



## The Islamic Movement in Israel: Ideology vs. Pragmatism

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### *Abstract*

This study aims to present the Islamic Movement in Israel, its ideology and pragmatism. With progress and modernization, the Islamic movements in the Middle East realized that they could not deny progress, so they decided to join the mainstream and take advantage of technological progress in their favor. The movement maintains at least one website in which it publishes its way, and guides the audience. Although these movements seem to maintain a rigid ideology, they adapt themselves to reality with the help of many tools, because they have realized that reality is stronger than they are. The main points in the article are: The Status of Religion in Israel; The Legal Status of Muslim Sharia in Israel; Personal status according to Israeli law; The establishment of the Islamic Movement in Israel – Historical Background; The crystallization of movement; Theoretical Background – The Theory of Pragmatism; Ideology and goals of the Islamic Movement in Israel; The background to the split in the movement – the opposition to pragmatism; How the ideology of the movement is expressed in its activity? The movement’s attitudes toward the Israeli elections, the Oslo Accords and the armed struggle against Israel; How does pragmatism manifest itself in the movement’s activities?

*Keywords:* Islamic Movement, Israel, ideology, pragmatism.

### 1. Introduction

The Islamic Movement operates in the State of Israel, which is a parliamentary democracy. The basis for the ideals of the State of Israel was laid in the second part of the Declaration of Independence (Brenner & Frisch, 2003) that on the day of the end of the Mandate, a Jewish state will be established in the Land of Israel, to be called the State of Israel, in which the governing institutions of the new state will operate. From here onward, the declaration determines the state’s image from the religious, social, international, and neighborly relations with the peoples of the region (U.S. Department of State, 2012).

## 2. The status of religion in Israel

The Declaration of Independence declares the State of Israel as a Jewish and democratic state. In order to avoid disagreements during the formulation, the authors did not refrain from explicitly defining the issue of the Jewish religion and other religions in the State of Israel, nor discuss the connection between religious matters and the civil law of the state. The Declaration promised to remain faithful to UN declarations, to refrain from discrimination on the grounds of religion, race and sex, and to guarantee freedom of religion for all citizens of the state, but there is no complete separation between religion and state in Israel. The Jewish religion has a better status than the other religions, with funding and organization, and since it is the religion of most of its citizens, the principle of freedom of religion and freedom from religion is maintained in Israel. The religious courts in the areas that were given by these courts (*Ibid.*, 2012).

Although there is a problem between the state and the religious establishment, Israel aspires to uphold the principle of freedom of religion and conscience. In general, most of the Israeli public is a secular Jew, but this public too is committed to religious personal status laws. The laws of religion are not the laws of the state, there are few religious laws that apply to the secular public (Sheetrit, 2013). The State of Israel has an independent legal system that is influenced by common law, yet has its own unique characteristics. Along with the Israeli legal system, Israeli law recognizes the special status of Jewish law as well as the status of other religious legal systems, particularly in the field of family law. In the State of Israel there is no formal constitution, and the basic principles of the system, especially after the constitutional revolution, are taken from a set of basic laws whose legislation has not yet been completed, as well as the interpretation of the law according to basic concepts stemming from the fact that the state is a Jewish and democratic state.

In Israel there is a rule of law principle that combines a formal and a substantive side. The formal party determines that each body is subject equally to the law and must act accordingly. Alongside compliance with the law, the formal party requires the actual enforcement of the law by the appropriate authorities and the existence of a social-legal sanction for cases of non-compliance. The essence of the rule of law is the content of the law. The requirement is that the law should reflect proper consideration of individual rights and fundamental freedoms and reflect democratic and egalitarian principles. The equality of the law requires not only its application equally to its value, but also its application in a different manner to different ones, so long as the basis for the distinction is made on a relevant basis.

The State of Israel, as a rule, meets the requirements of the rule of law, including the existence of basic laws that outline an entrenched constitutional framework of basic values and human rights, legislation that establishes the powers of the authorities and their subordination to the law, an independent and independent legal system that monitors the conformity of laws with the principles inherent in the Basic Laws and on the legality of the operation of the executive branch and the operation of a regular law enforcement system. Accordingly, the State of Israel views itself as a state of law and is usually considered as such. However, an actual deviation from the requirements of the rule of law is not rare, an excessive violation of fundamental freedoms, mostly for security reasons (Jiryis, 1979).

