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Entwined Dangers: Pandemic and Modern Technology

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Abstract

The COVID-19 pandemic constitutes a crisis situation in which the dangers posed by modern technology have never been more pronounced. As the devastation of the coronavirus epidemic continues, epidemic control around the world is focused on the introduction of new legal and regulatory measures against the virus. In this paper, I analyze Heidegger's and Foucault's critical theory of modern technology to show that the threat is not only biological, but also ontological: the threat of modern technology to our existential state of being, which cannot be ignored. The existential dangers posed by modern technology to the social control of human rights are far more subtle and have as long-reaching effects as the biological dangers of COVID-19.

Keywords: coronavirus, modern technology, biopower, Heidegger, Foucault.

1. Introduction

People worldwide have adopted daily actions to keep their immune systems safe, including handwashing, remote working and learning, and mask use. Thanks to scientific advances, a vaccine is under development, and we can image a future where this technology can defeat any ailment – but what about the existent and potential danger of this technology?

We must consider how the pandemic and modern technology have changed our lives, as well as what danger they present. The representative critics regarding these concepts are Foucault and Heidegger. The former shows how power controls people through an examination of epidemics, while the latter represents a critique of both aspects of technology-power from an ontological perspective on the essence of modern technology. Foucault has also acknowledged on several occasions that he was profoundly influenced by Heidegger. In his final interview, just before his death in 1984, Foucault revealed that

> [f]or me Heidegger has always been the essential philosopher. ...I had tried to read Nietzsche in the fifties, but Nietzsche alone did not appeal to me – whereas Nietzsche and Heidegger: that was a philosophical shock! But I have never written anything on Heidegger, and I wrote only a very small article on Nietzsche; these are nevertheless the two authors I have read the most. (Foucault, 1990: 250)

Much of the philosophical examination of COVID-19 to date has focused on the sociological implications of the epidemic, such as the ethical justifiability of the limitation of freedom of movement (Camporesi, 2020), or the failure of the government to exercise their powers competently, thus allowing the virus to spread (Rhiannon Frowde, 2020). But little attention has been paid to the impact of modern technology, our main weapon against COVID-19. As we use this

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technology to fight COVID-19, we should also be aware of the dangers to which we expose ourselves.

The themes that define the argument of this work come from Heidegger's and Foucault's respective interpretations of the modern relationship between technology and power. Both Heidegger and Foucault argue that in modern society, the human being is seen as a manipulable resource. Both suggest that liberation from this state requires a thorough examination of the essence of the human being, as currently understood. When facing the COVID-19 crisis, as both have pointed out, what we are experiencing, such as lock downs and medical policies, exacerbates and conceals the danger that biopower and modern technology have already brought us. Furthermore, with the spread and development of this COVID-19, the biopower enacted by the government and modern technology are even more dangerous to us on an ontological level, as Foucault and Heidegger point out, and the control of human being as a resource in contemporary society is even more serious than COVID-19. With the help of these two critiques of biopower and technology, with Heidegger's releasement (Gelassenheit) thought, I propose an approach to these issues, not only those which COVID-19 has brought to our attention, but also latent issues of human control.

In the following chapters, I identify Heidegger's concept of technology in Chapter 1 and clarify Foucault's understanding of power in Chapter 2. Chapter 3 contrasts the two concepts, the differences in the relationship between technology and power, and analyzes the additional technological and governmental dangers concealed by COVID-19.

2. Metaphysics and Enframing

2.1 *The essence of modern technology*

Firstly, I want to examine Heidegger's definition of modern technology. In his famous lecture "The Question Concerning Technology," Heidegger rejects the instrumental definition of technology because it fails to capture the "essence" of modern technology. For Heidegger, the definition of technology is an ontological description of "revealing," and technology is a context that belongs to modern society and shapes how we perceive beings (Seiende), which also makes it possible for us to understand and interact with things and beings. According to Hubert Dreyfus' definition, Heidegger thinks of technology as a "cultural paradigm" because technology in a context of practice cannot be fully expressed as a set of belief systems or a set of clear rules.[1] Heidegger asserts, "Technology is, therefore, no mere means. Technology is a way of revealing." (Heidegger, 1977: 12) It is a context of habits, customs, and skills within which the object that is under the context of modern technology appears usable. The exemplary manifestation of modern technology and being is the hydroelectric plant, and it is in this particular way of revealing modern technology that the river becomes a "water-power supplier."

It is important to note that, as a way of revealing, technology exploits and utilizes beings as computable, controllable objects. The beings that are exploited are not only the resources around us, but also humans. In other words, we ourselves are controlled by modern technology as a particular kind of resource, rather than being in control of exploiting technology, as is often thought – after all, it is humans who build hydroelectric power plants. Heidegger clearly states that:

[1] "[T]he technological paradigm embodies and furthers our technological understanding of being according to which what does not fit in with our current paradigm – that is, that which is not yet at our disposal to use efficiently (e.g., the wilderness, friendship, and stars) – will finally be brought under our control, and turned into a resource" (Dreyfus, 2006: 358).

> The human himself stands now within such a conscription. The human has offered himself for the carrying out of this conscripting. He stands in line to take over such requisitioning and to complete it. The human is thereby an employee of requisitioning. Humans are thus, individually and in masses, assigned into this. The human is now the one ordered in, by, and for the requisitioning. (Heidegger, 2012: 29)

Here, Heidegger asserts that the hallmark of modern technological domination is the rational ordering and control of being, and that this idea itself is not something that any human being or any society actively chooses to practice, but rather that this modern technological thinking has come to influence us as context at all times. The idea that resources are objects of human control and that technology is only a human tool are indeed practical examples of the dominant modern technological thinking in the ontic dimension surrounding our daily life, but this way of thinking is nothing but a result of modern technology and has itself been influenced by what Heidegger calls the thinking of modern technology as "Enframing" (Gestell). While it is true that we can decide how any particular technological thing is to be used, the very fact of which representations appear as candidates for truth or fallacy, and which existents are revealed as things to be used is not up to us to choose. The context in which the object appears is neither entirely graspable nor intentionally constituted. Rather, it is a forgotten horizon, practice, and context in the historical inheritance that we take for granted.

Heidegger points out that, unlike ancient technology, "The revealing that rules in modern technology is a "challenging" (Herausfordern), which puts to nature the unreasonable demand that it supplies energy that can be extracted and stored as such" (Heidegger, 1977: 14). He used the term "Enframing" (Gestell) to describe the essence of modern technology, which is "the way in which the real reveals itself as standing-reserve" (*Ibid*.: 23). This "Enframing" represents a structure of how the whole beings are revealed, as it pushes us in a certain direction. This modern technology can be considered as a tendency in the field of modern technological practice, which orders all beings to the principles of order and efficiency, and pursues reality down to the smallest detail. Thus, as long as the purpose of modern technology is to make beings orderly and computable, there are fewer and fewer possibilities for how beings be revealed and used by modern technology, leaving only the possibility of controlling and being controlled.

The real danger of modern technology, according to Heidegger, is that humans will continue to see technology as a mere tool and fail to inquire into its essence. He fears that all revelation will become computational, that all relations will become technical, that the unthought horizon of revelation, the "hidden" background practices that made technical thinking possible, will be forgotten. Thus, it is not technology, nor science, that poses the danger, but the essence of technology as a way of revealing; for the nature of technology is ontological, not technological. It is a question of how humans fundamentally view beings, and the source of this very view comes from metaphysics.

2.2 *Modern technology and metaphysics*

Heidegger's critique of modern technology stems from his examination of metaphysics. What is metaphysics? For Heidegger, metaphysics is a way of thinking that attempts to focus on the problem of the being (das Seiende) and its beingness (Seiendeheit) instead of Being (Sein) and the meaning of Being itself. In this way, metaphysical thought neglects the distinction between the Being and the beings. Heidegger considers modern technology to be "the completed metaphysics."

In his note "Overcoming Metaphysics", Heidegger believes that Nietzsche's concept of Will reaches the end and completion of metaphysics, and that this metaphysical way of thinking

has also influenced modern technology.[2] The impact of modern technology on man is definitely not only a question of the relationship between technical tools and man, but also means and ends. Modern technology, as the result of metaphysics, controls all elements through calculating and planning of beings. In such a situation, "beings have entered the way of erring in which the vacuum expands which requires a single order and guarantee of beings" (Heidegger, 2003: 105).

This order and guaranteed characteristic is reflected in two facets: the first is the complete planning mastery of beings (which is also an expression of Nietzsche's superhuman will). "The fact that instinct is required for superhumanity as a characteristic means that, understood metaphysically, subhumanity belongs to superhumanity, but in such a way that precisely the animal element is thoroughly subjugated in each of its forms to calculation and planning (health plans, breeding)" (Heidegger, 2003: 106). And in order to achieve this aim of complete planning mastery, modern technology requires precise calculation and estimation "[C]alculation is above all the first calculative rule" (*Ibid*.).

From this perspective of calculation-planning control of beings, we can distinguish the difference between modern technology and ancient technology. When comparing a hydroelectric power plant or a waterwheel, there is no difference between the two simply from the perspective of their beingness, in which both are a way and a means of using waterpower for the benefit of humans. However, when we build a hydroelectric power plant, we analyze in advance, from a metaphysical point of view, what location will yield the most power, the local topography, the economy, the local impact, etc., therefore, only in a digitalized nature can abstract concepts such as interest and power be grasped and used. This consideration is thoroughly reflected in the fact that we have to build a hydroelectric power plant for the benefit of humankind. The consideration undertaken before and during construction reflects the complete planning of the being to reach the end. In this planning-goal process, the human will always the highest priority. But building a waterwheel? Pre-modern humans may also have planned, but more often than not, in accordance with local life and the course of the river, and would not have gone so far as to change the natural conditions for the sake of their will (although there is of course the possibility of not being able to do so).[3]

Ultimately, the result of this metaphysical implementation of technology is the inclusion of all beings in computation-control, including, naturally, humans themselves. "Since man is the most important raw material, one can reckon with the fact that someday factories will be built for the artificial breeding of human material, based on present-day chemical research" (*Ibid*.).

In sum, the root of modern technology Enframing, according to Heidegger, lies in metaphysics, which plans and controls through metaphysical calculation, thus treating all beings (including human) as a kind of available and plannable object in which man loses the subjectivity of controlling technology and becomes an object controlled by technology; they become human resources, and thus can be applied in a medical context to patients for a clinic.[4] This control is not

[2] "With Nietzsche's metaphysics, philosophy is completed. That means: It has gone through the sphere of prefigured possibilities. Completed metaphysics, which is the ground for the planetary manner of thinking, gives the scaffolding for an order of the earth which will supposedly last for a long time." Heidegger, "Overcoming Metaphysics", p. 95.

[3] The difference between ancient and modern technologies cannot be distinguished from the ontic point of view, i.e., how to use beings, but rather by thinking about the ontological difference. That is, the practice of modern technology is entirely an expression of human will, and this will belong to a way of revealing, and the properties of rivers are only reflected as power resources in this Enframing revealing (Dreyfus, 2006).

[4] "Only to the extent that man for his part is already challenged to exploit the energies of nature can this ordering revealing happen. If man is challenged, ordered, to do this, then does not man himself belong even more originally than nature within the standing-reserve? The current talk about human resources

entirely coercive, but also includes the act of the human being voluntarily becoming a resource and an object to be used by the technology.

However, having made it clear that it is not we who control modern technology, but we who are controlled by it, Heidegger suggests that the way to saving us from the dangers of modern technology lies, as Hölderlin puts it, in the fact that "but where danger is, grows / The saving power also" (Heidegger, 1977: 34). In Section 3, I will discuss how people are both coercively and voluntarily controlled by technology under the omnipresence of COVID-19.

