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CONTENTS

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The Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt:
Ideology vs. Pragmatism

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Abstract

This study aims to present the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, its ideology and pragmatism. With progress and modernization, the Islamic movements in the Middle East realized that they could not deny progress, so they decided to join the mainstream and take advantage of technological progress in their favor. The movement maintains at least one website in which it publishes its way, and guides the audience. Although these movements seem to maintain a rigid ideology, they adapt themselves to reality with the help of many tools, because they have realized that reality is stronger than they are. The main points in the article are: The status of religion in the country; What is the Muslim Brotherhood? According to which ideology is the movement taking place? - Movement background and ideology; Theoretical background – The theory of Pragmatism; How is pragmatism manifested in the activity of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt? In conclusions: The rise of the Islamist movements as a leading social and political force in the Middle East is the result of the bankruptcy of nationalism, secularism and the left in the Arab world, which created an ideological vacuum, which is filled to a large extent by the fundamentalists, ensuring that Islam is the solution. It is not only about the extent of the return to religion, but about the transformation of religion into a major political factor both by the regimes and by the opposition. These are political movements that deal first and foremost with the social and political mobilization of the masses, and they exert pressure to apply the Islamic law as the law of the state instead of the legal systems taken from the Western model.

Keywords: Muslim Brotherhood, Egypt, ideology, pragmatism.

1. Introduction

Egypt is very large, but most of its inhabitants live densely in the Nile Valley and the Delta, since these are areas that deserve to live. The majority of the population, close to 78 million, is Muslim and a small Christian minority. Natural increase in Egypt is one of the highest in the world, although there has been a decline, which will cause the population to double over the next 25 years. Since 1945 there has been an accelerated process of urbanization, but it is a destructive process since there is no infrastructure for absorbing the masses, which ultimately end up as

D. Schwartz & D. Galily – The Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt: Ideology vs. Pragmatism

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unemployed or homeless on the margins of society, and they are the basis of radical Islam. Today, the economic aid provided by the United States to Egypt is necessary, as it avoids hunger and social unrest, and the tourism sector is a major and important source of income for Egypt, but the terrorist elements are aware of this and are trying to harm tourism in order to harm the economy. The state economy and privatization. Egypt is carrying out large-scale development projects, such as the construction of the Aswan dam, which has provided jobs, and provides electricity to thousands of villages, but development programs are not keeping pace with population growth. Industrialization is also difficult because most of the population is unskilled and almost half of the population is illiterate. The improvements in the economic situation in Egypt have not yet affected the standard of living of the masses and the weaker sectors of the population, which are a convenient place for radical Islamic movements. Egypt is a country with elements of democracy, but it is not democratic, since the state intervenes in all areas and there is no separation of powers. Also, the media is still under strict supervision, and most of the media is owned by the government (Ajami, 1983).

2. The status of religion in the country

During the reign of President Sadat, who was a devout believer, and spread and publicizes the government's efforts to develop and strengthen the Islamic prayer and education institutions and adopt clear Islamic law principles, the influence of the religious opposition in Egypt was on the rise, with the movement of "repentance" to fundamentalist Islam encompassing tens of thousands. While the Egyptian people underwent a shake-up in "modern" Egypt, Islam remained a solid rock and the return was like a retreat to the safe and familiar haven. Many joined Islam and Islamic organizations in protest against the material-economic situation. Others came to the Islamic movements as a result of spiritual emptiness and lack of direction. The movements offered their members a world view of equality, a simple way of life, a spiritual peace within religious piety when they were promised a change from the intolerable reality. The main victims of material and ideological distress are students at universities that have become the main stronghold of the Islamic opposition.

Sadat left Mubarak a government framework that functions relatively efficiently, and the economic situation of the country was better than what Sadat received from Nasser. The government faced a fundamentalist Islamic opposition, so that Egyptian society at the beginning of Mubarak's reign continued to oscillate between the three main components of personal consciousness: Islam-Egyptian-Arab.

After Sadat's assassination, Vice President Hosni Mubarak was president and head of the ruling National Democratic Party. Mubarak was elected president in four other elections, in 1987, in 1993, in 1999 and in 2005. Sadat's successor continued the peace policy taken by his predecessor.

When he was appointed president, he emphasized the difference between his policy and Sadat's policy: he blocked the rush towards a free market economy, stopped liberalization in the economy, and returned to more state supervision; On the other hand, a greater degree of freedom allowed political organization and opposition to power. Mubarak's policy has led to tourism and economic development, but due to the high rate of natural increase in Egypt, economic growth is not yet absorbing the needs of the population.

In the area of foreign relations, Mubarak continued to nurture Egypt's ties with the United States and at the same time rehabilitated relations with Russia, mainly seeking to improve relations with the Arab states, which were undermined by the peace treaty with Israel and restoring Egypt to its traditional role as leader of the Arab world. In contrast to his moderate foreign policy, Mubarak has been working hard in recent years against radical Islamic

organizations in Egypt. Islam in Egypt rises in its influence on democracy. It is a deep belief, and Islam is also known to the uneducated classes, and is embedded in the blood of culture and underlies the way of life and education. Democracy, on the other hand, has no basis in political history, political culture or dominant civil culture. In contrast to Islam, democracy is linked to Western failure, which has led to the destruction of traditional norms. The pursuit of democracy has historically stemmed from the conviction that this system is one of the components of Western supremacy.

It can be seen that Egypt is undergoing a revolution in power and even a push for democracy. The continuation of the transition and trend of change can also be seen in recent times, in 2005 in the first multi-national elections in Egypt.

The reality gave Mubarak a face, he received from Sadat a country that was completely boycotted by the Arab states, a state in which tension exists between regime and opposition and other ethnic and social tensions, he manages to stabilize Egypt and bring back the heart of the Arab world.

Mubarak softens the internal tension and stops the opposition's persecution, but the course of events is dynamic, and in Egypt today there is a weariness from Mubarak's rule. One of the most prominent is the personal aspect, the top of the government is stagnant, most of the officials are still appointed by the president, newspaper editors, senior generals and leading people in society, economy, culture and entertainment.

Sadat has led a process of disengaging from Nasser's socialist heritage and closer to the West. The move has not been completed, and there is a price to this – in society there are large gaps between the classes. Mubarak does not present a structured world view of Egypt's character. In this way, the regime acquiesced in social phenomena and even encourages some of them. Belief in failure to act as a guarantee of economic survival and stability, but also has disadvantages.

Islamic movements flourished against the oppression of civil society during Mubarak's time, when they could flourish under the protection of mosques and religious institutions. The pressure exerted by the Islamic movements on the government led to limited democratization, which allowed limited freedom of organization and political participation to opposition parties.

At the same time, Islamic movements exploited this possibility of political participation when they compromise and accept the state and territory as an arena of activity. Defining the goals was less a change of regime and more – Islamic society, a kind of coexistence between the territorial state and the Islamic values.

Fundamentalism conducts a battle of bravery against modernism, but is forced to compromise with reality. The leaders of radical Islam accepted the fact that a classical Islamic state could not be established, complemented by modern technology, and even exploited it to advance their interests. This is due to the technology that advances the achievement of Islam's goals and the system of preaching. Despair and disappointment the powerlessness of the government paved the way for the message of radical Islam. The young generation, as a result of economic and social distress, turned to seek the lost Arab honor. Fundamentalism works to achieve its goals in political ways, so they must compromise and act pragmatically, for example, with regard to technological progress, since they know that reality is stronger than them, but God's sovereignty is not subject to compromise, and society must live according to Sharia. The extremist movements and the regimes against them are operating.

The rulers of Egypt along the time axis are aware of the danger inherent in the Muslim Brotherhood, and therefore defined them as the primary enemy and as a strategic threat to the stability of the regime, since they present themselves as a classic Islam rather than an exceptional and fanatic factor. In Egypt, in fact, since the officers' revolution, there has been a struggle between the secular regime and the Islamic movement in Egypt, a struggle that has involved thousands of

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arrests and executions over the years. Mubarak was defined by the Muslim Brotherhood as a ransom to be cleared in order to prepare the way for the establishment of an Islamic State the Egyptian regime acted in response to brutal oppression and persecutions, thus reducing violence, but the use of such force led to temporary calm and subsequent calamity.

The main problem in the Arab countries is that there have been no political developments or a real improvement in the socio-economic sphere that has led to the establishment of a new movement that will replace radical Islamic movements, so radical Islam will continue to be a threat to the secular Arab regimes (Mura, 2012).

3. What is the Muslim Brotherhood? According to which ideology is the movement taking place? – Movement background and ideology

The Muslim Brotherhood was founded in 1929 by Hassan al-Banna in Ismailia. Following his view of the corruption prevalent in society, especially among the youth, as well as the economic, social and political inferiority of Egypt, he decided to establish a movement that would deal with education and correcting the situation. The movement is trying to bring Egypt back to the beginning of Islam, to the era of glamor, according to the Shari'a, the conditions prevailing in Egypt in those years, unemployment and distress caused the movement to grow easily. The Islamic message was easily absorbed in a frustrated society suffering from social and economic distress. Between religious and secular. The Muslim Brotherhood has become an orthodox urban movement, a regular movement designed to correct certain injustices in the name of religious norms. It is a modern political party with a systematic organization, a mechanism for mobilizing organized supporters, and a clear political platform. To mobilize the masses, the organization is supported by ideological persuasion, welfare and welfare programs, along with an organized banking system and Islamic investment. Hassan al-Banna established a military organization within the framework of the Muslim Brotherhood. This was particularly significant, as this indicated the Muslim Brotherhood's willingness to achieve its goals in violent ways as well.

Ideologically, the Muslim Brotherhood claims that the Muslim world is at an unprecedented low. This is because Islam has absorbed foreign influences that have corrupted the original message and corrupted the inhabitants of the Muslim world. As a movement that advocates patriotism, the brothers saw a special connection between Egypt and the movement. This attitude was also due to Egypt's dismal situation as a sign of the bleak situation in the entire Muslim world. They argue that the British control of Egypt instilled in Egyptian society the maladies of Western society, and led to moral corruption of the entire Egyptian society. The imperialist Western world that advocated liberalism was infected with moral corruption that affected Egyptian society and the world (Robinson, 2010).

