peoples' dependency on the actions of colonizers for freedom and self-worth. The underlying message here seems to be that resentment is the antithesis of what settler Canadians want or hope for from Indigenous groups, so resentment not only signifies the independence of Indigenous people; it simultaneously serves as a prod for settlers to change their ways. After all, no one likes to be resented!

All in all, then, there seems to ample philosophical support for holding onto resentment either when one has oneself suffered harm, or when harm has been directed toward the group of which one is a member. However, if this is the case, then this will serve as emotional energy to reinforce tribal walls—something that would seem antithetical to our collective wellbeing and progress towards a unified world.

4. Changing attitudes towards winners

There has always been inter-tribal conflict, however our attitudes towards winners and losers have shifted dramatically over the years, in a way not dissimilar to that described by Nietzsche in the *Genealogy of Morals* (2017).

The great conquerors in history were, and to many still are, seen as just that—*great*: Alexander the Great, Genghis Khan, Attila the Hun, Charlemagne, Thutmose III (Pharaoh of Egypt), Ch'in Shih Huang (China), Julius Caesar, and so on. Winning was good or at least neutral; losing—well, that was bad.

In contemporary society, who wins and who loses seems to be more a function of one's place in a complex social system, rather than as a result of individual excellence. Thus, for instance, it is abundantly clear that quality education is a necessary condition for anyone to compete in the socio-economic sphere. However, *quality* education is only readily available to tribal members who continue to benefit from perpetual advantage, i.e., those born into wealthy (often White) families[3]. Moreover, structural impediments stand in the way of those whose tribal descriptives hamper equal consideration in socioeconomic advancement, e.g., women, gays, Blacks, etc.

As a consequence of this systemic view, modern winners, instead of being inheritors of the attitudinal mantels of Alexander the Great or Napoleon, are resented as fraudulent in some sense. That is, these modern winners are perceived to be basking in benefits that were showered

[3] Of contemporary American education, Hughs (1993) notes that "disadvantaged students receive a basic education that is shockingly inferior to white ones" (p. 61).

upon them by luck. [4]And this attitudinal switch, in which winners are viewed negatively, is seen by many as essential to the work of making the system which we occupy a fairer one.[5]

But is this a good thing?

Is shaming those who may have benefited from the system or who may continue to benefit from the system the best way, or even a justified way, to move toward a more equitable world? Does fanning the flames of resentment move us closer to the possibility of a pan-tribal humanity?

5. Is shaming the "winners" a strategy for change?

There are many in academia who, either implicitly or explicitly, adhere to the opinion that shaming the "winners" is a necessary condition for systemic change. Peggy McIntosh, in her article "White Privilege: Unpacking the Invisible Knapsack" (1989), begins with a plea that we all ought to put on our "social system lens" so that we see clearly the relatively stable trajectories of groups as a function of skin color (the correlation between white skin and higher socio-economic level), gender (women carry a disproportional role in child-rearing), specific racial histories (slavery) and ingrained cultural imperatives (e.g., whether books are cherished in a household).

However, McIntosh goes on to make the case that (i) privilege be viewed in *zero-sum terms*, and (ii) that it is essential that people who are privileged *feel* guilty.

With regard to (i) that privilege is a *zero-sum* phenomenon, McIntosh says that while a lot of people "may say they will work to improve women's status, in the society, the university, or the curriculum, but they cannot or will not support the idea of lessening men's" (p. 1). And elsewhere, with regard to race, she says "In proportion as my racial group was being confident, comfortable, and oblivious, other groups were likely being made unconfident, uncomfortable, and alienated" (p. 3).[6]

And with regard to (ii) the notion that *feeling* guilt is important, she faults her schooling for giving her "no training in seeing myself as an oppressor" (p. 1). And that "I have met very few men who are truly distressed about systemic, unearned male advantage and conferred dominance" (p. 3).

Kevin Kumashiro (2000) goes even further in his paper "Toward a Theory of Anti-Oppressive Education" by making the case that everyone but a subset of white males is oppressed, thus placing this subset in the bull's eye of others' resentment. Specifically, he says that

[4] There are exceptions to this rule. Many individuals still accrue power and prestige through impressive personal endeavours, such as Bill Gates or Jeff Bezos.

[5] Some authors trace the seeds of this switch back to the moral systems arising from Christianity. In his books *The Antichrist,* and *The Genealogy of Morals*, Friedrich Nietzsche argued that Christianity sparked a "transvaluation of values", that eventually led to the elevation and celebration of weakness and suffering and the condemnation of strength and vitality. Nietzsche contended that the moral system that flowed from Christianity was misanthropic at its roots. That is, in its effort to protect the weak, this moral system ironically began to venerate weakness itself, and condemn the good things possessed by the powerful, such as laissez faire sexuality, a long life and wealth, i.e., instead of empowering the weak, it demanded that people be ashamed of their flourishing.

[6] Similar sentiments have been echoed in fields other than education. In a famous blog article "Get Out the Way" published on the American Mathematical Society's website, Piper Harron (2017) asks white, cisgender males to vacate their jobs or take a demotion in order to create space in STEM fields for marginalized parties.

> … the majority of students-namely, all those who are not White American, male, hegemonically masculine, heterosexual, and middle-class or wealthy, are marginalized and harmed by various forms of oppression in schools (p. 29).

And in an earlier passage, Kumashiro includes the descriptives "Christian" and "English-speaking" (p. 26).

But look what is happening here. These messages are clear attempts at "essentializing" (Gopnik, 2019: 178) the oppressor group: that everyone in the group is essentially the same and hence legitimate targets of resentment. But is this legitimate? While one may be justified in feeling resentment toward the white male Koch brothers, who indeed seem to be using their vast wealth to solidify their privilege, does it make sense to shine that same emotive light on the white males in a grade one class room—or in any classroom, for that matter. Thus, though Kumashiro says "Educators have a responsibility to make schools into places that are fair, and that attempt to teach to all their students" (p. 29), it is clear that he means that we all ought to jump on board the effort to down-rank[7] white heterosexual males, while "up-ranking" everyone else. If this is the case, then this flies in the face of Kumashiro's claim that educators ought to be fair and teach to *all* students. Instead, Kumashiro appears to be valorising the resentment of white, male, middle-class, Christian, English-speaking students.[8]

6. Is shaming the "winners" an impediment to change?

Tribal feuds are frequently characterized as a zero-sum phenomenon: either our tribe gets to keep this land, this treasure, this status, or yours does. Warfare of all stripes continues unabated on this very assumption. In such situations, emotional flaming is useful for energizing and consolidating one's forces. The Jews are vermin; the Tutsis are cockroaches; the gang controlling the next block are…etc.