## 3. The legal status of Muslim Shari'a in Israel

Sharia is Islamic religious law, which regulates all aspects of life and society. Since the 19th century, secular laws have been enacted in Muslim countries, for example, in commercial and criminal fields, but no personal laws have been enacted. In the commercial and criminal fields, Western law books were adopted and new Western-inspired laws were enacted, such as the Ottoman Code of the Majles. At first the legislators thought of completing the Shari'a, but gradually it became clear that the civil laws restrict the sharia. Marital law, marriage, divorce and

inheritance are the center of Shari'a. Beginning in the 20<sup>th</sup> century, the secular legislator in Muslim countries began to intervene in them.

The situation differs from country to country throughout the Muslim world. They all follow Islamic law, but the understanding of the law is varied and different from one another. There is a difference in the interpretation and application of Islamic law in various Muslim societies today. Due to the influence of colonialism, which often replaced religious law with secular law, and the liberal movements within Islam that raised questions about belonging and the possibility of implementing Shari'a from different points of view. In most countries in the Middle East and North Africa there is a dual system of religious and secular courts, where religious courts deal mainly with marriage and inheritance. But in the hands of fundamentalists, Shari'a binds all believers and even all the people ruled by the believers.

The Majla is a set of laws based on Muslim law, which regulated civil law during the Ottoman period. At that time, the Muslim rule according to which the clerics, the ulama, established the framework for the laws of the state according to the Shari'a, and the secular ruler is permitted to act and to serve in this framework, which was determined by the ulama. However, with the establishment of the British Mandate, the authorities ceased to regard the Muslim Ummah as a source of authority for the interpretation and amendment of the Majles laws, and instead referred to the Majles as laws that were subject to legal interpretation by the secular institutions established by the Mandatory government, By the State of Israel. Therefore, amendments were introduced in these laws, and some of them were canceled or changed considerably in all the legislative enactments that the State of Israel underwent. In 1984, the Majla was annulled in the Knesset Law, after the areas in which the transaction was settled in original Israeli laws passed by the Knesset.

One principle of Ottoman law was accepted in Israeli law, namely the application of personal religious law to matters relating to the individual status of the citizen (marriage, divorce, etc.). With the establishment of the State of Israel, the principle of legal autonomy was adopted in matters of personal status, in order to preserve the status quo between the secular Jewish public and the religious Jewish public. As far as the Muslim community in Israel is concerned, this means that sharia remains the valid law regarding marriages and divorces of Muslims in Israel (Stendel, 1996).

#### 4. Personal status according to Israeli law

With the establishment of the State of Israel, the principle of legal autonomy was adopted in matters of personal status. The authority in matters of personal status is reserved by law to religious courts, with the exception of certain restrictions. This arrangement grants sharia law to be applied in Israel, but only in matters of personal status (marriage, divorce, etc.), and only for Sunni Muslims.

The Sharia courts have official recognition and are funded by the state, similar to the rabbinical courts. The Kadis who lead them have the status of civil servants. Restrictions imposed by the state law on marriage and divorce, such as the prohibition on marrying a girl under the age of 17, the prohibition on bigamy and the prohibition against expelling a woman against her will apply to the sharia courts in Israel in the same way that they apply to rabbinical courts.

As other religious courts, the rulings of sharia courts in other civil matters are considered in Israeli law to be the rulings of an arbitrator, and therefore the litigants are obligated to them only if the conditions stipulated in the Arbitration Law have been fulfilled. The main condition is the agreement of all parties to remove the matter from the authority of the authorized civil court, and to transfer it to the Shari'a court (Slaughter, 2007).

## 5. The establishment of the Islamic Movement in Israel – Historical background

Since the mid-1970s, Arab society in Israel underwent rapid political and social changes, with the effects of the 1967 war more evident. The war brought to a great extent the rise of fundamentalist Islam among Israeli Arabs. Ideologically, the war symbolized for many the ideological bankruptcy of Arab secular ideologies, and the failure of the Arab national movement raised the framework of Religious-Islamic affiliation. From the Religious-Islamic point of view of the 1967 war, there were also influences: access to the holy sites of Islam in Hebron and Jerusalem, and the possibility of praying in the mosques on the Temple Mount aroused religious feelings. Acquaintance with the Arabs in the territories opened a window to a diverse religious life that was managed by a religious apparatus. The rise of fundamentalist Islam came to fill a void created by the 1948 war, during which the religious-spiritual leadership abandoned the area and left the Muslim public in Israel without a judicial system, guidance, and religious services. This situation changed as a result of the intervention of the Supreme Muslim Council, which was re-established in East Jerusalem after the 1967 war.