The only solution to the situation in which the Muslim world is located consists of two stages. In the first stage, Western imperialism must be expelled and all its ideas rejected. Second, Islam must be purged of all foreign influences and returned to Muhammad's initial message. After these two goals have been achieved, the glorious days of Islam must be renewed and the Islamic caliphate should be reestablished. But as an interim step towards achieving the ultimate goal, namely, the reestablishment of the Islamic caliphate, an Islamic order must be established in Egypt. The establishment of an Islamic order that would include the elimination of separation between religion and state, which is impossible for the Brotherhood, and the application of Sharia's - Islamic law as the constitution of Egypt.

According to the doctrine of the Muslim Brotherhood, these goals will be achieved gradually by training the hearts, in proper preparation for the establishment of an Islamic religious state. The training of hearts will be done through the following activities: preaching, education, direction, preparation and preparation for jihad. Educational institutions will be established that

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will educate the generation of sorrow in the Islamic way of life. In the country, an Islamic way of life will be instituted in all spheres of life. In addition, a preaching system will be introduced to educate the population regarding the Islamic message.

After a while, the movement that started from the bottom emerged, and also entered the political framework in order to reform society and the government in the spirit of Islam. Members of the movement began to incite various elements in Egypt against the government, and were also involved in political murders, such as Egyptian Prime Minister Al Nukrashi in 1949. On 12 February, Al-Banna was assassinated in retaliation for the murder of Egyptian Prime Minister Nukarashi by the Muslim Brotherhood.

During the first year of the Free Officers' transformation, there was good relations between the movement and the officers. However, from the middle of 1953, when it became clear that the Revolutionary Council was moving towards a secular state rather than an Islamic state, relations deteriorated. The crisis between the Muslim Brotherhood and Nasser broke out with the understanding that he held socialist and secular ideas. On October 26, 1954, in light of Nasser's assassination attempt, the movement was outlawed and severely oppressed (Badrul, 1982).

4. Theoretical background – The theory of pragmatism

Pragmatism is a philosophical theory that was raised in the United States at the end of the 19th century. Its founders were Charles S. Pierce, who gave the theory its name and developed its principles, William James, who promoted and disseminated it, and John Dewey, who developed the instrumental aspects of the theory (Bacon, 2012). The theory of pragmatism is a philosophical idea that emphasizes the connection between theory and practice: the value of the truth of theory depends on the organization and the effectiveness of its application. Pragmatism, says Richard Rorty, is about what are the most effective ways of achieving what we want to achieve (Brandon, 2011).

Pragmatism holds that the truth is measured by practical purposes. The truth of a claim is determined by practical results and the benefit it serves. Pragmatists rely on empirical experiments and practical success and rejecting a-priori assumptions as a source of human knowledge (espousing empiricism). According to pragmatism, thoughts, ideas, and outlooks are merely tools for achieving one's life goals – and have no metaphysical significance (Kloppenber, 1996).

That is, concepts represent appropriate thinking habits or etiquette; they do not represent metaphysical truths and do not describe the nature of things. Language is not only a means of communication but an expression of the world's consciousness and worldview. Knowledge is guided by the interests and values of users. The subjects establish themselves in a process of empirical experience, rather than as a result of rational and theoretical inquiry (Menand, 1998).

5. How is pragmatism manifested in the activity of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt?

The Muslim Brotherhood sometimes acts within the framework of the law, when it is possible and convenient, and sometimes undermines it for their own purposes. Their activities are directed against the state and its institutions, and as part of this they seek to infiltrate the ranks of the army and the police in order to take control of it, with the ultimate goal of creating an Islamic state. As part of its activity, the dilemma between the Pan-Islamic idea and the national point of view often arose. The regimes in Egypt from the beginning of the century aspired to the existence of a territorial nation-state, based on a system of law and bureaucracy according to the Western

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model. During the Mubarak era, relations with the West, especially the US, became closer to Egyptian economic cooperation and dependence.

How does a movement such as the Muslim Brotherhood cope with such a world view?

Since the 1980s, the movement, as befits an Islamic movement, has adopted the principles of the Sabra, a long-term strategy that will lead to a goal, i.e., an Islamic state. And thus, to be able to organize themselves as a party, since they were prohibited from organizing as an independent political party, so they succeeded in entering the People's Council in 1984 and 1987 and gained political achievements when their issues were placed on the agenda in the public (Murphy, 2007).

The Muslim Brotherhood has often faced the regime without violence at all, making it difficult for the regime to fight them. The regime, which understood that the threat was on Egypt's long-term stability, began to fight the brothers in the political arena and prevented them from running in the elections in 1990 and 1995, until finally they succeeded in eliminating them from the political field. Mubarak decided on a strategy of "total confrontation" and fought the religious movement without much success by enlisting his own clerics with counter-fatwas, and even using the strict laws that led to a deep internal crisis. In the first years of his term, Mubarak worked to increase democracy, made it possible to establish political parties, and expanded freedom of the press. He sought to reach a balance with the religious opposition, separating the moderates, ie, the Muslim Brotherhood, from the more extreme movements in which he fought with cruelty. Mubarak has been practicing Islamization, such as taxing alcohol, and increasing censorship on television. Moderate religious' activity was possible.

The regime needed to fill the religious vacuum in order to monitor religious services in the country and to provide the public with its religious needs. Therefore, Mubarak made a quiet alliance with them, so that the brothers would implement the shari'a without violence and without the regime's commitment to recognize them. The Muslim Brotherhood undertook to fill gaps for the regime and thus create a broader base of support because of its cooperation with the regime. The movement succeeds in threatening its stability. Over the years, the brothers have placed their own people in thousands of mosques in Egypt, in response to the regime's clerics. When Mubarak tried to nationalize some of the private mosques, those were left without worshipers, and this action caused unrest among the movement and among worshipers against the regime. The religious confrontation with the Brotherhood did not succeed in Egypt (Osman, 2010).

Another space that the Muslim Brotherhood has taken over is the socio-economic space by establishing schools and investment companies in the spirit of Islam, and the movement realized that because of the powerlessness of the government, and because these services are necessary for the state, And hospitals and boarding schools and schools at symbolic prices, where there was a huge shortage of these, and so the Islamic message went to the needy, the money that the movement earned from the investment companies was invested in Dawa, and the transmission of the Islamic message.

The government's inability to meet these needs provided a window of opportunity for Islamic activity. The regime knew that these bodies were necessary for the population, and therefore did not act decisively to close them. The movement exploits spaces in which the government cannot act against it. The willingness of the Muslim Brotherhood to participate in the democratic process is a compromise and a concession to the seizure of power by force. According to Hassan al-Bana's doctrine, the goal of fatwah is not only to reach the grassroots level, but also to the official level, namely, the People's Council, in which there is no separation between religion and state.

The main goal was to bring about the implementation of shari'a in the country. Participation in the People's Council serves the religious propaganda, and through the People's

Council the hearts can be fixed. Thus, the brothers merged with a secular party, the Wafd, in the 1984 elections, and were successful. And later in 1987, together with the Amal Party and the Liberals. The brothers needed the umbrella of other parties because they were outlawed. The movement did not give up its funds, and its platform was that sharia would be the main source of legislation. This issue has always been on the agenda. The regime, for its part, rejected the numerous bills they had proposed, and introduced alternative bills. The regime expected that the brothers' power would weaken or participation in the democratic process would lead to division, but the opposite happened, and their influence and power increased. In 1990, following new laws of the regime designed to make the movement more difficult, it withdrew from the People's Council.

Thus, the Muslim Brotherhood was pushed into the trade unions by the government and found a great deal of activity for them, and the brothers had a very strong organizational capacity, and therefore they had a large sector of workers in their ranks. The unions served as an alternative arena, and once again they received a political platform to convey the Islamic message. If at first Mubarak supported coexistence, from 1994-5 he began a comprehensive confrontation with them in order to suppress and humiliate them and remove them from any influential framework. In 1995, the Brotherhood decided to run again in the elections to the People's Assembly, the regime pushed them through many arrests and interrogations, and pushed them into all areas of the trade unions, the media and the political arena. The leader of the movement, Hamed Abu Nasser, was very old and ill and could not unite the ranks, and after his death Mustafa Mashur was elected to replace him, and he decided to maintain a moderate and nonviolent policy like his predecessor and called on the regime to deal with The movement was a dialogue to resolve the conflict, and the youth of the movement opposed the dead road In the days of Nasser's oppression, the movement suffered from internal strife and faction, and the leader supported the path patiently and with patience, and before him the young people wanted strong action. The movement from the headlines, weakening and even causing internal friction between the veteran leadership and the young leadership (El Rashidi, 2011).

6. Conclusions

The rise of the Islamist movements as a leading social and political force in the Middle East is the result of the bankruptcy of nationalism, secularism and the left in the Arab world, which created an ideological vacuum, which is filled to a large extent by the fundamentalists, ensuring that Islam is the solution. It is not only about the extent of the return to religion, but about the transformation of religion into a major political factor both by the regimes and by the opposition. These are political movements that deal first and foremost with the social and political mobilization of the masses, and they exert pressure to apply the Islamic law as the law of the state instead of the legal systems taken from the Western model.

The Islamic solution offered by these movements has several distinct advantages over others. First, Islam is presented as a comprehensive system that provides all solutions to the problem of this world and the next. Second, the Islamic solution is presented as an alternative to the realization of Arab and Islamic revival and power. Ideas of Islamic movements tend to be inclusive, which increases their attractiveness. They are radical in that they seek seemingly profound solutions to the fundamental problems of society. Third, it is not an imported solution. The Islamic solution is an authentic one, rooted in local culture and suited to local conditions.

Islamists also use Da'wah to convey their message. In addition, the voluntary activity of the Islamic movements brings them closer to the general public, especially those in need of social services, education and medicine, and places the Islamic societies in an important position of influence. In the depression surrounding the alleys of poverty, Islam appears as a new hope and the slogan "Islam is the solution" does not require proof.

