Open Journal for

Studies in History

CONTENTS

_____

Hyperborea on Maps – Always to the North

Asen Bondzhev

New Bulgarian University, Department of History, Sofia, BULGARIA

Abstract

Even if an almost entirely imaginary vision, the Hyperboreans remain the most productive and persistent Northern motif in ancient Greek literature. The Hyperboreans were thought to have traversed Greece during its mythical prehistory and to have left their mark on some of its innermost and sanctified places, thus helping to create, and sometimes to maintain, important values in Greek thought, such as justice, right, moral purity and religiosity. This study presents the roots of the Hyperborean myth, the main Hyperborean characters, Hyperborea's location on maps according to ancient sources, the exploitation of the myth throughout the ages and some contemporary attempts to locate the Hyperborean lands.

Keywords: Hyperborea, maps of Hyperborea, Apollo, Abaris, Delos, mythology, Ancient Greece, history of religion.

1. Hyperborea

Compared with other legendary places in Antiquity the mythology of Hyperborea had a significant specificity for the Greeks. If the Elysian Fields, the final resting place of the souls, belonged to an unearthly world, and the once rich and powerful Atlantis had long ago sunk into the ocean, Hyperborea, on the contrary, was considered by many poets as a completely real, although extremely difficult to reach territory – "neither by ships nor on foot" (Pind. *Pyth*. 10.29).

Hyperborea was inhabited by people who lived in the far northern part of the known world, "beyond Boreas" (ὑπὲρ Βορέᾱ) – beyond the North Wind. Despite its frigid location, Hyperborea was a sunny, temperate, divinely-blessed land, north of the Riphean Mountains and a favorite place of Apollo. The Hyperboreans founded Apollo's shrine at Delos and, according to Pausanias (10.5.8), at Delphi. They were portrayed as a fair, virtuous, creative people, with a social structure by poets, musicians and philosophers – an unattainable ideal for the Greeks. They were vegetarians (Cl. Alex. *Stromata* 1.15.72), holy people, experiencing no disease or war (Pind. *Pyth*. 10.40), lived to an extreme old age (Pliny 4.26). The godlike Hyperboreans seem to outshine the Greeks at every turn (Romm, 1992: 61). Hyperborea was an otherworldly paradise, a mythical utopia, which was both part of the mythical past and ever present in Greek literature (Bridgman, 2005: 3).

- Inscriptions from 4th century BC record that the temple of Apollo on Delos received gifts from somebody referred to as the Hyperboreans.
- Graves of Hyperboreans on Delos were identified and excavated in the 1920s.
- The Hyperborean Abaris saves cities from storms and sickness, gives oracles, and heals.
- The Hyperboreans founded an important center of Greek religion – in Delos. But they also might have Delphian and Olympian connection.

The Hyperborean myth may date from as early as the 8th century BC, and possibly even earlier (Bridgman, 2005: 71). The first extant written sources explicitly discussing Hyperborea, however, date back to the 5th century BC with Herodotus, Pindar, Simonides of Ceos, and Hellanicus of Lesbos, who referenced earlier, mostly lost sources describing Hyperborea by Hesiod, Homer, and Aristeas. The oldest reference to Herodotus was the 7th century BC, now lost, poem *Arimaspea* of Aristeas of Proconnesus.[1]

2. Apollo

Crucial for understanding Hyperborea is knowing Apollo.[2] Apollo was the son of Zeus and Leto. Leto was born on this island [Hyperborea], and for that reason Apollo is honoured among them above all other gods; and the inhabitants are looked upon as priests of Apollo (Diod. 2.47).

Due to the vengeful jealousy of Zeus' wife – Hera, Leto is forced to flee. She finds refuge and gives birth to her children, Apollo and Artemis, on the island of Asteria, which is named in honor of Apollo Delos, meaning "bright", "shining" (Gočeva, 1993). Just as Hyperborea, Delos was halfway between the world of the gods and that of humankind. It acted as a portal through which humans could communicate with the gods (Bridgman, 2005: 26; cf. *Homeric Hymn to Apollo*).

The earliest source for the Hyperboreans as Apollo's chosen ones is the poet Alcaeus of Mytilene (625/620-580 BC). Although the text is lost, it is paraphrased in prose by the 4th century rhetor Himerius (*Oratio* 48.10):

---

[1] *Arimaspea*, composed in three books (Suda, s.v. Aristeas), remained for a long time the only detailed report of the further North for the rest of the Greek world and a rich new source about Hyperborea. It was widely known in the Archaic and Classical periods, especially among the worshipers of Apollo and continued to be read at least into the Imperial period. It disappeared before the founding of the Library of Alexandria, and therefore it is unlikely that any large passages from it can be found in papyri (Bolton, 1962: 20-38). The surviving fragments of *Arimaspea* do not mention the Hyperboreans, and are very small and few in number – the longest extant fragment consists of six lines quoted by Pseudo-Longinus in *On the Sublime* 10.4 (Bowra, 1956: 1). However, a number of borrowings from the poem are contained in the works of Pindar, Herodotus, Hellanicus, and possibly Hecataeus of Abdera, Alcman, Pliny, Aelian, Plautus, Ennius, Aeschylus (Bolton, 1962: 39-73). *Arimaspea* is probably to be dated in the middle third of the 7th century BC (Phillips, 1955: 163); 615-595 BC (Dowden 2019); early-to-mid 6th century (Gagné, 2021: 246).

[2] Apollo has often been described as the "most Greek of the gods". His worship is spread throughout the Greek world, and pervades both the state and the private domain – theophoric names such as Apelles, Apollonios, Apollodorus, far from a few cities in Thrace, Illyria, Anatolia and Africa were named Apollonia. The diffusion of the Apollo cult is already complete at the time when our written sources begin, c. 700 BC. In the epics, Apollo is one of the most important gods. In spite of this, the impression remains that Apollo is not only a youthful god, but also a young god for the Greeks. There is no clear evidence for him in Linear B. On Delos, the real mistress of the sanctuary is Artemis; the earliest temple, constructed c. 700 BC, belongs to her; Apollo's temple lies at the periphery, though it did contain the monumental, gilded image. In Delphi, the central temenos always belonged to Apollo, but it was not founded before 750 BC. From the 5th century BC onwards, Apollo began to be understood as a sun god (Burkert 1985: 143, 149). See also Graf (2008); cf. Gagné (2021: 139-149); Graf (2022).

_____

When Apollo was born, Zeus outfitted him with a gold headband and lyre. He also gave him a chariot to drive – it was pulled by swans – and sent him to Delphi <and> to the Castalian waters to expound justice and law to the Greeks from there. But Apollo got on his chariot and ordered the swans to fly to the Hyperboreans. (Penella, 2007: 262)

Nor are we at liberty to entertain any doubts as to the existence of this race [the Hyperboreans]; so many authors are there who assert that they were in the habit of sending their first-fruits to Delos to present them to Apollo, whom in especial they worship (Pliny 4.26).

Figure 1. Swans drawing Apollo's chariot.

Figure 2. The return of Apollo to Delos from the land of the Hyperboreans in a chariot draw by winged horses (text on museum's plate). Amphora from Melos, c. 640 BC, National Archaeological Museum in Athens (cf. Gagné, 2021: 154)

Figure 3. Detail of Fig. 2, *Encyclopedia Britannica*, 11th ed., v. 12, 1911: 476, Fig. 9

Preserved inscriptions from the 4th century BC record that the temple of Apollo on the island of Delos received gifts, apparently symbolical sacrificial offerings, from somebody referred to as the Hyperboreans (Sandin, 2018: 14; see Coupry, 1972). Herodotus (4.32-36) also depicts individual Hyperboreans in ancient times bearing gifts to the temple of Apollo – the Hyperborean maidens.

3. The Hyperborean maidens

The first two Hyperborean maidens were Arge and Opis, who "came with the gods" (Hdt. 4.35) – probably Apollo and Artemis (Leto and Eileithyia, according to Gagné, 2021: 118; cf. Sandin, 2014: 210), followed by Hyperoche and Laodice accompanied by five Hyperboreans to protect the girls on their dangerous trip. All maidens could not return home and died on Delos.[3] For that reason the Hyperboreans started sending gifts to the temple of Apollo on Delos not in person, but through intermediaries.[4]

In 426 BC, a purification took place on Delos as a response to an oracle. All dead bodies in the area of the sanctuary, save those believed to be those of the Hyperborean maidens, were dug up and transported off the island, as the oracle had said there should be neither births nor deaths on Delos (Thuc. 1.8, 3.104; Diod. 12.58). The Hyperborean legend and the story of the Hyperborean maidens coming to Delos would seem to be a very strong and important myth for

_____

[3] According to Herodotus, the grave of Hyperoche and Laodice stood on the left at the door to the temple of Artemis (4.34); Opis' and Arge's grave was behind the sanctuary (4.35). The graves were identified and excavated in the 1920s by French archaeologists (Courby, 1921; Picard, 1924). The nearby fragments of pottery were dated 16th-15th century BC (Kolosovskaya, 1982: 66-67; cf. Burkert, 1985: 49).

[4] The origin of the Hyperborean gifts is to be found in the thank offering for the birth goddess Eileithyia for her role in the birth of Artemis and Apollo. Thus, the original gift was not to Apollo, but became associated with his cult (Bridgman, 2005: 40). Cf. Gagné (2021: 312) about the "probable point of origin for the offerings [in Hdt. 4.33], which does not point to the further North, but more prosaically to nearby Thrace."

_____

the Greeks to go against an oracle by leaving the graves of the Hyperborean maidens on the island while all others had to be removed (Bridgman, 2005: 39).

4. Abaris

The Hyperboreans appeared at key moments in the history of Ancient Greece, bringing innovations to its culture, revealing the mysteries of the universe, helping in time of need.

To the Greeks, Abaris was the most famous Hyperborean. He visited Greece to renew the good-will and kinship of his people to the Delians (Diod. 2.47) carrying (in later versions riding on) a mystical arrow, associated with Apollo. His legend developed throughout the centuries, but he seems always to have been regarded as a spiritual or magical authority (Plat. *Charm.* 158b; Heraclid. Pont. 73-75) and an ascetic (Hdt. 4.36); soon we hear of him as a seer and prophet (Lycurg. 14.5, Iambl. *VP* 138, 221).

Pindar (F 270) said, according to Harpocration (s.v. Abaris), that Abaris was a contemporary of king Croesus of Lydia (585-546 BC). If the lexicographer cites accurately, Abaris is then the Hyperborean individual mentioned first in known Greek sources, while at the same time being one of the youngest of the known Hyperboreans, belonging in the historical rather than mythical age. Herodotus (4.36) is the first to reveal concrete details of the legend, dismissing it as unworthy of his attention (cf. Gagné, 2020: 243):

> Thus, much then, and no more, concerning the Hyperboreans. As for the tale of Abaris, who is said to have been a Hyperborean, and to have gone with his arrow all round the world without once eating, I shall pass it by in silence. (Rawlinson 1910)

Heraclides of Pontus (51c) enhanced the narrative and let Abaris fly upon the arrow, which incidentally turned aerobatics and the magical arrow into his defining attributes in late antiquity. Abaris is mentioned offhandedly in a slightly ironical tone as a Hyperborean with magical or pharmaceutical competence by Socrates in Plato's *Charmides* (158b), but the earliest source that seems to have more than a few lines of substance to offer is the speech *Against Menesaechmus* of Lycurgus (14.5), preserved in fragments. Abaris is here said to have come to Greece in order to seek help, as the Hyperboreans and the rest of the world were subject to plague or famine, and Apollo ordained that Athens must pray for all nations in order to abjure the disaster (Sandin, 2014: 206).[5]

As a priest of Apollo in Hyperborea, Abaris organizes a worldwide collection of gold for the temple of the god in his country (Iambl. *VP* 91).[6] But he also brings his own offerings. He notably goes to Delos itself and reinstitutes the tribute. Sparta owed him its safety and cure from plague (Apollon. *Mirab.* 4; Lazova, 1993: 1; Graf, 2008: 39). He saved cities from storms and sickness, gave oracles, and healed. Abaris, in the service of Apollo, wrote down the oracles that he learned from Apollo, which are still known as the *Oracles of Abaris* (Gagné, 2021: 290, 369).

5. Hyperborean role in Delphi and Olympia. Further development of the myth

The Hyperborean role in the founding of the oracle of Apollo at Delos is undeniable. But according to Pausanias (10.5.7), a woman of the district of Delphi named Boeo wrote a

_____

[5] The implication here is that Athens is the center of the world. Moreover, the Hyperborean legend seems to have taken on more of an Athenian slant, or perhaps had been appropriated by Athens as propaganda comprising a mythical prehistory of the city and how the Hyperboreans helped Athens in its hour of need (Bridgman, 2005: 50).

[6] Gold is used to represent the conditions of life enjoyed by the gods. Gold is a metal that binds both the real world of the Greeks and their mythical parallel world of gods together (Bridgman, 2005: 15, 69).