The Islamic Movement in Israel, which was based in the late 1970s and early 1980s, was also fueled by a political crisis in the local arena. The NRP took the monopoly on the representation of the national aspirations of the Arabs of Israel. A nationalist stream began to take shape, in the form of the “villagers” and the TALAM, and there was a significant regression in the form of the moderate camp (Abu Raia, 1991).

All these political crises have allowed the Islamic movement to become an alternative to the decline of others.

The growth of the Islamic stream is also the result of socio-economic changes. The growing disparities in the level of development of the Arab and Jewish communities and the continued disregard of the Arab sector by the government authorities caused bitterness and frustration. A yearning for a new social order was created and fundamentalist Islam came to meet this need. Thus, from the 1970s a gradual strengthening of the sense of Arab belonging to the Arabs in Israel was felt.

The Islamic Movement in Israel aspires to awaken the values of Islam among Israeli Arabs. Therefore, the movement operates from the religious aspect to the education of Muslims and the operation of religious services, on the social level, through the operation of social services, and on the national level by openly opposing the State of Israel and supporting Palestinian terrorism. The movement is considered very extreme, and it has two factions, the extreme northern faction and the more moderate southern faction.

The movement began to organize during the British Mandate with the Arab Revolt, and after World War II. In the War of Independence, the movement suffered a severe blow because of its cooperation with the Arab Higher Committee, and assistance to the Muslim Brotherhood movement with which it was identified, leading to the closure of the movement’s institutions in Israel. During the military regime the movement was suppressed, and the remaining institutions in the West Bank were placed under Jordan. From the Six-Day War there was an awakening in the Islamic Movement, as there was a connection between the Arabs of the territories and the Arabs of the State of Israel.

The occupation of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip by Israel in 1967 significantly accelerated the development of Islamic organizations in these areas, and indirectly encouraged their re-emergence within the State of Israel. The military defeat vis-à-vis Israel strengthened the belief of many Arabs that their weakness stemmed from their distancing themselves from Islam, and encouraged them to cast their trust in the renewed faith. In the wake of modernization there has been a reaction against the Western and permissive culture of Jewish society and its bad

influence on Arab society. Finally, the Islamic Revolution of Iran, which encouraged Israeli Arabs to unite within a religious framework, is the Islamic Movement. At the same time, everyday life under the Israeli occupation has become a depressing experience that encouraged many to seek an explanation for the evil of decree. Israel, for its part, did not follow and supervise Islamic organizations during the first decades of the occupation; Israel's focus on suppressing the secular currents of the Palestinian national movement, headed by Fatah, diverted the attention of the authorities from the process of Islamization (Israeli, 1999).

## 6. The crystallization of movement

The Islamic Movement was founded in 1971 by Abdullah Nimr Darwish, who focused primarily on welfare activities and the establishment of institutions parallel to state institutions for the Muslim community. The first direction in which the Israeli Arabs were part of the Islamic Movement was the violent direction, headed by Darwish. The first Muslim terrorist organization in Israel, was founded on the inspiration of Khomeini's success in Iran and the wave of the radical Islam initiative that appeared in other Arab countries soon thereafter, with the aim of bringing some of the principles guiding fundamentalist Islam into practice. Western culture was perceived by the organization as responsible for the decay and moral deterioration in the world, including those who visited the Arabs, since Israel was portrayed as a Western representative in the Middle East, and was directed to the prison as a result of an attack which took place in one of the kibbutzim in the center of the country, which was used to deepen the ideology that guided them, during which the activists formulated a decision that guided them from their release until today. The Islamic Movement, under the influence of Sheikh Abdallah Nimr Darwish and later of the new generation leaders of the movement, adapted from its inception its political positions to the fact that it operates in Israel. Despite the desire to establish a Muslim state based on Islamic law, the Islamic Movement refrained from raising this demand. On the surface, it seems that the movement has come to terms with the existence of the State of Israel, and its leaders even call for maintaining the law. Movement spokesmen declare that they obey the laws of the state. But in order not to confront the PLO, which enjoys support among the Arab population in Israel, Sheikh Darwish expressed caution: "After a state is established, the Palestinian people will choose the social regime they want."

During the 1980s, the Islamic Movement built itself from below. Has succeeded in mobilizing broad popular support and significant involvement in the public sectors, which until now have felt alienated from the state, which discriminates against them because of their being Palestinians, towards the traditional local leadership, and between them and the Zionist parties, and the urban leadership of the Democratic Front for Peace and Equality (Hadash). Was accused by many of not caring enough for the local community and improving its living conditions, and concentrating too much on politics on the national level.