D. Schwartz & D. Galily – The Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt: Ideology vs. Pragmatism

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The Islamic movements' main concern is traditional educational activity aimed at preserving and strengthening the character and Islamic character of society. One example of this is the Muslim Brotherhood movement in Egypt at the beginning of its path, which took the approach that the path to achieving the goal, i.e., the establishment of an Islamic state, is a gradual one, emphasizing the Islamic education of the younger generation. How can we explain the fact that the Islamic movements join the government and usually operate within the framework of the law? Most of the Islamic movements in the Arab countries are persecuted by the regime, so they must recognize reality, otherwise the government will not allow them to exist.

Islam is a belief rooted in the consciousness of the masses and deeply ingrained in Egyptian culture. In Israel, the situation is different, modernization and democracy also affect Israeli Arabs. Therefore, it is possible that Islam is not so deeply rooted in the culture of the Arab citizens of Israel, they are aware of the possibility of a different path other than Islam (Chukov, 2018).

Every movement as radical as it may be, tries to adapt itself to the changing realities and conditions, since their leaders know that without any support from the government, it will be difficult for them to exist (Petkova, 2012).

The movements have developed over time tools that enable them to cope with reality. The religious law in Islam allows flexibility in organizing community life, Sharia's is adapted to reality because of the ruler's ability to canonize legislation and flexibility in political life according to principles such as sabra and long-term goals, to compromise with reality and find temporary solutions, as well as religious scholars who provide fatwas and commentaries on every subject.

With progress and modernization, the movements realized that they could not deny progress, so they decided to join the mainstream and take advantage of technological progress in their favor. Each movement maintains at least one website in which it publishes its way, and guides the audience. Although these movements seem to maintain a rigid ideology, they adapt themselves to reality with the help of many tools, because they have realized that reality is stronger than they are.

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D. Schwartz & D. Galily – The Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt: Ideology vs. Pragmatism

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The Islamic Movement in Israel: Ideology vs. Pragmatism

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Abstract

This study aims to present the Islamic Movement in Israel, its ideology and pragmatism. With progress and modernization, the Islamic movements in the Middle East realized that they could not deny progress, so they decided to join the mainstream and take advantage of technological progress in their favor. The movement maintains at least one website in which it publishes its way, and guides the audience. Although these movements seem to maintain a rigid ideology, they adapt themselves to reality with the help of many tools, because they have realized that reality is stronger than they are. The main points in the article are: The Status of Religion in Israel; The Legal Status of Muslim Sharia in Israel; Personal status according to Israeli law; The establishment of the Islamic Movement in Israel – Historical Background; The crystallization of movement; Theoretical Background – The Theory of Pragmatism; Ideology and goals of the Islamic Movement in Israel; The background to the split in the movement – the opposition to pragmatism; How the ideology of the movement is expressed in its activity? The movement's attitudes toward the Israeli elections, the Oslo Accords and the armed struggle against Israel; How does pragmatism manifest itself in the movement's activities?

Keywords: Islamic Movement, Israel, ideology, pragmatism.

1. Introduction

The Islamic Movement operates in the State of Israel, which is a parliamentary democracy. The basis for the ideals of the State of Israel was laid in the second part of the Declaration of Independence (Brenner & Frisch, 2003) that on the day of the end of the Mandate, a Jewish state will be established in the Land of Israel, to be called the State of Israel, in which the governing institutions of the new state will operate. From here onward, the declaration determines the state's image from the religious, social, international, and neighborly relations with the peoples of the region (U.S. Department of State, 2012).

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2. The status of religion in Israel

The Declaration of Independence declares the State of Israel as a Jewish and democratic state. In order to avoid disagreements during the formulation, the authors did not refrain from explicitly defining the issue of the Jewish religion and other religions in the State of Israel, nor discuss the connection between religious matters and the civil law of the state. The Declaration promised to remain faithful to UN declarations, to refrain from discrimination on the grounds of religion, race and sex, and to guarantee freedom of religion for all citizens of the state, but there is no complete separation between religion and state in Israel. The Jewish religion has a better status than the other religions, with funding and organization, and since it is the religion of most of its citizens, the principle of freedom of religion and freedom from religion is maintained in Israel. The religious courts in the areas that were given by these courts (*Ibid.*, 2012).

Although there is a problem between the state and the religious establishment, Israel aspires to uphold the principle of freedom of religion and conscience. In general, most of the Israeli public is a secular Jew, but this public too is committed to religious personal status laws. The laws of religion are not the laws of the state, there are few religious laws that apply to the secular public (Sheetrit, 2013). The State of Israel has an independent legal system that is influenced by common law, yet has its own unique characteristics. Along with the Israeli legal system, Israeli law recognizes the special status of Jewish law as well as the status of other religious legal systems, particularly in the field of family law. In the State of Israel there is no formal constitution, and the basic principles of the system, especially after the constitutional revolution, are taken from a set of basic laws whose legislation has not yet been completed, as well as the interpretation of the law according to basic concepts stemming from the fact that the state is a Jewish and democratic state.

In Israel there is a rule of law principle that combines a formal and a substantive side. The formal party determines that each body is subject equally to the law and must act accordingly. Alongside compliance with the law, the formal party requires the actual enforcement of the law by the appropriate authorities and the existence of a social-legal sanction for cases of non-compliance. The essence of the rule of law is the content of the law. The requirement is that the law should reflect proper consideration of individual rights and fundamental freedoms and reflect democratic and egalitarian principles. The equality of the law requires not only its application equally to its value, but also its application in a different manner to different ones, so long as the basis for the distinction is made on a relevant basis.

The State of Israel, as a rule, meets the requirements of the rule of law, including the existence of basic laws that outline an entrenched constitutional framework of basic values and human rights, legislation that establishes the powers of the authorities and their subordination to the law, an independent and independent legal system that monitors the conformity of laws with the principles inherent in the Basic Laws and on the legality of the operation of the executive branch and the operation of a regular law enforcement system. Accordingly, the State of Israel views itself as a state of law and is usually considered as such. However, an actual deviation from the requirements of the rule of law is not rare, an excessive violation of fundamental freedoms, mostly for security reasons (Jiryis, 1979).

3. The legal status of Muslim Shari'a in Israel

Sharia is Islamic religious law, which regulates all aspects of life and society. Since the 19th century, secular laws have been enacted in Muslim countries, for example, in commercial and criminal fields, but no personal laws have been enacted. In the commercial and criminal fields, Western law books were adopted and new Western-inspired laws were enacted, such as the Ottoman Code of the Majles. At first the legislators thought of completing the Shari'a, but gradually it became clear that the civil laws restrict the sharia. Marital law, marriage, divorce and

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inheritance are the center of Shari'a. Beginning in the 20th century, the secular legislator in Muslim countries began to intervene in them.

The situation differs from country to country throughout the Muslim world. They all follow Islamic law, but the understanding of the law is varied and different from one another. There is a difference in the interpretation and application of Islamic law in various Muslim societies today. Due to the influence of colonialism, which often replaced religious law with secular law, and the liberal movements within Islam that raised questions about belonging and the possibility of implementing Shari'a from different points of view. In most countries in the Middle East and North Africa there is a dual system of religious and secular courts, where religious courts deal mainly with marriage and inheritance. But in the hands of fundamentalists, Shari'a binds all believers and even all the people ruled by the believers.

The Majla is a set of laws based on Muslim law, which regulated civil law during the Ottoman period. At that time, the Muslim rule according to which the clerics, the ulama, established the framework for the laws of the state according to the Shari'a, and the secular ruler is permitted to act and to serve in this framework, which was determined by the ulama. However, with the establishment of the British Mandate, the authorities ceased to regard the Muslim Ummah as a source of authority for the interpretation and amendment of the Majles laws, and instead referred to the Majles as laws that were subject to legal interpretation by the secular institutions established by the Mandatory government, By the State of Israel. Therefore, amendments were introduced in these laws, and some of them were canceled or changed considerably in all the legislative enactments that the State of Israel underwent. In 1984, the Majla was annulled in the Knesset Law, after the areas in which the transaction was settled in original Israeli laws passed by the Knesset.

One principle of Ottoman law was accepted in Israeli law, namely the application of personal religious law to matters relating to the individual status of the citizen (marriage, divorce, etc.). With the establishment of the State of Israel, the principle of legal autonomy was adopted in matters of personal status, in order to preserve the status quo between the secular Jewish public and the religious Jewish public. As far as the Muslim community in Israel is concerned, this means that sharia remains the valid law regarding marriages and divorces of Muslims in Israel (Stendel, 1996).

4. Personal status according to Israeli law

With the establishment of the State of Israel, the principle of legal autonomy was adopted in matters of personal status. The authority in matters of personal status is reserved by law to religious courts, with the exception of certain restrictions. This arrangement grants sharia law to be applied in Israel, but only in matters of personal status (marriage, divorce, etc.), and only for Sunni Muslims.

The Sharia courts have official recognition and are funded by the state, similar to the rabbinical courts. The Kadis who lead them have the status of civil servants. Restrictions imposed by the state law on marriage and divorce, such as the prohibition on marrying a girl under the age of 17, the prohibition on bigamy and the prohibition against expelling a woman against her will apply to the sharia courts in Israel in the same way that they apply to rabbinical courts.

As other religious courts, the rulings of sharia courts in other civil matters are considered in Israeli law to be the rulings of an arbitrator, and therefore the litigants are obligated to them only if the conditions stipulated in the Arbitration Law have been fulfilled. The main condition is the agreement of all parties to remove the matter from the authority of the authorized civil court, and to transfer it to the Shari'a court (Slaughter, 2007).