_____

Delphian hymn which said Hyperboreans led by the poet Olen are the founders of the oracle of Apollo at Delphi.[7] In a legend related by Pindar (*Ol.* 3) the Hyperboreans gave Heracles the sacred olive trees which later became the crown/wreath of victorious Olympic athletes (see Gagné, 2021: 4-24). Thus, the Hyperboreans might had a significant role to play in the founding of three important centers of Greek religion (Bridgman, 2005: 71; cf. Gagné, 2021: 83-200).

The Hyperborean myth and cult had changed radically over time in relation to what it had been in earlier Greek literary sources and early belief – Hyperborea became a contemporary political, social or philosophical aspect which was described to follow a certain school of thought or to criticize Greek society.[8] These stories of a northern paradise were grafted onto the original myth often to satisfy Alexandrian romantic tastes, especially during the 3rd century BC. They also comprise Athenian propaganda which had as its goal the control of two major religious sanctuaries in the Greek world – Delos and Delphi (Bridgman, 2005: 44, 72).

6. Location of Hyperborea

Ancient Greeks believed a golden-age utopia had existed in the time of Cronus, before Zeus' lordship over their parallel mythical world, and that it continued to exist in such places as the land of the Hyperboreans located on the edges of the world known to the Greeks (Bridgman, 2005: 17). Hyperborea was believed to be beyond the snowy Riphean Mountains, with Pausanias (5.7.7) describing the location as "the land of the Hyperboreans, men living beyond the home of North Wind (Boreas)." Hesiod (*WD* 508), like Homer (*Il.* 9.5), placed Boreas in Thrace, perhaps in Mount Haemus, and therefore Hyperborea should have been north of Thrace.[9] In this archaic world picture, the northern horizon of the Greeks were the large mountain ranges – Thracian Rhodopes, Pangaion and Haemus (Podossinov, 2015, 2019: 194).

Figure 4. World picture of Homeric Greeks, c. 8th century. Podossinov (2015: 35)

Figure 5. The world according to Herodotus, 450 BC. The Challenger Reports, 1895

_____

[7] Romm (1992: 61-65); see also Farnell (1907: 98-111); Bridgman (2005: 67); Matveychev (2020: 14); Gagné (2021: 187). For the difference between mythological traditions of Delos and Delphi and the eventual older Delphian origin of the Hyperborean myth see Daebritz (1914: 267); Bridgman (2005: 26). The archaic Greeks attached great importance to the centrality of Delphi, which they saw as the "navel of the earth" (Strabo, 9.3.6).

[8] In the 5th century BC Pindar's Hyperboreans are intentionally described as the exact opposites of the popular Scythian stereotype – "he seems deliberately to render his Hyperboreans as distinctly *non*-Scythian as possible; the intention of Pindar may have been to turn them into veritable *anti*-Scythians" (Sandin, 2018: 23, 27). In the Roman Empire during the 1st century the geographer Pomponius Mela and the historian Pliny generated positive visions of Hyperborea that can be read as subtle criticism of Roman autocratic control (Webb, 2018: 48).

[9] Boreas, the god of the North Wind, is Thracian by authoritative poetic tradition (Ibyc. 5.9). "Thracian" is attested as "northern" in (late) Greek (Sandin, 2014: 213).

_____

Hyperborea's location changed to accommodate changes in Greek geographical knowledge. It also appears to have been used in part to explain Greek territorial expansion and conquest by moving the Hyperborean homeland about Europe, Asia and western northern Africa, thereby pushing the edges of the world further afield as Greek colonization progressed, using the divine justification of Apollo as a basis (Bridgman, 2005: 71).[10] In his PhD thesis Timothy Bridgman published a map of the supposed location of Hyperborea according to ancient sources.

Figure 6. Summary of ancient Hyperborean lands. Bridgman (2005: 22)

In the Roman geographical tradition, the Riphean Mountains take their place steadily in the extreme north-east of Europe. Valerius Probus in the commentary to Vergil's *Georgics* (3.382) notes, that "some people took the Riphaean Mountains for the Alps. But the Riphean Mountains proper are in Scythia." The "Scythian" tradition was reproduced by Mela, Pliny, Solin, Julius Honorius, Paulus Orosius, other Latin authors and in this form was inherited in the Middle Ages (Podossinov, 2019b: 146). In the 1st century the geographer Pomponius Mela (3.36) describes midnight sun and polar night – a distinctive phenomenon of the Arctic Circle:

> The Hyperboreans are located beyond the north wind, above the Riphaean Mountains, and under the very pole of the stars, where the sun rises, not every day as it does for us, but for the first time at the vernal equinox, and where it eventually sets at the autumnal equinox. Therefore, for six months daylight is completely uninterrupted, and for the next six months night is completely uninterrupted.

_____

[10] The historian Megasthenes served as a diplomat from 302 to 291 BC on several Greek embassies, one of them in the Maurya Empire in northern India. He transposed the Hyperboreans to the zone above the districts of the Indus and the Ganges (Bridgman, 2005: 54; Gagné, 2021: 360).

Figure 7. Pomponius Mela's World Map. English translation of De Situ Orbis, 1540.
http://myoldmaps.com/maps-from-antiquity-6200-bc/116-pomponius

Figure 8. The World according to Pomponius Mela. About 50 AD. Cram (1901: 572)

For thirteen centuries, from 8th century BC until 5th century, many ancient people perceived Hyperborea as completely real and having significant impact on their lives. By the end of Antiquity, the former reverence for Hyperborea was replaced by skepticism and irony. In the Middle Ages, the subject of Hyperborea was almost completely marginalized in both public consciousness and scientific thought. One of the last mentions of Hyperborea is in the Byzantine

_____

encyclopedia *Suda* from 10th century. Christianity has generated new interests, patterns, ideals and doctrines (Matveychev, 2017: 264; 2018: 68).[11]

The idea of the existence of the Riphean Mountains was revived during the Renaissance, when the rediscovery of Ptolemy's *Geography* in Europe prompted the emergence of the discipline of cartography. The Riphean and Hyperborean Mountains started to emerge on 15th and 16th century maps as mobile markers of boundaries and "natural" demarcation lines of Europe's eastern territories. Ptolemy's *Geography* was translated from Greek into Latin in the early years of the 15th century and enjoyed immediate success across Europe. In 1507 the Italian Celestine monk Marco Beneventano published his edition of Ptolemy's *Geography*, which included twenty-seven ancient maps depicting the Ptolemaic *oikoumene*, the inhabited world known to the Romans, next to six modern maps of newly discovered territories.

Figure 9. Marco Beneventano. Rome, 1507. *Tabula Moderna Polonie, Ungarie, Boemie, Germanie, Russie, Lithuanie*. Rapperswill, Polish Museum, CRP: 00100-04939. Map image from the Collection of Cartographia Rappersvilliana Polonorum Rapperswil, Switzerland.

Among the map's most prominent cartographic features are the Riphean Mountains, here called "Rissei Montes" (Piechocki, 2015: 77, 84).

_____

[11] Werhahn (1991: 983) insists, that the angels, almost exclusively depicted with wings since the 4th century, have nothing to do with the Hyperboreans.

Figure 10. Detail: Rissei [Riffei] Montes. Piechocki (2015: 85)

In the 16th century Hyperborea started appearing on maps as a northern continent. In 1569 Gerardus Mercator published his famous world map and insets of the Arctic region were separately published multiple time thereafter. In 1570 Abraham Ortelius published the first modern atlas of the world. In 1579 he began working on an inset map of the North Pole, as it can be imagined through the sources of Antiquity. Empirical evidence of the existence of the northern continent, however, was lacking, and by the middle of the 17th century the Arctic continent had "melted away" on most maps.

Figure 11. Abraham Ortelius, Theatri Orbis Terrarum Parergon; Sive Veteris Geographiae Tabulae, Commentarijs Geographicis et Historicis illustratae. . .Balthasaris Moreti, Antwerp, 1624. Gagné (2021: 35)

Figure 12. Gerardus Mercator, Septentrionalium terrarum descriptio, Amsterdam, 1623

After Hyperborea was long forgotten by scientific thought, in the 16th-18th centuries interest in the Hyperborean theme began to awaken in some countries. This was the period of formation of national states. The notion of political interest connected with the international prestige of the state and with its historical rights to rule came to the fore. The elevation of its history to the most ancient, Hyperborean times was to serve as the strongest proof of the greatness of the nation and its "primogeniture" in world history. If the Italian Renaissance was marked by a

search for ideals in the heritage of their great ancestors – the ancient Romans, then Northern European scholars were looking for ways to prove the historical superiority of their peoples over the Greeks and Romans. The "scientific Hyperborea" gained particular importance in Sweden, which sought to be able to justify not only its exceptional role in world history, but also its claim to a leading position in Europe (Matveychev, 2018: 69; 2022: 83) – Olof Rudbeck (1679), professor of medicine, claimed that ancient Swedes were the same as ancient Hyperboreans (Roling, 2019: 263).

The supposed location of Hyperborea was moved to northern Central Asia by the French astronomer Jean Sylvain Bailly[12] (1775) and to the North Pole by the Swedish general and diplomat Magnus Björnstjerna (1843).[13] The latter theory was later also shared by the first president of Boston University William Warren (1885: 185) and the British academic John Bennett (1963). The assumptions about Hyperborea's location continue even today: north of Altai, Russia (Machinsky, 1997); Serbia (Vasić, 1932, Budimir, 1969; refer to Palavestra, 2016); Poland (Chochorowski, 2020).

Despite all speculations Hyperborea remains a legitimate subject of scientific interest in historiography, archeology and linguistics, although it often acts as a suitable ground for the cultivation of various racial and nationalist theories, ideologies and pseudoscientific doctrines (Palavestra, 2016: 121).[14]

7. Conclusion

Even if an almost entirely imaginary vision, the Hyperboreans remain the most productive and persistent Northern motif in ancient Greek literature, embodying as it were the canonical North of Greek myth (Sandin, 2018: 14). The Hyperboreans were thought to have traversed Greece during its mythical prehistory and to have left their mark on some of its innermost and sanctified places (Romm, 1992: 61), thus helping to create, and sometimes to maintain, important values in Greek thought, such as justice, right, moral purity and religiosity (Bridgman, 2005: 71). They were unreachable by land or sea and most stories of travel to and fro involve flight – flying chariots. "There is something *otherworldly* as well as northerly about their land" (Ahl, 1982: 378). Pliny (4.26) insists that we are not "at liberty to entertain any doubts as to the existence of this race", which lived in a mythical golden-age utopian setting, halfway between the realm of the gods and that of humankind (Bridgman, 2005: 64). All of this makes Hyperborea one of the most interesting and mysterious aspects in the history of the ancient world. But Pindar's account (*Pyth*. 10.40) that the Hyperboreans live "without toil or battles" hints to the fact that they are in fact a peace-loving society, which understands that salvation of mankind is possible only through knowledge, wisdom, and self-improvement – an achievement of an evolved culture, and a hope for a humane future.

---

[12] Roling (2019: 263). See also Edelstein (2006: 272). Bailly, just as Rudbeck, claimed that Atlas, Saturn, and Uranus were historical figures – mathematicians and astronomers, whose discoveries marked the start of all science (Roling, 2019: 270).

[13] Roling (2019: 275). As an ambassador in London, he had discovered Sanskrit studies and concluded that long before a massive flood c. 5000 BC, which would not have been able to destroy the whole of humanity, the Polar Regions must have been a salubrious territory with a mild climate. As temperatures dropped in the northern hemisphere, the Hyperboreans had at first migrated to the warmer parts of Siberia, Central Asia, and Tibet, and then to more southerly latitudes, into India. A journey to the western hemisphere has followed.

[14] For an overview of pseudoscientific doctrines see Arnold (2018), Matveychev (2018). The Hyperborean myth was exploited by A. Rosenberg, the "official philosopher" of the Third Reich, and H. Wirth, the creator of the Ahnenerbe (Ancestral Heritage) institute under SS patronage (Mosionjnic, 2012: 81-86).

_____

References

Ahl, F. (1982). Amber, Avallon, and Apollo's singing swan. *The American Journal of Philology*, *103*(4), 373-411.

Ambühl, A. (1998). Hyperboreioi. *Der neue Pauly V*. Stuttgart: Metzler, 802-803.

Arnold, J. (2018). *Thinking in continents: Hyperborea and Atlantis in René Guénon's conception of tradition*. Retrieved 11 March 2023, from https://www.academia.edu/37107075/Thinking_in_Continents_Hyperborea_and_Atlantis_in_Ren%C3%A9_Gu%C3%A9nons_Conception_of_Tradition.

Bailly, J. (1775). *Histoire de l'astronomie ancienne depuis son origine jusqu'a l'établissement de l'ecole d'Alexandrie*. Paris.

Bennett, J. (1963). The Hyperborean origin of the Indo-European culture. *Systematics, 1*(3). Retrieved March 20 2023 from https://web.archive.org/web/20110914092948/http://www.matrixofcreation.co.uk/php/JGB/systematics-vol1-no3-203-232.htm.

Björnstjerna, M. (1843). *Die Theogonie, Philosophie und Kosmogonie der Hindus*. Stockholm.

Bolton, J. (1962). *Aristeas of Proconnesus*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Bowra, C. (1956). A fragment of the *Arimaspea. The Classical Quarterly*, *6*(1/2), 1-10.