For those who believe that warfare between human tribes is inevitable, this fanning the flames of resentment is not only natural, it is a good thing. Others, however, believe that this natural resentment ought to be kept under control,[9] and if possible, discouraged—especially given the better dialogical tools at modern humans' disposal.[10]

Thus, Martha Nussbaum (2016) argues, in her book *Anger and Forgiveness: Resentment, Generosity, Justice,* that anger is conceptually confused and normatively pernicious; that it assumes that the suffering of the wrongdoer restores the thing that was damaged, but that, in fact, it betrays an all-too-lively interest in one's *relative* status by humiliating the other. At their core, she argues that anger and resentment are at the same time infantile and harmful.

[7] Nussbaum (2016: 29).

[8] Though Kumashiro's suggestion that educators constantly look to the margins (p. 31) seems to be common-sense, what happens when, in this changing world, it is the young white male students who exists at the margin (as is the case in a prestigious private school in Canada in which, of a grade 1 class, less than 10% were white males). Is it these 2 or 3 students whom the teacher should unmask and make visible the privilege of their identities (Kumashiro, 2000: 37) and strive to help them acknowledge and work against their own privilege and their sense of being the "norm" (p. 35) so that can achieve a kind of self-reflexivity (p. 36) that will lead them to self-transformation (p. 44), and so that they see the other as an equal (p. 45)? What would such an education look like that focuses on these 2 or 3 students in contrast to the other 30 or so others?

[9] See Anderson and Gardner (2019), which echoes much of what is to follow.

[10] As Einstein has been purported to have said, "I do not know with what weapons WWIII will be fought, but WWIV will be fought with sticks and stones."

Nussbaum's major theme is "Deweyan" in the sense that it is grounded in the belief that *all of us* have the responsibility to try to develop ways to live together in a manner that is potentially beneficial to all. As such, we *all* need to be part of a dialogical process of equal participants who come together in an honest and open attempt to articulate a common future. Treating others as likely criminals is just about the worst way to begin if you want someone to cooperate as an equal (Nussbaum, 2016: 243).

Nussbaum recognizes how the thoughts of "payback" can be intensely satisfying; she even quotes Aristotle's comment that thoughts of retribution are pleasant (p. 17). Nonetheless, we all need to recognize that attempting to reverse the positions through "*down-ranking*" does nothing in the journey to create equality (p. 29).

Echoing this sentiment is the work of Philip Pettit (1996). In his article "Freedom as Antipower," Pettit asks, "how might we guard the powerless against subjugation by the powerful? One way would be to reverse roles, of course, and give them power over others rather than letting others have power over them. But that would only relocate the problem, not resolve it" (p. 588). And Donna Hicks (2011) similarly argues that while playing the victim card is tempting, it should be avoided. Thus, she says:

> The temptation to see the other person as the perpetrator and oneself as the innocent victim is one the greatest obstacles to resolving conflict in relationships. Our need to be both right and done wrong by is an outdated survival strategy that creates big problems for us today (p. 143).

Yet another problematic aspect of shaming the winner is that victimizers are often perceived as powerful and victims as powerless, which may be precisely how shaming really harms, namely that victims have their sense of agency diminished.

Even Pablo Freire, whose *Pedagogy of the Oppressed* (1970) can be read as condemnatory of oppressors and eulogistic of victims, points out that no pedagogy can be truly liberating if it treats the oppressed as unfortunates for three reasons: (a) it suggests that the oppressed emulate the oppressors (p. 54); (b) that that guilt is a kind of self-glorification—that one is royalty of infamy (p. 34); and (c) that playing the victim is often used a shield against judgment and hence the self-development that accrues through growth-inspiring feedback (p. 124).

And, in her paper "Suspending Damage: A Letter to Communities" (2009), Eve Tuck, an American indigenous scholar, builds on this idea when she argues that research focused on highlighting a group's victimization, which she labels "Damage-Centered Research," ultimately does a disservice to those who are deemed to be victims. Tuck argues that the language surrounding these approaches risks portraying members of these groups as objects damaged beyond-repair, thus crippling these groups' attempts to rise above their conditions.[11]

Still, the central question remains unanswered: If people are harmed, is it not our job to blame and punish the perpetrators?

In answering this question, we suggest that we adopt a more honest and reasoned view of the notion of perpetrator. Just as "winners" are no longer revered since their position is no longer viewed as function of their own agency, so we suggest that, for the very same reason, it makes no sense to view them as culpable. We suggest, in other words, that the reframing of this question can lead to a more productive outcome: if it indeed is a system of invisible assumptions,

[11] This point is also echoed by Schein and Gray (2018) as well as de Beauvoir (2011). It is for this reason that Nietzsche writes, in his book *The Antichrist* (1895), "If I must pity, at least I do not want it known; and if I do pity, it is preferably from a distance."

rules and norms that perpetrate lingering injustice, is it not our job to change the system so it is more just?

We suggest that the answer is "yes," and that we ought to be educating so that, in the face of injustice, individuals are more inclined to adopt a systemic rather than individual or tribal focus, that plans for action be laid out in small steps that are amenable to continuous evaluation and change, and that resentment, an inevitable and indeed valuable reaction to injustice be repurposed for good by harnessing it to reason.

7. Refocusing and repurposing resentment

Focusing on changing the system has four distinct merits:

(1) It holds more promise for ameliorating the problem than simply rewarding or penalizing individual players within a flawed game.

(2) It is inevitably forward looking, in contrast to the retrospective focus of responsibilizing people.

(3) It is a great equalizer (winners and losers are perceived to be equally products of and potential agents within the system).

(4) It helps to diminish the kind of interpersonal contempt that can destroy the possibility of working together.

Let us deal briefly with each of these in turn.