3. Discipline and biopower

Let us now turn to Foucault. In this chapter, I would like to compare Foucault's and Heidegger's critique of Enframing through the approach of Foucault's critique of biopower.

Foucault introduced the concept of biopolitics, which is a new technology of power in contemporary society in which political power actively guides and educates the social body of human beings in order to maintain appropriate actions of individuals within society. This form of power includes, on the one hand, the traditional political problem of governing the political activities of the state and, on the other hand, the body politics of governing the relationship between the individual's own activities and society as a whole. In Foucault's view, the politics of life is a new utilization of biopower, which is mainly found in two forms of power: the micro aspect of discipline and its control of the individual, and the macro aspect of biopower, which controls the total population.

> The power of discipline, which is closely related to the individual, is a number of physical training activities for the purpose of improving certain abilities of the human body, and through these activities the human being is taught obedience. Disciplinary technology does not have the absolute center of power of the monarch as the traditional ruling power, nor does it highlight the law's compulsory role in regulating activities, but takes control over individual bodies with working flesh by a whole system of surveillance, hierarchies, inspections, bookkeeping, and reports. In sum, "discipline tries to rule a multiplicity of men to the extent that their multiplicity can and must be dissolved into individual bodies that can be kept under surveillance, trained, used, and, if need be, punished." (Foucault, 2003: 242)

This power of discipline, established in the 18th century (starting from the end of the 17th century) became prominent in social institutions such as schools, factories, hospitals, the military, and prisons, in which people were taught through surveillance, exercise, and training, and a system of standardized rewards and punishments was established to promote positive activities by individuals that were conducive to group building.

Thus, the power of discipline achieved through the discipline of the flesh is a micro form of control over human action. In contrast, the macro form of control is biopower, which emerged at the end of the 18th century, a biopolitics that focuses on population and life in the sense of the quality of the population as the basis for the reproduction of the species. It is important to note here that, first, biopower does not exclude disciplinary power, but rather embraces the original techniques of disciplinary power, which are in different hierarchical levels. In a certain sense, they overlap. Secondly, unlike the object of the disciplinary power, the biopower technique is applied to the whole of human life, no longer just "to man as-body but to the living man, to man-as-living-being" (*Ibid*.). Foucault points out that:

(Menschenmaterial), about the supply of patients for a clinic (Krankenmaterial einer Klinik), gives evidence of this." Heidegger, "The Question Concerning Technology", p. 18.

> (biopower)is being established is addressed to a multiplicity of men, not to the extent that they are nothing more than their individual bodies, but to the extent that they form, on the contrary, a global mass that is affected by overall processes characteristic of birth, death, production, illness, and so on. So, after a first seizure of power over the body in an individualizing mode, we have a second seizure of power that is not individualizing but, if you like, massifying, that is directed not at man-as-body but at man-as-species. (*Ibid.*)

Foucault introduces the term "Population" to illustrate how biopower is no longer concerned with the body of individual human beings, but with the quality of life of the population as a whole. The population here is not an individual with the status of a legal subject, nor is it a social aggregate with the rights of a subject, but a biological group that contains the concept of a human species in an abstract sense. Therefore, instead of focusing on individual activities, biopower places all individuals in a group of "human beings" to investigate the overall quality of life from the point of view of statistics such as birth rate, death rate, overall health level and life expectancy. Information technology is used to safely regulate the overall population balance and overall security. Of course, the concept of population here is not a simple quantitative category as in traditional sociology or economics, but a new political concept that has been restructured in a new context, i.e., the object of political governance in the sense of the existence of human life as a whole. Foucault argues that biopower is "a matter of taking control of life and the biological processes of man-as-species and of ensuring that they are not disciplined, but regularized" (Foucault, 2003: 246).

Thus, the power of discipline as individual body and biopower as the regulation of population constitute two series: "the body-organism-discipline-institutions series, and the population-biological processes-regulatory mechanisms-State" (*Ibid.*: 250). These two forms of power came together in the 19th century to form a biopower that was both anatomo-politic and bio-politic; both individualized and holistic, both micro and macro, thus making it so that bio-political power has "taken control of life in general – with the body as one pole and the population as the other" (*Ibid.*: 253), and completely possesses dominion over human life itself. When such biopower is given the possibility to thrive, it expands exponentially, both technically and politically, and the danger of this expansion is illustrated in the potential for destruction, such as "when it becomes technologically and politically possible for man not only to manage life but to make it proliferate, to create living matter, to build the monster, and, ultimately, to build viruses that cannot be controlled and that are universally destructive" (*Ibid.*: 254).

Thus, it seems that the two mechanisms of biopower, physical discipline and population regulation, realize the control of life from the beginning to the end in both macro and micro aspects. Through microscopic physical discipline and macroscopic demographic adjustment, the power of life rules deeply into all aspects of life, and carries out a comprehensive implicit rule over the subjective life of human beings.

4. Pandemic between biopower and Enframing

In this chapter, first I would like to compare Foucault's and Heidegger's respective critiques of contemporary society. Since the objectives of the two thinkers are different, the former is concerned with how power comes to control man in the society, meanwhile the latter criticizes and reveals the dangers posed by modern technology, it seems dangerous to compare the two; but through analysis we can at least see how their perspectives may overlap or complement each other. Second, I would like to turn to reality and examine how, in the particular status quo of the Coronavirus, the dangers that both Foucault and Heidegger speak of are reproduced.

On one hand, Hubert Dreyfus points out that "Foucault's notion of power denotes the social aspect of…the [Heideggerian] clearing", therefore Heidegger and Foucault share "a common

critique of techno-/bio-power." In Dreyfus's interpretation, the difference between these lines of critique is simply a matter of perspective.

Timothy Rayner, on the other hand, disagrees, and points out that there is nothing in Foucault's work "to suggest that he seeks to recover the 'fire from the heavens' that Heidegger believes illuminated the world of ancient Greece." Furthermore, the reason Foucault recapitulates Heidegger's critique is nothing more than a way of thinking as an 'instrument of thought'. "Displacing this instrument from the world of Heideggerian concerns, and reinserting it within a Nietzschean realm of practices and struggles, Foucault turns Heidegger's way of thinking to a different end." At the same time, the aims of Foucault and Heidegger are not identical. "Whereas Heidegger's critique of technology seeks to recover the experience of what is always already forgotten in Enframing, Foucault's critique of biopower pursues an experience in which the biopolitical subject itself is forgotten: the moment of desubjectivation" (Rayner, May 2001).

But Rayner here, I think, misunderstands Foucault's point of view. It is true that for Foucault, his starting point is not Being, nor is he concerned with the relationship between Being and beings. But this does not mean that the object of Foucault's critique is not metaphysical. It is admittedly true that Foucault's starting position is not to examine power in terms of the Ontology-Metaphysics opposition, but the conclusions he draws confirm Heidegger's critique of metaphysics, both that metaphysics/biopower in contemporary society threatens this situation of human nature through the planning and controlling of human beings.

Moreover, in order to completely escape from the constraints of the modern Western thought model and its social system, and to constantly satisfy his own pleasure of unlimited aesthetic transcendence, Foucault creatively designed the Aesthetics of Existence lifestyle according to the conditions of modern life, which he takes from the ancient Greco-Romans. This active way of life is to transform the individual into a subject by means of "technology of the self,"

> which permit individuals to effect by their own means, or with the help of others, a certain number of operations on their own bodies and souls, thoughts, conduct, and way of being, so as to transform themselves in order to attain a certain state of happiness, purity, wisdom, perfection, or immortality. (Foucault, 1997: 225)

Thus, I think that where the two-part ways, as Rayner points out, are precisely where their concerns overlap, i.e., through the critique of the status quo of modern bio-/techno-power metaphysics, from the aim of returning to the way of thinking/life of the Greco-Roman period. But the difference in their views leads to different conclusions, as Dreyfus says (but he is not entirely correct); Heidegger's fundamental position starts from ontological differences, while the forgetfulness of Being in contemporary society is the absence of human subjectivity, which raises the danger of technology. Foucault, in contrast, is concerned (in Heidegger's terms) with the ontic, practical human way of being, the question of the power between this individual way of being and the human being as a community. This power is controlled and exploited in what Heidegger points out is the absence of modern subjectivity in society, as an individual human being, by means of Enframing, schools, and government agencies. Thus, where the two diverge is a difference of ontological difference.

4.1 *Pandemic, biopower and releasement*

Now let's get back to reality. The most pressing current situation is the threat COVID-19 poses to our biological existence; simultaneously, however, in order to protect us as individuals, governments have imposed lockdown efforts and are blocking our sociological meaning. And more importantly, we may, at some point in the future, become accustomed to this government-imposed planning and regulation of us.

Already in Europe people have had to go out less due to lockdown, and nightlife venues have been closed by governments who have found it beneficial to control the pandemic as long as they do not harm small businesses and tourism.

The emergency measures it imposes on us seem to universalize the current "state of exception" inherited from 20th century political theology, confirming Foucault's thesis that modern sovereign power is biopolitical (a power expressed in the production, management and administration of "life"). Moreover, (un)fortunately, both serving and as a result of the rapid development of contemporary medicine, people voluntarily become clinical cases, looking forward to the advances of contemporary technology, hoping to rely on it to resist COVID-19. Last but not least, viruses mark the eternal condition of our species. In case we forget that we are mortal, finite, contingent, lacking, ontologically deprived, etc., the virus is here to remind us, to force us to contemplate, to make us face our meaning of being.

The people's demands regarding resistance to COVID-19 shows a dichotomous character. On the one hand, the government is called to account for inaction and lack of regulation, which has led to the loss of hundreds of thousands of families and loved ones. At the same time, it demands that the government abandon its infringement on individual freedom.[5]

Here, in reality, there are two special government-controlled situations, so let's turn to these two. One is where the government tracks and controls the daily actions of each individual, introducing strict legal regulations and using discipline to control epidemics. In this case the trajectory of each of us is completely controlled by the government through the support of modern technology, such as health codes or surveillance cameras (which are absolutely invented by human's will and only have limited way to be revealed). In the other case, on the contrary, the government does not introduce obvious coercive measures and regulations, and in this case the epidemic is rampant and human health is completely dependent on medical institutions. But can we say that the former is a manifestation of biopower and the latter is not? No, the better interpretation of this situation is that the government is the embodiment of biopower in either case, because whether or not the government enforces control, the ultimate goal is for people to return to work and production and to ensure the stable development of the country and the government. Although the policies are different, the ultimate goal is the same. Through a metaphysical thinking, that is, only to achieve the ultimate purpose and ignore the specific ontic life of each person, to ensure the stable development and progress of society.

More generally, we have all come to realize that there is no risk of infection without any social activity. We will thus have to address a fundamental question: How much are we willing to risk going out for dinner, having coffee with friend, or saying hello to our neighbor? Where do we place our standards when we decide that our social well-being takes precedence over securing our health? Is political survival more important than biological survival? Or is it neither? What really determines our own existence?

> But hold on. Let us first recall the Zizek joke from the film "Ninotchka": the hero visits a cafeteria and orders coffee without cream; the waiter replies: "Sorry, but we have run out of cream. Can I bring you coffee without milk?" Zizek implies that in this joke "what we encounter here is the logic of differentiality, where the lack itself functions as a positive feature." (Zizek, 2013: 47)

Wasn't it the same when the communist regimes in Eastern Europe collapsed in 1990? The people who took to the streets demanding freedom and democracy free of corruption and exploitation ended up with freedom and democracy without solidarity and justice. Isn't that

[5] Cf. Marchforthedead.org and https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Protests_over_responses_to_the_COVID-19_pandemic.

exactly what we are watching today, when we see resistance to government mandates regarding COVID-19, a resistance whose target is actually biopower and modern technology? When we ask only for our human rights, we get a cup of human rights without health. The absence of the essence of human beings is ignored by most people in contemporary times.