Bridgman, T. (2005). *Hyperboreans: Myth and history in Celtic-Hellenic contacts*. Routledge.

Budimir, M. (1969). Balkan contribution to October. In *From the Eastern Balkans*. [Балкански прилог Октобру. У *Са балканских источника*]. Belgrade: Srpska književna zadruga.

Burkert, W. (1985). *Greek religion*. Harvard University Press.

Carey, J. (2006). Hyperboreans: Myth and history in Celtic-Hellenic contacts. *Classics Ireland*, *13*, 76-78.

Casson, S. (1920). The Hyperboreans. *The Classical Review*, *34*(1/2), 1-3.

Chochorowski, J. (2020). Siberian and European Hyperboreans as related by Herodotus – Literary myth or echo of historical reality? [Сибирские и европейские гипербореи в рассказе Геродота – литературный миф или эхо исторической действительности?]. *Vestnik Tomskogo Gosudarstvennogo Universiteta, Istoriya*, *68*, 72-78.

Coupry, J. (1972). Ed. *Inscriptions de Délos: Période de l'Amphictyonie attico-délienne: actes administratifs (№ 89–104: 33)*. Paris: Académie des inscriptions et belles-lettres.

Courby, F. (1921). Notes topographiques et chronologiques sur le sanctuaire d'Apollon delien. *Bulletin de Correspondance Hellenique*, *45*, 175-241.

Cram, G. (1901). *Cram's atlas of the world, ancient and modern*. New York, Chicago.

Daebritz, H. (1914). *Paulys Realencyclopädie der classischen Altertumswissenschaft, IX*. Stuttgart: Metzlersher, 258-279.

Dowden, K. (2019). Aristeas (35). *Brill's New Jacoby Online*.

Edelstein, D. (2006). Hyperborean Atlantis: Jean-Sylvain Bailly, Madame Blavatsky, and the Nazi myth. *Studies in Eighteenth Century Culture*, *35*(1), 267-291.

Farnell, L. (1907, 2010). *The cults of the Greek states*, vol. 4. Cambridge University Press.

Gagné, R. (2020). Mirages of ethnicity and the distant north in Book 4 of the *Histories*: Hyperboreans, Arimaspians and Issedones. In T. Figueira & C. Soares (Eds.), *Ethnicity in Herodotus*. London: Routledge, 237-257.

Gagné, R. (2021). *Cosmography and the idea of Hyperborea in Ancient Greece. A philology of worlds*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Gočeva, Z. (1993) Apollo [Аполон]. *A brief encyclopedia. Thracian antiquity*. Sofia: Agres, 18-19.

Gočeva, Z. (2007). Die Hyperboreer – Mythos und Geschichte. *Thracia XVII*, In honorem annorum LX Cirili Yordanov, 25-31.

Graf, F. (2008). *Apollo*. London and New York: Routledge.

Graf, F. (2022). Cosmography and the idea of Hyperborea in Ancient Greece. A philology of worlds. *Kernos, 35*, 339-341.

Kyriazopoulos, A. (1993). The land of the Hyperboreans in Greek religious thinking. *Parnassos*, *35*, 395-398.

Kolosovskaya, Y. (1982). Agathyrses and their place in the history of the tribes of South-Eastern Europe [Агафирсы и их место в истории племен Юго-Восточной Европы]. *Vestnik drevney istorii, 4*, 47-69.

Lazova, T. (1993). Abaris [Абарис]. *A brief encyclopedia. Thracian antiquity*. Sofia: Agres, 1.

Lazova, T. (1996). *The Hyperboreans. A study in the Paleo-Balkan tradition*. Sofia: St. Kliment Ohridski University Press.

Machinsky, D. (1997). Sacral centers of Scythia near the Caucasus and the Altai and their relationship in the late 4th millennium to the middle of the 1st mill. BC [Сакральные центры Скифии близ Кавказа и Алтая и их взаимосвязи в конце IV – середине I тыс. до н.э.]. *Stratum: struktury i katastrofy*. St. Petersburg: Nestor, 73-94.

Macurdy, G. (1916). The Hyperboreans. *Classical Review, 30*(7), 180-183.

Matveychev, O. (2017). Hyperborea as a subject of scientific interest in the Middle Ages and modern times [Гиперборея как предмет научного интереса в Средневековье и новое время]. *Sotsialyno-gumanitarnie znaniya, 5*, 262-279.

Matveychev, O. (2018). The Hyperborean issue in the 19th-20th Centuries [Гиперборейский вопрос в XIX-XX веках]. *Nauchnii ezhegodnik instituta folosofii i prava Ural, 18/3*, 67-85.

Matveychev, O. (2020). The origins of the cult of Apollo and the first poet Olen [Истоки культа Аполлона и первопоэт Олен]. *Antinomii, 20/3*, 7-21.

Matveychev, O. (2022). On the etymology of the term "Hyperborea" [К этимологии термина "Гиперборея"]. *Vestnik Tverskogo Gosudarstvennogo Universiteta, Seria: Filosofia, (2),* 81-90.

Mosionjnic, L. (2012). *Technology of the historical myth* [Технология исторического мифа]. Saint Petersburg: Nestor-Istoriia.

Palavestra, A., & Milosavljevic, M. (2016). Hyperborea in Serbian archaeology [Hiperboreja u srpskoj arheologiji]. *Archaica, 4*, 119-140.

Penella, R. (2007). *Man and the word: The orations of Himerius*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Phillips, E. (1955). The legend of Aristeas: Fact and fancy in early Greek notions of East Russia, Siberia, and inner Asia. *Artibus Asiae*, *18*(2), 161-177.

_____

Picard, C., & Replat, J. (1924). Recherches sur la topographie du hiéron Délien. *Bulletin de Correspondance Hellenique, 48*, 217-263.

Piechocki, K. (2015). Erroneous mappings: Ptolemy and the visualization of Europe's East. *Early Modern Culture of Translation*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 76-96.

Podossinov, A. (2015). *Where sailed Odysseus to? To the geographical concepts of the archaic Greeks*. [Куда плавал Одиссей: о географических представлениях греков архаической эпохи]. Moscow: Yazyki slavyanskoy kultury.

Podossinov, A. (2019a). A concept "Riphaean Mountains" in ancient geocartography: Myth, cosmology, symbol and/or reality? *Miscellanea Geographica, 23*(3), 194-198.

Podossinov, A., & Denisov, A. (2019b). The Rhipaean mountains on the early portolans: Influence of ancient and medieval traditional cartography? *Dialog so vremenem, 69*, 143-160.

Rausch, S. (2013). *Bilder des Nordens: Vorstellungen vom Norden in der griechischen Literatur von Homer bis zum Ende des Hellenismus*. Darmstadt: Philipp von Zabern.

Rawlinson, G. (transl.) (1910). *The history of Herodotus, Vol. I*. London: Dent.

Roling, B. (2019). Hyperboreans in Tibet: Transformations of the Atlantica of Olaus Rudbeck in the eighteenth and nineteenth century. *Boreas Rising*, 263-280.

Romm, J. (1989). Herodotus and mythic Geography: The case of the Hyperboreans. *Transactions of the American Philological Association, 119*, 97-113.

Romm, J. (1992). *The edges of the Earth in Ancient thought: Geography, exploration and fiction*. Princeton: Clarendon Press.

Rudbeck, O. (1679). *Atland eller Manheim* (4 vol., 1679-1702). Uppsala.

Sandin, P. (2014). Famous Hyperboreans. *Nordlit*, (33), 205-221.

Sandin, P. (2018). Scythia or Elysium? The land of the Hyperboreans in early Greek literature. In D. Jørgensen & V. Langum (Eds.), *Visions of North in premodern Europe* (pp. 13-33). Turnhout: Brepols (Cursor Mundi, 31).

Vasić, M. (1932). *Praehistoric Vinča* [Преисториска Винча I. Индустрија цинабарита и косметика у Винчи]. Belgrade: Državna štamparija.

Warren, W. (1885). *Paradise found: The cradle of the human race at the North Pole*. Cambridge: The Riverside Press.

Webb, L. (2018). Inter imperium sine fine: Thule and Hyperborea in Roman literature. In D. Jørgensen & V. Langum (Eds.), *Visions of North in premodern Europe* (pp. 35-58). Turnhout: Brepols (Cursor Mundi, 31).

Werhahn, H. (1991). *Reallexikon für Antike und Christentum XVI*. Stuttgart: Hiersemann, 967-986.

COAS

_____

The Lightning Gun: How the Blyskawica Submachine Gun Revolutionized Warfare

Nathaniel Marchese

Naugatuck Valley Community College, Waterbury, UNITED STATES

Abstract

This article explores how the impact of the Blyskawica submachine gun on the military world. Developed by the polish resistance during World War II, the weapon was a technological innovation that had a significant impact on firearms and military tactics. Its unique design and sound had a powerful psychological impact on its users and enemies, boosting morale and instilling fear in equal measure. The weapon's lightweight design and short barrel made it effective in close-quarter combat, while its ability to suppress enemy fire helped to shape the development of military tactics. The Blyskawica submachine gun became a symbol of resistance and freedom, playing a significant role in boosting the morale of the Polish people during the war. This weapon also stacks up pretty well to some of the biggest names in the submachine gun world in the World War II era.

Keywords: World War II, Polish history, military history, weapons history, firearms.

1. Introduction

The Polish Blyskawica submachine gun has a rich history that spans across a time when long-standing conflicts and wars had ravaged the world. The weapon was developed in response to the German occupation of Poland during World War II. It was designed under the leadership of Polish engineer Piotr Wilniewczyc, in collaboration with other weapon systems experts, including Seweryn Wielanier and Wawrzyniec Lewandowski. The Blyskawica was designed to be light yet powerful, simple and robust, reliable, and easy to produce. It was meant to be used by the Polish military and citizenry in the fight against the Nazis. However, the weapon found itself at the center of various armed conflicts and military operations not only in Poland but also in countries in Europe, Asia, and Africa. This article explores the history, features, and impact of the Blyskawica submachine gun in the military world.

2. History of the Blyskawica submachine gun

The development of the Blyskawica submachine gun began in 1939 in the Państwowa Fabryka Karabinów (PFK) arms factory in Radom, Poland. The Polish authorities had directed the factory to develop a light and reliable submachine gun that would be used by the country's military and resistance fighters. The lead engineer on the project, Piotr Wilniewczyc, designed the weapon to meet the specific requirements of the Polish forces. He borrowed elements of the British Sten submachine gun design to create a weapon that was easier to manufacture and cheaper to produce.

The weapon was named "Blyskawica," which translates to "lightning." This is reflecting its lightning-fast rate of fire. It was also a nod to the Polish destroyer ORP Blyskawica, which played a significant role in defending the port of Cowes during the German invasion of Britain in 1942.

The PFK factory completed the first prototype of the Blyskawica submachine gun in 1942. However, the weapon went into full production in 1943 when Poles organized an armed uprising against the Nazis in Warsaw. The factory produced over 7,000 Blyskawica submachine guns in the following months, which were distributed to the Polish underground forces, home army, and other resistance fighters. The weapon was also used by the British Special Operations Executive in their clandestine operations behind enemy lines in occupied Europe.

The Blyskawica submachine gun was designed and manufactured by the Polish Armia Krajowa, resistance movement during World War II. It was one of many weapons produced in secret underground workshops in occupied Poland. It was first produced in 1943 in a clandestine factory established in the city of Krakow. The gun was designed by engineer Seweryn Wielanier and manufactured by the Armia Krajowa, the largest resistance movement in Poland during World War II.

The Blyskawica was designed to be a lightweight and portable weapon that could be used by resistance fighters in urban environments. It used 9mm Parabellum ammunition and had a 32-round magazine. The gun was highly effective at close range and was used by the resistance in numerous sabotage and guerilla operations.

The Blyskawica was named after a Polish destroyer, ORP Blyskawica, which played a key role in the defense of the port city of Cowes during the German invasion of Britain in 1940. The gun was not widely known outside of Poland during World War II, but it gained international recognition during the Warsaw Uprising in 1944, when it was used extensively by the Polish resistance against the occupying German forces.

After the war, the Blyskawica continued to be used by the Polish Army and police forces. It was also exported to several other countries, including Indonesia, Peru, and Egypt. Today, the Blyskawica is considered a rare and highly collectible submachine gun, and examples can be found in museums and private collections around the world.

3. Features of the Blyskawica submachine gun

The Blyskawica submachine gun features a simple blowback mechanism that uses the force of the recoil to cycle and fire rounds from the open bolt. It was a lightweight weapon, weighing only 4.4 pounds, which made it easy to carry and handle in battle. The gun's barrel was 8.5 inches long, with a total length of 28 inches. It fired 9mm Parabellum rounds at a rate of 550 rounds per minute, with a maximum effective range of 200 meters.

The Blyskawica submachine gun had several unique design features that made it stand out from other submachine guns of its time. It had a tubular receiver made of high-quality steel, which gave it a robust and durable build. The gun also had a folding stock made of metal, which allowed it to be easily transported and stored. The weapon had a 32-round magazine that was loaded from the left side of the receiver. However, the gun's magazine could also be removed and replaced with a 72-round drum magazine.