(1) A systemic lens holds more promise for remedying injustice.

With his seminal book, *Suicide*, originally published in 1897, Emile Durkheim offered an entirely different perspective through which human behavior ought to be evaluated by providing extensive evidence to show that suicide rates varied as a function of "social facts" (e.g., group cohesion) rather than being merely as a function of individual psychological attributes. This "sociological" lens has been highly instrumental in changing the hitherto well-established disparaging views of marginalized groups such as women, people of color, and the poor.

Through this sociological lens, many have come to understand that the less advantaged state of these marginalized individuals was more a function of "systemic drivers" than personal deficiencies. The implicit assumption tied to this perspective is that, if the goal is to change behavior, altering the system ought to be the means. If the goal is to decrease suicide, for instance, undertaking measures to enhance the social cohesion will be far more effective than hiring more psychologists.

(2) A systematic lens in inevitably forward looking.

Viktor Frankl, in *Man's Search for Meaning,* speaks of the horrific memories of a prisoner liberated from a Nazi concentration camp; "that looking back on his camp experiences, he can no longer understand how he endured it all" (pp. 114-115). Nonetheless, Frankl warns against bitterness, disillusionment, and what he refers to as "moral deformity." To illustrate this worry, he recounts walking near a field of green crops after liberation, when a fellow prisoner "drew his arm through mine and dragged me through it" (p. 112). When Frankl objected, his friend shouted, "You don't say! And hasn't enough been taken from us? My wife and child have been gassed—not to mention everything else—and you would forbid me to tread on a few stalks of oats?" (p. 112).

Frankl is deeply saddened by his friend's reaction. Of his friend, he says that the only thing that had changed with liberation is that, instead of being an object of willful force and

injustice, he had become an instigator. That is, instead of being oppressed, his friend was now an oppressor.

But what precisely, according to Frankl, are the harmful consequences of hanging on to bitterness and resentment? Frankl, who was an existential psychiatrist, argues that such a person is looking the wrong way! To create meaning in life, one must focus on the *future* (pp. 94, 95, 120). That is, one must focus on the gap between who one is and who one wants to become (p. 127). One must embrace what he calls tragic optimism (p. 161); one ought to accept that life *for all of us* is filled with pain, guilt, hardship and death, but that one, nonetheless, ought to say "yes" to life (p. 161). We ought always to use our creativity to turn life's negative aspects into something positive or constructive, so that we become, what he refers to as, "attitudinal heroes" (p. 172).[12]

(3) A systemic lens is a great equalizer.

Writers who argue that the disadvantaged ought to resent the advantaged must anchor their position in the assumption that neither is responsible for the position that they find themselves in. If the disadvantaged were responsible, then they would be legitimate objects of approbation (not pity). Likewise, if the advantaged were responsible, then pride would be more appropriate than guilt. But if the advantaged are indeed not responsible because their preferable position is a function of the system rather than their actions as individuals, then neither pride nor guilt seem appropriate. Of course, if those in advantaged positions do not do their bit to make the system more just, then resentment towards those individuals might indeed be appropriate. But this is also true of those in disadvantaged positions. In other words, if the problem is indeed systemic, then it is the responsibility of everyone in the system to do what they can to make the system more just.

(4) A systemic lens diminishes interpersonal contempt.

In Malcolm Gladwell's (2005) iconic book *Blink: The Power of Thinking Without Thinking,* he cites John Gottman's 1980's experiments with married couples to make a point about how barely-noticeable emotional responses can affect the longevity and health of one's relationships.

In his experiments, Gottman found that there was one emotion capable of spelling doom for any relationship—contempt, i.e., a lack of respect for the other. This finding had wide-reaching implications not only for romantic relationships, but for all relationships of all kinds. If you begin to feel contempt for a person, the relationship falls apart, and conflict is bound to arise.

If one is not cautious, it is easy, and in fact natural, to focus one's resentment and contempt on persons or tribes—fomenting conflict and war rather than cooperation. This poses a sizable challenge, since it is precisely cooperation that we need to reform a system. By adopting a systemic lens, individuals can redirect their contempt towards systemic problems that have resulted in unjust outcomes. In short, a systemic lens helps us all avoid unnecessary interpersonal conflict and allows individuals to focus their energies on larger, needed changes.

[12] Frankl's position finds an echo is Spinoza's Ethics. Spinoza makes the claim that there are three basic emotions: pain, pleasure, and desire (E3P11S). Hatred, fear and indignation fall into the pain category, or what Spinoza calls negative emotions (E3P18). Since humans seek to free themselves from pain (E3P12), if we hate something, we will try to destroy it (E3P28). We will, in other words, always have to have the vision of what caused us pain in the past in order to keep focused on what needs to be destroyed. Our fixation on, or obsession with past pain, will interfere with appetitive pull of a better future. As the band Broken Bells lament in their song *The High Road,* "it's too late to change your mind, you let loss be your guide."

8. Planning for small steps

In his book, aptly named *A Thousand Small Sanities* (2019), Adam Gopnik argues that we all ought to embrace a process whereby we move forward on the backs of *A Thousand Small Sanities*. The foundational belief of this practice, which he labels "Darwinian liberalism" (p. 57),[13] is that humans are fallible (p. 26), and hence have difficulty foreseeing the rippling consequences of even small changes (note "the butterfly effect"), let alone the potential disasters inherent in an attempt at large-scale systemic overhaul. Gopnik recognizes, of course, that it is much sexier to advocate massive social renewal than the exigencies of small-step social reform (p. 168). On the other hand, he notes that we are remiss if we ignore what history has taught us; namely that catastrophic consequences can be expected to result from attempting to quickly engineer massive changes (pp. 40, 169).[14]

The characteristic that is distinctive of a Darwinian Liberal is the readiness to accept that social reform is *always* going to be essential. Each time we alter a society, new inequalities and injustices appear and are in need of remedy (p. 45); and that thus "a society, like a weekly magazine, is one long perpetual crisis. Solving this crisis long enough to get to the next one is the work we do" (p. 19). Gopnik helps us visualize the overarching theme by arguing that more dogmatic political visions are like unicorns, perfect imaginary creatures we chase but will never find. Darwinian Liberalism is a rhinoceros. It's hard to love. It's funny to look at. It isn't pretty but it's a completely successful animal (p. 14). Thus, though we cannot envision a perfect society, we can see bad when we bump into it. Fixing the imperfect—one imperfection at a time—is enough (p. 33).[15]

Echoing Gopnik's sentiments is the work of Robert Paul Wolff (1998) who, in his book *In Defense of Anarchism*, argues that even though ideals such as anarchy are morally defensible, practical considerations in an anarchist state would result in the resurfacing of many of the same structures we frequently criticize. Wolff's point is that while the desire to enact massive change is admirable, we ought to be cautious about large system overhauls, as we are highly likely to discard the best of what we already have. Churchill articulated a similar sentiment by noting that "democracy is the worst form of government except for all those other forms that have been tried time to time."