D. Schwartz & D. Galily – The Islamic Movement in Israel: Ideology vs. Pragmatism

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5. The establishment of the Islamic Movement in Israel – Historical background

Since the mid-1970s, Arab society in Israel underwent rapid political and social changes, with the effects of the 1967 war more evident. The war brought to a great extent the rise of fundamentalist Islam among Israeli Arabs. Ideologically, the war symbolized for many the ideological bankruptcy of Arab secular ideologies, and the failure of the Arab national movement raised the framework of Religious-Islamic affiliation. From the Religious-Islamic point of view of the 1967 war, there were also influences: access to the holy sites of Islam in Hebron and Jerusalem, and the possibility of praying in the mosques on the Temple Mount aroused religious feelings. Acquaintance with the Arabs in the territories opened a window to a diverse religious life that was managed by a religious apparatus. The rise of fundamentalist Islam came to fill a void created by the 1948 war, during which the religious-spiritual leadership abandoned the area and left the Muslim public in Israel without a judicial system, guidance, and religious services. This situation changed as a result of the intervention of the Supreme Muslim Council, which was re-established in East Jerusalem after the 1967 war.

The Islamic Movement in Israel, which was based in the late 1970s and early 1980s, was also fueled by a political crisis in the local arena. The NRP took the monopoly on the representation of the national aspirations of the Arabs of Israel. A nationalist stream began to take shape, in the form of the "villagers" and the TALAM, and there was a significant regression in the form of the moderate camp (Abu Raia, 1991).

All these political crises have allowed the Islamic movement to become an alternative to the decline of others.

The growth of the Islamic stream is also the result of socio-economic changes. The growing disparities in the level of development of the Arab and Jewish communities and the continued disregard of the Arab sector by the government authorities caused bitterness and frustration. A yearning for a new social order was created and fundamentalist Islam came to meet this need. Thus, from the 1970s a gradual strengthening of the sense of Arab belonging to the Arabs in Israel was felt.

The Islamic Movement in Israel aspires to awaken the values of Islam among Israeli Arabs. Therefore, the movement operates from the religious aspect to the education of Muslims and the operation of religious services, on the social level, through the operation of social services, and on the national level by openly opposing the State of Israel and supporting Palestinian terrorism. The movement is considered very extreme, and it has two factions, the extreme northern faction and the more moderate southern faction.

The movement began to organize during the British Mandate with the Arab Revolt, and after World War II. In the War of Independence, the movement suffered a severe blow because of its cooperation with the Arab Higher Committee, and assistance to the Muslim Brotherhood movement with which it was identified, leading to the closure of the movement's institutions in Israel. During the military regime the movement was suppressed, and the remaining institutions in the West Bank were placed under Jordan. From the Six-Day War there was an awakening in the Islamic Movement, as there was a connection between the Arabs of the territories and the Arabs of the State of Israel.

The occupation of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip by Israel in 1967 significantly accelerated the development of Islamic organizations in these areas, and indirectly encouraged their re-emergence within the State of Israel. The military defeat vis-à-vis Israel strengthened the belief of many Arabs that their weakness stemmed from their distancing themselves from Islam, and encouraged them to cast their trust in the renewed faith. In the wake of modernization there has been a reaction against the Western and permissive culture of Jewish society and its bad

influence on Arab society. Finally, the Islamic Revolution of Iran, which encouraged Israeli Arabs to unite within a religious framework, is the Islamic Movement. At the same time, everyday life under the Israeli occupation has become a depressing experience that encouraged many to seek an explanation for the evil of decree. Israel, for its part, did not follow and supervise Islamic organizations during the first decades of the occupation; Israel's focus on suppressing the secular currents of the Palestinian national movement, headed by Fatah, diverted the attention of the authorities from the process of Islamization (Israeli, 1999).

6. The crystallization of movement

The Islamic Movement was founded in 1971 by Abdullah Nimr Darwish, who focused primarily on welfare activities and the establishment of institutions parallel to state institutions for the Muslim community The first direction in which the Israeli Arabs were part of the Islamic Movement was the violent direction, headed by Darwish The first Muslim terrorist organization in Israel, was founded on the inspiration of Khomeini's success in Iran and the wave of the radical Islam initiative that appeared in other Arab countries soon thereafter, with the aim of bringing some of the principles guiding fundamentalist Islam into practice. Western culture was perceived by the organization Was responsible for the decay and moral deterioration in the world, including those who visited the Arabs, since Israel was portrayed as a Western representative in the Middle East, and was directed to the prison as a result of an attack Which took place in one of the kibbutzim in the center of the country, which was used to deepen the ideology that guided them, during which the activists formulated a decision that guided them from their release until today. The Islamic Movement, under the influence of Sheikh Abdallah Nimr Darwish and later of the new generation leaders of the movement, adapted from its inception its political positions to the fact that it operates in Israel. Despite the desire to establish a Muslim state based on Islamic law, the Islamic Movement refrained from raising this demand. On the surface, it seems that the movement has come to terms with the existence of the State of Israel, and its leaders even call for maintaining the law. Movement spokesmen declare that they obey the laws of the state. But in order not to confront the PLO, which enjoys support among the Arab population in Israel, Sheikh Darwish expressed caution: "After a state is established, the Palestinian people will choose the social regime they want."

During the 1980s, the Islamic Movement built itself from below. Has succeeded in mobilizing broad popular support and significant involvement in the public sectors, which until now have felt alienated from the state, which discriminates against them because of their being Palestinians, towards the traditional local leadership, and between them and the Zionist parties, and the urban leadership of the Democratic Front for Peace and Equality (Hadash). Was accused by many of not caring enough for the local community and improving its living conditions, and concentrating too much on politics on the national level.

The Islamic Movement has no official organizational structure. The activity is carried out with the help of non-profit organizations, each focusing on a different topic. The movement is headed by a number of leaders whose positions they have acquired because of their personalities or family ties, rather than by any hierarchical framework.

Despite the political connection, the Islamic movement was not registered as an organization, movement or party. Its activists are not members of any formal framework. This deliberate ambiguity was intended to grant it immunity from harm to the authorities.

The executive power of the Islamic establishment stems to a large extent from the fact that it was and still remains vague in defining the roles and positions within it. Membership in the Islamic Society is not formally regulated, but is determined by participation in current activities, which is based on charismatic authority and the institutional ambiguity that accompanies it, which

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are not limited by rigid procedures, and therefore are not subject to a significant threat from the junior members of the organization, who find it difficult to demand changes in the democratic process (Nachman, 2000).

7. Theoretical background – The theory of pragmatism

Pragmatism is a philosophical theory that was raised in the United States at the end of the 19th century. Its founders were Charles S. Pierce, who gave the theory its name and developed its principles: William James, who promoted and disseminated it, and John Dewey, who developed the instrumental aspects of the theory (Bacon, 2012).

The theory of pragmatism is a philosophical idea that emphasizes the connection between theory and practice: the value of the truth of theory depends on the organization and the effectiveness of its application. Pragmatism, says Richard Rorty, is about what are the most effective ways of achieving what we want to achieve (Brandon, 2011). Pragmatism holds that the truth is measured by practical purposes. The truth of a claim is determined by practical results and the benefit it serves. Pragmatists rely on empirical experiments and practical success and rejecting a priori assumptions as a source of human knowledge (espousing empiricism). According to pragmatism, thoughts, ideas, and outlooks are merely tools for achieving one's life goals – and have no metaphysical significance (James, 1975). That is, concepts represent appropriate thinking habits or etiquette; they do not represent metaphysical truths and do not describe the nature of things. Language is not only a means of communication but an expression of the world's consciousness and worldview. Knowledge is guided by the interests and values of users. The subjects establish themselves in a process of empirical experience, rather than as a result of rational and theoretical inquiry (Menand, 1998).

8. Ideology and goals of the Islamic Movement in Israel

The sources of inspiration for the Islamic Movement were the Orthodox Sunna, relying on classical Hadiths of Sunni-Orthodox Islam, such as Bakhari and Musallam. The ideas of the reformist-modernist Islamic stream that emerged from the 19th century and the first half of the 20th century. The use of anti-Western motifs with a tendency to glorify the Islamic past and view it as an ideal model that contemporary society should imitate. The doctrines of the Muslim Brotherhood, which is the most important source, are particularly prominent in the way in which the Brotherhood interpreted Islam as a religion with an educational-moral message and as a social framework according to which the society must conduct itself. Political views were designed without exceeding the limits of the law and taking into account the secular Palestinian national movement. The Islamic position on solving the Palestinian problem and the Israeli-Arab conflict was based on a long-term view. Resilience, waiting, restrained restraint for the hour of retaliation. The realization of the principle of mutual recognition: Israeli recognition of the right of self-determination of the Palestinian people, including the right to establish a Palestinian state, and Palestinian recognition of Israel's right to exist in peace (according to Darwish). The ideological basis of the Islamic movement, especially the northern branch, is an independent society, that is, a self-contained society that cares for itself. The idea is anchored in Muslim religious rulings. There is a religious problem with being a Muslim minority in a Jewish state, because it is difficult to observe the commandments. There are two solutions to this, either to the Muslim countries or to internal jihad to create closed and independent Muslim communities, similar to the idea of "independent society". The goals of the Islamic movement are essentially similar to those of any modern Islamic movement, and the ideology is very similar to that of the Muslim Brotherhood. The differences are largely due to the fact that the Islamic Movement operates within a predominantly Jewish state. The goals are to encourage the observance of Islamic precepts while

fostering Islamic culture and Islamic education. Islamic welfare activities according to the commandment of charity, as well as safeguarding and nurturing the holy sites of Islam. In addition, the movement is careful to help the Palestinians in the territories (Yisraeli, 1993).

9. The background to the split in the movement – The opposition to pragmatism

The split began in the 1990s, when ideological cracks were created between Raed Salah and Abdalla Nimer Darwish. Salah argued that more radical measures should be taken against Israel, and the cracks deepened with the Oslo Accords. Against this backdrop, two camps began to take shape in the Islamic Movement in Israel, a relatively moderate stream that demonstrated a pragmatic approach, encouragement of the mainstream PLO headed by Arafat, and support for a political settlement between Israel and the Palestinians, and against it a radical-activist stream that demonstrated a rigid political line,

In 1996, the movement decided to run in the Knesset elections after three previous postponements. The decision led to an absolute split between the northern faction headed by Raed Salah and the southern branch, which was eventually led by Sheikh Ibrahim Sarsur.

