Psychology of Masses in Sigmund Freud’s Interpretation

Nikolay Angelov Tsenkov

South-West University “Neofit Rilski”, Faculty of Philosophy, BULGARIA
Department of Philosophical and Political Sciences, Blagoevgrad

Received 1 October 2019 • Revised 25 November 2019 • Accepted 28 November 2019

Abstract

The article focuses on the psychology of masses according to Sigmund Freud, which he presents in his work “Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego”. Analogies between the infantile sexual development and the morphology of psychological crowds are indicated. The article also discusses some pathogenic personal manifestations in the crowd at the stage of mature sexual organization through the phenomenon of infatuation and sexual overestimation.

Keywords: Sigmund Freud, masses, group psychology, libido.

1. Introduction

Scientific research on masses is dominated by two contingent theoretical schools regarding the nature and effects of masses. The first school regards the individual member of a crowd as an anthropological construct derived from the very human nature. It is based on the belief that the crowd, as a social phenomenon, is rooted in psychological factors arising from instincts, impulses, and unconscious mental processes. This is why this school is known as psychological or anthropological. Its most prominent proponents are Gustave Le Bon, Gabriel Tarde, Sigmund Freud, Erich Fromm, and Elias Canetti.

The second school regards the crowd as a social phenomenon which has the characteristics of a certain epoch and occurs under specific circumstances as a historical result and cultural phenomenon. Among the scholars who support this interpretation are Jose Ortega-y-Gasset, Hannah Arendt, Herbert Marcuse and Theodor Adorno. This interpretation of the crowd can be defined as value-based or axiological.

Undoubtedly, the foundations of modern theories on crowd psychology were laid by Gustave Le Bon in his seminal book Psychologie des Foules published in 1895. At almost the same time, a compatriot of Le Bon’s – Gabriel Tarde – continued the psychological trend in sociology, although he remained more popular in France with his publications in the fields of criminology and penology.

Following the pioneers in crowd theory, Sigmund Freud proposed his own interpretation of crowding as a psychic phenomenon. While Le Bon was content with a mere description of crowds and Gabriel Tarde – with characterizing them, Freud aimed to explain the reasons and causes of their existence. In 1921, the Viennese psychoanalyst published his Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego devoting a considerable amount of its introductory section

© Authors. Terms and conditions of Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International (CC BY 4.0) apply. Correspondence: Nikolay Angelov Tsenkov (PhD), South-West University “Neofit Rilski”, Faculty of Philosophy, Department of Philosophical and Political Sciences, Blagoevgrad, BULGARIA. E-mail: n_tsenkov@abv.bg.
to Le Bon’s *Psychologie des Foules*. Freud agrees with his French colleague on the main characteristics of the group mind, viz. the loss of conscious personality and the almost exclusive control by the unconscious, the tendency of individual’s thoughts and feelings to be directed and infected by any emotion within the mass, and the amplification of this emotion by mutual infection. Freud comes to the general conclusion that as part of the mass, the individual becomes an automaton without his own will and uncritically adopts the ideas implied by the mass. Note, however, that he does not refer to primal African tribes living in places and times immemorial but rather to individuals who live here and now, to “people who despise the achievements of civilization and the laws of reason. The primitive people he refers to and studies – we are these” (Moscovici, 2007: 297).

On the other hand, he is extremely critical of Le Bon. Naturally, Freud interprets the psychology of masses from a psychoanalytical perspective. Although he agrees with Le Bon regarding the unconscious spiritual life of masses, he blames his French colleague for lack of originality and, above all, for his failure to recognize that “that in a group the individual is brought under conditions which allow him to throw off the repressions of his unconscious instincts. The apparently new displays are in fact the manifestations of this unconscious, in which the all that is evil of the human mind is contained as a predisposition” (Freud, 1993a: 63). The Viennese psychiatrist regards as incomplete Le Bon’s thesis that when people become members of a crowd, their individual consciousness disintegrates. For Freud the individual’s propensity to descend to a more primitive level of their psyche life in a psychological crowd is far more important. He maintains that all types of masses are based on (consciously) repressed against the target (unconscious) instincts or impulses.