In addition to its lightweight and easily transportable design, the Blyskawica submachine gun was known for its reliability, even in difficult conditions. Its simple blowback mechanism, in combination with its high-quality steel construction, allowed the weapon to withstand heavy use and remain functional even in extreme environments.

Beyond its technical capabilities, the Blyskawica submachine gun also played a significant role in the history of military weapons. It was the first submachine gun to be designed and produced entirely in Poland, a major achievement for a country that had been devastated by war and occupation. The Blyskawica submachine gun highlighted Poland's engineering and manufacturing prowess and became a symbol of national pride during a time of great hardship.

Moreover, the Blyskawica submachine gun was used by soldiers in several major military conflicts, including World War II and later the Korean War. Its impressive firepower, combined with its lightweight and reliable design, made it a favorite among soldiers and an important asset on the battlefield. Despite being designed over 80 years ago, the Blyskawica submachine gun is still a notable example of innovative and effective military technology.

Another notable feature of the Blyskawica submachine gun was its effective sound suppression. The weapon was fitted with a vented barrel that reduced the noise produced by the firing of the weapon, making it a preferred choice for special forces units that needed to use covertly. The gun was also equipped with an adjustable rear sight that allowed for exact shooting at varying distances.

Perhaps one of the most significant features of the Blyskawica submachine gun was its unique and intricate design. The gun's receiver, magazine, and stock were all carefully crafted to create a sleek and visually appealing weapon. The gun's overall aesthetic, combined with its military effectiveness, made it a popular collectible among gun enthusiasts and collectors.

Overall, the Blyskawica submachine gun was an impressive engineering feat that helped set up Poland as a leader in military technology. Its lightweight design made it easy for soldiers to carry and maneuver in the field, while its durability and reliability made it a trusted weapon of choice for soldiers in multiple military conflicts. Its unique design and historical significance continue to make it a popular and sought-after weapon among collectors and enthusiasts today.

4. How did the Blyskawica stack up in comparison to other World War Two SMGs?

MP-40

The Blyskawica was chambered for the 9x19mm Parabellum cartridge and had an effective range of up to 150 meters. The weapon had a folding metal stock that could be deployed quickly, which made it ideal for use in cramped spaces, such as in building interiors or urban environments. The gun had a relatively low rate of fire, at around 600 rounds per minute, which helped to conserve ammunition and allowed for more controlled bursts of fire. The Blyskawica was also noticeably quiet, which made it ideal for use in stealth operations, such as ambushes or hit-and-run attacks.

In comparison, the German MP-40 was a widely used submachine gun that had a higher rate of fire, at around 500-550 rounds per minute. The MP-40 was also chambered for the 9x19mm Parabellum cartridge and had an effective range of up to 100 meters. However, the MP-40 was a more complex weapon than the Blyskawica and required specialized tooling to manufacture. The MP-40 was also more prone to jamming and misfeeding than the Blyskawica, which was known for its reliability and durability.

Overall, the Blyskawica was a highly effective and innovative weapon that proved its worth in the hands of Polish resistance fighters during World War II. The gun's simplicity and ease of manufacture made it an asset to the resistance, and its compact design and quiet operation helped to make it a formidable weapon in close-quarters combat. Despite its relatively low rate of

_____

fire, the Blyskawica was able to hold its own against the more widely used MP-40 and played a significant role in the resistance movement against German forces.

PPSh-41

The Blyskawica submachine gun and the PPSh-41 submachine gun were two of the most used submachine guns during World War II. Here are some details comparing the two weapons:

The Blyskawica was designed and constructed by the Polish resistance, and as a result, it was easily producible with limited resources. It was constructed using basic metalworking tools. making it ideal for underground resistance workshops. On the other hand, the PPSh-41 was designed and produced by the Soviet Union on a larger scale using more advanced manufacturing techniques. The Blyskawica was chambered for the 9x19mm Parabellum cartridge, which was also used by the PPSh-41. The PPSh-41 had a much higher rate of fire than the Blyskawica. The PPSh-41 had a rate of fire of about 900 RPM, while the Blyskawica was around 600 RPM.

The ranges of the Blyskawica and the PPSh-41 were similar, with an effective range of around 150 meters for both. However, the PPSh-41 had a slightly better accuracy due to its higher rate of fire.

The Blyskawica had a 32-round magazine, while the PPSh-41 had a 71-round drum magazine or a 35-round box magazine. The Blyskawica was much lighter than the PPSh-41. The Blyskawica weighed around 3 kg, while the PPSh-41 weighed around 4.5 kg. Both the Blyskawica and the PPSh-41 were known for their reliability and durability. The Blyskawica has a reputation for being particularly reliable due to its simple construction.

In summary, the PPSh-41 had a higher rate of fire, greater magazine capacity, and slightly better accuracy. The Blyskawica, on the other hand, was lighter, more easily producible, and had a reputation for being incredibly reliable. Both guns were effective submachine guns, and each had advantages and disadvantages.

M1 Thompson

The Blyskawica and the M1 Thompson are both submachine guns that were used during World War II. Here are some details comparing the two weapons:

The Blyskawica was constructed using simple metalworking tools and designed for ease of production by the underground Polish resistance, while the M1 Thompson was a mass-produced weapon designed by the Americans. The Blyskawica had a unique folding stock, and its barrel was attached to the receiver with a screw, while the M1 Thompson had a wooden stock and a barrel band that held the barrel to the receiver.

The Blyskawica used the 9x19mm Parabellum cartridge while the M1 Thompson used the .45 ACP cartridge. The M1 Thompson had a much higher rate of fire than the Blyskawica. The M1 Thompson had an average rate of fire of around 700 rounds per minute while the Blyskawica had a rate of fire of around 600 rounds per minute. The M1 Thompson had a longer effective range than the Blyskawica. The M1 Thompson had an effective range of around 200 meters while the Blyskawica had a range of roughly 150 meters. However, the Blyskawica was known for its accuracy even at its shorter range.

The M1 Thompson had a higher magazine capacity than the Blyskawica. The M1 Thompson had a 20 or 30 round magazine, while the Blyskawica had a 32-round magazine. The M1 Thompson was heavier than the Blyskawica, weighing around 4.5 kg compared to the Blyskawica's 3 kg. Reliability and durability: both the Blyskawica and M1 Thompson were considered reliable and durable weapons. The M1

Thompson had a reputation for being very dependable, but the Blyskawica was considered even more dependable due to its straightforward design.

In summary, the M1 Thompson had a higher rate of fire, longer effective range, and a greater magazine capacity than the Blyskawica. However, the Blyskawica was lighter, more easily producible, and considered more dependable due to its simple construction. The Blyskawica also had a reputation for being highly accurate for a submachine gun, despite its shorter effective range. Ultimately, both weapons served their purposes as submachine guns during World War II.

Sten

The Blyskawica and Sten submachine guns were both used by allied forces during World War II. Here are some details comparing the two weapons:

> The Blyskawica and Sten were both designed for ease of manufacture and were simple blowback-operated firearms. However, the Blyskawica was more complex in design than the Sten, with a slenderer body, folding stock, and a distinctive large muzzle brake compared to the Sten.

> The Blyskawica used the 9x19mm Parabellum cartridge while the Sten initially used the 9x19mm cartridge, but later versions utilized the slightly more powerful 9x23mm Winchester cartridge. The Blyskawica had a small edge over the Sten submachine gun with a slightly higher rate of fire of around 600 or 700 rounds per minute compared with the Sten's 500 rounds per minute. Despite being similar in range, the Blyskawica was considered more accurate at ranges up to about 100 meters.

> The Blyskawica had a relatively large magazine capacity of 32 rounds compared to the Sten's standard magazine capacity of 32 rounds. Weight and Durability: Both guns were similar in weight, coming in at around 3 kg/set. Both were also noted for being durable and reliable.

> The Blyskawica was produced in relatively small numbers by the Polish resistance, and it took more than a year to build the first 100 guns. The Sten, on the other hand, was produced in significant quantities and rapidly became one of the most widely produced firearms in the history of the world, with more than 4 million units manufactured.

In summary, while the Sten was a more widely produced and simpler design using less metal and less time and effort to produce, the Blyskawica had a small edge over the Sten in terms of accuracy, rate of fire, and magazine capacity. However, it should be noted that both submachine guns played a vital role in the allies' war effort during World War II, and each had strengths depending on the situation in which it was used.

Type 100

The Blyskawica and Type 100 submachine guns were both used during World War II. Here are some details comparing the two weapons:

> Both the Blyskawica and Type 100 submachine guns were blowback-operated firearms. The Blyskawica was designed by the Polish resistance in a slenderer body with a folding stock, while the Type 100 was designed by the Japanese with a more compact appearance and fixed wooden stock.

> The Blyskawica used the 9x19mm Parabellum cartridge, while the Type 100 used the slightly less powerful 8x22mm Nambu cartridge. The Type 100 had a higher rate of fire, with around 800 rounds per minute compared to the Blyskawica's rate of around 600-700 rounds per minute. The Blyskawica was more accurate than the Type 100, with a range of up to 200 meters compared to the 100-meter range of the Type 100.

The Blyskawica had a 32-round magazine capacity, while the Type 100 had a 30-round capacity. The Type 100 was lighter than the Blyskawica, coming in at around 2.8 kg, while the Blyskawica weighed around 3 kg. Both guns were reliable and durable. The Type 100 was produced in significant quantities by Japan, with around 30,000 units produced. In contrast, the Blyskawica was produced in smaller numbers, with only around 700 units manufactured.

In summary, the Type 100 had a higher rate of fire and was lighter than the Blyskawica, but the Blyskawica was more accurate and had a longer range. Both guns had similar magazine capacity and were considered durable and reliable. However, the Type 100 was produced in greater quantities than the Blyskawica. Overall, each gun had its strengths depending on the situation in which it was used.

Grease Gun

The Blyskawica submachine gun and the Grease Gun (officially known as the M3 submachine gun) both saw service during World War II. Here are some details comparing the two weapons:

The Blyskawica was a blowback-operated submachine gun designed and produced in Poland, with a slenderer appearance and folding metal stock. The Grease Gun was designed and produced in the United States, with a blockier appearance and retractable wire stock. Both submachine guns utilized the .45 ACP cartridge.

The Blyskawica had a slower rate of fire, around 700 rounds per minute, while the Grease Gun had a higher rate of fire, around 450 rounds per minute. The Blyskawica had a range of up to 200 meters and was more accurate than the Grease Gun, which had a maximum effective range of 50-100 meters.

The Blyskawica had a 32-round magazine capacity, while the Grease Gun had a 30-round magazine capacity. Weight and Durability: The Grease Gun was heavier than the Blyskawica, coming in at around 4.5 kg, while the Blyskawica weighed around 3 kg. Both guns were considered durable and reliable.

The Grease Gun was produced in much larger numbers than the Blyskawica, with almost 700,000 units produced in the United States during World War II. The Blyskawica, on the other hand, was produced in a limited quantity, with only around 700 units manufactured.

In summary, the Blyskawica had a slightly higher rate of fire, longer range, and better accuracy than the Grease Gun. However, the Grease Gun had a larger production quantity, higher ammunition capacity, and was slightly heavier. Both guns were considered reliable and durable. The choice between these two submachine guns would likely depend on the specific preferences and needs of the user, as well as the situation in which the firearm was being used.

Owen Gun

The Blyskawica submachine gun and the Owen Gun were both used during World War II. Here is a comparison of the two weapons:

Design and Construction: The Blyskawica was a blowback-operated submachine gun designed and produced in Poland, with a slenderer appearance and folding metal stock. The Owen Gun was designed and produced in Australia, with a unique and distinctive appearance, featuring a top-mounted magazine, and a straight wooden stock.

The Blyskawica utilized the 9mm Parabellum cartridge, while the Owen Gun used the .45 ACP cartridge. The Owen Gun had a faster rate of fire, around 700-900 rounds per minute, while the Blyskawica had a slower rate of fire, around 700 rounds per minute.

The Owen Gun had a range of up to 180 meters and was more accurate than the Blyskawica, which had a maximum effective range of 100-150 meters. Magazine Capacity: The Owen Gun had a 33-round magazine capacity, while the Blyskawica had a 32-round magazine capacity.

The Owen Gun and the Blyskawica were both considered lightweight and durable, with the Owen Gun weighing around 3.6 kg and the Blyskawica weighing around 3 kg.

The Owen Gun was produced in relatively large numbers, with over 45,000 units produced during World War II. The Błyskawica, on the other hand, was produced in a limited quantity, with only around 700 units manufactured.

In summary, the Owen Gun had a faster rate of fire and longer range than the Blyskawica, while the Blyskawica was more accurate and had a slightly larger production quantity. Both guns were considered lightweight and durable. The choice between these two submachine guns would likely depend on the specific preferences and needs of the user, as well as the situation in which the firearm was being used.