Before leaving this eulogy in defense of constant adjustment and change within the system toward a more perfect union, we ought to take note that the engine that keeps biological evolution in motion toward a more perfect union is fueled by a master value, namely survival. We ought to at least pause, then, to reflect on what will keep the systemic evolution going forward in a way that evolutionary rather than revolutionary. We suggest that resentment toward that system is just such a candidate, but that in order to be effective it must be combined with knowing how to engage in reasoned dialogue.

It is to that topic that we will now turn.

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[13] Echoing the notion that the continuing evolution is a result of thousands small incremental changes (p. 225).

[14] Mao's Great Leap Forward or Stalin's collectivization programs.

[15] Listening again to advice from Spinoza, our aims ought to be to understand, and intervene carefully to build institutions that foster empowerment in regular, imperfect, passionate humans. Our aims must be to improve and not perfect— since this is impossible (Tucker, 2018: 146).

9. Participant reactive reasoning rather than participant reactive attitudes

Thus far we have we argued that we ought to be educating so that, in the face of injustice, individuals are more inclined to adopt a systemic rather than individual or tribal focus. Moreover, we have claimed that plans for systemic reform ought to be laid out in small steps that are amenable to continuous evaluation. The final ingredient that must be added is educating so that individuals develop the habit of engaging in what Stephen Darwell calls "second-personal" reasoning.

Second-personal reasoning requires that all participants recognize that it is the strength of the reasons offered, not the emotional force of one side or the other, that determine which position is deemed superior. It requires that all participants know how to articulate a reasoned, clear, precise position, how to estimate the strength of competing reasons, recognize that some strategies, such as ad hominem attacks, are illegitimate and so on.

But how can this be, one may wonder? Would we then be asking emotional beings who are saturated through with perception-skewing reactive attitudes to somehow miraculously transform into rational automatons? What has happened to the importance of freedom-inducing force of participant reactive attitudes, such as resentment?

The answer, we suggest, is that while participant reactive attitudes indeed signal that one views the other as capable of doing other than s/he did (one doesn't resent an apple for falling on one's head), merely flinging attitudes at one another is ultimately a surreptitious attempt to undermine the very freedom that is being recognized; it is often an attempt to manipulate the other (as one would any other object) into doing one's bidding.

Adding "objective" reason to the mix can help rectify this paradox. Thus, instead of merely exchanging participant reactive attitudes, we ought to engage in what Gardner elsewhere (2012) has referred to as "participant reactive reasoning"; i.e., that we all ought to be participantly reasonable (p. 258). This does not mean that we leave participant reactive attitudes locked at home so that we might engage in some Kantian rational Kingdom of Ends dialogue. Quite the contrary. "It is precisely because the rules of reasons are presumed to be 'objective' that we do not view each other as such because it is the 'objectivity' of the rules that frees us from determining bias, and it is this freedom that warrants non-objective or participant reactive responses. If you are committed to everyone playing by the rules, in other words, you must be prepared to call a 'foul'" (Gardner, 2012: 265). Gardner goes on to note that,

In this light, we need to keep in mind, that since good/bad judgments that are rationally supported (though perpetually open to revision) are inherent to the process, blanket edicts that we all ought to love, tolerate, and accept one another "no matter what," or that we ought to revere choices that are a product of isolated "reasoning," whether universalizable or not, will shut this process down. "Respect for persons" requires neither that we love others nor leave them alone. Respect requires, rather, that we engage (p. 266).

So, it is perfectly legitimate for me to view your position as reprehensible, but when engaged in a reasoning process with you, my evaluation of your reasons must be objective. To do otherwise, is to put my own freedom under threat from my own freedom-destroying reactive attitudes.[16]

[16] Thus, as evidence that objectivity is being trampled underfoot by the war of epidermises (Bruckner, 2020: 86), that people are making distinctions between "black reason" and "white reason," Bruckner notes that "If a black person thinks differently from others, he thinks like a European, that is, he necessarily is "white," a valet who is a ventriloquist, a traitor to his brothers. He is Bounty Bar, or an Oreo (p. 85).

We must not mistake being critical of others for critical thinking (Garrison, 2006: 13). Yes, we can be critical of others, but if we are serious about reasoning together in the service of making genuine progress in overcoming the obstacles that stand in the way of a better world, we must engage in critical thinking *with* one another, i.e., in evaluating the reasons with a critical view, we must not let our critical view of the other interfere with the process.

10. Conclusion

Many educators have been taught to treat resentment with kid gloves. Many may themselves be simmering with resentment or have students in their classes who are. Certainly, educators can expect that their charges are more or less hooked on social media and that, as a result, their classrooms will be swimming in simplistic black-and-white ideas of "victim and abuser, good and evil, and primitive notions of who is clean and unclean" (Todd, 2019: H3).

The price for leaving it be, or fanning the flames of resentment, are enormous. It may signal the end of the concept of humanity as "union in diversity" and the triumph of the human species as incompatible with each other (Bruckner, 2010: 86). For that reason, educators need to be courageous in making the case that resentment as a stand-alone attitude, while a perfectly natural response to injustice, in and of itself, may be a self-indulgent obstacle to cooperative change. It must become evident to resenters that the emotional energy of such an attitude can be harnessed to play a more positive role if (1) the focus stays firmly fixed on systems, (2) if action plans are formulated in small realistic steps, and (3) if all of us recognize that toxicity of resentment can be transformed into a catalyst for change by wedding itself to "objective" reasoning.[17]

Of course, we recognize that directing one's resentment towards a system rather than a specific individual or group is not as emotionally satisfying as the self-valorization that comes with categorizing oneself as "being hard done by" by the corresponding "doer" (Benjamin, 2018). As well, resenting a system carries the implication that no one (including the resenter) can duck the responsibility for doing their bit to implement change. And then of course, there is the problem of "tribal membership": refusing to echo the intertribal vindictives puts one in jeopardy of being alienated from those to whom one is closest.