Foucault's solution is not good for the problem at hand. Foucault's practical return to the Greco-Roman way of life is valid only when it is not an emergency situation, and the conflict today is not only in the dichotomy between humankind and biopower, but also in the relationship between and resistance against modern technology and COVID-19. This relationship cannot be accomplished by using Foucault's theory of care of the self alone.

Let us turn to Heidegger, who suggests that where there is danger, there is hope. He proposes, again, a solution to the treatment of modern technology which is the positive contrast to the world of Gestell, namely the idea of "releasement" (Gelassenheit). It constitutes a "comportment toward technology which expresses yes' and at the same time 'no'": "we let technological devices enter our daily life, and at the same time leave them outside, that is, let them alone, as things which are nothing absolute" (Heidegger, 1966: 54). This attitude is not one of letting it go, of allowing COVID-19 to rage, but rather of looking at our existence and meaning controlled by modern technology, at the absence of Being.

Genuine letting, accomplished through thinking in releasement begins with the insight that the very structure of a claim about all there is, is itself imposing on rather than genuinely enabling, the manifestation of particular entities. On pain of being incapable of giving an account of itself, thinking cannot presuppose or aim to arrive at a specific ontology but must remain ontologically non-committal (Keiling, 2016: 106).

Therefore, I think that the direction proposed by Heidegger is more universal. It is the current crisis that makes us perceive the danger of modern technology-biopower, and it is for this reason that we resort to measures such as lockdown; this in turn forces us to reflect on biopower, on the meaning of existence, and in the midst of the danger, use the attitude of Releasement to save the individual self that is lost within contemporary society.

What is the danger today? The real danger is that we forget that we are already in danger and enjoy the good life brought by modern technology/biopower. We have good reasons to believe that we are the masters of this world, and thanks to technological advancement, we can enjoy the subway, air conditioning, food and other commodities or conveniences anytime and anywhere. But we forget the value of our own existence, the meaning of existence.

And it is precisely now, at this particular time, during this particular pandemic, that the government, in combination with contemporary technology, have shattered our peaceful lives and forced us to re-examine the meaning of our lives, the meaning of our existence. (Un?)fortunately, when facing lockdown, while our social existence is limited, can we not also perceive from this reduced existence that our life is not as good as we think, that the meaning of people's existence has long been fixed by modern technology/biopower, that our own meaning has been denied by the meaning of society as a whole? Heidegger pointed this out long ago, "but where danger is, grows / The saving power also". It is precisely this danger that gives us the opportunity to reflect on our own values and meanings.

> *It was the best of times, it was the worst of times, it was the age of wisdom, it was the age of foolishness, it was the epoch of belief, it was the epoch of incredulity, it was the season of Light, it was the season of Darkness, it was the spring of hope, it was the winter of despair, we had everything before us, we had nothing before us, we were all going direct to Heaven, we were all going direct the other way — in short, the period was so far like the present period, that some of its noisiest authorities insisted on its being received, for good or for evil, in the superlative degree of comparison only*. Charles Dickens

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Towards the Multistage Ecosocial Theory of Glottogenesis: Modern Evolutionary Concepts, Principles, and Extension of the Nomological Approach

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Abstract

In recent decades, studies of the origin of language have seen shifts toward multistage concepts, explanations based on social and ecological patterns, and the integration of different levels of analysis (from behavioral practices to gene structures). The article develops these ideas. It aims to streamline and integrate evolutionary concepts and principles, suggest a special explanatory methodology. The models of gene-culture coevolution (Wilson et al.) and cultural drive (Laland et al.) are connected with the functionalist model of homeostatic dynamics and development (A. Stinchcombe). The conceptual core of the theory consists of the "zone of nearest evolutionary development," "concern (need)," "providing structure," "magic wand." The formulated fundamental principles — a kind of "universal laws" of glottogenesis — draw on a rich intellectual tradition in biology and macrosociology. A priori rules fix the conditions of each new complexity stage of glottogenesis emergence. The main difficulty lies in justifying and explaining these stages. Moreover, the data obtained in archaeology, paleoanthropology, paleoclimatology, and paleogenetics are indirect. The extended variant of nomological explanation (C. Hempel) allows "on the industrial basis" to construct theoretical hypotheses and check them with the help of modern observations, comparisons, and experiments. Justified by this way, regularities connected logically with various indirect paleoscientific data can explain the main stages of early language evolution.

Keywords: language origin, glottogenesis, gene-cultural coevolution, cultural drive, functional approach evolutionary principles, language complexity, nomological approach.

1. Gene-cultural Coevolution

What is the biological basis of sapientation processes? Significant anatomical and psychophysiological changes accompanied the emergence and development of speaking ability. During evolution, there appeared (Wildgen, 2012: 361):

1) the organs of articulation that produce speech (control of breathing through innervation of pectoral muscles, specific vocal cords, the shape of larynx, forms of mouth, lips, and teeth);

2) a precisely tuned auditory system (mainly the inner ear);

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3) specialized brain areas (in the cortex and the brain stem) with their specific abilities of perception, recognition, categorization, memory, and self-control; Broca and Wernicke's speech centers.

The *concept of gene-culture coevolution* that has become popular was born to combine Neo-Darwinism with the ideas of the Baldwin effect and Waddington epigenesis. So, the priority of gene mutations sounds in the very name. Researchers emphasize the evolutionary success of behavior acquired during ontogeny and conditioned by innate potential.

Researchers pointed out similarities of this model with Lamarck's doctrine seemingly long rejected. Some authors also mention the importance of a changing external environment (Richards, 1987: 399; Oppenheimer, 2012).

There is a clear departure in modern genetics from the former strict corpuscular (in fact, Mendelian) ideas about unidirectional causality "from the bottom up": from the genotype to the phenotype. Instead, flexible epigenetic processes are increasingly recognized. In other words, the ideas and positions of neo-Lamarckism are strengthened (Wilson & Lumsden, 1983; Koonin, 2011; Popov, 2018).

The gene-culture coevolution theory authors adhere to the idea of a dynamic relationship between genotype-determined assignments, brain, psyche formation during ontogenesis, and behavior. The latter becomes successful in adapting and sexual selection in a changing environment. Here "epigenetic rules" are the key concept, and "cultural alternatives" become a significant property of the changing environment (Wilson & Lumsden, 1983: 70-71). The authors describe the main links of the relevant cycle as follows (*Ibid*., 1983: 117-118):

- The genes prescribe the rules of development (the epigenetic rules) by which the individual mind is assembled.
- The mind grows by absorbing parts of the culture already in existence.
- The culture is created anew in each generation by the summed decisions and innovations of all the members of the society.
- Some individuals possess epigenetic rules enabling them to survive and reproduce better in the contemporary culture than other individuals.
- The more successful epigenetic rules spread through the population, along with the genes that encode them; in other words, the population evolves genetically.

An important direction in developing these ideas is to consider the inheritance and distribution due to the Baldwin effect of not so much individual potential to specific forms of behavior, as more general and *broader mental potential* to learning, experience borrowing, thinking, and constructive abilities.

When confronted with new challenges, some individuals give successful responses thanks to their innate predispositions. Thus, *individual learning* occurs — the choice of the best of alternatives. If no one imitates such a pioneer, the effect dies with him. Nevertheless, if the most successful tribe members are imitated ("biased transmission"),[1] the innovation is preserved. Then *social learning* can take place — acquiring abilities in interaction with elders and imitating them. Such knowledge is effective in a stable environment. However, when the environment changes and

[1] "Biased transmission" — individuals in groups usually imitate successful tribesmen, choosing among several known behavioral alternatives the best one (Richerson & Boyd, 1992: 65).

creates *challenges*[2] (especially with migrations and encounters with outsiders), more of those who learn individually must emerge for the group to succeed (Richerson & Boyd, 1992: 70-71).

Individuals who have gained advantages through innate epigenetic rules propagate their genes primarily in their group. Successful practices spread through imitation. This group becomes more successful in the following generations than other groups due to its "advanced" members. In intergroup encounters mixing, mutual contributions of genes happen (as an essential mechanism of population reproduction and integrity). As a result, benefits derived from combinations of genes, rules, and culturally translated practices spread throughout the population. The extinction of those groups left without this evolutionary advantage only accelerates extending the latter.

The success of individual learning has its regularities associated with the Skinnerian mechanisms of reinforcement (Richerson & Boyd, 1992: 64).

Acquired successful forms of behavior are closely related to innate predispositions. The scheme in Fig. 1. presents the complex mechanism of joint action of gene mutations, heredity, development of neural brain structures, sexual and intergroup selection, translation, updating cultural patterns, and social practices. The scheme includes two clearly expressed contours: the lower one presents processes on genes, heredity, and selection, and the upper one — the processes in behavior, imitation, interaction with the environment, and social transfer of experience, the transmission of various kinds of cultural patterns.



Fig. 1. Model of gene-culture coevolution, where blocks indicate conditional phases and arrows indicate transitions between stages. The shaded blocks and arrows denote processes mainly related to heredity and selection, while the white blocks denote behavior, psyche, and culture.

[2] The concept of "challenge" here correlates with the more accepted idea of "stress" in biology. Numerous experiments have shown that stress causes directed mutations — the so-called stress-induced mutagenesis as a quasi-Lamarckian mechanism of evolution. Moreover, as environmental pressures mount, the Darwinian model weakens and gives way to the Lamarckian mode. See more details in Koonin (2011: 263-273).

Read the scheme according to the ordinal numbers of blocks. The numbers with letters (1 1a, 4a-4b-4c, 5-5a) mean parallel or conjugate (separable only analytically) phenomena in the circuit of causal relationships. Divergent mutations (block 1) are eventually replaced by mutations "in a narrower spectrum" (1a) with preservation of the epigenetic rules supported by selection (4a, b, c).

Trial and error in block three can only partially be considered behavioral analogs of gene mutations. The successful answers (individual or group actions, practices, strategies) are not accidental.

First, not all group members come to them, but the carriers of the most pronounced innate epigenetic rules. Second, successful responses are not created "out of nothing." They are always a transfer of an idea, structure, or technique from another sphere. Third, they can be a new combination of such patterns with some modifications and adjustment of elements to each other.

In other words, successful behavioral responses are generally "indebted" to predispositions, the inherited genome, and cultural patterns transmitted through generations. They allow for various recombination.

The death of individuals and groups that have not received a practical behavioral innovation (block 4a) enhances the reproductive success of those who have received it (4b) and contributes to selection for the ability to acquire such innovations (4c).

Block 5a expresses the incorporation of the Baldwin effect into the model: hominid groups not only adapt to their environment but also adapt the material, social, and cultural environment to their needs. These changes lead to the even greater success of behavior according to acquired epigenetic rules in subsequent generations. Here we are talking about the arrangement of stays and hearths, trail-building, establishing contacts with other groups (cross-marriages, exchanges, joint warfare), and later already about storage technologies, construction of dwellings, domestication of animals and plants

2. The cultural drive

The models of gene-culture coevolution (Wilson & Lumsden, 1983) and cultural drive (Laland, 2017: 124) are closely related and sometimes difficult to distinguish. However, the treatment of the vector of changes causality in recent years reversed: not from genes to culture and back, but *from adaptive behavior and culture to genes*. Like this approach and alternative to (Neo)Darwinism, Russian evolutionists already in the 1920s developed the ideas of orthogenesis, nomogenesis, and the importance of the interaction of entire populations (not just individuals) with the environment.