5. Impact of the Blyskawica submachine gun in the military world

The Blyskawica submachine gun played a significant role in the Polish Home Army's armed resistance against the Nazi occupation. Its lightweight design and ease of handling made it popular among Polish resistance fighters, who used it in urban guerrilla warfare. The weapon was used to attack German troops, sabotage supply lines, and gather intelligence. The Blyskawica submachine gun was also used in the Warsaw Uprising of 1944, where Polish resistance fighters held out against Nazi forces for over two months.

Following the war, the Blyskawica submachine gun was widely exported to countries across the world. Its reliability and robustness made it a popular weapon in military operations and conflicts around the globe. For example, the gun was used by both sides in the Korean War, where it proved to be an effective weapon in urban and close-quarter combat. The Blyskawica submachine gun was also used by Portuguese Special Forces during the Mozambican War of Independence in the 1960s and 1970s.

In addition to being widely exported and used in various military operations, the Blyskawica submachine gun had a significant impact on the development of firearms technology. The gun was one of the first to include a quick-change barrel system, which allowed for easy replacement of the barrel without the need for special tools or training. This innovation was later incorporated into many other firearms, including machine guns and assault rifles.

The Blyskawica submachine gun also had a unique firing mechanism known as the "floating firing pin." The firing pin was not fixed to the bolt face but was instead held in place by a spring within the bolt. This design helped to reduce wear and tear on the gun and made it more reliable in adverse conditions.

Additionally, the Blyskawica submachine gun was one of the first guns to use a double-stack magazine, which allowed for a higher ammunition capacity without increasing the size of the magazine. This innovation was later incorporated into many other firearms, including assault rifles.

Apart from its technical innovations, the Blyskawica submachine gun also had a psychological impact on its users and enemies. Its unique shape and distinctive sound gave it an intimidating presence on the battlefield, which helped to boost the morale of those carrying it into battle. According to some reports, German soldiers in World War II feared the weapon so much that they would attempt to surrender rather than face its firepower.

Moreover, the use of the Blyskawica submachine gun by the Polish resistance fighters was a symbol of their resistance to Nazi occupation, and it played a vital role in boosting the morale of the Polish people during the war. The gun became a symbol of resistance and freedom, and many of those who fought with it during the war went on to become notable figures in Poland's post-war history.

In terms of its impact on military tactics, the Blyskawica submachine gun was often used in close-quarters combat, where its lightweight design and short barrel made it effective in confined spaces. It was also used to pin down enemy forces and suppress their fire while other units maneuvered into position.

Overall, the Blyskawica submachine gun was a highly effective weapon that played a significant role in military conflicts around the globe. Its technical innovations, distinctive design, and psychological impact helped to shape the development of firearms and military tactics in the 20th century and beyond.

6. Conclusion

In conclusion, the Blyskawica submachine gun is a unique and significant weapon in the history of military arms. It was designed as a simple yet powerful weapon that could be easily produced and maintained. The Blyskawica's use in the Polish resistance movement during World War II displayed the weapon's effectiveness and reliability in urban guerrilla warfare. Following the war, the gun was exported to countries across the world and played a critical role in various conflicts and military operations. The Blyskawica submachine gun proved to be a reliable and effective weapon that was instrumental in many key battles throughout history. Although it is no longer in use by modern militaries, its legacy lives on as a symbol of Polish engineering and design excellence. Overall, the Blyskawica submachine gun is a significant piece of military history that has left an indelible mark on the world of arms and will continue to be studied and appreciated by historians, collectors, and enthusiasts alike for years to come.

References

Battlefields of WWII (2023). *Blyskawica submachine gun*. Accessed 22 March 2023. https://www.battlefieldsofww2.com/blyskawica-submachine-gun.html.

Bishop, C. (2002). *The encyclopedia of weapons of World War II*. New York: Crescent Books.

Cieplucha, A. (2017). Small arms of Polish resistance during World War II. *The Journal of Slavic Military Studies*, *30*(2), 311-327.

Gander, T. (2015). *The Blyskawica submachine gun: Poland's secret WWII weapon*. Osprey Publishing.

Guns & Ammo Staff (2018). *Submachine guns: From the MP18 to the MP40*. Guns & Ammo, 25 September 2018. https://www.gunsandammo.com/editorial/submachine-guns-from-the-mp18-to-the-mp40/248700.

_____

Kurowski, F. (1991). *Das Blyskawica-Maschinenpistole: Ein Kapitel deutscher Waffenproduktion im besetzten Polen*. Zweibrücken: VDM Heinz Nickel.

Lynn, R. A. (2023). The Błyskawica submachine gun: Poland's finest weapon? *Small Arms Review*. Accessed 2 March 2023. https://www.smallarmsreview.com/display.article.cfm?idarticles=3292.

Marion, F., & Windrow, R. (1988). *German military equipment of World War II: Catalogue of enemy ordnance materiel* - Vol. 1. Oklahoma: Frederic J. Hack & Co.

Mayo, L. (2016). Błyskawica submachine gun: Forgotten weapon of the Polish resistance. *Military History Matters*, *5*(6), 48-51.

McCollum, I. (2023). Błyskawica Submachine Gun: Poland's Backyard SMG. *Forgotten Weapons*. Accessed 2 April 2023. https://www.forgottenweapons.com/blyskawica-submachine-gun-polands-backyard-smg/.

McNab, C. (2011). *World War II submachine guns*. Oxford: Osprey Publishing.

Moss, M. (2023). Great guns: The MP40 and Blyskawica submachine guns. *War History Online*, 30 March 2023. https://www.warhistoryonline.com/instant-articles/great-guns-mp40-blyskawica-submachine-guns.html.

Peck, M. (2023). Top 5 submachine guns of World War II. *The National Interest*, 4 April 2023. https://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/top-5-submachine-guns-world-war-ii-17207.

Popov, S. (2013). The Blyskawica submachine gun. *Journal of Firearms & Public Policy*, *25*, 59-67.

Richardson, D. (2016). High security: The Błyskawica machine pistol. *Small Arms Defense Journal*, *10*(6), 22-25.

Smith, J. E. (1964). *Small arms of the world*. New York: The Stackpole Company.

Strzelecki, A. (2019). *The Błyskawica submachine gun: A Polish WWII icon*. *Guns & Ammo History*, 7 May 2019, https://www.gunsandammo.com/editorial/the-blyskawica-submachine-gun-a-polish-wwii-icon/364113. Accessed 13 April 2023.

… (2014). The Blyskawica submachine gun. *Forgotten Weapons*. 18 February 2014. Accessed 7 April 2023. https://www.forgottenweapons.com/the-blyskawica-submachine-gun/.

Tingley, B. (2023). Błyskawica: The fast and furious Polish submachine gun of WWII. *War is Boring*. Accessed 12 April 2023. http://warisboring.com/blyskawica-the-fast-and-furious-polish-submachine-gun-of-wwii/.

Walter, J. (2002). *Submachine guns of World War II*. London: Greenhill Books.

World War II Database (2023). *Błyskawica sub-machine gun*. Accessed 12 March 2023. https://ww2db.com/weapon.php?q=272.

Zaloga, S. (2013). Polish home army: Blyskawica submachine gun. *Armchair General*.

Zaloga, S. J. (2009). Polish army last stand at Annapol. *Armchair General*, 2(5), 56-59.

COAS

Connecticut's Contribution to World War II:
A Historical Analysis

Nathaniel Marchese

Naugatuck Valley Community College, Waterbury, UNITED STATES

Abstract

Connecticut, also known as the "Arsenal of Democracy," played a vital role in the Allied victory during World War II. As one of the industrial powerhouses of the United States, Connecticut's manufacturing capabilities ramped up to meet the war effort's needs. The state produced everything from ammunition to airplanes, and its labor force played a crucial role in keeping the war machine running. This article will explore Connecticut's critical role in World War II by examining its economy, industry, military contributions, and social impact.

Keywords: Connecticut, World War II, social impact, manufacturing capabilities.

1. Introduction

Connecticut's contribution to the Allied victory in World War II was extensive and varied. From large munitions factories to small businesses producing essential war materials, Connecticut's economy became a significant part of the American war effort. As a highly industrialized state, Connecticut had an extensive infrastructure for manufacturing, which helped to produce crucial supplies like ammunition, clothing, and machinery for the war. Looking beyond the state's role in production, Connecticut also provided an essential social contribution through the sacrifices made by its people.

2. Connecticut's economy and industry

Connecticut's economy and industry grew significantly during World War II due to an increased demand for war materials. Manufacturing increased substantially as factories shifted production to make military products. The state's skilled workforce quickly adapted to the new needed skills in the war production industries. In 1942, Pratt & Whitney Aircraft announced plans to build a new plant in East Hartford for manufacturing aircraft engines. The company constructed the plant to support the military's needs, and by 1945, it had produced over 27,000 aircraft engines. Colt Firearms in Hartford ramped up production to provide arms to the military, producing over 700,000 rifles and machine guns by the end of the war.

Connecticut was also a significant supplier of ammunition. The Remington Arms factory in Bridgeport, which had established its roots in Connecticut in the 1800s, turned its efforts toward producing munitions for the war. The factory constructed a new building to accommodate

_____

the increase in production and hired tens of thousands of new employees. By war's end, the factory had produced over 1 billion rounds of ammunition.

Connecticut's economy continued to thrive after the war, with manufacturing leading the way. Companies like General Electric and Uniroyal established operations in the state, and Sikorsky Aircraft, which had been producing aircraft in Connecticut since the 1920s, continued to expand. Throughout the rest of the 20th century, Connecticut became known for its advanced manufacturing, with companies specializing in aerospace, medical supplies, and more.

Connecticut's economy also expanded beyond manufacturing. The state's proximity to major cities like New York and Boston made it an ideal location for finance and insurance companies, and the insurance industry in particular grew rapidly. Hartford became a hub for insurance companies, earning the nickname "Insurance Capital of the World."

Today, Connecticut's economy is diverse and includes a range of industries such as healthcare, education, and technology. While the state has faced economic challenges in recent years, it remains a vital part of the U.S. economy and a leader in many industries.

The state's location and transportation infrastructure also contribute to its strong economy. Connecticut is home to a number of major highways and airports, making it easy for businesses to move goods and people in and out of the state. The Port of New Haven is also an important transportation hub, connecting Connecticut to international trade networks.

Connecticut's healthcare industry is particularly noteworthy. The state is home to some of the top hospitals and medical research institutions in the world, including Yale New Haven Hospital, Hartford Hospital, and the UConn Health Center. These institutions contribute significantly to the state's economy and provide thousands of jobs for Connecticut residents.

Similarly, Connecticut's education industry is a driving force behind the state's economy. The state is home to some of the most prestigious universities in the US, including Yale University and the University of Connecticut. These institutions attract talented students and faculty from all over the world, and their research and innovation help to fuel the state's economy.

Finally, Connecticut's technology industry has been growing in recent years. The state is home to a number of startups, particularly in the biotech and fintech sectors. Companies like Infosys, Cognizant, and IBM have also established operations in Connecticut, creating jobs and driving innovation.

Overall, Connecticut's diverse economy and strong industries have helped it weather economic challenges in the past and continue to position it as a leader today.

The strong manufacturing industry that arose in Connecticut after World War II was largely a result of the wartime economy. During the war, many factories in Connecticut were converted to produce goods for the war effort, such as munitions, aircraft, and military vehicles. This created a surge in demand for workers and raw materials, leading to a period of rapid growth in the state's manufacturing industry.

After the war, many of these factories shifted to producing consumer goods, contributing to the post-war economic boom. Additionally, the demand for aircraft production continued as the Cold War began, leading to the expansion of companies like Sikorsky Aircraft in Connecticut.

Connecticut's location on the East Coast and its transportation infrastructure also made it a strategic location for defense-related industries during the Cold War. Companies like Electric Boat, which produces submarine technology, became an important part of the state's economy during this time. Overall, World War II had a significant impact on Connecticut's economy, shaping its manufacturing and defense industries for decades to come.

3. Connecticut's military contribution

More than 300,000 Connecticut residents served in the military during World War II, with many going overseas to European and Pacific theaters. Connecticut's contributions to the military extended beyond the number of soldiers it supplied. The Navy's largest submarine base, located in Groton, was significant in the Pacific theater. The submarines constructed there played a critical part in winning the war in Japan.

Additionally, the Pratt & Whitney factory created more than 17,000 airplane engines, and Sikorsky Aircraft in nearby Stratford contributed significantly to the development of helicopter technology. These aircraft, crucial to the war effort, were also used extensively in the post-WWII world for commerce and humanitarian aid.

Connecticut's military contribution did not stop with World War II. The state continued to play a significant role in other conflicts, including the Korean War and the Vietnam War. In fact, the Vietnam War Memorial in Hartford is the first state memorial in the country dedicated solely to Connecticut veterans who fought and died in that war.

Connecticut's military heritage is also reflected in the National Guard units stationed throughout the state. These units have been activated for various missions, including peacekeeping and disaster relief efforts.

Overall, Connecticut's military contributions have been substantial and have helped shape the history of the United States. The state's dedication to the military continues to this day, with Connecticut residents serving in current conflicts around the world

In recognition of the state's military history and contributions, Connecticut has established several museums and memorials dedicated to honoring veterans and educating the public about their sacrifices. These include the Connecticut Military Museum in Danbury, the Connecticut Trolley Museum in East Windsor, and the Veterans' Memorial Park in West Hartford.