Still, educators must persevere. They must not only not side-step the resentment that may be simmering in their classrooms, they must actively promote and oversee reasoned dialogical interchanges on precisely those topics that typically engender resentment. Politically correct but intellectually bankrupt classrooms can be avoided by adhering to the guidelines suggested above. And, importantly, educators must be prepared to articulate the other side of the argument if it is not forthcoming either due to the mix of participants or due to the fear of ostracism for voicing an unpopular position. In the long run, the guiding vision here is not so much closing in on an agreement, but rather creating a demonstration for all participants that deep meaningful reflective interchange can take place on topics that are either considered closed or inflammatory.

It is not an overstatement to say that the fate of the human species may rest on the degree to which we can overcome our tribal tendencies. Unfortunately, our very biology works against us—our bloodied history attests to this. Our self-indulgent self-satisfaction also actively works against us. Resentment works against us.

However, there is hope and that hope is carried on the shoulders of courageous non-politically-correct educators who are able to refocus resentment toward systems rather than

[17] The "spirit is always composed of two contrary sides: it is kind of *pharmakon—at once* a good *and* an evil, *at once* a remedy *and* a poison . . ." (Stiegler, 2017: 10).

people, who consistently solicit doable action plans, and who oversee reasoned, meaningful, reflective dialogues on topics that are typically welcome mats for resentment, an attitude that, though it signals freedom, ultimately destroys it.

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Classification and Symbols of Masses in the Conception of Elias Canetti[i]

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Abstract

The article focuses on the types of masses and their symbols according to Elias Canetti, which he presents in his large-scale work Masses and Power. The main forms of the masses are classified, according to their functional characteristics. Various natural phenomena and clusters are natural combinations of symbolic significance, carried away from ancient times to the present day through myths, traditions, dreams, speech. Analogies are examined between the natural symbols of masses, which are absorbed and carried by man as attributes of the masses in the social reality.

Keywords: Elias Canetti, masses, classification, symbols.

1. Introduction

Although the first edition of Elias Canetti's book *Crowds and Power* was released as late as 1960, the author himself states that as early as 1924, barely twenty years old, he was overwhelmed, even obsessed by the idea to write a book on masses. An important event that enticed him to embrace this endeavour was the torching of the Court of Justice in Austria's capital on 15 July 1927. "The police had been ordered to shoot at the rebellious workers – more than 90 people were murdered!" Elias Canetti was one of those rioters: "I became part of the crowd, I merged with it. I did not try to oppose its actions" (Canetti, 1980: 245).

The author of *Crowds and Power* considers masses as an anthropological source of history driven by the endless cycle of self-preservation and extermination of mankind. According to Arnason and Roberts (2004), in Canetti's interpretation, culture is reduced in the last instance to nature, inhabited and actuated by the masses. Canetti argues that the fear of being touched by the unknown and the unexpected is at the heart of the psychological reflex to "merge" in a crowd. It is only in a crowd that man feels secure and equal to others, the only situation in which the fear changes into its opposite. The more fear is generated, the more quickly and spontaneously a mass appears. However, this "security and power", or rather the feeling of "un-touchability" in the crowd, appear at *individual psychological level*. They are typical but *come at a high price*! At social level crowds are the *conditio sine qua non* of dictatorial regimes: the "individual in the crowd" has lost his individuality and identity, he has no face; his de-individualization invites for manipulation and subjugation to any kind of ideology (Lozev, 1990: 65-67).

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The future Nobel Prize winner Canetti defined four major attributes of the crowd. The first one is *growth*, to which there are no natural boundaries. Where such boundaries are artificially imposed, an eruption of the mass is always possible and will transform the type of the crowd from closed to open. The second attribute is *equality*. According to Canetti, the most important occurrence within a crowd is the discharge. Before this the mass does not actually exist. Discharge is the moment when all who belong to the crowd get rid of their differences and feel *equal*. Then an immense feeling of relief ensues and men free themselves from their inhibited fear of being touched, which underlies the formation of the crowd. The third attribute is *density*. Canetti holds that a crowd can never feel too dense. Nothing must stand between its parts or divide them. Everything must be the crowd itself. The last attribute is the *need for direction*. "A crowd exists," writes Canetti, "so long as it has an unattained goal" (Canetti, 2018: 26). The crowd is in perpetual movement in a direction, which is essential for its existence. Moreover, the direction, the common goal strengthens the feeling of equality in the crowd. All members of the mass are united for achievement of the common goal, which drives underground all their private different goals (Canetti, 2018: 26).

2. Classification of masses

The author of *Crowds and Power* devotes a considerable part of his survey to the classification of crowds in terms of their predominant attribute. He classifies them into *open and closed* masses. Masses are open when their growth is not impeded. *An open mass* pretends to be omnipresent, it wants to seize everyone within reach, it does not know borders and barriers: "…it does not recognize houses, doors or locks and those who shut themselves in are suspect". "Open" is to be understood here in the fullest sense of the word; it means open everywhere and in any direction. The open crowd exists so long as it grows; it disintegrates as soon as it stops "growing" (Canetti, 2018: 11) Contemporary manifestations of the open mass are the demographic boom and the rapid expansion of the big cities. In contrast to the open crowd, there is the *closed* mass, which renounces growth and has a boundary which provides the crowd with stability. In a historical context, the closed masses from the past are a prototype of the common institutions. Their essential feature is limitation. They establish a boundary which prevents disorderly increase. The closed mass loses its chance to grow but gains in sustainability. Examples of such masses are certain professional guilds, religious communities, political formations, sports fan clubs, syndicates, etc. The closed crowd renounces the unlimited growth – it does not need integration but rather a segregation from the other crowds in order to justify its existence. If we compare a closed mass to a wall (which by definition could not be unlimited), then the mortar which binds its bricks is the *repetition*. It is the expectation of repetition which prevents the mass from disintegration. The above examples can be illustrated with some repetitive manual labour operations, the repetition of prayers, the cyclic political elections, the expectation of football fans to watch the next game of their favourite team, etc. Naturally, quite often, a closed mass is so obsessed to pursue its goal that it becomes forgetful of its boundary and becomes an open mass. Such transformational processes are usually the revolutions (from guerrilla groups to people's power), the coups (from a political elite to a national movement), the wars (from a revanchist groups to mass militarist coalitions), etc.