The Islamic Movement has no official organizational structure. The activity is carried out with the help of non-profit organizations, each focusing on a different topic. The movement is headed by a number of leaders whose positions they have acquired because of their personalities or family ties, rather than by any hierarchical framework.

Despite the political connection, the Islamic movement was not registered as an organization, movement or party. Its activists are not members of any formal framework. This deliberate ambiguity was intended to grant it immunity from harm to the authorities.

The executive power of the Islamic establishment stems to a large extent from the fact that it was and still remains vague in defining the roles and positions within it. Membership in the Islamic Society is not formally regulated, but is determined by participation in current activities, which is based on charismatic authority and the institutional ambiguity that accompanies it, which

are not limited by rigid procedures, and therefore are not subject to a significant threat from the junior members of the organization, who find it difficult to demand changes in the democratic process (Nachman, 2000).

#### 7. Theoretical background – The theory of pragmatism

Pragmatism is a philosophical theory that was raised in the United States at the end of the 19<sup>th</sup> century. Its founders were Charles S. Pierce, who gave the theory its name and developed its principles: William James, who promoted and disseminated it, and John Dewey, who developed the instrumental aspects of the theory (Bacon, 2012).

The theory of pragmatism is a philosophical idea that emphasizes the connection between theory and practice: the value of the truth of theory depends on the organization and the effectiveness of its application. Pragmatism, says Richard Rorty, is about what are the most effective ways of achieving what we want to achieve (Brandon, 2011). Pragmatism holds that the truth is measured by practical purposes. The truth of a claim is determined by practical results and the benefit it serves. Pragmatists rely on empirical experiments and practical success and rejecting a priori assumptions as a source of human knowledge (espousing empiricism). According to pragmatism, thoughts, ideas, and outlooks are merely tools for achieving one's life goals – and have no metaphysical significance (James, 1975). That is, concepts represent appropriate thinking habits or etiquette; they do not represent metaphysical truths and do not describe the nature of things. Language is not only a means of communication but an expression of the world's consciousness and worldview. Knowledge is guided by the interests and values of users. The subjects establish themselves in a process of empirical experience, rather than as a result of rational and theoretical inquiry (Menand, 1998).

#### 8. Ideology and goals of the Islamic Movement in Israel

The sources of inspiration for the Islamic Movement were the Orthodox Sunna, relying on classical Hadiths of Sunni-Orthodox Islam, such as Bakhari and Musallam. The ideas of the reformist-modernist Islamic stream that emerged from the 19<sup>th</sup> century and the first half of the 20<sup>th</sup> century. The use of anti-Western motifs with a tendency to glorify the Islamic past and view it as an ideal model that contemporary society should imitate. The doctrines of the Muslim Brotherhood, which is the most important source, are particularly prominent in the way in which the Brotherhood interpreted Islam as a religion with an educational-moral message and as a social framework according to which the society must conduct itself. Political views were designed without exceeding the limits of the law and taking into account the secular Palestinian national movement. The Islamic position on solving the Palestinian problem and the Israeli-Arab conflict was based on a long-term view. Resilience, waiting, restrained restraint for the hour of retaliation. The realization of the principle of mutual recognition: Israeli recognition of the right of self-determination of the Palestinian people, including the right to establish a Palestinian state, and Palestinian recognition of Israel's right to exist in peace (according to Darwish). The ideological basis of the Islamic movement, especially the northern branch, is an independent society, that is, a self-contained society that cares for itself. The idea is anchored in Muslim religious rulings. There is a religious problem with being a Muslim minority in a Jewish state, because it is difficult to observe the commandments. There are two solutions to this, either to the Muslim countries or to internal jihad to create closed and independent Muslim communities, similar to the idea of "independent society". The goals of the Islamic movement are essentially similar to those of any modern Islamic movement, and the ideology is very similar to that of the Muslim Brotherhood. The differences are largely due to the fact that the Islamic Movement operates within a predominantly Jewish state. The goals are to encourage the observance of Islamic precepts while

fostering Islamic culture and Islamic education. Islamic welfare activities according to the commandment of charity, as well as safeguarding and nurturing the holy sites of Islam. In addition, the movement is careful to help the Palestinians in the territories (Yisraeli, 1993).