In a similar vein, Daniel Dor and Eva Jablonka, staking on the factor of *specific hominid sociality*, propose to speak not about gene-culture coevolution but about culture-driven coevolution ("from gene-culture coevolution to culturally driven coevolution"). In doing so, they rely on the ideas of James Baldwin, Conrad Waddington, and Ivan Shmalghausen.

> "As the growing literature within the framework of Evolutionary-Developmental Biology (evo-devo) makes clear, genuinely new behavioral patterns emerge from exploratory processes made possible by brain plasticity. They are gradually shaped by experience to approximate their functions, become objects of learning, mould capacities in their shape, and eventually, if the selection pressure remains, drive a process of genetic accommodation. Adaptation thus begins at the level of phenotype: capacity emerges from behavior, not the other way around. Genes are followers in evolution" (Dor & Jablonka, 2014: 17).

These sensible ideas, however, quite rhyme with the well-known metaphor of the "whip," when a behavioral adaptation forced due to changes in climate, landscapes, available means of subsistence then "pushes" multiple morphological, psychophysiological shifts, fixed already in the genome (Givón, 2009). Turner and Maryanski (2008) conceptualize these "whips" as "Spencerian selection pressures."

Here we talk about the same mass behavior of hominids, whose enigmatic changes led to progressive sapientation: morphological and cognitive.

3. Zones of nearest evolutionary development and stages of glottogenesis

"Zone of the nearest development" (ZND) is an essential concept in Leo Vygotsky's psychology, which means a discrepancy between the level of a child's actual development and their possible development level. A child can achieve this level when solving tasks with an adult or peers (Vygotsky, [1930] 1997). Thus, a child successfully masters each zone of the nearest development through interiorization.

Cognitive evolution and glottogenesis occurred stepwise. Evolutionary developing species ascents to each new step only when it has mastered the previous one. Therefore, I suggest the concept of Zones of Nearest Evolutionary Development (ZNED) as an analogy to Vygotsky's notion. In the aspect of glottogenesis, each actual stage included already used linguistic distinctions and structures, individuals' speech tasks and abilities, features of social interactions, and communicative practices, which were potential ingredients for the emergence of new structures of these types. The field of possibilities for modifying and combining these potential ingredients constituted each ZNED in this sphere. In terms of the parametric space of potential attractors, the achievement of each ZNED makes a new set of attractors available.

However, a living system, i.e., a group or population of hominids with a particular cognitive and speech abilities level, needs to be "pushed" toward them. New challenges and concerns played a role as the "pushes" (drivers) that led to new tryouts. In anthropogenesis, a certain it was a "main way" between attractors: an ascending ladder of steps of glottogenesis and cognitive evolution to a full-fledged language with Hockett's universals (Hockett, 1963). Exceptionally flexible and potentially rich providing structures had set this path (below, I will discuss these *magic wands*).

Advancing in the mastery of ZND in ontogenesis, a child learns a native language in just a few years. Constant communication with native speakers is the backbone of this acquisition.

In cognitive evolution as a phylogeny of language and consciousness, there were no those "adults" who could transmit linguistic structures in the ready-made form and already standardized cultural patterns. Therefore, hominids moved to speech and language very slowly, with constant strenuous attempts to break through to mutual understanding in new spheres of discussion and at new levels of precision. The progression through ZNED as stages of linguistic complexity — *glotto-aromorphosis* — took many hundreds of thousands and even millions of years, albeit with increasing acceleration (Dediu & Levinson, 2018; Gabora & Smith, 2018).

For each stage, we should reconstruct the new *techno-natural niches* that emerged, the new systems of relations (social orders) associated with them, and the corresponding *communicative concerns*[3]: a kind of analog of the child's learning tasks

[3] Communicative concerns can be understood (somewhat simplistically) as objectively given needs to transmit and perceive messages meaningful in the context of a particular social order and techno-natural niche. The theoretical notion of "concern" I will deploy below. "Communication" is here understood quite

The concept of "concerns" as one of the key concepts in theory developed here requires justification and clarification. The basic construct for this notion is the functional model, which has wide systemic application and is also a helpful tool in analyzing evolutionary processes.

4. Artur Stinchcombe's functional model and its application in explaining cognitive evolution

Figure 2 represents the scheme of Stinchcombe. The activity of *the providing structure* ***S*** (social institution, practice, technology, ritual, or tradition) maintains *the homeostatic variable* ***H*** (object of constant concern) at an acceptable level. The lower the homeostatic variable ***H***, the more intensive becomes the action of structure S (negative connection). The structure ***S*** itself restores and strengthens ***H*** (positive connection), thereby neutralizing the oppressive effect of the *tension* ***T***. It is the classical cybernetic principle of feedback providing stable equilibrium.



Note: From now on, solid arrows mean positive (strengthening, increasing) connection, and dashed arrows mean negative (weakening, decreasing) relationship.

Figure 2. A. Stinchcombe's model of functional causality

Stinchcombe enriches the classical canon. The action of structure ***S*** is "not free," its activity increases *costs* ***C*** (positive relation). The growth of costs naturally depresses the intensity of the structure *S* (the negative link). Costs ***C*** also can directly increase the tension ***T*** (Stinchcombe, 1987: 136).

As applied to cognitive evolution and glottogenesis, the values of variables and the dynamic relationships between them receive the following interpretation:

- *the homeostatic variable* is the state of the object of concern (e.g., peace, harmony, mutual understanding, coordination of collective action in a group) in terms of acceptability for a given live system; when homeostatic variables values are high, the group (as well as group alliance, population) is more likely to survive, expand and prevail in encounters with other groups (alliances, populations);

traditionally as the interaction between living beings to exchange some meaningful content (information in the broadest sense).

- the *providing structure activity* ***S*** in the aspect of social and cognitive evolution is the intensity of the effective impact on the object of concern ***H*** or the interaction of individuals and groups, especially with the use of communication;

- the magnitude of the *costs* ***C*** that directly depend on the activity ***S*** of the providing structure is the adverse effects of this activity; for example, the development of speech and verbal memory led to the growth of the brain and skull of the fetus, which increased the risk of birth traumas; the suppression of aggressive loners led to the decline in the effectiveness of coercion and control by direct violence as the former primary way of disciplining tribe members;

- *challenges* as effects of *tension* ***T*** can come from outside (f. e. lack of food, raw materials for necessary stone tools, threats from predators, rival groups, other forms of "whips" — the Spencerian selection pressures); increased costs ***C*** also can cause stresses damaging the objects of concern ***H*** (f. e. effective weapons against outsiders become dangerous for group members; becoming attractive to a desirable partner increases the risk to be a potential victim of rapists).

5. Concerns, their providing structures, and magic wands

Let us call a concern a stable complex of variables significant for the existence of a live system (an individual, group, or community) in its niches, which manifests itself in the increasing variability and renewed activity of the live system aimed at getting into a definite ("comfortable") zone of values of these variables.

Variability and activity represent attempts in the broadest sense: variants of the phenotypes, genomes, behavioral trials and probing speech actions, new social practices and rules, finally, innovative cultural patterns, including language ones.

The attempts, if successful, are fixed thanks to special fixation mechanisms that include multilevel selection, genetic heredity, and intergenerational cultural transfer.

As a result, a providing structure of any type (adaptation in the broad sense) emerges. This structure restores the homeostatic variable (object of concern), i.e., returns it to the required zone of values. A providing structure can be an organ, a property of an organ. In cultural and cognitive evolution, such structures also include types of behavior, social practices, rules, institutions, mental and speech abilities, various patterns, values, intellectual schemes, and linguistic constructions.

Environmental and social pressures form challenges and concerns for living beings (individuals), groups, and populations. Behavioral attempts are activities of these subjects, and fixation mechanisms conserve resulting successful structures (in that broadest sense). So, this conceptualization enwidens and explicates the Spencerian evolutionary ideas that Turner and Machalek (2018: 31) formulate:

> "Societies are fit if individuals and corporate units can respond to these pressures through their capacities for agency; and these responses do not come from some underlying genome and the shuffling of genes into new variants on which selection occurs but, instead, by goal-directed actions and/or luck of individual actors or collective/corporate actors seeking solutions to these selection pressures."

Of course, we are referring here primarily to objective concerns. They have a subjective representation as needs among animals. Humans can perceive concerns in the ordinary sense as desires, aspirations, passions, interests, motives.

Let us relate the concept of "concern" to those close to it. In evolutionary biology, *"function"* generally refers to the purpose of an organ or system of organs.

Concern, unlike function, is not attached to an organ or system of organs. The concern is not a characteristic of an organism but the whole complex, including an individual (or a group, a community) with a particular encompassing niche of existence.

Need is a renewable state of readiness of an organism or a subject (an individual, a group) to fill some deficiency in air, food, water, sex, social support, play, physical or mental abilities manifestation.

"Concern" as a word of everyday speech is subjective (somehow perceived) need. *"Concern"* (in the systemic, broad sense) manifests itself in activity and/or changes driving to achieve acceptable, preferable values of the variables of that caring, keeping them within certain limits.

In what follows, we will deal primarily with hominids' fundamental concerns and their communicative concerns. The *areas of fundamental concerns* include:

- security, control of violence, and the ability to use it;
- sustenance;
- comfortable, acceptable external conditions (protection from cold, heat, wind, precipitation);
- sexuality;
- position among their kind, level of group membership, status, dominance, prestige, leadership, influence, dignity;
- parenthood as protection, sustenance, upbringing, and education of children;
- possession, ownership, preferential or exclusive access to territory, the bodies of potential sexual partners, things, resources, raw materials, and everything regarded as good.

Fundamental concerns play a vital role in the entire evolution of the human species (prehistory and history) and thus in cognitive evolution, including glottogenesis. In the most general sense, they play the role of primary drivers in the renewal of techno-natural niches and social orders, and already in these niches and orders, new — derived — concerns emerge.

Providing structures (adaptations in the broad sense and related elements, constraints, connections, processes) can be vastly different: from anatomic organ to social practice. Moreover, the origin of a structure can also be quite different, including through compromise with other structures, through their integration, through following rules (i.e., previously established structures), through conscious responses to challenges, i.e., decisions and their implementation.

The structures that make up the "building material" for the new structure are called its ingredients. A particular case of the sufficiency of only one ingredient is pre-adaptation, i.e., a structure that previously provided other concerns. Exaptation means using a structure or function for a purpose other than that for which it initially evolved.

In addition, distinctive features of structures have different plasticity, some change beyond recognition or disappear altogether, while others remain almost unchanged.

Among the providing structures, there are special ones that I call metaphorically magic wands because they have a fantastic property of high plasticity and multifunctionality, a vast potential for development, for which sometimes there are no limits. In other words, a magic wand is a source of multiple future exaptations.

The brain and skillful hand have become such a structure in the human organism. In prehistory and history, such major magic wands have emerged as language, consciousness, technology, thinking, philosophical and scientific cognition, art.

In languages, the magic wands are diverse ways of phonological distinction, word formation, sentence composition, and semantic values.

6. Principles of evolution applied to sapientation and glottogenesis

The principles formulated below, which have within the framework of the outlined concept the status of initial postulates, outside have their empirical and theoretical grounds. These principles are partly directly borrowed, partly obtained by generalization, conceptual stylization from works on the general theory of evolution, anthropogenesis, developmental psychology, social psychology, and sociology (Spencer, [1901] 2021; Vygotsky, [1930] 1997; Alexander, 1987; Collins, 2004; Boehm, 2015; Turner & Machalek, 2018; et al.).