The differences between the factions are first and foremost in relation to the State of Israel, the northern faction does not recognize the right of existence of the State of Israel and is interested in establishing a Muslim state in its territory, but there is willingness to use Israel for immediate needs, in fact to make the best of it. In contrast, the southern faction does not recognize the right of the State of Israel to exist as a Jewish state, but it is willing to participate in government institutions and to influence its decisions from within.

The split in the movement was a fait accompli. Both factions claimed to be the authentic representatives of the movement. Both of them used the name of the movement, and both chose leaders and leaders. Since 1996, many attempts have been made to reconcile the rift in the Islamic movement, but without success (Rabinowitz, 1996).

10. How the ideology of the movement is expressed in its activity?

The leadership of the mainstream Islamic fundamentalist movement in Israel has moved from the mid-1980s to Abdallah Nimr Darwish. Then the violent way was abandoned and the Islamic movement was led in a new way of persuasion, study and teaching in exchange for alleviating the distress of society. The combination worked and worked properly, and the changes were felt in the villages, mosques were enlarged and the number of worshipers increased significantly, and patterns of Islamic dress and performance were adopted for women and men. Darwish directed the movement in a new direction of deepening roots by training hearts, persuasion and learning, education and teaching, and contributing to alleviating the distress of society, in contrast to confrontation with the authorities or religious coercion. Within a short period of time, "Islamic associations" were established in a number of Arab communities. Sheikh Abdallah Nimr Darwish became a central and charismatic figure who believed in taking fate into his own hands. To achieve this goal, he began establishing an infrastructure of families who collect money through the Zakat.

In the Islamic Movement of Israeli Arabs, the social function has a central place. They established labor camps for the establishment and rehabilitation of infrastructure in the villages. The main theme of the activity is the da'wa, the call to Islam. To this end, the movement began building a network of kindergartens, clinics and schools, and an Islamic college was established in Umm al-Fahm. In the field of youth, the Islamic Movement also dealt with the problem of crime, the drug problem, and sports.

D. Schwartz & D. Galily – The Islamic Movement in Israel: Ideology vs. Pragmatism

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Sheikh Ra'ed Salah spent three years in senior positions: the head of the Islamic Movement, the mayor of Umm al-Fahm, and the head of the al-Aqsa Institute for the Renovation of the Sacred Islamic Places. In 1997 Salah began to fight for Muslim public opinion in Israel, has rallied the Al-Aqsa Mosque as a symbol and has organized conferences to support the mosque and its holiness. These conferences have gained influence and momentum over the years among Israeli Arabs, and each year they hold a mass demonstration of tens of thousands of activists in Umm al-Fahm under the headline "Al Aqsa in Danger". The movement must discover pragmatism, since it must act within the framework of the laws of the state, in order to receive financial aid, and at the same time acquire a public image of the state Path of the resistance to Israel.

In 1997, a conflict began in Nazareth due to an attempt by the Islamic Movement to build a mosque near the Church of the Annunciation. This conflict caused great uproar between Christians and Muslims in Nazareth, all because of the spread of a Muslim myth of the Islamic movement, as if the territory belonged to Muslims for a long time. The movement did a great deal to achieve its goal, and international organizations and even Yasser Arafat intervened, and during the conflict, the movement's great support was expressed.

After the events of October 2000, Salah was charged with partial responsibility for the events. The Commission stated that Salah had entered the list of fugitives because of the encouragement of violence, false accusations against the State of Israel, the denial of its legitimacy, and the influx of fire among Arab Israelis. In 2001 Salah resigned from the leadership of Umm al-Fahm and focused on his activities as a religious leader and leader of the northern branch of the Islamic Movement. In 2003, Raed Salah was arrested on suspicion of helping Hamas financially and in information, and of various economic offenses.

The ideology of Salah, the leader of the radical stream, is that he is interested in receiving Israel's help when it suits his needs, but he is careful to oppose Israel openly and apparently to incite against it more covertly.

According to various interviews in the media, patience and pragmatism were expressed, for example, when the decision was made to dissolve the Islamic Relief Committee by the State of Israel, Salah, decided to be patient and considerate, and therefore the provision of aid would not stop. There is an understanding that he must act within the framework of the law, otherwise the government will stop all movement activity.

The heads of the local councils on behalf of the movement use the funds of the State of Israel, despite the dissatisfaction with the existence of the state, in addition to donations, in order to improve the situation in their communities (Stendel, 1996).

11. The movement's attitudes toward the Israeli elections, the Oslo Accords
and the armed struggle against Israel

The question of whether the Islamic movement should participate in the elections to the Knesset provoked a serious internal dispute. The supporters' camp, the pragmatic stream, focused mainly on the southern Triangle, the Negev and some of the northern communities. This stream under the leadership of Sheikh Darwish adopted a pragmatic approach that holds that elections must be held independently or within the framework of an Arab list or bloc. The opponents, the radical stream, focused on the villages of the Galilee and the northern triangle, headed by the mayor, Sheikh Raed Salah.

With the elections for the 14th Knesset approaching in 1996, the movement decided to participate in the elections in order to influence government decisions within the framework of a united Arab list, as a coalition with the Arab Democratic Party of the League of Arab States. The

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United Arab List was divided into four seats, two of which were assigned to representatives of the Islamic Movement (Abd al-Malik Dahamshah and Tawfiq Khatib).

The radical movement sided with the Islamic stream in the territories and criticized the Palestinian Authority, while the pragmatic movement tried to take a neutral stance, maintaining contact with both sides. The southern branch, headed by Sheikh Darwish, supports participation in the Knesset elections from a pragmatic approach of participation in an Arab list. The pragmatic reasons are the civil duty, since there is no harm to the belief in the Knesset vote, and also ensuring proper representation for the Arabs in the Knesset. The ideological argument is that Muslim minorities who were under a non-Muslim majority also participated in political life. The northern faction, which opposes the elections, has other reasons. The pragmatic argument is that there is no need to compete and the friction with the symbols of Jewish and Zionist rule should be minimized. Ideologically, halakha cannot participate in elections because Muslims have only one constitution – the Shari'a and the Koran – and cannot be replaced by a reference to this position taken by Sheikh Yusuf al-Qardawi, a resident of Qatar, who interprets Islam very harshly. The split led to the weakening of the Islamic movement, to the weakening of Arab politics and its unification, and undermined the voting rate of the Arab public for the Knesset.

The signing of the Declaration of Principles between the PLO and Israel in September 1993 was welcomed by the pragmatic stream headed by Sheikh Abdallah Nimr Darwish, who was the most vocal supporter of the peace process. Make sure to show a balanced approach and not to criticize the Islamic opposition too harshly.

The radical movement of the Islamic Movement expressed vehement opposition to the agreement. Sheikh Raed Salah called the agreement an act of treason and called for its abolition in democratic ways. His colleague, Sheikh Kamal Khatib, considered the agreement "a betrayal of the right of the Palestinian people." As the peace process progressed, the internal split between the two camps deepened.

The distinction between the two branches of the Islamic movement is sharpened by the attitude toward Hamas, and by examining the nature of the connection to the Islamic stream in the territories. The radical faction, emphasizes its political-ideological identification with the Islamic movement in the territories. The pragmatic stream turns to activity within the Green Line, accepting the fact that it is a minority in a non-Muslim majority state. He decided to go to the Knesset and accept the rules of the game of a Western democratic regime, and recognize the legitimacy of the existence of the State of Israel (Yisraeli, 1993).

12. How does pragmatism manifest itself in the movement's activities?

Community and political activity. Since its inception, the Islamic Movement has been working on establishing alternative systems for existing or missing public systems in the Arab sector. These systems provide a basis for imparting Islamic values and constitute the infrastructure of the Islamic state that the Islamic movement wishes. The stated aim of these systems is to provide services in all areas of social, cultural and economic life. In fact, it is a convenient and legal cover for promoting Islamic ideology.

The movement begins to develop pragmatically in 1989, when the movement decides to compete for the leadership of a number of Arab communities, the movement wins the council's leadership in six Arab towns and significant achievements in other communities. The greatest victory is achieved by Sheikh Raed Salah in Umm al-Fahm, which becomes the center of the movement.

The municipal elections were natural and obvious, due to the extensive activity in the villages because the municipal framework in the Arab communities was the only framework that

was not completely subordinate to Jewish institutions and Jewish influence. Therefore, in the 1980s, the movement channeled its activity to the municipal level. This was chosen as the first consolidation arena because selective action was possible only in communities where the power of the fundamentalist circles was strong. A good success was recorded in the elections for the local councils in October 1983: the movement won the leadership of two councils (out of six settlements that the movement was competing for) and the representation of seven seats in five villages. In the February 1989 elections, the victory of the movement was sweeping: they won 45 seats (out of the 14 settlements that the movement competed for). In the municipal elections in 1993, the Islamic Movement maintained its power: it won five seats and a number of local council members rose to 50. In the municipal elections in 1998, the movement continued to grow stronger: it won the leadership of five local authorities when the greatest achievement was in Nazareth. The Islamic stream won a majority in the Nazareth Council and thus defeated the front headed by Rakah for the first time in 23 years. From the beginning, the center of gravity of the movement's activists was determined on the local-municipal level. In Umm al-Fahm, for instance, the branch of the Islamic Movement was established in 1976. In 1978, an Islamic reconciliation committee for family affairs was set up, which worked mainly to find compromises between Muslim-sponsored spouses. The relative success of this initiative led to the establishment of a series of committees dealing with a variety of social and cultural fields. Since the beginning of their activity, activists of the Islamic Movement have been characterized by the attention paid to the problems that preoccupied the weaker sections of the population. Problems that have not been treated or treated inadequately by the State of Israel. One of the most prominent features of the Islamic Movement's municipal activity is the great pragmatism demonstrated by its leaders in the ongoing affairs of the authorities they are responsible for. In Umm al-Fahm, for example, which in the past has been marked by the unwillingness and inability of the municipality and government officials to cooperate with each other and thereby contribute to the development of the city and its problems, there has been a change since 1989. The current leadership in the city is different from Hadash's municipal government, an action that emphasizes the exploitation of every opportunity and support from the outside, including state support, for the realization of urgent urban goals. This approach is made possible, inter alia, by the special status of the Islamic Movement, as opposed to other political movements active in the Arab community in Israel. All modern political movements, such as Hadash, Mada, the Progressive List and others, are based in various ways on imported universal ideas and values: communism, socialism, liberalism, secular nationalism, and so forth. The Islamic Movement, on the other hand, derives its legitimacy from the past and the Muslim heritage. Because it is perceived as a representative of local, regional and religious tradition, it is free of the pressure of other political movements, which represent the Arabs in Israel. The pragmatic progress of the Arabs in Israel from what the Israeli bureaucracy gives them entails an ideological compromise – take less than what you deserve according to historical justice, in which you and the public you represent only a movement whose ideological strength is undeniable, like the Islamic Movement, Such relations with the state, and it does so: it exploits rifts in the network of discrimination, in order to achieve more achievements for the public good, without paying a political price in terms of public support and trust.