Connecticut also offers various education and support programs for veterans and their families, including the Connecticut Department of Veterans Affairs and several veteran-specific job training and educational assistance programs.

As Connecticut looks to the future, its military heritage will continue to inform and shape its identity. The state remains committed to honoring its veterans and supporting current members of the military, continuing its long tradition of service and dedication to the nation.

Connecticut's military contributions during World War II laid the foundation for its continued service and dedication to the military. The state played a critical role in the war effort, producing and supplying vital resources and equipment, including submarines, rifles, and aircraft engines. Connecticut residents also served bravely and made sacrifices on the battlefield, with many losing their lives in service.

The state's contributions to World War II had a lasting impact, both on the nation and on Connecticut's identity. By maintaining a strong military presence and continuing to honor veterans and their sacrifices, Connecticut carries forward the legacy of its World War II contributions and its deep commitment to serving the country.

4. Connecticut's impact by theater

Connecticut's impact on World War II was significant in all major theaters of the war. Here's a breakdown of Connecticut's contribution to each theater.

_____

4.1 *European Theater*

Connecticut was home to several major military production facilities, including the Bridgeport Brass Company, which made thousands of casings for artillery shells. Additionally, Connecticut-trained soldiers served in key roles throughout the European theater. In the European Theater, Connecticut industries manufactured a vast array of products that the military needed in its fight against Nazi Germany. One of the state's most significant contributions came from the Pratt & Whitney Aircraft Company in East Hartford, which produced thousands of aircraft engines for the U.S. Air Force. Pratt & Whitney's engines powered most of the American fighter planes, bombers, and transports that fought in Europe.

Another critical contribution to the war effort came from the Winchester Repeating Arms Company in New Haven. The company manufactured machine guns and other weapons, which provided critical support to U.S. troops during the Normandy invasion and subsequent battles against Nazi forces in France.

Connecticut also played an essential role in the training of soldiers who went on to fight in Europe. Several Connecticut military installations trained troops, including the Camp H.H. Arnold in Groton, the Fort Sheridan in New Haven, and the Fort Devens in Massachusetts.

The state's residents also served in important leadership roles throughout the war, including General Colin Powell, who rose to become Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff during the Gulf War, and General John W. Vessey Jr., who served as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff under President Ronald Reagan.

In addition to the military, Connecticut was also involved in a significant humanitarian effort in Europe during the war. Thousands of state residents donated money and supplies to the American Friends Service Committee, which provided relief to civilians affected by the conflict.

In addition to Connecticut's contributions to the war effort, many Connecticut residents saw action in the European Theater. They served alongside members of other U.S. military units, including the 10th Mountain Division and the 82nd and 101st Airborne Divisions. Several Connecticut residents earned significant honors for their service in the European Theater. For example, Private Joseph W. Mastronuzzi from New Haven received the Medal of Honor, the nation's highest military honor, for his heroism in Italy in 1944.

4.2 *Pacific Theater*

Connecticut played a major role in producing ships for the Pacific fleet. The shipbuilding industry in Connecticut was boosted by the emergency shipbuilding program launched by the U.S. Maritime Commission in 1940. By 1945, Connecticut was producing dozens of Liberty and Victory ships each month, which were used to transport troops, supplies, and equipment to the Pacific theater.

Many Connecticut residents served in the Pacific, and the state also contributed to the war effort on the home front.

Connecticut was a hub of manufacturing during the war, producing goods ranging from ships and submarines to munitions and aircraft engines. The Electric Boat Company, located in Groton, Connecticut, was a major producer of submarines for the war effort. Electric Boat designed and constructed the Gato-class submarine, which became one of the most successful and widely used submarine classes in the war.

Connecticut residents also served in various branches of the military and participated in major Pacific battles, such as the Battle of Guadalcanal, the Battle of Iwo Jima, and the Battle

_____

of Okinawa. One notable Connecticut resident who served in the Pacific was Joseph W. Stilwell, an Army general who led Chinese and American troops in several key battles.

Connecticut residents also contributed to the war effort through fundraising, bond drives, and other forms of support on the home front. The state's close proximity to major population centers like New York City made it an important hub for logistical support and supply chain management during the war.

Overall, Connecticut played an important role in the Pacific Theater and World War II as a whole. The state's contributions on both the military and home front fronts helped ensure victory for the Allied forces.

Naval Submarine Base New London, located in Groton, Connecticut, was a crucial part of the submarine force in the Pacific Theater. The base trained submarine crews before they were sent to the theater, and also served as a repair and resupply hub for subs that were already deployed. The base was responsible for training over 15,000 submariners during the war.

Sikorsky Aircraft Corporation is an aerospace company, founded in Stratford, Connecticut, was a major producer of helicopters and became a crucial component of the Pacific Theater. Sikorsky's helicopters were used for transport, reconnaissance, and medical evacuation in areas where traditional planes couldn't land. Sikorsky also trained helicopter pilots and maintenance crews during the war.

Governor Raymond E. Baldwin, who served as the governor of Connecticut from 1941 to 1946, was an active supporter of the war effort. He served as chairman of the War Manpower Commission for New England, which oversaw labor and production efforts in the region. Baldwin also assisted in the formation of the Connecticut State Guard, a defense force made up of civilian volunteers.

In 1943, a U.S. Navy training vessel collided with a freighter off the coast of New London, Connecticut. The training vessel, which was carrying African American sailors, sank within minutes. 221 sailors were killed or went missing in the incident, and the Navy initially claimed that the ship had suffered a torpedo attack by Japanese forces. The true cause of the sinking wasn't uncovered until decades later this is known as The Amistad Incident.

Pratt & Whitney produced engines that were used in many of the Allied aircraft in the Pacific. In fact, Pratt & Whitney engines powered some of the most famous planes of the war, including the B-17 Flying Fortress and the P-51 Mustang.

Yale University in New Haven, Connecticut, played a significant role in training military personnel for the Pacific Theater. The school's curriculum was tailored to teach skills like Japanese language and culture, as well as military strategy and tactics.

The GE plant in Bridgeport, Connecticut, produced important components for the aircraft, ships, and submarines used in the Pacific. The company was also responsible for developing and producing some of the most advanced electronic equipment of the time, which was critical to the success of U.S. military operations.

U.S. Coast Guard Academy: Located in New London, Connecticut, this academy trained many Coast Guard officers who served in the Pacific Theater. The academy also played a critical role in developing amphibious warfare tactics, which were essential for Allied troops to gain a foothold on islands in the Pacific.

All in all, Connecticut played a critical role in the Pacific Theater during World War II, from producing submarines and helicopters to training personnel for the war effort. The state's contributions helped ensure Allied victory and changed the course of history.

_____

4.3 *North African Theater*

Connecticut-trained troops played a role in the campaigns in North Africa, particularly the Allied invasion of Algeria in 1942. Connecticut also provided equipment and supplies for the troops, including ammunition and fuel.

The state's manufacturing industry, particularly in Bridgeport, played a crucial role in producing the necessary military equipment and supplies for the war effort.

One of the most notable contributions from Connecticut was the production of M4 Sherman tanks by the American Locomotive Company in New Haven. These tanks were used extensively by American and British forces in North Africa, including in the decisive battles of El Alamein and Kasserine Pass.

Connecticut's naval industry also played a key role in the North African campaign. The Electric Boat Company in Groton, which was originally founded to build submarines, produced a number of landing craft and other amphibious vessels that were used in the Allied landings in North Africa.

Connecticut residents also served in the North African Theater as part of the United States armed forces. Connecticut's 43rd Infantry Division was one of the units that fought in North Africa, participating in the capture of Faid Pass and the Battle of Hill 609.

In addition to the production of tanks and landing craft, Connecticut played a role in supplying other military equipment and supplies for the North African campaign. The Pratt & Whitney Aircraft Company, based in East Hartford, produced aircraft engines that were used in planes flown by American and British forces in North Africa.

Connecticut also contributed medical personnel to the North African Theater. The Yale University School of Medicine sent over a dozen doctors and nurses to the region to help care for wounded soldiers.

Connecticut soldiers who served in the North African Theater received numerous decorations and honors for their bravery and service. Among them was Private First Class Henry Wojtusik, who was awarded the Medal of Honor for his actions during the Battle of Hill 609 in Tunisia.

The North African campaign was a crucial turning point in World War II and marked the first significant victory for the Allies in the European theater. Connecticut's contributions to the campaign helped to secure this victory and furthered the state's reputation as a key contributor to the war effort.

4.4 *Mediterranean Theater*

Connecticut was a key supplier of arms and munitions to the Allied forces fighting in Italy and across the Mediterranean. The state's military contributions were primarily focused on providing supplies for the war effort, as well as training and deploying soldiers and airmen.

Connecticut also saw a significant number of its residents serve in the Mediterranean theater. Yale Medical School, for example, set up a medical unit that was deployed to North Africa to treat wounded Allied soldiers.

Connecticut's contributions to the Mediterranean Theater in World War II were not limited to just the production and distribution of weapons and equipment. The state also played a significant role in training troops and providing logistical support.

_____

One of the most important military installations in Connecticut was the Groton Submarine Base, which operated throughout the war and supplied submarines to the Mediterranean Theater. The base also hosted thousands of sailors and seamen who trained for service in the submarine corps.

Another notable military installation in Connecticut was the Bradley Field Air Base, which was located in Windsor Locks. The base was primarily used for training pilots for the war effort, including the pilots who flew combat sorties in North Africa and Europe.

In addition, Connecticut was home to several Army and Navy hospitals that treated wounded soldiers and provided medical support for the war effort. The state's medical personnel were highly regarded for their expertise and many had been recruited from the state's leading hospitals and medical schools.

Overall, Connecticut's contributions to the Mediterranean Theater were essential to the Allied war effort. The state's industrial power, training facilities, and medical expertise all played crucial roles in the military operations that helped secure victory in Europe and North Africa.

4.5 *China-Burma-India Theater*

Connecticut helped to equip U.S. forces fighting in the China-Burma-India theater, which primarily involved supporting Chinese forces fighting the Japanese. The Groton Iron Works supplied metalwork, while the Bridgeport Brass Company manufactured artillery shell casings. Connecticut also played a role in providing communications equipment for U.S. forces in this theater.

The state's contributions to the theater were mainly focused on the production and distribution of weapons and other war materials.

One of the most important military installations in Connecticut during the war was the Colt's Manufacturing Company in Hartford. The company produced a variety of weapons, including rifles, machine guns, and pistols that were used by Allied troops in the China-Burma-India Theater.

The Winchester firearms company in New Haven also played a crucial role in producing weapons and ammunition for the theater. Winchester produced rifles, machine guns, and ammunition that were used by American and British troops in the region.

Connecticut was also home to several companies that produced aircraft components and engines for planes that were used in the theater. The Pratt & Whitney company in East Hartford, for example, produced a range of aircraft engines, including the famous R-2800 engine, which was used in many of the planes that flew in the China-Burma-India Theater.

Overall, Connecticut's industrial expertise helped to provide essential support for the Allied war effort in the China-Burma-India Theater. Without the state's contributions, it would have been much harder for the Allied forces to supply and equip their troops in this crucial area of the war.

5. Social impact

Connecticut's contribution to World War II also had a significant social impact. With many men overseas, women took on new roles in the workforce. In factories across the country, women took on jobs that were previously considered only for men. It was said that women

"manned" the home front, going to work and producing essential materials for the military. Connecticut's female workforce helped the state produce the goods necessary to fight the war.

Connecticut also saw an influx of immigrants and African Americans during World War II, as they were recruited to work in the defense industry. This led to increased diversity and changed the social fabric of the state. Despite facing discrimination and bigotry, these groups made significant contributions to the war effort and helped overcome the labor shortages caused by the absence of men in the workforce.

The war also had a profound impact on the families and communities of Connecticut. Many residents lost loved ones, and the state rallied together to support and honor those who served and sacrificed. The war created a sense of patriotism and unity among Connecticut's residents, and this legacy continues to this day.

This shift in gender roles had a lasting impact on the social fabric of Connecticut and the nation, as it challenged traditional stereotypes and expectations of women in society. It also helped pave the way for greater gender equality and opportunities for women in the workforce. Today, Connecticut continues to honor the contributions of women in the war effort and promotes gender equality in all areas of society.

Additionally, Connecticut's African American population also played a significant role in the war effort. Segregation in the military was still in effect at the time, but African Americans were able to serve in support roles such as cooks, drivers, and laborers. In Connecticut, African American communities rallied together to support the war effort and raise money for war bonds. These contributions challenged the systemic racism and segregation that existed in the United States during this time and helped pave the way for greater civil rights and opportunities for African Americans. Today, Connecticut acknowledges the important contributions of the state's African American community during World War II and continues to strive towards greater racial equality and inclusion.

Both the contributions of women and African Americans during World War II, as described above, were critical elements of the war effort. The mobilization of the entire population in support of the war was vital to the success of the Allies. Women and African Americans, who had often been marginalized and discriminated against in American society, were able to prove their value and capabilities during the war, which helped pave the way for greater equality and social progress. These contributions were also a key factor in the ultimate victory of the Allies in World War II.