These postulates are often assumed and implicitly used in many works on the language origin and evolution (Jackendoff, 2002; Bybee, 2002; Dessalles, 2007; Tomasello, 2008; Turner, Maryanski, 2008; Bickerton, 2009; Wildgen, 2012; Dor et al., 2014; Sterelny, 2016; Laland, 2017; Gabora & Smith, 2018).

The principle of providing, or "whip": when a new acute concern (objective group need) emerges, if there are sufficient ingredients, abilities for trials, fixation mechanisms, there is bound to be a structure that provides this concern to some extent; in particular, social practices, individual attitudes, and speech abilities are such structures.

The advantage of the breadth of available ingredients: a live system chooses response to a challenge always in the accessible space of possibilities. Accordingly, evolutionary responses always use the available arsenal of ingredients, i.e., already functioning alternative structures. The wider this arsenal, the wider the possibilities of various combinations, the higher the probability of forming and winning a competition for more effective providing structures.

The advantage of colliding diversities: the more encountering populations and their cultural traditions are carriers of structures available for modification and use in new combinations, the wider the arsenal of ingredients, the more likely new effective forms will emerge to provide the emergent concerns (see above).

The principle of magic wand expansion (proliferation of successful structures): if some found or established (for example, linguistic) structures prove highly effective in providing current concerns, new attempts to use them for various other concerns will undoubtedly emerge; in such cases, the mechanism of positive reinforcement in ontogenesis, positive selection in phylogenesis, is activated; if these structures again lead to success, then the intensity of subsequent attempts to use and modify them grows.

The principle of adaptation to previously established structures: if a new structure comes into conflict with already existing structures that successfully function, supporting its stability, the new structure is likely to be adapted and modified. So, a new word, a construction, an inclusion from an alien language will change (say, phonetically, grammatically) to be easily pronounced and recognized.

The principle of collateral consequences, or costs: the activity of many structures developed to provide concerns (objective needs) leads to various tensions, leading to new concerns requiring new providing structures.

The principle of cultural drive: successful behavioral practices and abilities are fixed not only in social learning but also through the formation of hereditary prerequisites for such behavior due to the operation of diverse selection levels.

The principle of zones of nearest evolutionary development (ZNED): the structures developed to provide some concerns are potential ingredients of future structures that may be needed to provide new concerns; the area of possibilities for modification and combination of these potential ingredients constitutes the ZNED; only within it structures with parts or aspects built from these ingredients may emerge.

The principle of no complete evolutionary gaps: it is legitimate to extrapolate known similar features of the initial and final periods of some evolutionary epoch to an unknown middle period; if at the early stages or similar levels of evolution, members of a species had some distinct trait and a similar trait is present in much more evolutionarily advanced species as their presumed descendants, then it is reasonable to assume that this trait existed in the intermediate stages that we do not know.

The principle of the rhythm of formative (breakthrough) and cumulative stages: in formative stages, new cognitive structures with significant potential for functionality, modifications, and deployment (*magic wands*) appear; in subsequent cumulative steps, these new structures realize their deployment potential by modifying and articulating with other forms, which leads to accumulation of changes and possible maturation of a new breakthrough stage.

Skinner's principle of reinforcement: attitudes and abilities are formed and strengthened in the psyche thanks to positive reinforcement (or negative for rejected structures); in humans, from early childhood and in higher mammals (dogs, horses, and apes), the explicit (un)approval from significant others serves as sufficient reinforcement.

Vygotsky's principle, or interiorization: if behavioral acts in social interaction (especially communication) lead to successful responses to challenges (especially repeated ones), then participants' attitudes (predispositions, abilities) are likened to these actions, because of which participants become inclined and capable of reproducing corresponding behavioral responses to subsequent similar challenges.

The shift from Darwinian to Lamarckian mechanisms in human evolution. The more the life of individuals depends on social practices, relationships, structures (rather than directly on the natural environment), the more they seek to enhance or maintain their position in the communities that provide them, the more their behavior depends on social control and the dynamics of competition in those communities. Various rewards (including reproductive success) go to those with good social reputations (Alexander, 1987). The systematic effect of this trend in generational change through the Baldwin effect (changes in genes, brain structures) and through the translation of cultural patterns (changes in mentality) sets the vector of directed evolution. This principle is a result of the joint action of the “whip,” cultural drive, Vygotsky, and Skinner principles.

Spencer’s principle, or a combination of differentiation and integration: if initially used structure is syncretic (for example, an inarticulate sound, protosyllable, protoword), and for successful responses to different calls, separate actions are necessary, then thanks to repeated attempts, different structures will emerge; if for successful responses to the subsequent calls and concerns these structures are required together, then as a result of corresponding attempts, encompassing constructions will necessarily form.

The principle of convolutions: if structures (for example, words, parts of words, word combinations) are repeatedly and successfully used both together and separately in providing different concerns (communicative tasks), then an integrative structure, or convolution (for

example, a new compound word, a new stable phrase, a new syntactic form for similar phrases) will invariably emerge.

The principle of gluing: if structures (e.g., words, parts of words, phrases) are repeatedly and successfully used only together to provide the same concerns (communicative tasks), they are combined into a merged, inseparable whole, or gluing (a new word or particle, whose complex origin is hidden from speakers and revealed only by special linguistic analysis). A particular case of such gluing is the well-known phenomenon of grammaticalization.

The principle of ceasing the search upon success: if in finding an answer to the threat challenge, the established structure protects against risks and damage, or if due to the response to the challenge-opportunity attractive goals are achieved through the new structure, and no new concerns appear, then the providing structure is maintained and further used without new attempts (trials, probes, searches) at modification.[4]

7. Glotto-aromorphoses as rises in the stages of linguistic complexity

At the heart of every significant growth of language complexity is a flexible and multifunctional structure, i.e., a linguistic *magic wand*. Let us formulate as a priori postulates the rules of progression of glottogenesis steps based on the evolutionary principles presented above, especially the *ZNED principle*.[5] The essence of the rules is that the emergence of a subsequent step of language complexity cannot occur in the absence of the previous one:

- constructions of *complex syntax* (with recursion, polysemy, rhetoric decorations) can appear only when structures of simple syntax and grammar already exist and are in use;
- encompassing structures of *simple syntax and grammar* that govern combinations (chains) of words can emerge only when such combinations with simple order and coherent values are already present in speech;
- word combinations with simple order and coherent values (i.e., *pidgin-sentences*), and full-fledged words themselves can appear only when protophrases are present;
- *full-fledged words* (which are used arbitrarily, clearly articulated, and identifiable, which have constant values independent of the situational context but semantically connected) could appear and multiply only when the protowords (not clearly articulated with syncretic, vague values recognizable only in context);
- *withdrawing (leading away) protophrases* describing situations in another place and time could only appear when reactive and situative protophrases were already in use;
- *reactive and situative protophrases* as chains of protowords arranged in no order, but with a general syncretic meaning conveying what is happening "here and now" can only appear when there is already a practice of uttering individual protowords;
- *individual protowords (holophrases),* being gluings of syllables or phonemes aimed at conveying integral situational meaning, can appear because of many

[4] "…once a cognitive demand is satisfied at a linguistic level, there is no need to have another strategy for the same purpose" (Coupé & Hombert, 2005: 40).

[5] See also (Donald, 1998; Gabora & Smith, 2018; Jackendoff, 2002; Bybee, 2002; Burling, 2005; Dessalles, 2007; Bickerton, 2009; Hurford, 2012).

repeated communicative interactions, possible only under certain social conditions of joint intentionality and shared motivation to mutual understanding.

Suppose we manage with the help of these principles and rules to construct and substantiate a plausible conception of the stepwise evolution of language and associated cognitive abilities supporting it through the expanded Hempelian approach and various indirect data (see below). In that case, it will be the best confirmation of the formulated postulates and rules adequacy.

A direct empirical, much less experimental, verification of this consistency is impossible for obvious reasons (which is quite distressing for pedantic adherents of Popper's falsifiability principle).

Indirect confirmations of the rules are structurally similar sequences of a child's acquisition of their native language (Vygotsky, [1930] 1997). Without systematic learning, the adult, who finds himself in a completely new language environment, also moves from mastering individual words to protophrases and pidgin-sentences. If he masters the syntax and grammar of a foreign language, it is only with great difficulty, purposefully developing his speech ability using frequent corrections by others.

8. Renewal of techno-natural niches and social orders

The development of a glottogenesis research program focused on accounting for changing social interactions and types of communication is already taking place in dozens of particular studies. However, the rise to a new stage usually requires a new encompassing conceptual construct. The multistage ecosocial conception draws on the models, principles, and rules, outlined above, and in addition, includes the following components:

- ideas of niche construction and social order renewal (Odling-Smee et al., 2003; Dor & Jablonka, 2014; Laland, 2017);
- an extension of the classical challenge-response scheme (Toynbee, [1961] 2013);
- evolutionist notions of multilevel selection, pre-adaptations, and exaptations, attempts or trials in a broad sense (from behavioral to mutational ones), fixation mechanisms (through imprinting, interiorization, social learning, sexual or group selection) (Gintis, 2004; Richerson & Boyd, 2005);
- synthesis of the concepts of interiorization, interactive rituals, operant conditioning, and attitudes as controlling parts of the psyche (Skinner, 1986; Collins, 2004; Vygotsky, [1930] 1997; Boehm, 2015).

The idea of niche updating as the most crucial driver of cognitive evolution is already widely accepted (Odling-Smee et al., 2003; Bickerton, 2009; Laland, 2017). In evolutionary biology, "niches" represent areas of interaction between species and their environment, primarily in foraging, breeding, and providing security, comfortable living conditions. Some species' niches are delimited from or overlap with the niches of others, which is usually associated with stiff competition, adaptations, and selection. The niches of hominids, especially beginning with Early Homo (c. 2.7 mya), had crucial features.

First, hominids updated and expanded their interactions with the natural environment faster, more successfully, and on a larger scale through the discovery of new sources of subsistence.

Secondly, the development of instrumental technologies transformed natural niches into techno-natural ones, as their capture, construction, renewal, also the transformation of new niches became increasingly dependent on the progress of Stone Age technologies.

Thirdly, there was an equally rapid and large-scale transformation of the systems of social relations: the structures of interactions initially adapted to the survival of communities in their natural niches. As time passed, social relations acquired their autonomous dynamics and evolution.

Everyone occupies a particular position in the relations system, i. e., an internal social niche for social animals within a group. At the same time, the group outside must interact with groups of the same species: as a rule, competing for territory, feuding, or entering friendly and mating relationships. Such internal and external social niches are significant for lion pride. Social interactions and relations occupy almost the main forces, energy, and attention in groups of baboons, chimpanzees, and bonobos (our closest relatives).

Due to hominids' initial cohesion and subsequent successful expansion, their intragroup and intergroup interactions have become even more critical. As a result, social niches with behavioral adaptations appear as *social orders:* systems of typical relations and practices with patterns of behavior of individuals and groups, set by positions occupied with corresponding possibilities of mutual influence, access to each other, and benefits and resources. In the long run, these relations and positions began to supplement by systems of rules, i.e., *social institutions*.

Natural niches and social orders, including typical vital circumstances, are addressed to individuals and groups as *concerns*. These concerns initially take the form of *challenges-threats* and *challenges-opportunities*. Then, prospective responses become behavioral strategies and practices. It is a process of *providing structures* formation.

9. Coevolution of niches, orders, and communications

Consider the causal influences between techno-natural niches, social orders, communicative concerns, and practical, verbal behavior. There is no direct causal determination here. The role of techno-natural niches is to supply challenges-threats ("whips" or "sticks") and challenges-opportunities ("carrots") primarily in the *areas of sustenance* (hunger or new delicious, nutritious food), *security/violence* (fearful predators, dangerous enemies, or opportunities to defend against them, defeat them) and *living conditions* (heat, cold, harsh weather, or pleasant comfort). Hominids in their main response strategies — creation, use of external means, and coordination of complex group behavior — used intragroup communication.