2. Structural model of the psyche

Freud’s structural model of the psyche defines three distinct, interacting agents in the psychic apparatus – the *Id*, *Ego*, and *Super-ego*. Freud borrowed the original term for *Id* (“das Es”) from Groddek and Nietzsche to denote the unconscious, disorganized, and irrational part of the human personality, the “dark, inaccessible part of our personality”, which is striving to bring about the satisfaction of the instinctual needs subject to the observance of the pleasure principle. The *Id* is in search of pleasure and is seeking to avoid unsatisfaction, thus following the natural primary instinct to exist of all living creatures. The *Id* is unresponsive and indifferent to the demands of reality. The *Id* is unaware of doubts or contradictions and therefore does not compromise on reality. The unconscious has no internal organization, but is directed against the external world, the social reality, where the *Id* encounters a number of obstacles – prejudices, traditions, taboos, etc. Fotev (1993: 121) points out that “all organizations (ranging from the individual intellect to the societal structures) are more or less repressive of the *Id*, in terms of sexual impulses governed by the pleasure principle (Lustprinzip)”. Brantlinger (1983) adds that the mechanisms of repression, which civilization exercises on individuals are all based on the sublimation (transformation) of the instincts and include law, morality, culture, and the arts, and – perhaps most important – religion. Freud did not disguise his irony regarding religion, saying that “devout believers are safeguarded in a high degree against the risk of certain neurotic illnesses; their acceptance of the universal neurosis spares them the task of constructing a personal one” (Freud, 1993b: 329).

The *Ego* represents consciousness, reason, and common sense. It takes notice of external reality and regulates and contains the unconscious desires of the individual. It is based on rational thinking and acts according to the reality principle (Reälitätprinzip). Its interests may be defined loosely as “economic”. It seeks to please the *Id*’s aspirations and passions in realistic ways. According to Freud, the ego is like a person on horseback in relation to the *Id*. The ego,
according to the doctrine of the Viennese psychiatrist, serves three rigorous masters – the Id, the super-ego and the outside world – with conflicting and divergent requirements.

Apart from the interactions between the *id* and the *ego* characterized as a conflict between the pathogenic unconscious and the preconscious rationalizations, the psychic apparatus also includes a third theoretical construct – the *super-ego*, which is an upgrade of the *ego* and functions as our conscience, ego ideal, and sense of morality which punishes the ego with feelings of guilt. According to Ratner (2005: 25), the super-ego represents the norms and values adopted by the child in the course of its socialization and personal development: “It (the super-ego – N. Ts.) contains the spiritual images of the parents and other authority figures idolized by the ego throughout his life, whereby for the ego the consent of the super-ego is more valuable than the approval or disapproval of one’s neighbor. At the same time, the super-ego represents the collective rules and norms; it is, to a certain extent, a representation of society and culture in the inner world of the individual.”

Freud’s concept of instinctual drives is fundamental to his psychoanalytic theory as well as to those who dispute it. According to him, a person’s psyche is the arena of the dualistic conflict between two primal forces. In his essays “Beyond the Pleasure Principle” (1920) and “The Ego and the Id” (1923), Freud introduced the structured formal model of ego psychology, which is driven by the mythological opposition between the sexuality of the ego and the Id, between the narcissistic and the objective libido, between Thanatos and Eros.

Eros is easier to define, because the concept dates back from the ancient Greek mythology, in which it represents the god of love. In “Beyond the Pleasure Principle”, Freud uses this construct to denote all creative, life-producing drives existing in the universal philosophical and mythical tradition. Thus, according to Laplanche and Pontalis (2009), Eros is defined as a fundamental concept referring to the life instincts, whose goals are the preservation, binding, and union of the organism into increasingly larger units. Since Freud’s language is closer to the language of philosophers rather than the language used medicine, his meaning of the term is closer to Plato’s *eros*, Schopenhauer’s “will to live” and Bergson’s “élan vital”.