Mediating between Hamas and the PLO, and with the Israeli authorities. The movement's representatives tried to mediate between the Israeli and Hamas authorities and to bridge the gap between Fatah and Hamas leaders in the territories. This activity, which began in 1992, peaked in 1994-5 after the establishment of the Palestinian Authority in the territories. For the Islamic Movement, the mediation initiatives were aimed at bringing about calm between the two sides, but at the same time the movement sought legitimacy and recognition both from the mainstream of the PLO and from the Islamic faction in the territories.

In 1994, the movement's public activity was felt in the Jewish public when Sheikh Saleh tried to mediate between Israel and Hamas on the subject of Nachshon Wachsman, in order

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to gain media attention and reputation. On the other hand, Sheikh Darwish called on the kidnappers of Sergeant Nissim Toledano and the soldier Nachshon Wachsman to spare their lives. The movement understands that it must receive legitimacy as a movement with communal responsibility from the Israeli authorities, in order to continue operating without the intervention of the authorities.

There is a significant similarity between the Islamic movement in Israel and the movement in the Palestinian territories, especially with respect to the establishment of social, educational, cultural and religious infrastructures under the auspices of the Islamic movement. Many of the ideological characteristics of the Islamic Movement in Israel are similar and similar to those in the territories. At the same time, political Islam in Israel developed its own lines.

The main organizational tool of the Islamic Movement is the Islamic Association. It is an organization based on donations of funds and voluntary action and operates committees in various fields. There is no doubt that the key to the success of the Association lies in its willingness, at an early stage, to break the boundaries of the areas that until then had been considered traditional religious. Activity such as the establishment of peace house, with all its importance, would not give the movement a real political grip. The preoccupation with education, including the integration of innovative elements and support for non-religious institutions, signaled to the public that the Association sees its role in initiating improvements in a wide range of subjects. This activity expanded the meaning of the term "Islamic movement" beyond religion, and began to give the association political relevance that cannot be ignored. Such a model of action is known in radical religious movements such as Hamas and the Muslim Brotherhood.

Much of the activity of the Islamic Movement was voluntary, but at the same time the movement developed an efficient system for collecting donations from the public. The main instrument is the zakat committees, which require every Muslim to devote part of his financial profits and assets he accumulated in a given year to the benefit of the community and poor. The main change in this area began at the end of the 1970s, when the Zakat committees began to function as superpowers of fundraising and would be channeled to the needy. The institutionalization of financial activity through the Zakat committees, together with the budgetary assistance that came from abroad, gave the Islamic Movement a very significant organizational push: In Umm al-Fahm, the largest Muslim city in Israel, the Islamic Movement created a powerful and economically powerful center for itself in the 1980s. As an alternative to the municipality and state institutions, and over time became the center of power.

Special emphasis is placed on spreading the Islamic da'wah, a call for Muslims to return to the original Islam. The movement managed to enlist the members of society to work for their community. In many respects, Sheikh Abdallah and his movement filled the vacuum created by the neglect of government authorities (Israeli, 1999).

13. Conclusions

The rise of the Islamist movements as a leading social and political force in the Middle East is the result of the bankruptcy of nationalism, secularism and the left in the Arab world, which created an ideological vacuum, which is filled to a large extent by the fundamentalists, ensuring that Islam is the solution. It is not only about the extent of the return to religion, but about the transformation of religion into a major political factor both by the regimes and by the opposition. These are political movements that deal first and foremost with the social and political mobilization of the masses, and they exert pressure to apply the Islamic law as the law of the state instead of the legal systems taken from the Western model. The Islamic solution offered by these movements has several distinct advantages over others. First, Islam is presented as a comprehensive system that provides all solutions to the problem of this world and the next.

Second, the Islamic solution is presented as an alternative to the realization of Arab and Islamic revival and power. Ideas of Islamic movements tend to be inclusive, which increases their attractiveness. They are radical in that they seek seemingly profound solutions to the fundamental problems of society. Third, it is not an imported solution. The Islamic solution is an authentic one, rooted in local culture and suited to local conditions. Islamists also use fatwa to convey their message. In addition, the voluntary activity of the Islamic movements brings them closer to the general public, especially those in need of social services, education and medicine, and places the Islamic societies in an important position of influence. In the depression surrounding the alleys of poverty, Islam appears as a new hope and the slogan "Islam is the solution" does not require proof.

The Islamic movements' main concern is traditional educational activity aimed at preserving and strengthening the character and Islamic character of society. One example of this is the Muslim Brotherhood movement in Egypt at the beginning of its path, which took the approach that the path to achieving the goal, i.e., the establishment of an Islamic state, is a gradual one, emphasizing the Islamic education of the younger generation. How can we explain the fact that the Islamic movements join the government and usually operate within the framework of the law? Most of the Islamic movements in the Arab countries are persecuted by the regime, so they must recognize reality, otherwise the government will not allow them to exist. Islam is a belief rooted in the consciousness of the masses and deeply ingrained in Egyptian culture. In Israel, the situation is different, modernization and democracy also affect Israeli Arabs. Therefore, it is possible that Islam is not so deeply rooted in the culture of the Arab citizens of Israel, they are aware of the possibility of a different path other than Islam (Chukov, 2018). Every movement as radical as it may be, tries to adapt itself to the changing realities and conditions, since their leaders know that without any support from the government, it will be difficult for them to exist (Petkova, 2012). The movements have developed over time tools that enable them to cope with reality. The religious law in Islam allows flexibility in organizing community life, Shari'a is adapted to reality because of the ruler's ability to canonize legislation and flexibility in political life according to principles such as sabra and long-term goals, to compromise with reality and find temporary solutions, as well as religious scholars who provide fatwas and commentaries on every subject. With progress and modernization, the movements realized that they could not deny progress, so they decided to join the mainstream and take advantage of technological progress in their favor. Each movement maintains at least one website in which it publishes its way, and guides the audience. Although these movements seem to maintain a rigid ideology, they adapt themselves to reality with the help of many tools, because they have realized that reality is stronger than they are.

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The Mysteries of Lake Copais
and the Island Fortress of Gla

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Abstract

The Bronze Age drainage of Lake Copais, Boeotia, is unique within Europe as the largest and most complex work of engineering of the period. Comprising large dams, polder dykes, canals, massive levees, cuttings and tunnels, it made at least 95km² of drained lake bed available for agricultural production. The first polders were established in the Middle Helladic period with great extensions in the Late Helladic. During the latter period the largest of all the Mycenaean citadels was constructed at Gla which had been a rocky island in the lake prior to the drainage. But exactly what type of settlement it was still remains something of a mystery. This paper draws together the history of research on the citadel of Gla.

Keywords: Gla, Ancient Boeotia, Mycenaean palaces, Mycenaean fortifications.

1. Introduction

In 1886 a site forgotten to the history of Greece resurfaced almost miraculously from the water after being drowned for at least thirty-one centuries: the plain of Lake Copais in Boeotia, which lies some 100 km north-west of Athens (Fig.1). On the ground of the drained marsh, still crowded with a thick vegetation of reeds, enigmatic remains of dykes and canals appeared. This amazing discovery led archaeologists to search the fortified island of Gla, an ancient settlement of people who had domesticated the waters of the lake, until disaster caused the final flooding of much of their territory and ruined their cities. Since the 19th century archaeological survey has revealed a great number of sites around and within the Plain (Fig. 2).

Located at the foot of high mountains, covered by snow in winter, the marshes of Lake Copais are indeed fed by many rivers, in order of decreasing importance: the Kephissos[1], the

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[1] We can claim no consistency in the transliteration of Greek names. We have used the "old English version" where the names are generally known but a closer transliteration from Greek where the names are less well-known.

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Melas, the Herkyne, the Phalaros and the Lophis[2]. In summer, the waters of the marshes were partly reduced by evaporation, but throughout the year, their overflow drained to the east of the lake into twenty-three sinkholes (*"katavothres"*), natural cracks in the karstic limestone. Becoming underground waters, they joined the sea in the Gulf of Euboea, some 3km distant.

> - Since 1850 researchers have revealed a unique Mycenaean citadel at Gla, Boeotia.
> - Gla is by far the largest Myceanean, Cyclopean-walled fortress.
> - The "palace" and other buildings are quite unlike other Mycenaean palatial structures.
> - Other building complexes resemble barracks, work-shops and/or storage facilities.

A first attempt at drainage was carried out by a French company at the end of the 19th century. After its partial failure, a British company undertook more significant works which made possible the final, complete drainage in the 1930s (Dean, 1937; Idol, 2018).

Boeotia and Attica form a long peninsula, therefore bathed by the sea on three sides; but Boeotia is so isolated from marine influence by the mountain ranges which surround it that winters are harsh and summers are scorching. As the highest mountains are to the north, west and south, the plain is especially exposed to the winds from the east. Following Theophrastus (V, 12, 3) we can also assume that before the intensive drainage the constant moisture maintained in the plain by the evaporation of the marsh was more important and mitigated the rigors of the climate.