What is necessary to convey, convince, learn, or understand: all this depends no longer directly on natural challenges ("sticks and carrots"). It began to depend on the established social order in the group (later, in the alliance of groups, in complex configurations of relations). It is at this point that the sociological approach takes on particular significance. Moreover, the life of hominids, so distant and alien to us, was permeated by *social universals* that have not lost their relevance to this day: violence and control over violence, power, status (in perspective — prestige, and influence), material goods (in view — wealth, property). Thus, natural "sticks and carrots" are refracted in different social orders.

Each stage of anthropogenesis begins with the emergence of new features in technology, in the way of life and nutrition, in anatomical changes. These changes are always associated with shifts in social interaction, material and communicative practices, and cognitive abilities.

Let us now turn to the general approach of explaining each glotto-aromorphosis and the corresponding ascent to a new stage of cognitive evolution.

10. Extension of C. Hempel's nomological explanatory model

A methodological approach is needed that encompasses multiple methods of obtaining, interpreting indirect data on glottogenesis, and turning them into a kind of megamachine for hypothesis making and hypothesis testing.

First, it is necessary to present the regular connections between the phenomena as *a pair of theoretical and empirical hypotheses* for each glotto-aromorphosis — the breakthrough to a new stage of linguistic complexity through the formation and spread of language magic wands.

Second, paleoclimatic and archaeological data on the changes in the corresponding period's material practices and social interactions are *used to evaluate each empirical hypothesis*.

Third, each theoretical hypothesis's general concepts and logical connections should ensure its reliable verification and *not only (!) by indirect data*.

Carl Hempel's nomological scheme with a deductive derivation of judgments about phenomena-sequences from judgments about initial conditions-causes and from "universal hypotheses" (Hempel, 1942) seems to be a promising ideological core of such an approach. The empirical hypothesis of each transition to a new stage of language development has the following form: "*there and then under such circumstances, linguistic structures of such class must have formed."* Fig. 3 presents a diagram of this explanatory logic.



Note: The shaded arrow means the influence of causal phenomena on consequences in reality under study (lower right area). The white arrows are the logical justifications of judgments in theoretical thinking (upper left area). To K. Hempel's canonical scheme, justifications are added: separately for the theoretical hypothesis (through indirect data: up-to-date testing by observations and experiments) and the empirical hypothesis (through indirect data of paleo-sciences).

Figure 3. The extended scheme of the nomological explanation of cognitive evolution and glottogenesis phenomena

A more general theoretical hypothesis ("universal" in Hempel's terms) with the logical structure "if..., then..." is constructed for the empirical hypothesis. The extension of Hempel's scheme is necessary because the theoretical hypothesis itself must be justified. Moreover, one should formulate the hypothesis *so abstractly that it allows testing its consequences by up-to-date observations, analog (in-situ), or computer experiments*. Figure 4 presents the general logic of theoretical hypothesis justification.



Note: Here the blocks denote judgments and arguments. The arrows indicate logical reinforcement: increasing the validity, plausibility of judgments, confidence in them.

Figure 4. Scheme of theoretical hypothesis justification in K. Hempel's extended nomological approach

Examples among already conducted experiments include varying the nature of oral instruction in the practical making of Olduvai and Acheulian stone implements (Morgan et al., 2015; Laland, 2017: 189-207), teaching grapheme or gestural languages to chimpanzees (Lloyd, 2004; Rumbaugh, 2013), experiments and observations of language-learning children (Tomasello, 2008), computer simulations (Tamariz & Kirby, 2016; Kirby, 2017; Markov & Markov, 2020), experiments with communicating robots (Nolfi & Mirolli, 2010).

If this indirect method supports the theoretical hypothesis, the judgments of the empirical hypothesis become more plausible (the opposing arrows in Figure 3). On the other hand, if the theoretical hypothesis is not supported, then another meaningful explanation must be sought reformulated, and the hypothesis should be tested again. In addition, there are rich opportunities to vary experimental conditions.

Assumptive judgments about conditions and results of conditions' formation in each place and epoch (as a part *"if"* in an empirical hypothesis) have separate testing logic. Here the indirect data of paleo-sciences and the archaeology of sites and implements used in studies of anthropogenesis get their role, allowing us to judge the way of life and social interactions of hominids.

The theoretical hypotheses get their sources in the cognitive evolution principles formulated above, first, *the principle of providing*, *the principle of ZNED, the principle of magic wands expansion, the principle of adaptation to previously established structures*, and in *the rules of glottogenesis stages progression*. Therefore, the theoretical hypothesis form explaining a glotto-aromorphosis takes the following form.

With such a new type of social orders and communicative concerns, with such already used signification means (including linguistic structures), with the addition of such new practices of attempts and such fixation mechanisms, definite type of linguistic structures will emerge, use these means as ingredients, and provide the concerns mentioned above.

The substantiation of the empirical hypothesis, in this case, looks as follows (Figure 5).



Figure 5. Indirect justification of the empirical hypothesis in the extended Hempelian explanation scheme

11. Conclusion

Studies of glottogenesis have made impressive advances in empirical, theoretical, and methodological aspects over the past 2 to 3 decades. Most promising are the ideas of multistage evolution driven by feedback circles between changes in natural niches, social orders, behavior, cognitive and communicative abilities, anatomy, psychophysiology, and innate gene potential.

Various kinds of attempts are expanding, not only analogies and comparisons (with the learning of communication by great apes, with children mastering speech, with patients with aphasia, with communication in primitive tribes) and experimentation. The sketch of the concept presented above aims to combine and order various ideas, methods, and results, including them in an encompassing ontological construct with the possibility of strict justification of judgments.

Perhaps this conceptual construction and the version of extending Hempel's explanatory scheme have significant flaws, so they will not be recognized. Nevertheless, there is still an imperative to build an encompassing theoretical framework and a methodology that allows for logical justification of judgments about causes and drivers of glottogenesis based on indirect data. The strategy of this kind offers the best opportunity for further discoveries, for understanding the origins of human language and reason.

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When the Imagination Replaces an Absent Memory[1]

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Abstract

The art cannot be limited to overcoming limitations, however those are important facts in its history. After modernism, the idea of time as a straight line, loaded the linear orientation. Even fuzzy and without a trace of it attributed distinctiveness, time is in the author's power. The creation allows the imagination to replace true memory or its failure. If the creator is able to organize a temporality which tempts him and at the same time attracts the attention of certain listeners, there are all conditions for a success of the creation.

Keywords: style, modernism, creation, memory, imagination, time.

1. Introduction

"The Compression" of the decades into a synonymous feature of the past came into fashion during the last century. No matter how much the fashion itself has been underestimated and ridiculed as a perfunctory term, it has grown to its symbolic determinant. In the latest fashion, the fashion of prosperity has thrown shadows on everything. The photography has played its decisive part as a new fashion and miracle of the new technology. The photography can take hold (catch) the very moment; it can fix its temporary place.

2. Art and time

A drawing, painted by William Hogarth about 1740, provokes our curiosity with the fact that a new attitude towards the time appeared. Though Hogarth's drawing disappeared, we know about it only from its numerous engravings. The name of this drawing is "Taste in High Life". It presents some modern of that time temptations. A boring old woman in a crinoline dress flirts with a growing older gentleman with a wig and a cane, a young lady tickles a black boy and in front of them a monkey reads s French menu. A number of paintings hung on the walls. We see Venera Medichy on one of them, she is also in a crinoline dress and an old fat woman tightens her corset. In the left corner a fluffy little amur arranges different clothes and accessories of the previous fashion season. On the Venera' pedestal is written the mode 1742 "It's obvious that time still passes

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slowly. If we accept that Hogarth painted it about 1740, it means that li collected little amur dresses and clothes fashionable in 1739. On the pedestal is 1742, i.e. the painting was engraved 2 years later" (Dgeimisan, 2005: 63).

A modern Hogarth, who lives in London with a substantial image of a businessman and creator, will not be relaxing if the idea of a Taste in High Life was born in his mind. He will draw in outlines a fashion story which will firstly appear in Vogue in 2 weeks, and then in a Brazilian magazine in a month and even in a Bulgarian one. It will also appear in the Net and in 6 months they will appear in the completed, tempting, easy to remember image of the style .....-x.

The last century was soaked in charm of these characters and now we "the old men" of the 21st century who cannot realize what has happened in the 2000 sigh deeply over these images of the style .....-x, though badly the children of the new millennium has already written.

All these things will not be possible without the help of the photography. The dead time prints has gathered one by one.

You can find among them the airhostesses' hairstyle of the 1950s when a group of art trends has declared its presence as a whole because they do not share the characteristic feature of modernism – the opposition between art for the elite and common art. It's the time when people began to talk about the so called global anti-culture as a common base of all human activities – starting with medicine, education up to music and poetry.

The charming vulgarity of Mary Quant's mini-skirt which bombed the fashion of the 1960s and declared equality between Brigitte Bardot and Jean-Paul Sartre, who's smoking "Gouloise" in a stylish way. In the same way the adventurous James Bond's experience (wisdom of life) added in some way the refined experiment of the conceptual vanguard.

At the end of the 1960s the so called anti-cultural revolutions which followed the Chinese cultural wave faded away and an illusion for coming back to the traditions, nostalgia for the high "retro" style in fashion appeared. On the grounds of that a discussion about the new conservative reaction began. Over the course of time it became clear enough that the conservative tendencies of the 70s had just organically completed the democracy of the 60s (see. Angelov, 2005).

3. Modernity and cultural memory

In 1986, D' Orse's Museum in Paris was officially opened and it became a symbol of the unification between the vanguard, the traditions and common banality. Earlier this unification was really impossible. Its exposition was devoted to the Art of the 19c but it invalidated the results and obliterated the last traces of the past artistic collisions. For the first time impressionists and post – impressionists' canvas were exposed at one and the same time with their opponents of the historical art of painting also those of the parade portrait style as well as the sentimental genre too. The opening of the museum was a kind of climax of the interest towards the so called "bad" paintings, bloody, erotic triteness, and pictorial murders of the Roman emperors, also agony and torture of the first Christians as well as "interrogation s" of the Inquisition.

In this train of thought the question about the 90s arises. Where was their place? Where were they? The style overloaded retrospectively slowly disappeared, faded away...

In one of the Bulgarian university hospitals just for the sake of the numerous visitors' convenience who are always confused while standing in queue in front of the doctors' consulting room or surgery and they cannot orientate themselves along the hospital corridors, in the central hall at the entrance there is a big board of the hospital wards: anesthesiology, surgery, urology, hematology... On another board is written archives museum. In this way without any punctuation

marks distinctions or particularization, following the same way you can find the morgue without any symbols. Probably it's out of courtesy.

At first sight, without thinking, this strict mark showing the way out of the building, together with the hospital ward and the morgue, convinces our resistant consciousness in its simplicity and unusual justice. In fact, it shows distinction to immortality. Some people are trying to threaten other people speculatively, who still resist temptation. This sequence of the directions – morgue, archives, and museum – rules the history with necessity and inevitability, though feelings and mood which cast a gloom. This gloomy frankness of memento mori reminds us of the end of life. All the things remained in this direction are just a pressed form of a formula for time overcoming. Focusing on the end of the vital human passions themselves, events and acts, the arrow generalizes the irresistible completion of the vital cycles. At the same time a thing which has just been alive and can change whatever and whenever it likes, moves to an area where every activity and change disappear completely – the area of memory. Without being at present and without future, our memory is free of time. Time has lost its power over it.