#### 9. The background to the split in the movement – The opposition to pragmatism

The split began in the 1990s, when ideological cracks were created between Raed Salah and Abdalla Nimer Darwish. Salah argued that more radical measures should be taken against Israel, and the cracks deepened with the Oslo Accords. Against this backdrop, two camps began to take shape in the Islamic Movement in Israel, a relatively moderate stream that demonstrated a pragmatic approach, encouragement of the mainstream PLO headed by Arafat, and support for a political settlement between Israel and the Palestinians, and against it a radical-activist stream that demonstrated a rigid political line,

In 1996, the movement decided to run in the Knesset elections after three previous postponements. The decision led to an absolute split between the northern faction headed by Raed Salah and the southern branch, which was eventually led by Sheikh Ibrahim Sarsur.

The differences between the factions are first and foremost in relation to the State of Israel, the northern faction does not recognize the right of existence of the State of Israel and is interested in establishing a Muslim state in its territory, but there is willingness to use Israel for immediate needs, in fact to make the best of it. In contrast, the southern faction does not recognize the right of the State of Israel to exist as a Jewish state, but it is willing to participate in government institutions and to influence its decisions from within.

The split in the movement was a *fait accompli*. Both factions claimed to be the authentic representatives of the movement. Both of them used the name of the movement, and both chose leaders and leaders. Since 1996, many attempts have been made to reconcile the rift in the Islamic movement, but without success (Rabinowitz, 1996).

#### 10. How the ideology of the movement is expressed in its activity?

The leadership of the mainstream Islamic fundamentalist movement in Israel has moved from the mid-1980s to Abdallah Nimr Darwish. Then the violent way was abandoned and the Islamic movement was led in a new way of persuasion, study and teaching in exchange for alleviating the distress of society. The combination worked and worked properly, and the changes were felt in the villages, mosques were enlarged and the number of worshipers increased significantly, and patterns of Islamic dress and performance were adopted for women and men. Darwish directed the movement in a new direction of deepening roots by training hearts, persuasion and learning, education and teaching, and contributing to alleviating the distress of society, in contrast to confrontation with the authorities or religious coercion. Within a short period of time, “Islamic associations” were established in a number of Arab communities. Sheikh Abdallah Nimr Darwish became a central and charismatic figure who believed in taking fate into his own hands. To achieve this goal, he began establishing an infrastructure of families who collect money through the Zakat.

In the Islamic Movement of Israeli Arabs, the social function has a central place. They established labor camps for the establishment and rehabilitation of infrastructure in the villages. The main theme of the activity is the *da'wa*, the call to Islam. To this end, the movement began building a network of kindergartens, clinics and schools, and an Islamic college was established in Umm al-Fahm. In the field of youth, the Islamic Movement also dealt with the problem of crime, the drug problem, and sports.

Sheikh Ra'ed Salah spent three years in senior positions: the head of the Islamic Movement, the mayor of Umm al-Fahm, and the head of the al-Aqsa Institute for the Renovation of the Sacred Islamic Places. In 1997 Salah began to fight for Muslim public opinion in Israel, has rallied the Al-Aqsa Mosque as a symbol and has organized conferences to support the mosque and its holiness. These conferences have gained influence and momentum over the years among Israeli Arabs, and each year they hold a mass demonstration of tens of thousands of activists in Umm al-Fahm under the headline "Al Aqsa in Danger". The movement must discover pragmatism, since it must act within the framework of the laws of the state, in order to receive financial aid, and at the same time acquire a public image of the state Path of the resistance to Israel.

In 1997, a conflict began in Nazareth due to an attempt by the Islamic Movement to build a mosque near the Church of the Annunciation. This conflict caused great uproar between Christians and Muslims in Nazareth, all because of the spread of a Muslim myth of the Islamic movement, as if the territory belonged to Muslims for a long time. The movement did a great deal to achieve its goal, and international organizations and even Yasser Arafat intervened, and during the conflict, the movement's great support was expressed.

After the events of October 2000, Salah was charged with partial responsibility for the events. The Commission stated that Salah had entered the list of fugitives because of the encouragement of violence, false accusations against the State of Israel, the denial of its legitimacy, and the influx of fire among Arab Israelis. In 2001 Salah resigned from the leadership of Umm al-Fahm and focused on his activities as a religious leader and leader of the northern branch of the Islamic Movement. In 2003, Raed Salah was arrested on suspicion of helping Hamas financially and in information, and of various economic offenses.

The ideology of Salah, the leader of the radical stream, is that he is interested in receiving Israel's help when it suits his needs, but he is careful to oppose Israel openly and apparently to incite against it more covertly.