Eros is the antagonistic drive of Thanatos (Todestrieb) – the death drive which, in Freud’s view, has its deep philosophical roots. Beyond the principle of pleasure is the deep psychological motivation for repetition, i.e. the drive to recreate past states. The perpetual reproduction of the same life stories and incarnations reveals the effect of the instinct to lead organic life back into the inanimate state, the compulsion to repeat the cycle: “And since life originates from inanimate matter, Freud introduced the concept of the death drive as a term in opposition to the life drive; like Schopenhauer, he formulates the grim hypothesis *the aim of all life is death*” (Rattner, 2005: 23).

3. Masses and libido

Freud defined the term *libido* psychoanalytically as the primal force of sexual love (*Eros*) (*Critical Dictionary of Psychoanalysis*, Penguin Books, 1995). According to Freud’s theory, it is “a quantitatively variable force which could serve as a measure of processes and transformations occurring in the field of sexual excitation” (Freud, 2015: 116) as well as “energy, regarded as a quantitative magnitude of those instincts which have to do with all that may be comprised under the word ‘love’” (Laplanche & Pontalis, 2009: 184). Libido can be the original libidinal cathexis of the *ego* (narcissistic libido), a part of which was detached, and directed onto objects itself and directed to external objects as an outward source (object). According to Freud, are inherently egoistic, auto-erotic beings. It is only under the influence of the mother that narcissistic libido is transformed into object-libido.
According to Freud, a neurosis represents an instance where one’s libido is suppressed. Although he points out that this does not mean that any person deprived of satisfaction of all their libidinal impulses are neurotics, in all cases of neurosis such deprivation is observed. Freud explains the conflict between the Id and the Ego as a conflict between (consciously) suppressed (unconscious) impulses. This psychic conflict occurs when the external repression returning formation of behavioral or psychosomatic symptoms becomes debilitating, i.e. when it is complemented with internal suppression. Blamed for being pansexual, the Austrian psychiatrist states that “it [psychoanalysis] has maintained not that neuroses are derived from sexuality but that their origin is due to a conflict between the ego and sexuality” (Freud, 1931: 258). Freud formulated the aim of psychoanalysis as the task to make the unconscious conscious, thus eliminating the internal conflict between the Id and the ego, i.e. to turn the Id into ego.

The psychology of the mass is closely related to the psychology of the individual, because, as Freud pointed out, masses are held together by libidinal bonds. According to the father of modern psychoanalysis, a mass is based on impulses of love guided by two main principles: (1) equality among its members, and (2) dependence between the leader and the majority.

Clearly, a group is held together by a power of some kind: and to what power could this feat be better ascribed than to Eros, who holds together everything in the world? When “an individual gives up his distinctiveness in a group and lets its other members influence him by suggestion, it gives one the impression that he does it because he feels the need of being in harmony with them rather than in opposition to them, so that perhaps after all he does it ‘out of love’ for them” (Freud, 1993: 81). Freud explains that “in cases of collaboration libidinal ties are regularly formed between the fellow-workers which prolong and solidify the relation between them to a point beyond what is merely profitable” (Freud, 1911: 56). According to the Vienna psychoanalyst, “the fact of the existence of sexual needs in human beings is expressed in biology by the assumption of a “sex drive” on the analogy of the instinct of nutrition, that is hunger” (Freud, 1955: 27). The libido theory assumes that the sex drive creates libidinal ties and binds group members in their quest to satisfy their needs. The erotic libido directed at others is more powerful than the narcissistic, ego-directed libido. Love – sexual or platonic – is at the heart of every relationship. In the case of masses, we can conditionally call this attraction a social promiscuity.