Additionally, the experiences of minority groups, including women and African Americans, during World War II have been cited as catalysts for the Civil Rights Movement and the women's rights movement that emerged in the post-war years. The war effort required a massive mobilization of labor and resources, which opened up new opportunities for marginalized groups, but also exposed and challenged the inequalities and prejudices that existed in American society at the time. The successes and contributions of these groups during the war helped to fuel social and political movements that sought to achieve greater equality and justice in the years that followed.

Connecticut played a significant role in supporting the war effort, including in the mobilization of women and African Americans. The city of Bridgeport, for example, was a major center of manufacturing for the war, with factories producing goods such as aircraft engines and munitions. Women and African Americans were a key part of this workforce, with women taking on jobs traditionally held by men and African Americans filling positions that had previously been closed to them.

In addition, Connecticut was home to the Tuskegee Airmen, a group of African American pilots who were trained in Tuskegee, Alabama, but who were stationed at the Bradley

Field air base in Windsor Locks, Connecticut during the war. These pilots were recognized for their bravery and skill during the war and helped to break down racial barriers in the military.

Connecticut also contributed significantly to the war through its naval base in New London, which was a primary training site for submarine crews. The base played a vital role in the Battle of the Atlantic, which was a major theater of the war.

Overall, Connecticut's contributions to the war effort, including those of women and African Americans, were critical to the Allied victory and helped to pave the way for greater social and political progress in the post-war era.

6. Connecticut's role in the Manhattan Project

Connecticut played a critical role in the Manhattan Project, which was the top-secret research program that produced the world's first nuclear weapons during World War II. The state was home to several important facilities and institutions that contributed to the project's success.

One of the key facilities located in Connecticut was the Yale University Physics Department, which was led by renowned physicist Ernest O. Lawrence. Lawrence was instrumental in the early stages of the Manhattan Project, and his team at Yale worked on the development of the magnetic separation process, which allowed for the extraction and purification of Uranium-235 from natural uranium.

Another important facility in Connecticut was the Manhattan Project's research laboratory at the University of Connecticut, which was led by chemical engineer John H. Reilly. The laboratory focused on the production of heavy water, which was used as a neutron moderator in nuclear reactors.

Perhaps the most significant facility in Connecticut was the Connecticut National Guard Armory in New Haven, which was converted into a heavily guarded and top-secret factory for the production and testing of high-explosives. This factory, known as the Winchester Repeating Arms Company or the New Haven Laboratory, produced large quantities of high explosives that were used to detonate the atomic bombs during the war.

Overall, Connecticut's contributions to the Manhattan Project were critical to the successful development and eventual deployment of the atomic bomb, which played a significant role in ending World War II.

In addition to the facilities mentioned above, Connecticut was home to other important institutions and companies that played a role in the Manhattan Project. For example, the Combustion Engineering Company in Windsor worked on the development of nuclear reactors, and the Pratt & Whitney Aircraft Company in East Hartford manufactured some of the components and parts for the atomic bombs.

Connecticut's role in the Manhattan Project was not limited to technological contributions. The state was also home to significant political and scientific leadership. For example, Connecticut Senator Brien McMahon was a key legislative figure in the creation of the Atomic Energy Commission, which was responsible for the post-war management of the nation's nuclear weapons program.

Moreover, Connecticut's proximity to New York City, where many of the leading scientists and technicians working on the Manhattan Project were stationed, made the state a key logistical center for the program. Connecticut played a crucial role in transporting materials, equipment, and personnel to the various Manhattan Project sites around the country.

Connecticut's contributions to the Manhattan Project were diverse and significant, ranging from technological innovation and manufacturing to political leadership and logistical support. Without the contributions of the state's institutions and individuals, the Manhattan Project may not have been successful in developing the atomic bomb, which changed the course of World War II and had lasting implications for global politics and security.

Connecticut played a crucial role in the development of the first atomic bomb during World War II. The state was home to several key sites of the Manhattan Project, including laboratories, factories, and research facilities.

One of the most significant sites was the Metallurgical Laboratory at the University of Chicago, where scientists first managed to achieve a self-sustaining chain reaction in a nuclear reactor. Many of the researchers who worked on this project went on to join the Manhattan Project.

Another important site in Connecticut was the Underwater Sound Laboratory in New London, where scientists developed equipment to detect German submarines during the war. This facility later became the Naval Undersea Warfare Center and continued to play a leading role in the development of sonar technology.

Connecticut was also home to several factories that produced components for the atomic bomb, including the Winchester Repeating Arms Company in New Haven, which manufactured detonators and other explosive devices.

After the war, many of the scientists who had worked on the Manhattan Project continued their research in Connecticut, including the physicist Robert J. Van de Graaff, who built one of the world's first high-energy particle accelerators at Clark University in Worcester.

7. Conclusion

Connecticut played a significant role in the Allied victory during World War II. The state's economy and industry ramped up production to meet the demand for war materials, and its military contributions helped the U.S. win the war. Connecticut's social impact was also striking, with women taking on new roles and contributing to the war effort on the home front. As we continue to reflect on the sacrifices made by our military and our citizens, Connecticut's contribution to World War II will always be remembered.

Overall, Connecticut's status as an industrial powerhouse was critical to winning World War II. Through its manufacturing capabilities, the state produced everything from firearms to ammunition to aircraft engines, contributing significantly to the war effort. Its skilled workforce adapted to the changing industries, and its military bases and facilities produced crucial personnel and equipment. Connecticut's social impact was also remarkable, with women taking on new roles in the workforce and contributing to the war effort in unprecedented ways. Connecticut's contribution to World War II was a testament to its industrial might, its skilled workforce, and its unwavering commitment to the Allied cause.

References

Botticelli, Susan. Yale and the War Effort. *Yale Alumni Magazine*, November/December 2014. https://yalealumnimagazine.com/articles/3982-yale-and-the-war-effort.

Connecticut Digital Archive - World War II Collection

World War II Collection, Connecticut Digital Archive. https://collections.ctdigitalarchive.org/islandora/object/20002%3A86011.

Connecticut in World War II: Connecticut Veterans Historical Project

Connecticut Veterans Historical Project: World War II, Central Connecticut State University. http://content.library.ccsu.edu/cdm/landingpage/collection/VHPWWII.

Connecticut Goes to War: The African and Middle Eastern Theater, Connecticut History, The Connecticut Historical Society, accessed March 7, 2021. https://connecticuthistory.org/connecticut-goes-to-war-the-african-and-middle-eastern-theater/.

Connecticut History Online

World War II, Connecticut History Online. https://connecticuthistory.org/topics/world-war-ii/.

Connecticut Historical Society

Connecticut in World War II, Connecticut Historical Society. https://chs.org/browse-items/connecticut-wwii/.

Connecticut Homefront during World War II. Connecticut History.org, accessed August 16, 2021. https://connecticuthistory.org/connecticut-homefront-during-world-war-ii/.

Connecticut Humanities. "Connecticut in World War II." Accessed April 2, 2023. https://connecticuthistory.org/topics-page/connecticut-in-world-war-ii/.

Connecticut Industry in World War II," ConnecticutHistory.org, accessed March 29, 2023. https://connecticuthistory.org/connecticut-industry-in-world-war-ii/.

Electric Boat. "Electric Boat: From the 1800s to Today." Accessed April 4, 2023. https://www.gdeb.com/about/history.

General Electric Bridgeport Works, ConnecticutHistory.org, accessed September 29, 2021. https://connecticuthistory.org/general-electric-bridgeport-works/.

Henry Wojtusik, Connecticut State Library, accessed March 3, 2023. https://libguides.ctstatelibrary.org/hg/medalofhonor/wojtusik.

Leavenworth, William. "Connecticut and the Manhattan Project." The Connecticut Magazine, January 1948, 26-35.

Melillo, Mark J. "The Manhattan Project in Connecticut." University of Connecticut Digital Commons. Accessed March 30, 2023. https://digitalcommons.uconn.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=5035&context=dissertations.

National Park Service. "Manhattan Project Sites in Connecticut." Accessed March 25, 2023. https://www.nps.gov/articles/manhattan-project-sites-in-connecticut.htm.

Pratt & Whitney, National Museum of the United States Air Force, accessed March 12, 2023. https://www.nationalmuseum.af.mil/Visit/Museum-Exhibits/Fact-Sheets/Display/Article/196254/pratt-whitney/.

Shelden, Rachel. "Connecticut and the Manhattan Project." ConnecticutHistory.org. Accessed March 17. 2023. https://connecticuthistory.org/connecticut-and-the-manhattan-project/.

Sikorsky. "Sikorsky Aircraft: 90 Years of Innovation." Accessed April 1, 2023. https://www.lockheedmartin.com/en-us/products/sikorsky-history.html

Tomes, Jason J. "Connecticut and the Second World War: A State Divided?" Connecticut Explored 8, no. 2 (Spring 2010): 46-53.

The Electric Boat Company in World War II, ConnecticutHistory.org, accessed March 11, 2023. https://connecticuthistory.org/the-electric-boat-company-in-world-war-ii/.

The Connecticut Historical Society. "Connecticut's Role in World War II." Accessed April 3, 2023. https://chs.org/connecticuts-role-in-world-war-ii/.

The Connecticut Historical Society. "The Rise and Fall of Connecticut Industry." Accessed April 4, 2023. https://chs.org/2019/03/the-rise-and-fall-of-connecticut-industry/.

The North African Campaign, National WWII Museum, accessed March 5, 2023. https://www.nationalww2museum.org/war/articles/north-african-campaign.

Tuskegee Airmen National Historic Site: Connecticut. National Park Service, accessed March 29, 2023. https://www.nps.gov/tuai/learn/historyculture/connecticut.htm.

The USS Connecticut: An American Battleship in World War II. The New England Historical Society. accessed March 28, 2023. https://www.newenglandhistoricalsociety.com/uss-connecticut-american-battleship-world-war-ii/

U.S. Coast Guard Historian's Office. "The U.S. Coast Guard and World War II." Accessed September 29, 2021. https://www.history.uscg.mil/Complete-Time-Line/Time-Line-1941-1950/USCG-in-WWII/.

Wainwright, Natalie E., and Paul G. E. Clemens. "Guide to the Manhattan Project in Connecticut." Yale University Library. Accessed March 22, 2023. https://guides.library.yale.edu/c.php?g=295784&p=1971227.

Yale Medical School Goes to War, *Yale News*, March 19, 2023. https://news.yale.edu/2010/05/27/yale-medical-school-goes-war.

The Change of Diplomatic Ideas in the Late Qing Dynasty (1840-1914): A Literature Review

Yang Li

Ghent University, Faculty of Arts and Philosophy, Ghent, BELGIUM[1]

Abstract

This study delves into the evolution of diplomatic ideas during the late Qing dynasty (1840-1914), offering a comprehensive review of existing literature on this transformative period. It critically examines the established timeline, justifying the selection of 1840 as the starting point and 1914 as the endpoint for this research. The review further investigates the changing landscape of ancient Chinese diplomatic concepts, tracing their evolution during the late Qing Dynasty and their interactions with the emerging notions of sovereignty and national consciousness within modern China. Additionally, it constructs a chronological narrative from the extensive body of Chinese studies on the metamorphosis of diplomatic ideas in modern Chinese history. This literature review concludes by identifying crucial research lacunae and formulating three pertinent research questions, paving the way for a more nuanced understanding of this significant historical transformation.

Keywords: Qing China, diplomatic factors, Chinese history.

1. Introduction

This study investigates the shift in diplomatic ideas during the late Qing dynasty (1840-1914). This literature review examines the existing literature on the transformation of diplomatic ideas, including the transformation of China's view of the international system and the establishment and evolution of China's diplomatic bureaucracy. The aims of this literature study are divided into six primary objectives, listed below. Succinctly, the objectives seek to justify the selection of the study period from 1840 to 1914 and identify what is already known in the current literature about the idea of diplomacy in the late Qing dynasty from 1840 to 1914. From this the other objectives seek to discover an appropriate research lens for the study and to explore recent debates on the topic:

(1) To articulate why 1840 was chosen as the starting year for this study and why 1914 is used as the cut-off year.

(2) To analyse the changes in ancient Chinese diplomatic ideas and the diplomatic ideas of the late Qing Dynasty and the influence of the concept of sovereignty and the national consciousness of Chinese people on diplomatic ideas in modern times.

---

[1] PhD Candidate.

(3) To create a chronology from existing literature in Chinese studies of the transformation of China's diplomatic ideas in modern Chinese history.

The review concludes by identifying research gaps and developing three research questions.