According to various interviews in the media, patience and pragmatism were expressed, for example, when the decision was made to dissolve the Islamic Relief Committee by the State of Israel, Salah, decided to be patient and considerate, and therefore the provision of aid would not stop. There is an understanding that he must act within the framework of the law, otherwise the government will stop all movement activity.

The heads of the local councils on behalf of the movement use the funds of the State of Israel, despite the dissatisfaction with the existence of the state, in addition to donations, in order to improve the situation in their communities (Stendel, 1996).

#### 11. The movement's attitudes toward the Israeli elections, the Oslo Accords and the armed struggle against Israel

The question of whether the Islamic movement should participate in the elections to the Knesset provoked a serious internal dispute. The supporters' camp, the pragmatic stream, focused mainly on the southern Triangle, the Negev and some of the northern communities. This stream under the leadership of Sheikh Darwish adopted a pragmatic approach that holds that elections must be held independently or within the framework of an Arab list or bloc. The opponents, the radical stream, focused on the villages of the Galilee and the northern triangle, headed by the mayor, Sheikh Raed Salah.

With the elections for the 14<sup>th</sup> Knesset approaching in 1996, the movement decided to participate in the elections in order to influence government decisions within the framework of a united Arab list, as a coalition with the Arab Democratic Party of the League of Arab States. The



United Arab List was divided into four seats, two of which were assigned to representatives of the Islamic Movement (Abd al-Malik Dahamshah and Tawfiq Khatib).

The radical movement sided with the Islamic stream in the territories and criticized the Palestinian Authority, while the pragmatic movement tried to take a neutral stance, maintaining contact with both sides. The southern branch, headed by Sheikh Darwish, supports participation in the Knesset elections from a pragmatic approach of participation in an Arab list. The pragmatic reasons are the civil duty, since there is no harm to the belief in the Knesset vote, and also ensuring proper representation for the Arabs in the Knesset. The ideological argument is that Muslim minorities who were under a non-Muslim majority also participated in political life. The northern faction, which opposes the elections, has other reasons. The pragmatic argument is that there is no need to compete and the friction with the symbols of Jewish and Zionist rule should be minimized. Ideologically, halakha cannot participate in elections because Muslims have only one constitution – the Shari'a and the Koran – and cannot be replaced by a reference to this position taken by Sheikh Yusuf al-Qardawi, a resident of Qatar, who interprets Islam very harshly. The split led to the weakening of the Islamic movement, to the weakening of Arab politics and its unification, and undermined the voting rate of the Arab public for the Knesset.

The signing of the Declaration of Principles between the PLO and Israel in September 1993 was welcomed by the pragmatic stream headed by Sheikh Abdallah Nimr Darwish, who was the most vocal supporter of the peace process. Make sure to show a balanced approach and not to criticize the Islamic opposition too harshly.

The radical movement of the Islamic Movement expressed vehement opposition to the agreement. Sheikh Raed Salah called the agreement an act of treason and called for its abolition in democratic ways. His colleague, Sheikh Kamal Khatib, considered the agreement “a betrayal of the right of the Palestinian people.” As the peace process progressed, the internal split between the two camps deepened.

The distinction between the two branches of the Islamic movement is sharpened by the attitude toward Hamas, and by examining the nature of the connection to the Islamic stream in the territories. The radical faction, emphasizes its political-ideological identification with the Islamic movement in the territories. The pragmatic stream turns to activity within the Green Line, accepting the fact that it is a minority in a non-Muslim majority state. He decided to go to the Knesset and accept the rules of the game of a Western democratic regime, and recognize the legitimacy of the existence of the State of Israel (Yisraeli, 1993).

## 12. How does pragmatism manifest itself in the movement's activities?

*Community and political activity.* Since its inception, the Islamic Movement has been working on establishing alternative systems for existing or missing public systems in the Arab sector. These systems provide a basis for imparting Islamic values and constitute the infrastructure of the Islamic state that the Islamic movement wishes. The stated aim of these systems is to provide services in all areas of social, cultural and economic life. In fact, it is a convenient and legal cover for promoting Islamic ideology.

The movement begins to develop pragmatically in 1989, when the movement decides to compete for the leadership of a number of Arab communities, the movement wins the council's leadership in six Arab towns and significant achievements in other communities. The greatest victory is achieved by Sheikh Raed Salah in Umm al-Fahm, which becomes the center of the movement.