Freud pointed out that “all members of the group equally love the leader and this love makes them equal” (Gradev, 2005: 154). According to him, intolerance vanishes as the result of the formation of a group, and in a group; self-love is replaced by love for the other. “So long as a group formation persists or so far as it extends, individuals behave as though they were uniform, tolerate other people’s peculiarities, put themselves on an equal level with them, and have no feeling of aversion towards them. Such a limitation of narcissism can, according to our theoretical views, only be produced by one factor, a libidinal tie with other people” (Freud, 1996: 31-32). The question would at once be raised whether such tolerance and considerateness are not due to a set of pragmatic interests. This objection may be met by the reply that no lasting limitation of narcissism is effected in this way, since this tolerance does not persist longer than the immediate advantage gained from the other people’s collaboration. On the contrary, people’s collaboration creates libidinal ties that reinforce their relationship beyond the immediate gain. “And this is true both of the sexual love for women, with all the obligations which it involves of sparing what women are fond of, and also of the desexualized, sublimated homosexual love for other men, which springs from work in common” (Freud, 1996: 31-32). Narcissism, or the self-love, as an antisocial tendency, is transformed into social relations through transformations of the ego libido into object libido. Essentially, a group is formed based on new libidinal ties among its members. Phylogenesis, which is defined as the transition from selfishness to altruism and is the core of group formation.

Having satisfied their needs based on benefits, group members dissolve the group. They replace the already redundant partner with a new object of desire and every time this
happens, they are incapable of creating a lasting relationship. Similarly, the crowd, which is essentially inherently organic, would have a very short existence if it were based solely on economic gain and not on the libidinal ties among its members. It disintegrates when these ties cease to exist. Thus, the organized, permanent groups consist of individuals who have diverged their instincts from their original sexual aim — and this, according to Freud, is their psychopathology, because they have replaced the desires of the ego with an object that they have accepted as their ego-ideal. Here enters the figure of the leader of the group.

4. Mass and leader. Eros and Mimesis

In Freud’s interpretation of the morphology of the masses, the ties with the leader are far more important for the psychological crowd than the ties among its members. The leader is the ideal that consolidates the crowd as well as the dominant libidinal object of the crowd. Thus, he becomes the equality-generating factor of the crowd. The level of his influence determines both the level of cohesion of the mass and the duration of its existence since it does not have its own purpose, but follows the course set by its leader. In this regard, Gradev points out that: “His emotional authority over every member of the crowd is the key to understanding its cohesion and inner equality. In other words, the emotional obedience to the leader, which is subconscious and seemingly voluntarily, inevitably turns the random gathering of individuals into a psychological crowd” (Gradev, 2005: 160).

The relationship between the leader and the crowd is undoubtedly emotional and irrational. According to Freud, this relationship stems from the early development of children’s sexuality. He equates the macrosocial phenomenon of the crowd to the psychology of family relations, explained, naturally, through the techniques of Freudian psychoanalysis. Psychoanalytic theory draws an analogy between the father as the head of a family and the leader as the power figure in a crowd. The psychic status of the father projected over the libidinal ties with the other family members is at the heart of the emotional dominance of the leader over the members of the crowd (“children”).

What Tarde calls imitation in Freud’s psychoanalytic terminology is referred to as identification—a natural and reciprocal phenomenon in a family environment. The parents create the child because they want to reproduce and continue the existence of their own selves. Through identification, a little boy would like to grow like his father and be like him, thus taking him as his ideal. By copying him, the boy reproduces his pattern of behavior, but also allows his ego to be assimilated to a certain degree by his father’s ego. This kind of spiritual absorption can easily be projected to explain the ties between the crowd and its leader.

At the same time as this identification with his father, the boy begins to develop a true object-cathexis towards his mother (the narcissistic libido transforms into object-libido) and the point of unification of the child’s mental life (the confluence of the straightforward sexual object-cathexis towards his mother and the typical identification towards his father) is referred to by Freud as “normal Oedipus complex” (Electra complex for girls). These two ties subsist side by side for a time without any mutual influence or interference. The little boy notices that his father stands in his way with his mother as his rival. “His identification with his father then takes on a hostile coloring and becomes identical with the wish to replace his father in regard to his mother as well. Identification, in fact, is ambivalent from the very first; it can turn into an expression of tenderness as easily as into a wish for someone’s removal” (Freud, 1996: 33). In Totem and Taboo, Freud creates direct analogies between crowds and the primordial hordes on the one hand and the figure of the father and that of a tyrannical leader on the other. Women in the primal horde were property of the father and his sons were kept in forced celibacy by him. His tyranny kept the brothers in psychic equality based on their common celibacy. All behavioral autonomy was in its infancy stifled by the tyranny of the father, who concentrated all available social power.
Subordination was the norm, no one dared to oppose to the powerful leader. But dissatisfaction was piling up. The sons’ obedience comes to an end when they eventually join forces (probably instigated by their mothers who fear for the lives of their children and united by their common love and hatred towards their father) and commit patricide. Soon, however, their rebellion supported by their mistreated mothers reproduced the same pattern of tyrannical paternal prohibition as soon as one of the brothers was pronounced leader of the horde following the rules of crowd psychology. The collective sin imposes the same incest and patricide restrictions. Through the historical continuum, this primordial situation is projected in modern-day crowds. The taboo (prohibitions) in the culture of the totemic (fraternal) community are identical with the desire of the child to remove the father from his way to his mother’s love. “The psychological motivation of patricide, i.e. the original sin starting the course of human civilization, is explained by the Oedipus complex: the sexual attraction to the mother and the aggressive jealousy of the almighty rival and the oppressor – the father” (Nikolov, 1990: 32).