Canetti further classifies masses in terms of their functional characteristics. The first category is the *rhythmical mass*. When human beings became *Homo Erectus*, they started using their feet in a completely different way. "Rhythm is originally the rhythm of the feet", explains Canetti (2018: 28) Then men discovered the oldest language – they learnt how to interpret animal tracks in order to understand the rhythm of large groups of animals, which were domesticated later on. The typical tribal dances around the camp fire are a good example of a rhythmic crowd. All crowds are similar in terms of their rhythm. There are also *stagnant masses,* which are closely compressed, passive, and patient. Such are the spectators of sport events, theatrical performances,

and concerts. The duration of these events and their structure are set in advance and the crowd is allowed to express its emotions in certain ways – through applause or cheers. Canetti gives an extremely impressive example for a stagnant crowd with the famous *Standing on Arafat*, the climax of the pilgrimage to Mecca. Only a few hours away from their final destination, a few hundred thousand pilgrims gather on the plain of Arafat on a ritually appointed day. Bareheaded, they group themselves in a large circle round *The Mount of Mercy* towards two o'clock, when the sun is hottest, and remain there until it sets.

The *slow mass* has the form of a procession. It has set off on a long journey and no discharge is allowed before the goal has been reached. The exodus of the Jews and their journey towards the Promised Land illustrates this slowness – the old die and new babies are born. This is exactly what must happen until the people of Israel reach their goal – a whole generation must be replaced. *Invisible masses* are usually composed of the invisible dead. The conception of the invisible dead is probably humanity's oldest conception. Without further ado, here we will only quote the Canetti's example regarding the Celts of the Scottish Highlands: "The word *gairm* means shout or scream, and *sluagh-ghairm* was the battle-shout of the dead. This word later became "slogan". The expression we use for the battle shouts of our modern masses derives from the Highland hosts of the dead" (Canetti, 2018: 42).

In terms of their prevailing affection, Canetti distinguishes the *baiting mass,* which forms with reference to a quickly attainable goal usually associated with violence and most often than not with the physical murder of a designated victim. There are many historical examples of baiting crowds, where the victim is stoned, burned on the stake, shot dead by a firing squad, beheaded with a guillotine or sword or buried alive in an anthill, which was a customary execution method of some African tribes. Everyone participates in the killing and no-one has been appointed executioner. The members of a baiting crowd are guided by two basic psychological impulses. The first one is the discharge "from the fact that the victim, who has oppressed or threatened them, is no longer a threat for them; They become equal to it by the act of its destruction" (Gradev, 2005: 407). The second impulse is the illusionary suppression of the common fear of death by "transferring" death on the victim by collectively killing it.

Canetti continues with the *flight mass*. Such a crowd is created by a threat and has a single purpose – survival. In collective flight the energy of some increases the energy of others and the distances between its members disappear. What is more, the crowd has the illusion that the danger is distributed equally so long as they keep together. The *personal* threat is reduced to a *common* threat, the *individual* fear is transformed into a *shared* fear; *my* salvation requires a *collective* effort – the flight. Good examples of flight crowds are the refugee waves in various historical periods. The flight masses are disintegrated in three different scenarios. The first two are natural and logical – when the goal of salvation is attained or when the threat has ceased to exist. However, there is yet a third option, which Canetti calls "the oozing away of the flight in sand". The crowd disintegrates because the goal is too far off, the threat is too great and the people grow exhausted. "A large number of people together refuse to continue to do what, till then, they had done singly" – Canetti wrote in the introduction to *prohibition masses* (Canetti, 2018: 55). Once a prohibition is imposed, a resistant mass begins to form. It is negative in character since it is based on refusal. Prohibition crowds are formed by resistance; they refuse to obey the accepted public regulation standards. A good example for a prohibition crowd is the strike – the collective refusal of workers to continue doing their individual jobs. The refusal to obey is what makes the members of the mass feel really equal.

Reversal crowds were formed in many turning points in history. Reversals aim to destroy or rearrange a stratified society. They are revolutionary in essence because in addition to overthrowing the existing norms, they institute new ones. According to Gradev, reversal crowds are formed "in the process of collective deliverance from the many painful "stings" of command" (Gradev, 2005: 413). These "painful stings" are left by the commands the person was forced to

carry out. Canetti gives an example with the storm of the Bastille during the French Revolution, when the crowd set free the prisoners, who were able to join the crowd, but thieves, too, were strung from the lamp posts. By storming the Bastille, the crowd took over justice in two main aspects – the right of inflicting capital punishment and the right of mercy. Unlike the flight crowds, which are formed when a threat arises, a *feast crowd* is formed by abundance. During the feast many prohibitions and distinctions are waived and unaccustomed advances are not only permitted but smiled on – everyone is allowed to participate in the festive rituals. Dances (e.g. the circle dance at a wedding) and festive rituals (e.g. the making of ritual breads) involve and engage all participants. Violence, which is characteristic of most crowds, is not associated with this type of crowd. On the contrary – during the feast "there are no enemies, there is no common identical goal or threat which people have to attain or flee from" (Gradev, 2005: 413). Feasts imply repetitiveness and temporal continuity; feasts call to one another and everyone is assure in their future repetitions.