A state of complete immobility is a state of immortality. Thus, 90s are entirely in the sphere of memory.

The 20th century is over. It's like a book which had been read for a long time and its plot was of great interest at the very beginning but it became boring and gradually lost its rhythm, and the relations between them also became monotonous not only for the readers but also for the author too. The promising story of modernism at the very beginning has come to its natural end. The book, on the first page aof which arrogantly is written "20th century – the century of modernism" is now on the bookshelf close to the other books which have already been "read". These are the books of our past: *The Century of Humanism*, *The Baroque Century*, *Enlightenment*, *The century of History*, etc. The 20th century like the previous centuries has turned to a historical fact, an archival document, and a museum exponent. The 20th century is dead.

For none of the previous centuries that fact wouldn't be so unexpected with the characteristic of a tragedy. "Novecento" (Italian – means 20th century). Unlike the other centuries the 20th century was seized with passion for news – about wars, catastrophes, horror, tragedies etc. The 20th century wanted to be modern above all things, to master (come over) the secret of the eternal modernity, to create "Perpetua mobile" of actuality. In the past the 20th century couldn't think about itself. Its character was defined by strive for conquer and rule the speed of the motion towards. Overcoming gravity, the 20century man dashed happily higher and higher, enchanted by the increasing speed and pleasure. An impression was born that maddening dynamics was endless and the free flight of modernism would wander far in the free distance without any limits. The past seemed to be like a convict prison and the man who was in chains for a long time looked as if he had just been unshackled. Looking from the skies, the sky of the free flight, our past was funny and aside. It was the same as we observe the earth from the space. Thus, our past slowly disappeared also our God. Looking forward the eternal and permanent change, finally the secret of modernity was found forever (see. Eco, 2006).

The 20th century has developed a language appropriate to overloading everybody and everything by its increasing speed. The language of modernism requires a permanent change in order to remain adequate to the dashing vanguard. The idea of the future art created the language of the future and the maniacal wish to escape of the past, to forget all the things that happened before; It felt fear of the approaching moment when the new will not be new it is its turn to go into the sphere of memory. A hope was born that the only way to press the fear of the completion is to create a language of the future now. This is the only way to make that necessary step forward into the future. Looking forward the Future and despising the reality, the genius modernist peacefully waits for the future time and future generations these people who have to speak the language

he has created. The goal of modernism was to conquer the future. For this reason, the past caused only contempt and loathing.

Despite declaring hostility in a number of manifestos towards the positivism of the 19th century the vanguard created a new concept of time, though. The only difference in the interpretation of time in comparison with the historical concept of the previous century is their appeals to a complete destroy of the past. The idea of the progress of the modernistic vanguard is to expel past because that passionate desire for speed, overcoming time and space, acquires the sacrifice of everything in the future. But this idea depends on the idea of revolution and the famous history of the 19th century considering world history as a simple endless line only the process of evolution could complete itself.

The realization of the history as a revolutionary process imposes everything to be historically explained. For this reason, we got used to thinking a possible common history. In the same way we refer to Nature, even to our own life. In such a way we can easily and without any problems explain all the events that have happened, using one scheme in advance. To this preliminary scheme are subordinated not only fashion but also ideas as well as art. However, the past seems to be something quite big and it is beyond a simple "package "of a just one principle scheme.

Certainly, the people who were adept to modernism knew well that every relation which belonged to the past wasn't a form of conservatism. This maxim threatened their modernistic revolution. That's why they made great efforts in creating a new completely incomprehensible for the past language. In fact, this is the language of the future for which the past itself is something unnecessary "Language which will mark the unspoken, inexpressible and will transform the live protest of the present into hard set time structures, inadaptable to all known ways and methods of writing history" (Rusev, 2005: 38).

The fear of the death mask of the elementary endless straightforwardness established, gave rise to the modernistic intolerance to the museums. The constellation of dead points adhesion arranged, lined up by featureless, lacking individuality regularity of the great powers of the historical consistency implacably prompting that it is capable of taking in the next modern time, facing the hated past.

The new modernistic language had to keep the freedom of every single fact, of every single creature out of the global context of the whole. Also, it had to protect them from any kind of domination and not to allow just one creative outburst of a single part of the chain of the numerous consequences, results. This language had to make fun of the metaphor expressing culture as a shelf on which all these creative outbursts are thrown as simple facts, and the culture itself simply presented as an experienced and comprehended past.

A museum, a library, a graveyard, - all those show the embodiment of the time tyranny, which modernism wants to destroy. Every event, every revolution, every creative act found in the museum departments are elementary documentary archive units which should be kept and saved. In the museum there isn't any kind of a creative act pretending for future realization because in the hated past it has mechanically gone out of real life.

The traditional museum exhibitions are arranged according to definite regularities, prompted by logics of the elementary endless straightforwardness and historical succession. The museum of Guggenheim in New York, created by Frank Lloyd Wright is something completely different. Unlike ordinary art galleries in which the exponents are in one horizontal line, in the Guggenheim Museum they are in a vertical spiral. The idea is that there is nothing permanent in life; even the museum is subordinate to the inevitable, inescapable change. Thus, the modernistic art hasn't been "driven into a tight corner", actually it out of it. The modernistic art is not a simple mixture of hard exponents but it's a continuation of the present day into the future, which has

differentiated its ideal "field" in which the time couldn't be in power. Named "modern ", the museum has declared that it won't be a collection of some facts from our cultural past, or just an expression of conformism which lacks strength of character.

The exhibition itself is arranged as a protest against the traditional inertness of the museums and their mausoleum silence. Artifacts and objects are moving, blinking, making a noise, so you cannot think of them as some dead items. There is a special place for the film art and its variety. The visitor becomes not only an involuntary, unintentional and a direct witness but also a real participant in the destruction of obstacles between the object and the subject, between the one who contemplates and the thing, item that has been contemplated. In this direct communication with the viewer the modern art opposes to its turning into a document of the past.

Some shining and making a noise exponent of the modern art are as curious as the one that could be seen in the museums of old technical equipment. Marcel Duchamp' radical act of exposing his famous public lavatory 100 years ago, nowadays it hardly ever be defined as radical, after a visit to the Mall' promotion of toilet and bathroom accessories for public conveniences. Nobody is shocked anymore by such a radical act. Marcel Duchamp's … pisoar … has been declared as the most influential creation of the modern art instead of the traditional favorite Picasso and Matisse. The photo of that toilet unit was published on the first page of the British newspapers. That 60 cm porcelain sculpture was declared as the most important work of the XX c art by 500 British experts. Honestly speaking, bell époque public lavatories, one of which has been renowned as a work of art by Duchamp, now it seems to simply ridiculous.

Certainly, it's naïve to expect that a creation could overcome time. It seems as if the work of art has succeeded in its own way to unravel and get into the time. That was A. Malraux' idea when he declared that "a work of art exists in time which is out of the chronological order".

If innovation and creativity are vital they become traditions. If they are not talented – they disappear. Appeared as a radical negation of the tradition, the language of modernism couldn't overcome it because it was talented and it became its captive. The border between its revolutionary character and the fashion slightly vanish to an absolute impossibility to be distinguished. Thus, 90s began to look like a preliminary definite reserve, where modernism could stops its mad rush and specifies more accurately its attitude towards the cultural memory.

4. Conclusion

After the period of modernism the former idea of time as a straight layout has lost its one-way character. To create a story whatever it is – historical or fictitious, romantic or real, or just to retell what happened yesterday or last year, it shows that over the past time something had been kept/saved and "ego" can still express it. Though vague, time is still within the creator/artist's power. Sometimes the creation allows imagination to be a substitute for the true memory or its insufficiency. So, what, if the simple presentation of the time as a trip, the beginning of which fades into the dim distance and the end scarcely flashes in our eyes with its slogan "future", has already passed censure on us? If the creator (the artist) is in a position to organize temporality which has tempted him and at the same time has attracted attention of a particular audience, it means that obviously there are favorable conditions for success.

Art can be reduced to overcome some restriction nevertheless how essential, important these facts are for its history on one hand and on the other hand to look for its meaning in the exultation of the permanently increasing speed, the result of which is the final goal. The modern art has overcome its pathological dependence on fear by birth and to assert itself. The art develops freely, easily in every direction. It has been found that the sphere of memory is not a dead zone. In fact, the news is dead. That's why 90s are considered to be the end of the 20th century.

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Philosophy of Political Ideologies and Trends or What is Political Philosophy?

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Abstract

This study aims to recall the ideas and activities in the field of political philosophy. It is one of the so-called "practical perspectives of philosophical knowledge", along with those such as the philosophy of law, social philosophy, ethics, aesthetics, etc. At the basis of the way of construction and reflection in our societies, the social-political-cultural structure are different ideas and religions, and in practice, in modern reality, they are expressed in political ideologies, stereotypes, reminiscences, etc. The structure of the article is: Introduction. "What is political philosophy?"; Philosophy of political ideologies and trends; Political ideologies in the conditions of globalization; Instead of a conclusion. The political ideologies in the conditions of globalization.

Keywords: political ideologies, trends, political philosophy.

1. Introduction. What is political philosophy?

This is a research direction in socio-ethical philosophy investigating the formation of attitudes of thinking and behavior in society in the aspect of the form of its government, ideologies, and attitudes.

The political philosophy examines the ideologies, perspectives of power, the state, government, politics, freedom, justice, property, rights, law and its application by authorities: what they are, why (and even if) they are necessary, what makes a government legitimate, what rights and freedoms I must protect and why, what form it must take and why, what the law is, what obligations citizens owe to the legitimate government if any, and when it can legitimately be overthrown, civil society and the forms of asserting civil rights, etc.

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2. Philosophy of political ideologies and trends

2.1 *The politics as a social phenomenon*

Politics (πολιτικός), the term has ancient Greek origins; πόλις – city-state, and from there πολιτικά (politics). The original meaning of the term was broad and unspecific and meant "affairs, activities relating to the policy." Later, it acquired the meaning of art and science for the management of the state. This is also the traditional definition of politics. Aristotle's book *Politics*, which is an analysis of the construction of the human community and the techniques of state management, with a view to a state form that combines maximum stability and maximum expediency and justice, in the assessment, played a big role in establishing the term "politics" of Olof Gigon. He is one of the most important historians of philosophy of the 20th century and deals with the whole range of ancient philosophy. His books have been translated into many languages. An example of his work is the demystification of the figure of Socrates. Gigon pointed out that Socrates, as presented by his student Plato, was the bearer of Plato's own worldview. Gigon was also of the opinion that all the problems of modern philosophy were already recognizable in ancient philosophy, even sometimes only in the germ. Aristotle defines man as a zoon political – "man is a political animal by nature;" "a creature that lives in the polis."

According to him, "he who lives outside the state by nature and not by force of circumstances is either below or superior to the common man," he is either "animal or God." A specific feature of the political form of life, according to Aristotle, is autarchy, self-sufficiency that is lacking in smaller communities, the family, and the individual. The state is the highest community and through it, self-sufficiency is achieved, it strives for the highest good; it is a human association that unites such natural human communities as – "oikia" and "come".

Thinkers of the past defined politics differently:

Plato: according to him, politics is the "king's art" to govern all other types of art (military, oratorical, judicial, etc.). For him, politics is a skill "to protect all citizens and, if possible, to make good out of the bad."

Machiavelli: according to him, politics is knowledge of correct and wise management;

Max Weber: according to him, politics is leadership over the state apparatus;

Karl Marx: according to him, politics is politics – class struggle.