In this situation, the boy is looking for a solution of the dilemma between what he would like to be and what he would like to have. On the one hand, he wants to have his mother, and on the other, he is strongly tied to his father as an object of both his love and hatred. His unconscious (and forbidden) longing is to do what his father is allowed to do – to have sexual intercourse with his mother. This early-childhood emotional conflict is similar to Hamlet’s dilemma: To be or not to be like my father (in order to have my mother), this is the question. And the ghost of the father whispers from the depths of his unconscious with the voice of the Id: Be like me, don’t be like me. Freud summarizes this state of things as “identification has appeared instead of object-choice, and that object choice has regressed to identification” (Freud, 1993a: 94). In this process, one’s ego assumes the characteristics of the object through introjection of the object into the ego. The ego is identified with the object and the object becomes the ego. The “empathy and subsistence with the other person” (Isaev, 1930: 75) is a phenomenon which has as its core the libidinal ties. The ability of the personality to sublimate enables the extension of the ego into a new instance – the ego ideal. Gradually, the boy substitutes the image of his real father with an ideal father. This tie is preserved and developed throughout one’s lifetime. It makes him introject the ideal of the person who was his prototype in his childhood.

The ego ideal is the key to understanding the psychology of the crowd. The meandering paths of individual psychological identification ultimately result in the internalization of the ego ideal of the leader in the individual’s ego. The idealized image of the father is substituted with that of the leader. This tie was explained by Gradev as: “The mechanism of replacing the ego ideal of the crowd with the personality of its leader resembles the dynamics and the emotional relations between the child and the father in a family. The leader has emotional power over all members of the crowd because they have accepted him as an element in their mental structure” (Gradev, 2005: 176). According to Freud, “Each individual is a component part of numerous groups, he is bound by ties of identification in many directions, and he has built up his ego ideal upon the most various models. Each individual therefore has a share in numerous group minds – those of his race, of his class, of his creed, of his nationality, etc. ... the individual gives up his ego ideal and substitutes for it the group ideal as embodied in the leader” (Freud, 1996: 51-52).

According to the founder of modern psychoanalysis, the pathogenic manifestations of personality continue at the stage of mature sexual organization through the resulting phenomena of infatuation and sexual overestimation. There are some rather striking similarities between the behavior of a person in love and of a crowd member. The object of one’s love is exempt from criticism. The same applies to the crowd leader. The person in love is hypnotized to believe that everything the object (hypnotist) does and asks for is right and blameless. The sublimation is followed by the phase of idealization: “the object is being treated in the same way as our own ego, so that when we are in love a considerable “amount of narcissistic libido overflows on to the object. It is even obvious, in many forms of love choice that the object serves as a substitute for some
unattained ego ideal of our own” (Freud, 1993a: 100). The one in love voluntarily renounces his own thoughts and feelings and assumes those of the object. Love is transformed into a pursuit of a fictitious perfection since the object serves as a substitute for some unattained ego ideal of our own as a means of satisfying our narcissism.