3. Symbols of masses

Mass symbols is the name given by Canetti to collective units which do not consist of men, but which are still felt to be masses. They are various natural and geographical phenomena allude to some of the essential attributes of the crowd and stand as symbols for it in myth, tradition, dream and speech. Canetti finds analogies between these natural collective units that symbolize human masses in society. *Fire* is such a symbol. The author of *Crowds and Power* describes its attributes in relation to mass characteristics: "Fire is the same wherever it breaks out: it spreads rapidly; it is contagious and insatiable; it can break out anywhere, and with great suddenness; it is multiple; it is destructive; it has an enemy; it dies; it acts as though it were alive, and is so treated" (Canetti, 2018: 79). All this is true of the mass – it can be formed anywhere and expands rapidly like fire, it wants to grow and is contagious. It is amorphous like glowing ambers and yet united, it comprises an indefinite number of people. Like fire, it can be destructive and seeks an enemy to destroy (baiting crowd, reversal crowd). The crowd discharges as suddenly and quickly as fire dies; it has its own turbulent and intensive life. The likeness between fire and the mass has led to the close assimilation of their images. Since ancient times, man has been trying to tame the fire, to merge with it, and even to become fire. The absorbing flames and their vital warmth seem to hypnotize the individual who, though he has learned to tame fire, remains obedient to its overwhelming power.

Another crowd symbol is *the sea*. It is all-embracing and can never be filled and thus serves for a model for the mass, which always wants to grow and would like to become as large as the sea. The sea consists of a vast multitude of individual drops of water, which are united to become part of a whole. Similarly, separated human beings ("a drop in the sea") unite into a crowd ("a sea of people"). Sea waves are innumerable and their motion is determined by the wind. Like men in a crowd who strive to attain a certain goal, the waves follow the direction towards the infinity. They are ceaseless. Like a crowd, they can become huge and then disappear instantly. The sea is vital, it never sleeps. The mass wants to resemble the sea in order to overcome its greatest fear – its discharge. The sea gives life to millions of organisms in and above it. It unites the inflows of streams and rivers, collects the water of the rain from the clouds above and the glaciers along its shores, but these dynamic processes do not disturb its natural rhythm of life in which everything is united, distributed and circulated. "With the living is the sea in love / the dead are cast ashore", wrote Hristo Fotev – a poet from Burgas, who dedicated most of his works to the watery expanse of the sea (Fotev, 1998: 25). The destructive power of the sea is another attribute which resembles a crowd. Those who disregard the laws of the sea can be engulfed by it. The density of the sea and its coherence "is something which men in a crowd know well: it entails a yielding to others as though they were *oneself* …" (Canetti, 2018: 83). Naturally, the attributes of

the sea are too comprehensive to correspond exactly to any of the crowds we know – they can only strive to attain them.

Rain is another symbol. Like the sea, rain consists of innumerable drops. However, all languages speak of *rain*, rather than *drops*, falling. Similarly, we speak of the *crowd* rather than the separate *humans* in it. We are all familiar with the calmness just before a storm. The sky turns grey; heavy clouds block the sun. The dark, destructive impulses of a crowd are very similar to the destructive power of the downpour, which can flood houses and gardens, demolish streets and bridges, destroy the crops (hail is the hard aggregate form of rain.) No human action can stop the rain from falling. Like crowds, which always pursue a certain goal, rain always falls from above – from the sky to the ground. "There is a sameness in the impact of rain-drops, and the parallel lines of their fall and the uniformity, both of their sound and of their wetness on the skin, all serve to accentuate this sameness" – explains Canetti (2018: 86). Unlike the raging of fire and the constant presence of the sea, rain is the mass in the moment of discharge. The clouds dissolve into rain and the sun shines again.

Another mass symbol discussed by Canetti is the *river*. We say that one "goes with the flow" when they lack initiative and ambition. The most striking thing about a river is its direction – it can only flow in one direction – to the sea – and without a direction it would not be a river. This is why the river stands for processions, demonstrations and tributaries, which always flow in a certain direction like the river flows toward the sea (another crowd symbol). In his book "The Fratricides" Nikos Kazantzakis (Kazandzakis, 2018: 18) skillfully depicts the inflow of a river into the sea and its symbolic significance through a dialogue between a young priest and an old man beholding the stream:

> "What are you looking at, grandfather?" he asked with curiosity.
>
> The old man raised his head and smiled sadly. "At my life flowing and disappearing, son, flowing and disappearing."
>
> "Don't worry, grandfather, it knows where it is going–toward the sea, everyone's life flows toward the sea."
>
> The old man sighed. "Yes, my son, that is why the sea is salty – from the many tears."

A river is the crowd in its "vanity". All river-like formations want to be seen. A crowd in motion along the streets of a large city (a procession, a demonstration, a tributary, etc.) resembles the flow of a river between its banks. Along its route to the sea, the river can become destructive just like a crowd. It can overflow its banks and flood towns and villages. The equality of the water drops in a river is apparent. However, a river does not have the raging of the fire, the universality of the sea or the discharge of the rain. The river is a symbol of the movement of a crowd, which is still under control and has not achieved its goal yet.

Forest is an extremely expressive mass symbol. It may be overgrown with shrubs, but its real density, which makes it's a forest, is its foliage. It is the overhead foliage of single trees, which, linked together like the water drops, forms a continuous roof which shuts out the light and defines the skyline. The linked crowns of its trees create a sense of protection "from above". In the mass, man feels equal to the others and sheltered by the forest. He stands upright like a tree and inserts himself amongst the other trees, from which he has descended, if we believe the evolution theories. As Canetti wrote: "The direction in which a forest draws men's eyes is that of its own growth. A forest grows steadily upward" (Canetti, 2018: 86). The forest compels men to look upwards, grateful for the protection above. Thus the forest is the first image of awe, the religious feeling of standing before God. Another aspect of the forest is that it is immovable and solid. Every tree is deeply rooted in the ground. It can be cut down but cannot be moved. This makes the forest authentic symbol of the *army* – a solid mass which has taken up position and will neither surrender nor flee and which allows itself to be cut down to the last man before it gives a foot of

ground. Compared to the other crowd symbols, the forest has "the persistence of the river, the density of the rain and the mysteriousness of the fire" (Gradev, 2005: 442).