2. 19th century observations of the Copais basin

In 1850, before its drainage, Emile Burnouf, a member of the French School of Archaeology of Athens, published a report on Lake Copais, as it appeared at that time, with reference to ancient authors. The low waters of the lake covered 150 km² and the high waters 230 km². The flood-depth was 6 m at its deepest near the city of Copae (modern Kastro) in January and February. In the north-east, the lake was separated from the Euboean Gulf by a pass at Kephalari, 35 m higher than the lake level and thus it could never have joined the sea. Such land-locked basins are quite common in the Balkan peninsular and may be found at considerable heights above sea-level as "mountain-plains" such as Lassithi in Crete or as lower endorheic basins or "polje". Burnouf realized that the Lake had changed greatly through time and quoted Strabo (IX, 2, 4) who reported a popular tradition that in ancient times the ground of Copais had been dry and well cultivated and that the Orchomenians had been rich.

The swamp was drained at the end of the 19th century by the British Lake Copais Company. Immediately the dried lake bed revealed traces of very old works, namely dykes and canals. These observations were carefully recorded in 1892 by Michalis A. Kambanis, a Greek archaeologist who was very familiar with the region and published his observations in 1892 and 1893. He noted the huge ancient tunnel only partially completed under the pass of Kephalari to the north-east of the lake.

Secondly, at the south-east end of the lake, he found the remains of a huge trench, which had reached more than 30m depth through the limestone rock, to cut through the Karditza pass which separates Lake Copais from Lake Hylike. "The traces of work started on the passes of Moriki and Anthedon to connect Lake Hylike with Lake Paralimni and this latter to the sea,

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[2] The modern annual flows of these rivers are estimated as: Kephissos 179hm³, Melas 130hm³, and the Herkyna, Pontzas and Lofis together 44hm³ (Mamassis et al. 2015).

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remained as a draft of the present drainage works,"[3] Kambanis noticed. He also noted the presence of three massive canals with high dams and cut channels embracing the flow from all the rivers entering the lake and flowing to the sinkhole area at the north-east end of the lake. He also realized that the masonry of the dams and dikes was similar in style to that at the fortress of Gla and at Tiryns in the Argolid. "These are," he concluded, "the best evidence to show us, at least with some approximation, that this work relates to an era that corresponds to the floruit of the Minyans, the subjects of Minyas, King of Orchomenos."

The ruins of the city of Orchomenos, in the west of the plain, have since been extensively studied. This city was founded at the beginning of the Middle Bronze Age and the upper layers were dated to the Mycenaean period (LHII-LHIIIC). Schliemann discovered in the city a beautiful tholos tomb which had been described by Pausanias (IX, 36.3) as the "Treasury of Minyas" and he commented "distinguished historians have explained the pyramids of Egypt in the greatest detail, and not made the slightest mention of the 'Treasury of Minyas' or the walls of Tiryns, which are by no means less marvelous". The remarkable similarity of this tholos tomb to the "Treasury of Atreus" at Mycenae was commented on by Schliemann and his assistant Dörpfeld even suggested that the two tombs may have been planned by the same architect (Wood, 1990).

Later work (Knauss et al.1984; Knauss,1986) has shown that the first attempts at drainage by the use of dikes to create polders began in the Middle Helladic period and the creation of large canals, dams and dikes allowed the near-complete drainage of the whole plain during the Late Helladic period when the citadel of Gla and other cities around and within the Copais basin flourished (Fig. 2). More recent research (Lane et al., 2020; Kountouri et al., 2013) has added considerable detail to our knowledge of the Bronze Age drainage and the subsequent land use in the plain.

3. The fortress of Gla

3.1 *19th century research*

Interesting ruins are located at the east end of the plain, facing the high cliff overlooking the north of the ancient city of Copae (modern Kastro). There, about 1km from the former eastern shore of the lake, a rocky outcrop in the form of a triangular plateau called Gla with an area of 23.5ha rises up to 30m above the plain. When the plain was flooded, this rocky eminence obviously became an island, but we can imagine that when the plain was dry it became accessible, so its inhabitants built the wall which can still be seen atop the island's steep flanks. Inside this massive Cyclopean defensive wall were found the foundations of buildings which were first excavated by the Belgian archaeologist A. de Ridder in 1894. The area enclosed by the great wall is much larger than that of other Mycenaean defenses (Fig. 3), measuring some 23.5ha compared with Mycenae at 3.1ha within the walls. De Ridder commented: "The entire circumference of the island (3km) is crowned by a wall of consistent thickness. The fortress[4], which dates from the same time, was placed at the highest point of the island, at right angles it formed a barrier against attackers from the east. Its construction is similar to that of the defenses of Mycenae and Tiryns, but the architect was more successful at Tiryns in making it difficult to enter some rooms" (Figs. 4 & 5). It is a single-entry enclosure, with main rooms preceded by a vestibule or access room, and communicating with each other only by narrow corridors". According to de Ridder: "A fire ruined the palace. In the center of the island are the ruins of a large entrenched camp, bounded on two

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[3] It is a strange omission that no modern researchers seem to refer to these massive channels which may have been an element of the uncompleted Hellenistic drainage system.

[4] The building usually referred to as the "palace" or "melathron".

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sides by long parallel walls. On the island, there is no trace of springs, but in the limestone ground, they could disappear."

The origin and meaning of the modern toponym Gla are uncertain: perhaps a deformation of the Albanian term "goulas" meaning fortress, because many immigrants of Albanian origin have lived in the region since the 16th century at least.[5] In 1894, the German archaeologist F. Noack identified Gla with Homeric Arne, relying on the arguments of Thucydides (I, 12, 3)[6] saying that Thessalian Arne was the main center of the Boeotians, and in 1962 Threpsiadis agreed but in reality there is no firm identification of Gla with any of Homer's cities.

3.2 *The so-called "agora" and "palace".*

In 1954 J. Threpsiadis (Daux, 1961 & 1962) took over the excavations at Gla. Six years later, he reached the main gates of the massive Cyclopean walls of the island, which were flanked by square towers. He also explored the western part of the buildings located within the central enclosure that de Ridder called "the entrenched camp". There he discovered a series of "workshop-rooms" whose function could not be clearly defined (Fig. 5). Threpsiadis called this area the "agora", because he thought it was at the center of an ancient city. Later, Richard Hope Simpson (1981) suggested that the long buildings looked like military barracks with stables at both ends. A lane was cleared which led from the South Gate of the so-called "agora" to the great South Gate of the encircling walls of the island. At the North Gate they found traces of two roads, one leading to the town of Copae, the other leading west, onto the old marsh. This "agora" was, in fact, the southern half of a large central rectangular enclosure of 31,000m², built on the highest part of the island. A wall separated the southern part ("agora") from the northern part (the "palace" or "*melathron*"), which marked a second protected area within the acropolis. Inside this area, a third enclosure seemed reserved for the occupants of the east wing of the building (Fig. 5).

A remarkable system of wastewater disposal was discovered inside the "palace". The floors of rooms and of the two "megara"[7] could still be distinguished, as well as the successive layers of plaster, three thick layers, bore witness to a long occupation of the building. The thick walls and the waste water system indicate that the palace was of two storeys, the upper parts being of mudbrick. One half of "horns of consecration" of Poros marble, similar to those found in Cretan palaces was found. The roughly cut horn (80 x 18cm) was a work similar to that of the Poros steles of Mycenae and of the Poros cube with engraved depiction of ships found in the Boeotian village of Paralia, Avlis (possibly the ancient Hyria)[8]. Also, there was a multitude of fresco fragments, the most remarkable showing diving dolphins and parts of other maritime scenes, including large-scale argonauts from the east wing of the south enclosure as reconstructed by Christos Boulotis (2015).

Recently, analysis of the rare blue color used in these frescoes has shown the use of rare, imported lapis lazuli as a pigment, mixed with hematite and an organic color possibly from murex (Brysbaert 2006), an example of extraordinary conspicuous consumption. Further, the remains of roof-tiles showed that the roofs were ridged and tiled unlike other Mycenaean palaces.

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[5] Alternative etymologies have been proposed but a derivation from Arvanitika, a form of Albanian, "goulas" / "gulas" meaning "fort" seems most certain (John Bintliffe, pers.comm.)

[6] Thucydides (I,12,3) states: "Thus in the sixtieth year after the fall of Troy, the Boeotian people, having been expelled from Arne by the Thessalians, settled in the country formerly called Cadmeis, but now Boeotia: a portion of the tribe already dwelt there, and some of these had joined in the Trojan expedition."

[7] Though often described as such the rooms at the southern and western ends of the "palace" structure show very little similarity to the "megara" of other Mycenaean palaces. It is surely a misnomer.

[8] This unusual engraving is now in the Schimatari Archaeological Museum near ancient Tanagra.

Guy Rachet (1969) commented on the palace of Gla: "By its structure, it differs from other palaces with a megaron, as this name was wrongly given to the rooms located at each end of the buildings. The western 'megaron', with its pillars, rather recalls the Cretan megara."

The excavations at Gla were renewed in 1979 by S. Iakovidis. In his reports (1983 & 2001), he noted that the so-called "megara" located at the west and south ends of the L-shaped "palace" building had, in fact, neither throne emplacements nor central hearths which radically distinguishes them from other known Mycenaean palaces. He also found that the main gates of the fortress were accessible by metaled roads coming up out of the plain by ramps and inclined sections. The west and south gates had ramps leading onto the rampart. Carts could have been used on these paved roads. Also, Iakovidis said the walls of Gla were not as thick as those of Mycenae and Tiryns and the stones used were smaller, but its plan was more elaborate.