This type of idealization is a reverse narcissism over, an auto-eroticism overflown to the object. If the sexual over-estimation and the being in love increase even further, the tendencies towards directly sexual satisfaction may now be pushed back entirely. “The object becomes more and more unassuming and modest, and the object more and more sublime and precious, until at last it gets possession of the entire self-love of the ego... The object has, so to speak, consumed the ego” (Freud, 1993a: 101). Traits of humility, of the limitation of narcissism, and of self-injury occur in every case of being in love. The ego surrenders to the object, the functions allotted to the ego ideal entirely cease to operate and, eventually, the object has taken the place of the ego. The one in love is depersonalized. It is this depersonalization that is the main consequence of the libidinous constitution of crowds, which, according to Freud, consist of “a number of individuals who have substituted one and the same object for their ego ideal [the leader] and have consequently identified themselves with one another in their ego. It is an elemental form of inter-subjectivity.” (Freud, 1993a: 104). There is the same humble subjection, the same compliance, the same absence of criticism, towards the hypnotist just as towards the loved object. For those in love, immediate sexual satisfaction is only temporarily kept back, and remains in the background as a possible aim at some later time, which leads to separation of their ego from their ego ideal, a construct on which are based all libidinal ties in the crowd. In love, so to speak, is the formation of a table of two. Both in the crowd and in love one loses his mind. Therefore, falling in love can be defined as formation of a crowd consisting of two members. Both when in love and as a member of a crowd, a person tends to lose touch with reality.

The founder of modern psychoanalysis concludes that the crowd affects its members and changes their mentality on the grounds of two fundamental assumptions: first, the *heightening of affectivity in groups*; and second, the *collective inhibition of intelligence in groups*. The second assumption is supported by William McDougall in his book *The Group Mind*: “The principal ground of the low order of intelligence displayed by simple crowds is that the ideas and reasonings which can be collectively understood and accepted must be such as can be appreciated by the lower order of minds among the crowd. These least intelligent minds bring down the intelligence of the whole to their own level” (McDougall, 1921: 71).

Defending his libido theory, Freud disagrees with Wilfred Trotter’s instinctive theory based on the concept that a herd resembles a “flock of animals in the literal sense” – a *gregarious animal* (Trotter, 1921: 112). According to the founder of the Vienna Psychoanalytic Society, the herd instinct does not arise from human nature itself, but manifests only when people form a crowd around a leader, to whom and through whom the libidinous ties of a crowd can be established. Even the slightest fluctuation in the strength of these ties can threaten the cohesion of the group. Freud gives the following example in support of his view: “We have only to think of the troop of women and girls, all of them in love in an enthusiastically sentimental way, who crowd round a singer or pianist after his performance. It would certainly be easy for each of them to be jealous of the rest; but, in face of their numbers and the consequent impossibility of their reaching the aim of their love, they renounce it, and, instead of pulling out one another’s hair, they act as a united group, do homage to the hero of the occasion with their common actions, and would probably be glad to have a share of his flowing lock. Originally rivals, they have succeeded in identifying themselves with one another by means of a similar love for the same object” (Freud, 1993a: 108). The repressed abstract sexual energy of the crowd finds a specific and real realization through the figure of its leader. Equality applies to crowd members, but not to the leader. Crowd members are equal to each other in their common love towards their leader. According to Gradev, the love towards the leader is essential “and thus it ‘transforms’ the ties among the crowd members
into ties of mutual acceptance and brotherly love. The generator of this emotional harmony is the leader, who symbolizes the father figure for the crowd members” (Gradev, 2005: 155). The individual members of a crowd are truly united by their love towards the one who is of higher order and dominates them.

This reciprocal reflex is based, on the one hand, on the innate need for paternal love, which is provided by the leader of the crowd, and on the other, on the need for control, which the leader is empowered to exercise over the crowd. The crowd needs the illusion that the leader distributes his love equally and justly to all members. The leader is, undoubtedly, a lonely and emotionally crippled individual, despite the influx of love for him. He does not need and is incapable of loving anyone. The love of the crowd members towards him is only a means to keep them in subjugation. What he really needs is his narcissistic drive to dominate the others. In short, leaders love themselves without loving their subordinates, while crowd members, on the other hand, love the other members without being able to love themselves.