The next symbol discussed by Canetti is *wheat*, which is defined as a diminished and subjugated forest. It grows where forest stood before. Wheat is sown and reaped, and thus multiplied. It multiplies like a crowd. Wheat stalks are perfectly equal in height. The innumerable small seeds are sown, germinate and grow together and are reaped together. Their rhythm when excited by the wind is that of a simple dance. This symbolizes the submissiveness of the mass. Even when they are struck down by a storm, when they straighten up, they are equal once again. A cornfield as a whole generally appears uniform in height. According to Canetti, "The full ears are like heavy heads; they nod to one or turn away as the wind blows" (Canetti, 2018: 89). All blades of wheat grow in the same direction – from the ground to the sky. Anything which happens to one happens to *all*. The germination of the seed and the harvest of the wheat are the beginning and the end of a natural cycle similar to the cycle of life and death of the humans. Harvest follows the sowing like death follows. Again and again – to eternity. The Eucharist, the main sacramental ceremony of the Church, commemorates the Last Supper, when Jesus Christ gave to his disciples *bread as a symbol of His body* – While they were eating, Jesus took bread, and when he had given thanks, he broke it and gave it to his disciples, saying, "Take and eat; this is my body" (Mathew 26: 26-28). And yet, on All Souls' Day we honour the souls of the dead and give to our relatives *boiled wheat as a symbol of resurrection* in a ritual symbolizing the endless cycle of life and death ("…unless a kernel of wheat falls to the ground and dies, it remains only a single seed. But if it dies, it produces many seeds" (John 12: 24)).

The next symbol is *wind*. We often wonder where the wind comes from when we want to understand what is going to happen. The most striking thing about wind is its direction. The strength of the wind varies and it has many faces. What is interesting is that although they cannot see it, people have various names for it - for example, on the Southern Black Sea coast the locals use the names "sereco" for the southeastern, pleasant sea breeze, "levanti" for the dangerous eastern wind, "meltem" for the dead wave wind, and so on. Wind is invisible, but its movement is apparent – it moves the clouds, drives the waves, bends the branches of the trees. It can whine or howl, it can bring coolness or destroy, it is as ambivalent as a crowd. Since ancient times wind has been associated with breath in terms of its density. But on the other hand, its invisibility enables it to stand for invisible crowds, and thus for spirits.

Sand as a mass symbol has two especially important qualities – the first is the smallness and sameness of its grains and the second is its endlessness. The sameness of the sand is associated with the sameness of men in a crowd and the reduction of their psychological differences. Its endlessness is associated with the crowd's aspiration for perpetual growth. Insignificant on their own, sand grains are united in an endless multitude – the monotonous, vast and lifeless desert. *Heaps* of fruit or grain symbolize the result of activity of many hands occupied with the picking or harvesting. The size of the heap is as important as the size of the crowd – their goal is to grow. Men celebrate in feasts the heaps they have managed to collect. Apart from these festive heaps, Canetti writes about stone heaps, which are also the result of collective human efforts. As a manifest mass behavior, this symbol clearly stands out in some protests in which the disgruntled "heaped children's shoes or other objects in squares and in front of government offices, so that society can literally see the hardships of the economically deprived people" (Gradev, 2005: 446). The last symbol described by Canetti in his classification of crowd symbols is *treasure*. Its main function is to be safeguarded and amassed. A hoard of treasure can be won openly through competition on all kinds of lottery, as well as to be depreciated through inflation caused by a mass in flight.

4. The order

A key element of Canetti's concept regarding mass is their relation to power, an important manifestation of which is the order. In reality, individuals are driven to social activity through regulations, i.e. have to obey orders. This applies to all social spheres – politics, religion, family relations, economics, etc. – which impose individual codes of conduct. All statutory regulations, religious dogmas, educational principles, business rules, etc. are, in their essence, collective orders. An order is considered as natural as it is necessary. In a famous radio conversation with Theodor Adorno in 1962, the author of *Crowds and Power* described how the impulse to reject these collective orders is a sub-conscious mass-formation factor:

> "…no-one who has carried out an order has in no way enjoyed this. He may not be aware of it; he may not think about it. But the sting of the order remains stuck in the individual. And this is especially important. In this way, people can accumulate many stings from orders received twenty or thirty years ago. People want to free themselves from these stings, and that is why they often seek out situations that are the exact reverse of the original situation in which they received commands, in order to get rid of the sting. The consequences of this desire are clear. Everyone who lives in a society is pierced by many such stings. Their number can increase so much as to make him do monstrous acts because he suffocates from these stings." (Canetti, 1994: 463)

The many stings accumulated from repetitive and overlapping orders are very difficult to get rid of individually. According to Canetti, such deliverance is possible in a *reversal crowd*. It is a crowd whose discharge consists mainly in its collective deliverance from the stings of command (Canetti, 2018: 341). Throughout history there are numerous examples of such removal of stings: a king, who has repeatedly ordered the beheading of a lot of people is decapitated by the crowd, which has suffered these stings for a long time. The initial command situation is repeated, but in a reversed order. Then everything is repeated - those who acquired the power are afraid and are looking for a way to get rid of their fears by issuing the same kind of orders. This mechanism creates a vicious circle of issuing orders, followed by execution, then accumulation of stings, and again discharge at the end. (Against this 'vicious circle' Plato, one of the greatest philosophers, and perhaps the greatest inventor of ideologies (Popper), found a 'political cure': in his famous theory of 'the ideal city-state (Kalipolis)' he emphasizes the need for implanting universally the feeling of living in a 'just state' which means implanting the feeling of living in 'the perfectly organized and governed state' (Lozev, 2000, ch. 3)).

5. Conclusion

Elias Canetti belongs to those researchers who consider the mass man as an anthropological construct derived from the very human nature. This concept seeks the cause of crowds as a public phenomenon in psychological factors associated with intrinsic instincts, mass conduct codes, and unconscious psychic processes. According to Canetti, each human harbours the animal of the "mass" man. This is why Canetti's classification of crowds is historically universal, it is based on universal instincts (destructiveness), beliefs (ghosts of myths), rituals (pilgrimages), patterns of behaviour (flight from danger), and so on, which, under specific circumstances, become social processes. Mass symbols are not associated with cultural phenomena or historical periods - they are derived from nature (fire, wind, rain, etc.) and represent the natural attributes associated with the different types of mass. Crowd participation is not a social phenomenon pertaining to a certain historical period and manifest under specific circumstances. On the contrary, every person has the potential and need to become periodically "invisible", to feel relieved of the responsibility to be himself, to immerse his self in the anonymity of a crowd.

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