The municipal elections were natural and obvious, due to the extensive activity in the villages because the municipal framework in the Arab communities was the only framework that

was not completely subordinate to Jewish institutions and Jewish influence. Therefore, in the 1980s, the movement channeled its activity to the municipal level. This was chosen as the first consolidation arena because selective action was possible only in communities where the power of the fundamentalist circles was strong. A good success was recorded in the elections for the local councils in October 1983: the movement won the leadership of two councils (out of six settlements that the movement was competing for) and the representation of seven seats in five villages. In the February 1989 elections, the victory of the movement was sweeping: they won 45 seats (out of the 14 settlements that the movement competed for). In the municipal elections in 1993, the Islamic Movement maintained its power: it won five seats and a number of local council members rose to 50. In the municipal elections in 1998, the movement continued to grow stronger: it won the leadership of five local authorities when the greatest achievement was in Nazareth. The Islamic stream won a majority in the Nazareth Council and thus defeated the front headed by Rakah for the first time in 23 years. From the beginning, the center of gravity of the movement's activists was determined on the local-municipal level. In Umm al-Fahm, for instance, the branch of the Islamic Movement was established in 1976. In 1978, an Islamic reconciliation committee for family affairs was set up, which worked mainly to find compromises between Muslim-sponsored spouses. The relative success of this initiative led to the establishment of a series of committees dealing with a variety of social and cultural fields. Since the beginning of their activity, activists of the Islamic Movement have been characterized by the attention paid to the problems that preoccupied the weaker sections of the population. Problems that have not been treated or treated inadequately by the State of Israel. One of the most prominent features of the Islamic Movement's municipal activity is the great pragmatism demonstrated by its leaders in the ongoing affairs of the authorities they are responsible for. In Umm al-Fahm, for example, which in the past has been marked by the unwillingness and inability of the municipality and government officials to cooperate with each other and thereby contribute to the development of the city and its problems, there has been a change since 1989. The current leadership in the city is different from Hadash's municipal government, an action that emphasizes the exploitation of every opportunity and support from the outside, including state support, for the realization of urgent urban goals. This approach is made possible, inter alia, by the special status of the Islamic Movement, as opposed to other political movements active in the Arab community in Israel. All modern political movements, such as Hadash, Mada, the Progressive List and others, are based in various ways on imported universal ideas and values: communism, socialism, liberalism, secular nationalism, and so forth. The Islamic Movement, on the other hand, derives its legitimacy from the past and the Muslim heritage. Because it is perceived as a representative of local, regional and religious tradition, it is free of the pressure of other political movements, which represent the Arabs in Israel. The pragmatic progress of the Arabs in Israel from what the Israeli bureaucracy gives them entails an ideological compromise – take less than what you deserve according to historical justice, in which you and the public you represent only a movement whose ideological strength is undeniable, like the Islamic Movement. Such relations with the state, and it does so: it exploits rifts in the network of discrimination, in order to achieve more achievements for the public good, without paying a political price in terms of public support and trust.

*Mediating between Hamas and the PLO, and with the Israeli authorities.* The movement's representatives tried to mediate between the Israeli and Hamas authorities and to bridge the gap between Fatah and Hamas leaders in the territories. This activity, which began in 1992, peaked in 1994-5 after the establishment of the Palestinian Authority in the territories. For the Islamic Movement, the mediation initiatives were aimed at bringing about calm between the two sides, but at the same time the movement sought legitimacy and recognition both from the mainstream of the PLO and from the Islamic faction in the territories.

In 1994, the movement's public activity was felt in the Jewish public when Sheikh Saleh tried to mediate between Israel and Hamas on the subject of Nachshon Wachsmann, in order

to gain media attention and reputation. On the other hand, Sheikh Darwish called on the kidnapers of Sergeant Nissim Toledano and the soldier Nachshon Wachsman to spare their lives. The movement understands that it must receive legitimacy as a movement with communal responsibility from the Israeli authorities, in order to continue operating without the intervention of the authorities.

There is a significant similarity between the Islamic movement in Israel and the movement in the Palestinian territories, especially with respect to the establishment of social, educational, cultural and religious infrastructures under the auspices of the Islamic movement. Many of the ideological characteristics of the Islamic Movement in Israel are similar and similar to those in the territories. At the same time, political Islam in Israel developed its own lines.