In order to complete the mental structure of the individual in the context of the psychology of the crowd, we should go beyond the relationships between the Id and the ego in terms of pressure of the pathologically unconscious on the conscious and consider the third constituent of the structural model of the psyche, the super ego, which performs the functions of self-observation, the moral conscience, the censorship of dreams, and the chief influence in repression. The founder of psychoanalysis defines the psychological group as “a number of individuals who have substituted one and the same object for their ego ideal and have consequently identified themselves with one another in their ego.” Of course, this definition applies only to groups “that have a leader” (Freud, 2013: 386). The leader, in addition to being the object of identification and desire, also plays the role of a moral conscience and censor, i.e. of a super-ego. Thus, the leader complies with and represents the moral constitution of human society.

According to Freud, crowd psychology is based on two fundamental concepts: love (Eros) and identification (Mimesis). Their functions are well-known – the power of love drives the person to unite with others while the desire for identification with the others results in acceptance of a particular group ideal. Serge Moscovici sums up the functions of Eros and Mimesis as: “The former urge us to unite with the people we would like to possess, and the latter – with the people who are what we would like to be ourselves” (Moscovici, 2007: 334). This conflict between the erotic (to have) and the mimetic (to be) drive, results to a more or less apparent psychopathology between the numerous libido desires on the one hand, and between the libido and the demands of imitative desires relevant to the social reality.

On individual level, the erotic outweighs the mimetic. However, in a crowd, the situation is inverted, crowd members imitate rather than love. This observation leads to the conclusion that “the rise of the need to imitate is counterbalanced by the decline of the desire to love” (Moscovici, 2007: 335). Crowd psychology begins with Eros and ends with Mimesis. Eros is for the leader, and Mimesis is for the members.

This balance is at the core of the psychological crowd. It is a specific form of inverse democracy in which everyone is equally non-free. However, the question is what the mechanism of crowd formation is. After all, each person has unique individuality. How does it disappear when the person becomes a member of a crowd? Moscovici, one of the most prominent supporters of Freud gives the following answer to this question: “Seeing the other’s success and joy, we ask ourselves, “Why him? Why them? Why not me? Envy always finds something to look for. Nobody can have or ask for everything they want as far as they have what everyone else has. Envy provokes rivalry. Group spirit is based on avoidance of envy, even if that would mean common and voluntary deprivation ... we give up our desires, abandon our most coveted ambitions so that others may have to sacrifice them as well” (Moscovici, 2007: 337-338). We forfeit our individuality so that we resemble our rivals and thus they are no longer our rivals. The pressure for equality provides
protection from the belligerent and repressive world. Equality neutralizes the weight of social and psychological barriers. Imitative pleasure is similar to sexual pleasure. The only difference that in the former case people become one with the crowd while in the latter – with their partner. The eternal struggle between Eros and Mimesis reveals the complex morphology of crowd psychology. The vertical axis is the love impulse of each individual towards the leader, and the horizontal axis is “the number of people who have the same object as their ego ideal and therefore identify with each other. Their identification regressively replaces their libidinal ties” (Moscovici, 2007: 352-353).

5. Conclusion

Every person who gets familiar with Freud’s works voluntarily or involuntarily becomes a psychoanalyst. His theories became the stepping stones for the scientific works of many of his followers and disciples, who subsequently renounced him. Despite their claims for originality, many of his colleagues developed their theories based on the negation of his views. In this way, however, they merely reproduce and reinforce the conceptual foundations of his psychoanalytic concepts.

For example, Victor Frankl blames psychoanalysis for having “Id-efied” and “de-ego-efied” human existence by giving priority to the unconscious instincts, but at the same time acknowledges that the spiritual basis of human existence on which he builds his theory of existential analysis is “ultimately unconscious” (Frankl 2016: 39). Wilhelm Reich, who, according to Campbell and Brennan (1996: 225), was “a man with an incredible gift of setting others against himself” was expelled from the Psychoanalytic Association in 1934 and continued his scientific career without Freud’s scientific guidance. Reich claims that human destructiveness stems from sexual repression in the family environment, i.e. the socium. This in no way contradicts Freud’s view that crowd psyche departs from the psychic dynamics in the family environment, as discussed above (Gradev, 2005: 256).