Does politics unite or divide people? Conflict and Consensus Concept of Politics:

On the one hand, there is the understanding that politics consists in working for the common good, in the search for ways to overcome the contradictions and conflicts that have arisen in the course of joint social life;

On the other hand, there is also the understanding that politics is a field of the conflict itself, a struggle between opposing group and class interests.

2.2 *Structure of the political sphere*

Political subjects (leaders, political elite and organizations, party bureaucracy);

Political relations (specific relations between large groups of people, between political institutions, between the rulers and the ruled, between political parties and their leaders on the occasion of political power);

Political consciousness (political ideologies and political mass psychology).

2.3 *Essence of political ideology*

The term "ideology" was introduced into scientific circulation by the early 19th century French thinker Destutte de Tracy. With this term, he designates his doctrine of ideas, interpreted as a doctrine of the general regularities of the origin of ideas from the content of sense experience. De Tracy sees ideology as the basis of morality, politics, and law. The main thing – is the ideas in their connection with practical activity.

The political ideology is a system of views, ideas, convictions, values and attitudes expressing the interests of different social groups, classes and societies. Ideology recognizes and evaluates people's relationship to reality, social problems and conflicts, as well as contains programs for activities aimed at strengthening or changing existing social relations.

Daniel Bell defines ideology as a system of beliefs aimed at motivating people to take or refrain from certain actions. Ideology, by determining the orientations in political activity, carries out the selection of means for its implementation and mobilizes broad sections of the population to participate in the implementation of the policy.

2.4 *Social functions of ideologies*

- Legitimizing;
- Mobilizing and integrating;
- Normative-controlling (for checking the practical projects);
- Socializing (forms the consciousness of the masses);
- Compensatory (compensates dissatisfaction with social reality).

2.5 *Types of political ideologies*

2.5.1 *Conservatism*

The conservatism, along with liberalism, is one of the main political ideologies that shaped political thought in the last two centuries – of course, we can also talk about socialism, anarchism, nationalism, etc., but they are their derivatives.

The conservatism is a political doctrine that arose after the great socio-political upheavals in Europe caused by the French Revolution and the Napoleonic Wars.

Etymologically, conservatism is derived from the Latin *conservare* (to preserve, preserve). Hence the need to recognize the importance and protection of basic values and mechanisms for a society, which guarantee its existence and became necessary with its historical development. In this sense, conservatism without traditionalism is impossible

The English philosopher and statesman Edmund Burke (1729-1797) is considered the "father of conservatism" as a political philosophy. The main lines of his conception are set forth in "Reflections on the Revolution in France" (1790). Central to the book, recognized as the primary source of conservatism, is the critique of political rationalism. The main idea of the Enlightenment – the omnipotence of human reason – is put under skeptical scrutiny. Overconfidence in human abilities and an atheistic worldview based on the view of the scientific basis of progress lead, according to Burke, to harmful consequences for society (see Burke, 1790).

The destruction of the centuries-old order in which the state functions, the denial of the wisdom of the ancestors, and anticlericalism represent essentially a senseless but dangerous

rebellion against God's established creation. To political radicalism, leading in its wake to revolutionary thinking and action, Burke opposes the trinity of religion, morality and politics.

2.5.2 *Anti-utopia as the main function of conservatism*

With conservatism, one cannot speak of underestimating human reason, but of doubting the overexposure of its role. According to Burke, the rejection of tradition and the revolutionary restructuring of society through the forcible redistribution of goods proves the unreasonableness of excessive rationalism. However, preserving order and stability is not a rejection of reforms, as long as they are rooted in a mature way in them.

According to Burke, the reformer should be like the gardener who removes weeds without reshaping the garden. Burke: "A revolution is a change in government; reform is a correction of abuse of power. Reforms can be carried out without the need for a revolution, and vice versa – a revolution not only does not eliminate abuses of power but can also deepen them" (see Burke, 1790). In short, it is about the opposition between a revolutionary and an evolutionary approach.

A justification of inequality, but not as a lack of freedom, but largely the opposite. Inequality is a consequence of freedom resulting from the observance of order and justice, not from that resulting from forcible equalization. Equality is slavery to the strong (in this case, to the able).

2.5.3 *The following components largely apply to conservatism in Western societies*

- Man is a religious animal;
- Religion is the basis of civil society;
- Attempts at rapid and radical changes (regardless of intentions) destroy social ties;
- Gradual reforms are always preferable to revolutionary ones.

The main purpose of a government is to ensure order and legality; its achievement is unthinkable without realizing the principles of the rule of law, law and the equality of all citizens before the laws.

- Order and legality precede freedom; there is no freedom where there is no order and legality.
- In a well-ordered society, hierarchy, differences, and leadership inevitably exist.
- Political power should be limited and not have overarching tasks; it must provide conditions for human activity, not prescribe its content.
- Private property is a prerequisite for freedom and the pursuit of personal happiness.
- Social inequality is inevitable; moreover, it is desirable because it is the result of human freedom; any equalization limits human freedom, and often times the incentives for action.

The market economy is the best economic environment for realizing the principle of private property as a guarantor of human freedom.

Tradition	Order	Authority
Religiosity	Elite Justice	Anti-Universalism
Nationalism	Right	Anti-Revolutionary

2.5.4 *Stages in the development of conservative thought:*

- Classical conservatism (E. Burke, Joseph de Maistre, Disraeli) – an aristocratic reaction against the French Revolution;
- Market conservatism (criticism of state intervention in the economy and the advance of socialist statism);
- Neoconservatism (the 1970s).

2.5.5 *Main features of neoconservatism*

- "Less state, more civil society" (the main function of the state – protection of the right to freedom of the individual;
- Equality of the provided opportunities – to guarantee equal chances to every person by the law and the institutions. Society opens opportunities for people, and each person must react adequately, according to his skills and capabilities.

Christian democracy – the main variety of conservative ideology. It arose at the end of the 19th century. The conservatism seeks to combine the ideas of "justice" and "liberty," a defender of "social capitalism" by using the redistributive powers of the state

2.5.6 *Liberalism*

The liberalism emerged as an ideological and political movement in the second half of the 18th century (Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, the French Enlighteners; later J. Bentham, John Stuart Mill, etc., see Locke, 1823; see Hobbes, 1651).

The liberalism justifies rule on the basis of law. The purpose of the state is to ensure the celebration of law, and it itself must obey the legal requirements and principles of law.

The purpose of the state is to ensure the celebration of law, and it itself must obey the legal requirements and principles of law.

Equality of citizens before the law. Need for procedures to prevent the marginalization of parliamentary minorities. Tolerance of differences, but not tolerance of the intolerable, of intolerance. Neither hyper politicization nor apoliticization. In human life, politics should only be given its due, i.e., neither more nor less than is necessary to achieve such collective decisions as favor the maintenance and development of the conditions for freedom (see Mill, 2001).

In the economic field, liberals defend the principle of free market exchange, of personal entrepreneurship, against political interference in the economy, against protectionism. The main function of the state – is the protection of private property, creation and maintenance of general frameworks of free competition, protection of order, and protection of foreign political sovereignty. The state is only a "night watch". In the spiritual sphere – protection of tolerance and compromise. Freedom of opinion and speech are extremely important principles.

Cosmopolitanism, universal values	Personality choice leads to stability	Freedom
Secular consciousness, spiritual worldview, lack of racism	Justice	Universalism
Above a national worldview, Cosmopolitanism, globalism	Right	Protests, revolutionary attitude

3. Political ideologies in the conditions of globalization

3.1 *Political dimensions of globalization*

The globalization is a process that most clearly penetrates into social spaces, is part of a person's daily life and forms his attitudes towards participation in society. The political space is the place in which a person expresses and gives voice to his ideas and claims for social existence. Through political space as a sphere of governance, globalization as a process creates regulations that achieve global reach. In this way, a large part of the countries of the world undertake to follow certain development guidelines. It is precisely this comprehensive and inclusive process that leads to gradual development – the progress of the countries as a whole. But by themselves, individual regions and the human masses inhabiting them have different levels of education and economic-technological development, and this is where the "globalization at different speeds" or "globalization slowing down" results. This is also the reason why, in the generally globalized world in which we live, it is impossible to "implement" or "apply" urgent political models in developing societies – the difference is huge, for example, a country with a 300-year-old civil society (Great Britain) and civil society at 30 (Eastern European countries). Or in other words, the consumer, material globalization towards the free movement of goods, capital and people, does not necessarily go with the immediate achievement of political and social trends in the development of societies.

Put another way, the globalization in politics is a phenomenon in which international mechanisms and institutions emerge that more and more nations decide to join. Individual countries then promise to observe certain norms, for example, regarding respect for human rights. Globalization in politics goes hand in hand with social globalization, which is the process by which all the people of the world seek the recognition of the same rights.

Likewise, we should not overlook the key role of technology in making remote communication possible in real-time. This has an impact on globalization in politics because if a country breaks, for example, its international commitments, it will spread immediately.

Some examples of globalization of politics are organizations such as United Nations (UN), World Health Organization (WHO), etc.

As a specific process with political dimensions, the globalization has its positive characteristics:

- The process of universalization and openness allows countries to cooperate to fight common problems such as poverty, global warming, or malnutrition;
- Decisions of international organizations can be directly applied to all countries that are members of these organizations;
- Thanks to political globalization, there are international bodies that citizens can turn to if their rights are violated. This can be of the greatest importance, for example, if a government commits genocide against its own

people. Faced with these situations, we have entities such as the International Court of Human Rights of the United Nations;

- The risk of authoritarianism in individual societies is reduced, due to the fact that the state may fall under international sanctions. At this stage, let us recall that electoral processes usually have foreign observers.

3.2 *The globalization and its disadvantages*

- Often the implementation of an international agreement; leads to a renunciation of sovereignty, i.e., from the independent action of the individual state in one direction or another, oftentimes against its internal interests;

- Continuing with the above, the loss of sovereignty can generate discontent among a sector of the population. This happens mainly in the context of an economic or political crisis and can eventually lead to the emergence of nationalist movements;

- Often times countries with stronger economies impose their interests over countries in transition with weaker markets.

4. Instead of a conclusion. The political ideologies in the conditions of globalization

The topic of political ideologies is long. In itself, globalization is a kind of ideology or idea about the perception of the world and the ways and mechanisms by which it will be structured.

The classic division of ideologies into conservative and liberal values still exists today. Of course, today the shades are much more distinct than the classic trends. The boundaries of conservatism and neoconservatism and liberalism with neoliberalism are often blurred, as well as the extreme elements in them, such as anarchism, nationalism and moderate social democracy and socialism.

The globalization has mixed the mechanisms for constructing political-social spaces. The economies of individual countries, in an attempt to search for mechanisms for constant growth and escape from financial crises and bankruptcies, are ready to look for all possible ways to balance on the basis of ideological mechanisms.

When we talk about political ideologies in the globalization process, we must keep in mind that we are talking about the mechanisms that led to the formation of specific:

- International organizations with an economic orientation: G-7, G-20, BRICS, etc.;

- Political-economic unions: EU, EEC, etc.;

- Military, political and economic: NATO, SCO, etc.

Along with the fact that states seek a basis for economic and political cooperation, they often do so with an ideological-political orientation. For example, the cooperation between the USA, Canada and the EU gives rise to the transatlantic doctrine.

Nina Ilieva in a reflection on the transmission of philosophy writes: “The understanding of philosophy as a “voice in the conversation of humankind”, as a mediator in the

relationship between people and especially as a universal link in the mutual understanding of these same people" (Ilieva, 2023: 138).

The philosophical meaning from the point of view of analysis is an extremely important point in theorizing a political thought or concept. Without a thorough knowledge of the structure and history of philosophical concepts and trends, political analysis is empty and meaningless. A political concept is working progressive and perspective if it is built on the basis of accumulated thought experience.

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