Iakovidis also published (1978) a study on five bronze door hinges that were found in the palace, four by de Ridder and one by Threpsiadis. Iakovidis claimed that they appeared less sophisticated than those found at Mycenae and Tiryns, and therefore they were certainly older. They differed also from the types of hinges of the same period found in Crete, Egypt and the Middle East. Finally, he concluded from the finds on Gla that it can be asserted that the fortress was built and used when the citadels of the Argolid were still in the early stages of construction and, he claimed, that it was burned and abandoned before their second and last stages of extension and before the palace of Pylos was destroyed. That is to say that the Gla structures would belong to the first half of the 15th century B.C. and would thus precede the other Mycenaean sites by more than a century. However, later work has revised this assessment.

3.3 *The defensive walls and lower town*

Though not particularly well-preserved today, the Cyclopean walls were once truly massive. Their total length is 2.8km and the width consistently between 5.4m and 5.8m with offsets every 6m to 12m with four major gates and two "sally-ports". This Cyclopean wall enclosed a huge area of 23.5ha, compared to only 1.7ha at Tiryns and 3.1ha at Mycenae. Having searched the buildings of the eastern part of the "agora", Iakovidis (1983) identified them as warehouses. But Hope Simpson (1981), suggested that this "agora" plan resembles military barracks and the rectangular divisions of the long buildings at the south and east of the enclosure strongly suggested stables because a culvert along the north wall was probably intended for the removal of animal urine. The ceramics gave a date in LHIIIA (c. 1400-1320 BC) for the construction of these buildings. However, as the current ruins sit directly on the bedrock, it is not possible to know if other constructions already existed in previous eras. While the first vestiges of Orchomenos date back to the Neolithic period (Dakouri-Hild, 2010), the first main period of prosperity of the region could be placed between 1750 and 1400 B.C. Furthermore, it has been found that the fortress of Gla was linked to several other strongholds built in the Late Bronze age on the hills east of the basin (Fig. 7), probably to protect the zone of sink holes (*katavothres*) against attack (Fossey, 1980). According to Pausanias (IX, 38, 5)*,* Heracles himself as leader of the Thebans during a war against Orchomenos, blocked the main sinkholes in one day and thus flooded the plain where the Minyan cavalry had gathered[9].

Another element which should be noted is references by ancient authors, repeated by modern writers, to foreign influences or immigration into the area. In 1848, L. Ross, Professor at the University of Halle, who saw Gla as a refuge for the inhabitants of the nearby towns in case of

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[9] This is a common interpretation. However, Pausanias says: "The Thebans say that Herakles turned the River Kephissos into the Orchomenian Plain; it once ran below the mountain into the sea until Herakles broke open the chasm in the mountains." This may suggest the destruction of the diversionary dam or the canal linking the River Kephissos to the Melas rather than the blocking of the sinkholes.

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enemy attack, recognized these people as having a Phoenician origin with a close relationship with the Egyptians, because of the names of surrounding places, such as Mount Ptoon (Ptoion), which he claimed could be found in the two languages. In 1972 and 1973 T. G. Spyropoulos, based partly on his discoveries of the "tomb of Amphion and Zethos" in Thebes, developed the hypothesis of an Egyptian occupation of Copais in EH II (c. 2650-2200 BC). However, he adduced no evidence for this claim and his claims for the tombs in Thebes have been substantially revised (Ministry of Culture and Sport, 2012).

During his extensive work on the evolution of the whole basin, J. Knauss (1986) revealed that Gla had an extensive "Lower Town" (Fig. 8), a large area of settlement on the drained plain to the immediate west of the citadel and protected from flooding by the long approximately north-south polder dyke. This area is so large that it almost links Gla to the ancient city of Copae on its hill to the north-west.

More recently, there has been an intensive program of research on the citadel of Gla and in the surrounding area, led by Elena Kountouri and Michael Lane (Kountouri et al., 2013; Kountouri & Lane, 2018; Lane et al., 2020) which has revealed many new discoveries. First, in the area, Mycenaean walls have been revealed and dated at both Ayia Marina Pyrgos and Ayios Ioannis (Fig. 7) In the plain itself a system of rectilinear land or field boundaries have been revealed by geophysical techniques, indicating how the 'new' agricultural land was sub-divided. At the same time the application of several geophysical techniques and excavation within the citadel of Gla has revealed many previously unknown buildings and building complexes which substantially fill the large 'empty' areas on the plans of earlier researchers (Fig. 9). Of particular note is the enormous circular geophysical "anomaly P" with a diameter of some 40m the significance of which is, as yet, unknown (Koutouri et al., 2013).

Other building complexes are unusual, notably the "Eastern Complex", a group of six nearly identical structures laid out in a neat symmetry of two rows of three, most unlike typical building complexes elsewhere and somewhat reminiscent of a modern 'industrial estate". All the excavated groups have been dated to the LHIIIA/B period (c. 1400-1200 BC). Despite these remarkable discoveries the exact nature of the so-called "palace" or "*melathron*" and the citadel as a whole remains debatable.

4. The site of Copae

Formerly the hill of Copae, in the north-east of the lake, was isolated from the northern bank by the Great Canal and separated from the rest of the plain to the south by the course of the earlier outlet of the lake, and then by the last section of the channel which went along the east bank towards the north, following the earthen bank which protected the lower city and the polder of Gla. But the foot of the hill of Copae was surrounded by a broad marshy zone which was itself drained at some time by ditches. Unfortunately, it is difficult now to carry out excavations on the hill of Copae as it is entirely covered by the modern village of Kastro. However, certain vestiges of ancient constructions were still visible in the 19th century according to H. N. Ulrichs (1840) a German traveler: "On a small flattened hill, surrounded by marshes crossed by a narrow roadway reinforced by polygonal walls, there was a fortress with polygonal walls of rough stones laid out horizontally, with many doors. And, inside the enclosure, stood the bases of great constructions that Pausanias identified as sanctuaries to Demeter, Dionysus and Serapis". A Demeter "Tauropoulos"[10] was mentioned on the coins of the city where a bull appeared. In fact, according to the shards of pottery found on the surface, the hill of Copae was occupied without a break from

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[10] This would be an unusual epithet for Demeter. It is far more commonly associated with Artemis, after the place-name Tauris.

the Neolithic era to the Roman period. In 1980 J. M. Fossey said: "Immediately north of the chapel of Ayia Paraskevi, until the 1960's and the beginning of the 1970's, a piece of wall in broad rough blocks remained, whose construction and size invite comparison with the enclosure of Gla. This wall was completely covered over during the last three or four years. Some other rare vestiges of the enclosure wall, a little to the west of the same chapel, are on the contrary, built in traditional masonry." Little remained to guide the research. But perhaps it would be easier now to excavate the site of the ancient surrounding marsh, which has almost completely dried but remains an accessible zone. And we should not forget that the lower city of Gla was in close relationship with Copae. Both the fortress and the Lower Town of Gla fall within the "30-minute walking zone" (Farinetti, 2011) of Copae which would suggest that in the Late Helladic III period they effectively formed a single settlement.

5. The end of settlement at Gla

The massive drainage works of the Copais basin seem to have failed at the end of the Late Helladic IIIB period and the basin reverted catastrophically to a lake. This had the effect of submerging Gla's Lower Town and turning the fortress back into an island. At the same time many of the sites around the reformed lake, including Gla, show signs of widespread burning. Some settlements such as Orchomenos were re-occupied in the Late Helladic IIIC but most were not. In and around the basin we know of at least 18 sites occupied in the LHIIIB period but only 5 in LHIIIC. It may seem obvious that the population would have declined after the loss of the huge area of prime agricultural land to the newly risen lake but the phenomenon of decreased settlement density in LHIIIC affects the whole of Boeotia as Fossey (1988) demonstrated conclusively.

The ancient sources put the destruction of major sites such as Gla and the whole of the hydraulic works down to conflict, particularly between Thebes and Orchomenos with Herakles as a major protagonist. In 2020, Laetitia Phialon published an important review of the possible archaeological evidence for such inter-palace rivalry in Boeotia, but the events behind the collapse of both settlement and drainage works remain obscure. All we can say without hesitation is that this collapse and the desertion of the citadel of Gla is part of the general collapse of the Mycenaean, palace centered civilization.

6. Conclusion

In the last 130 years, archaeological survey and excavation have revealed an amazing story of hydraulic engineering draining the great Lake of Copais, works which are unique in scale in Europe in the Bronze Age. At the same time the huge citadel of Gla has come under investigation. The work through the 20th century revealed the unique "palace" and the rows of possible "barracks" or workshops in the so-called "agora". The buildings were so unlike other Mycenaean palatial buildings that their real nature remained obscure. Modern, multi-disciplinary studies have added greatly to our knowledge of the settlement, revealing numbers of previously unrecognized building complexes and remarkable signs of conspicuous consumption within the citadel. However, many questions remain unanswered and we can only hope that continuing research will produce further material to help define the true nature of the site; its relationship to nearby sites such as Copae and the date and nature of the catastrophe that destroyed the wealth of the area by returning the Copais basin to a marshy lake which lead to the desertion of the great Mycenaean fortress of Gla.

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Figure 1. Location of Lake Copais, Boeotia

Figure 2. Archaeological sites in and around the Copais basin

Figure 3. The comparative sizes of four major Mycenaean sites

Figure 4. Sketch plan of Gla drawn by Hope Simpson
(after Noack, De Ridder, Thresiadis and Travlos)

Figure 5. Plan showing the Main Enclosures with the "Palace" and "Agora", by J. Threpsiadis, 1960.


Figure 6. Plan of the "Palace/Melathron" of Gla. (after De Ritter, 1894 and Threpsiadis, 1954)

X- Xinos   S- Stroviki   T1- Tourloyianni 1   T2- Tourloyianni 2C- Copae   G- Gla   AM- Ayia Marina-Pyrgos   K- Kontza GK- Great Katavothra   V- Vristika   M- Mytikas

Figure 7. North-east area of the Copais showing the Intervisibility Network (after Fossey, 1980)

Figure 8. The "Lower Town" settlement area of Gla (after Lane, 2020 from Knauss, 1986)

Figure 9. Recent discoveries within the Citadel of Gla (after Kountouri et al., 2012)

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