Jung criticized Freud for limiting himself only to the individual unconscious of his patients and disregarding the powerful layer of the collective unconscious, which is a key factor for both the individual and the collective psyche. Having analyzed various images in myths, traditions, fairy tales, dreams, poems, religions, neurotic and psychotic cases, Jung believes that he has discovered “in this lowest layer of the collective unconscious the so-called ‘archetypes’”, i.e. the primary elements of the psychic morphology, inherent “patterns of behavior”, basic forms of fantasy, and even Plato’s cognitive concepts” (Rattner, 2005: 71). However, I do not consider Jung’s view as contradictory to Freud’s concept in his Totem and Taboo regarding “the existence of a collective mind in which the psychic processes run exactly as they do in the individual psyche” (Freud, 1991b: 242). This shows that Freud assumes the existence of a collective psyche that is passed down through the generations and does not depend on their individual lifespan. This opinion is supported by Gradev (2005) as well.

The founded the Society for Individual Psychology, Alfred Adler, was referred to as “the second son of Freud” (the first being C. G. Jung). According to Adler’s theory, the second child develops faster, as it wants to surpass the first one and be on the top. If this is true, then “narcissistic ambition” is another distinctive trait of the character of such people who cannot put up with being always in the position of catching up or following someone else. The breaking point of his relationship with Freud was in 1911, when Adler presented three papers to the Vienna Psychoanalytic Association, in which he criticized Freud’s animalistic and pessimistic image of man. He criticized Freud’s concept that the instinct-driven psyche of the young child was perversely polymorphous and held that this was, at best, a poetic assumption and that but nothing could be gained by projecting the mentality of a mature pervert back to childhood. According to Adler, neurosis is based on the feeling of inferiority which is intrinsic to the human psyche as
people have a deep-rooted sense of dissatisfaction, which constantly torments them and provokes incessant efforts to compensate their insecurity and inferiority complexes. Despite his criticism regarding Freud’s view of the infantile character of neuroses, Adler acknowledges that this assumption, which underlies his individual psychology, is formed in childhood “... from constitutional inferiority and from other similar childhood positions stems a sense of inferiority that requires compensation in the sense of heightening one’s sense of self” (Adler, 1921: 17). However, the feelings of inferiority, along with childhood sexual trauma, repressed childhood sexuality, early traumatic situations, etc. is not a true etiological factor (cause of disease), but should only be understood and interpreted as symptoms of the disease. With his characteristic polemical tone, Freud summarizes: “For, whether a man is a homosexual or a necrophilic, a hysterical suffering from anxiety, an obsessional neurotic cut off from society, or a raving lunatic, the ‘Individual Psychologist’ of the Adlerian school will declare that the impelling motive of his condition is that he wishes to assert himself, to overcompensate for his inferiority...” (Freud, 1933: 197).

Until Freud, psychology was the science of conscious mental processes. Speaking of unconscious psyche was equivalent to speaking of wooden iron, since the concepts of “conscious” and “psychic” were synonymous. By trying to explain the irrational, Freud managed to rationalize crowd psychology and to provide new perspectives on the early theories of LeBon and Tarde. Denied and praised, psychoanalysis undoubtedly answers a plethora of questions. According to Storr, one of Freud’s most popular researchers, it “struggles to create a unified system of ideas that would not only explain all forms of mental illness, but also religion, art, literature, humor, personal and social decadence” (Storr, 2009: 280). Although he writes in conditions of great distrust and hostility, although he repeatedly changes his theories, and despite the lack of solid empirical evidence for his theses, the Viennese psychiatrist manages to cover human reality, including history and culture to such an extent that the opinion of the American historian Philip Rieff does not sound exaggerated when he says “Together with Nietzsche, Freud declared that the dominant science of the future would not be history, but psychology. History has become the psychology of the crowd” (Rieff, 1979: 225).

Acknowledgements

This research did not receive any specific grant from funding agencies in the public commercial, or not-for-profit sectors.

The author declares no competing interests.

References