The main organizational tool of the Islamic Movement is the Islamic Association. It is an organization based on donations of funds and voluntary action and operates committees in various fields. There is no doubt that the key to the success of the Association lies in its willingness, at an early stage, to break the boundaries of the areas that until then had been considered traditional religious. Activity such as the establishment of peace house, with all its importance, would not give the movement a real political grip. The preoccupation with education, including the integration of innovative elements and support for non-religious institutions, signaled to the public that the Association sees its role in initiating improvements in a wide range of subjects. This activity expanded the meaning of the term "Islamic movement" beyond religion, and began to give the association political relevance that cannot be ignored. Such a model of action is known in radical religious movements such as Hamas and the Muslim Brotherhood.

Much of the activity of the Islamic Movement was voluntary, but at the same time the movement developed an efficient system for collecting donations from the public. The main instrument is the zakat committees, which require every Muslim to devote part of his financial profits and assets he accumulated in a given year to the benefit of the community and poor. The main change in this area began at the end of the 1970s, when the Zakat committees began to function as superpowers of fundraising and would be channeled to the needy. The institutionalization of financial activity through the Zakat committees, together with the budgetary assistance that came from abroad, gave the Islamic Movement a very significant organizational push: In Umm al-Fahm, the largest Muslim city in Israel, the Islamic Movement created a powerful and economically powerful center for itself in the 1980s. As an alternative to the municipality and state institutions, and over time became the center of power.

Special emphasis is placed on spreading the Islamic da'wah, a call for Muslims to return to the original Islam. The movement managed to enlist the members of society to work for their community. In many respects, Sheikh Abdallah and his movement filled the vacuum created by the neglect of government authorities (Israeli, 1999).

### 13. Conclusions

The rise of the Islamist movements as a leading social and political force in the Middle East is the result of the bankruptcy of nationalism, secularism and the left in the Arab world, which created an ideological vacuum, which is filled to a large extent by the fundamentalists, ensuring that Islam is the solution. It is not only about the extent of the return to religion, but about the transformation of religion into a major political factor both by the regimes and by the opposition. These are political movements that deal first and foremost with the social and political mobilization of the masses, and they exert pressure to apply the Islamic law as the law of the state instead of the legal systems taken from the Western model. The Islamic solution offered by these movements has several distinct advantages over others. First, Islam is presented as a comprehensive system that provides all solutions to the problem of this world and the next.

Second, the Islamic solution is presented as an alternative to the realization of Arab and Islamic revival and power. Ideas of Islamic movements tend to be inclusive, which increases their attractiveness. They are radical in that they seek seemingly profound solutions to the fundamental problems of society. Third, it is not an imported solution. The Islamic solution is an authentic one, rooted in local culture and suited to local conditions. Islamists also use fatwa to convey their message. In addition, the voluntary activity of the Islamic movements brings them closer to the general public, especially those in need of social services, education and medicine, and places the Islamic societies in an important position of influence. In the depression surrounding the alleys of poverty, Islam appears as a new hope and the slogan “Islam is the solution” does not require proof.

The Islamic movements’ main concern is traditional educational activity aimed at preserving and strengthening the character and Islamic character of society. One example of this is the Muslim Brotherhood movement in Egypt at the beginning of its path, which took the approach that the path to achieving the goal, i.e., the establishment of an Islamic state, is a gradual one, emphasizing the Islamic education of the younger generation. How can we explain the fact that the Islamic movements join the government and usually operate within the framework of the law? Most of the Islamic movements in the Arab countries are persecuted by the regime, so they must recognize reality, otherwise the government will not allow them to exist. Islam is a belief rooted in the consciousness of the masses and deeply ingrained in Egyptian culture. In Israel, the situation is different, modernization and democracy also affect Israeli Arabs. Therefore, it is possible that Islam is not so deeply rooted in the culture of the Arab citizens of Israel, they are aware of the possibility of a different path other than Islam (Chukov, 2018). Every movement as radical as it may be, tries to adapt itself to the changing realities and conditions, since their leaders know that without any support from the government, it will be difficult for them to exist (Petkova, 2012). The movements have developed over time tools that enable them to cope with reality. The religious law in Islam allows flexibility in organizing community life, Shari’a is adapted to reality because of the ruler’s ability to canonize legislation and flexibility in political life according to principles such as sabra and long-term goals, to compromise with reality and find temporary solutions, as well as religious scholars who provide fatwas and commentaries on every subject. With progress and modernization, the movements realized that they could not deny progress, so they decided to join the mainstream and take advantage of technological progress in their favor. Each movement maintains at least one website in which it publishes its way, and guides the audience. Although these movements seem to maintain a rigid ideology, they adapt themselves to reality with the help of many tools, because they have realized that reality is stronger than they are.

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