2.   Defining the period under study

The commonly accepted starting point for modern Chinese history is the first opium war from 1839 to 1842. The Opium War ended in China's defeat and reparations because of the Qing state's opium-banning policy; China and Britain signed the first unequal treaty in Chinese history, the Treaty of Nanking.[2] After the first opium war in 1842, the Qing government had to conclude and sign a series of unequal treaties with Western imperialist countries. Marxism described these unequal treaties as coercive treaties. After the signing of the Nanjing treaty in 1842, the Qing empire's national sovereignty and territorial integrity were seriously undermined, China's economic independence was lost, and China was gradually reduced from a sovereign state to a semi-colony.[3] Many studies hold that this contact in the First Opium War was also the beginning of a change in the Qing state's foreign policy.[4] Before 1840, Qing China regarded European countries as foreigners and upheld a policy of strictly restricting foreign trade from the outside world.[5] For example, the Qing state designated the Thirteen Hongs of Canton as a monopoly organisation that specialised in foreign trade.[6] However, since the signing of the Treaty of Nanjing, the Qing empire's foreign policy converted from self-seclusion to a gradual-opening policy.[7]

Nevertheless, many scholars claim that the signing of the Beijing treaty in 1860, after the Second Opium War, is actually the turning point in the transformation of China's foreign policy because thereafter the Qing government began to develop a foreign policy theory based on the principle of Xin Shou Wai Jiao [diplomacy abiding by treaties] within the administration.[8] At this point the Qing dynasty began to accept international law and embarked on a programme of

---

[2] Kitson, P. J., The Last War of the Romantics: De Quincey, Macaulay, the First Chinese Opium War. *The Wordsworth Circle*, 49, no. 3 (2018): 148-158.

[3] Wang, H. tan xi ya pian zhan zheng dui zhong guo she hui fa zhan de ying xiang 探析鸦片战争对中国社会发展的影响 [Explored the influence of opium War on China's social development]. *Modern Educational Science: Middle school Teachers*. (6), 144-144. (2012).

[4] Keller, Wolfgang, Ben. Li, and Carol H. Shiue. China's Foreign Trade Perspectives from the Past 150 Years. Cambridge, Mass: National Bureau of Economic Research, 2010.

[5] Zhao, P. fen xi qing chao de bi guan suo guo zheng ce de bu li ying xiang 分析清朝的闭关锁国政策的不利影响 [Analysis of the adverse effects of the closed policy of the Qing Dynasty]. *Journal of Nanchang Institute of Education*, No. 6 (2013): 58-59.

[6] Beauclair, I. Liang Chia-pin, Kuangtung Shihsan Hang K'ao (The Thirteen Hongs of Canton) (Book Review). *Pacific Affairs*, *13*(1), p. 102 (1940).

[7] Motegi, Toshio., Yan, Li, Foreign Policy in Regard to Japan and Consciousness of the Japanese Language in the Late-Qing: Caught between Tribute and Treaty. *Study of Economic History* (Keizaishi Kenkyu) *14*(2011): 233-243.

[8] "信守外交". Li Yumin 李育民. Zhong Guo Fei Yue Shi 中国废约史 [The History of Treaty Abolition in China]. Beijing: Zhong Hua Shu Ju, 2005.

_____

fulfilling treaty obligations.[9] However, during the First Opium War, many Qing officials' perceptions and their diplomatic ideas changed when negotiating with the British envoys.[10] Therefore, the First Opium War might be the moment when attitudes towards diplomacy in the Qing Dynasty began to change, a time also seen as the start of modern Chinese history by many Chinese scholars.

The year 1914 was chosen as the endpoint of this study because the newest existing literature suggests that 1914 was the point by which China's new-style diplomacy reached its maturity. In his book, Xu explains that 1914 was a turning point when China actively wanted to join and engage with the international system, highlighting that a new generation of Chinese diplomats (Wang Chonghui and Lu Zhengxiang) started to proactively participate in international affairs.[11] This transformation has been attributed to the emergence of the Chinese adoption of the concept of the nation-state. Xu defined this process as China's internationalisation, the positive response of the Chinese people and their active participation in the international system and their acceptance of the influence of various new ideas, social forces and the trends of the times.[12] This internationalisation process can be traced to the first Sino-Japanese war in 1895. It is often assumed that modern national consciousness had not yet been formed and established before the First Sino-Japanese War, the end of the nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth century. After this war, Japan replaced Qing China as the dominant power in Korea.[13] After this war, the emerging Chinese intelligentsia deemed it one of their primary tasks to redefine China's role in the modern world; the concept of the nation-state became popular among Chinese social elites.[14] The failures of the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-95 and the Boxer Protocol in 1901 convinced many Chinese that only by becoming a nation-state could China successfully catch up with the tide of world development.[15] Under this backcloth, the Revolution of 1911 erupted, and the Republic of China was established while the Qing state collapsed. The 1911 Revolution was a revolutionary movement that ended feudal monarchy in China and established the concept of sovereignty to underpin the Chinese state. Xu claims that the government of the Republic of China began to strive for independent diplomacy in its foreign policy in 1914 to defend its national interest when confronting the conflicts among the European powers before the First World War.[16] Meanwhile, Xu summarises features of China's new-style diplomacy in 1914 by stating that public opinion influenced China's foreign policy when China negotiated with Japan about the Twenty-

_____

[9] Esherick, Joseph, Hasan Kayalı, and Eric Van Young. Empire to Nation: Historical Perspectives on the Making of the Modern World. Lanham, Maryland; Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2006.

[10] Mao H. J. (Translated by Lawson J, ed). Tian Chao De Ben Kui 天朝的崩溃 [The Qing Empire and the Opium War: Collapse of the Heavenly Dynasty]. Cambridge University Press, 2016.

[11] "王宠惠 陆徵祥". Xu, Guoqi. China and the Great War: China's Pursuit of a New National Identity and Internationalization Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005.
[12] Ibid.

[13] Yi, S. Y. zhong ri zai chao xian de jing zheng yu jin dai dong ya chao gong ti xi de bian qian 中日在朝鲜的竞争与近代东亚朝贡体系的变迁 (1876-1910) [Competition between China and Japan in Korea and the Evolution of tributary System in Modern East Asia (1876-1910)]. Xiangtan University, (2018).

[14] Michael, G. Chinese Intellectuals and the Revolution of 1911: The Birth of Modern Chinese Radicalism (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1969), 248.

[15] Xu, Guoqi. China and the Great War: China's Pursuit of a New National Identity and Internationalization Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005.
[16] Ibid.

one Demands.[17] When the First World War broke out in Europe in 1914, these demands aimed to arbitrarily expand Japan's privilege in China, even seeking to conquer China.[18] The period from 1840 to 1914 thus marked the transition from pre-modern to modern Chinese diplomacy; 1914 thus was selected as the end date of this topic.

3. The transformation of diplomatic idea factors

Traditional Chinese diplomatic ideas might have been subject to the Ancient Chinese Tian Xia Guan [view of under heaven].[19] For traditional Confucian intellectuals in ancient China, China lay at the very heart of the world. Many scholars conclude that conventional ancient China's diplomatic ideas are isolationist and ideologically closed. Xu even defines the character of ancient China's diplomatic ideas as a Middle Kingdom syndrome where the Qing government's view of the world was based on a hierarchy centred on Chinese supremacy, rather than on the notion of mutual equality among nation-states.[20] This China-centred hierarchical order was termed the Tian Xia Guan [view of under heaven]. The Confucian scholars' Tian Xia Guan [view of under heaven] was regarded as a unique ancient Chinese ideological system that integrates cosmology, politics, and culture, recognises self-living space and deals with national and foreign relations.[21] These encompassing connotations seem to be based on traditional Confucianism because traditional Confucianism set the standard for distinguishing between ancient China and foreign countries. In Chinese history, there were roughly three criteria to measure the difference between Chinese and Foreigners: blood relationship, geography and clothing, etiquette and other cultural criteria.[22] Confucius also highlighted that those cultural criteria played a decisive role in differentiating China from foreign countries.[23] From the geographic dimension, Confucian intellectuals argued that ancient China was the centre of the world while the area surrounding ancient China was foreign. Ancient Chinese intellectuals described this spatial difference as the Hua Yi Zhi Bian [distinctions of Chinese and the foreigners].[24] In the meantime, these geographical differences, which led to the partition between the Central Plains dynasty and the Foreigners, were heightened by Confucian culture. The central kingdom was governed by the emperor and its Confucian

---

[17] Xu, Guoqi. China and the Great War: China's Pursuit of a New National Identity and Internationalization Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005.

[18] Naraoka, S. Chapter 3 Japan's Twenty-One Demands and Anglo-Japanese relations. Taylor & Francis (2017).

[19] "天下观". Yan Tang 汤岩, gu dai zhong guo zhu dao de guo ji fa: li nian yu zhi du 古代中国主导的国际法：理念与制度 [International Law dominated by Ancient China: Ideas and Institutions]. *Journal of Central South University (Social Science)* 21, No. 5 (2015): 99-104.

[20] Xu, Guoqi. China and the Great War: China's Pursuit of a New National Identity and Internationalization Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005.

[21] Zhang, S. M. A Historical and Jurisprudential Analysis of Suzerain–Vassal State Relationships in the Qing Dynasty. *Frontiers of History in China* [Online], *1*(1), 124-157 (2006).

[22] Han. D. Y. The Rise and Fall of the Hua-Yi System in East Asia. *Journal of Chinese Humanities* (Leiden) 2019, no. 2 (2020): 200-214.

[23] Yue Huankuan. Qian tan kong zi de min zu guan 浅谈孔子的民族观 [A Brief discussion on Confucius' national view]. Heilongjiang shi zhi, no. 23 (2010).

[24] "华夷之辩". Chen Yibao 陈义报. cong 'man han 'dao 'zhong xi':min chu qing yi min shi ye zhong de hua yi zhi bian 从'满汉'到'中西':民初清遗民视野中的'华夷之辨 [From 'Manchu and Han' to 'Chinese and Western' : The Differentiation of 'Chinese and Foreigners' in the Vision of the Remnant of qing Dynasty in the Early Republic of China] Ningbo da Xue Xue Bao. *Ren Wen Ke Xue Ban* 32, No. 4 (2019): 87-94.

_____

officials, ritualising the Confucian culture and considering ancient China to be the centre of the world.[25] Xu claims that the Chinese government primarily maintained cultural centrism and a sense of political and moral superiority when solving foreign affairs.[26] Thus, in the conventional Chinese diplomatic opinion, the Qing state and its officials still viewed China as the Middle Kingdom and the centre of the world order.

However, this chronic sense of superiority which once appeared to be dominant in ancient China cumulatively shifted during the late Qing dynasty. After the First Opium War, the Qing state had to sign the Nanjing Treaty with Britain in 1842. Nevertheless, recent literature proves that even the most damaging diplomatic consequences of the opium war could not thoroughly shake the Chinese isolationist worldview.[27] In his book *The History of Treaty Abolition in China*, Li explains that Confucian Chinese officials knew nothing about the conception of state sovereignty, international law, and the principles and methods of modern state relations.[28] They still understood and dealt with foreign relations with the concept of central empire in feudal times when ancient China located them as the centre of the world.[29] These diplomatic behaviours concretely reflected that the Qing government superficially obeyed the treaties with European powers while being reluctant to implement them until the end of the Second Opium War in 1860 when the Qing government seemed to change its attitude toward these unequal treaties and European power.[30] Although most of the existing literature neglects this fact, Li's book records this change as Xin Shou Wai Jiao [diplomacy abiding by treaties].[31] He explains these diplomatic principles as the Qing government putting forward a foreign policy theory based on good faith (ibid.). During this period, many Qing government officials upheld this foreign policy, such as Li Hongzhang, Zeng Guofan, Ding Richang at the local governor level and Prince Gong at the central government level.[32] Many diplomats were implementers of Xin Shou Wai Jiao [diplomacy abiding by treaties], for instance, Guo Songtao and Zeng Jize. In contrast to Li, literature of the period only

_____

[25] Wang Rixuan. Gu yanwu de tian xia guan ji qi xian dai xing zhuan hua顾炎武的'天下观'及其现代性转化 [Gu Yanwu's view of the world and its transformation of modernity]. *Journal of Chaohu University* 22, No. 1 (2020): 17-24.

[26] Xu, Guoqi. China and the Great War: China's Pursuit of a New National Identity and Internationalization Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005.

[27] William C. K. Traditions of Centrality, Authority, and Management in Modern China's Foreign Relations, in Thomas W. Robinson and David L. Shambaugh. eds. *Chinese Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice* (Oxford University Press, 1994), 17.

[28] Li Yumin 李育民. Zhong Guo Fei Yue Shi 中国废约史 [The History of Treaty Abolition in China]. Beijing: Zhong Hua Shu Ju, 2005.

[29] Ibid.

[30] Li Yumin 李育民. Dui Wai Chuan Tong Guan Nian Dui Wan Qing Wai Jiao De Ying Xiang传统对外观念对晚清外交的影响 [The influence of traditional foreign ideas on late Qing Diplomacy]. *Chinese Cultural Studies*, No. 1 (2020): 166-180.

[31] "信守外交". Li Yumin 李育民. Dui Wai Chuan Tong Guan Nian Dui Wan Qing Wai Jiao De Ying Xiang传统对外观念对晚清外交的影响 [The influence of traditional foreign ideas on late Qing Diplomacy]." Chinese Cultural Studies, No. 1 (2020): 166-180.

[32] "李鸿章 曾国藩 丁日昌". Li, Yumin. 李育民. Lun qing zheng fu de xin shou tiao yue fang sheng ji qi bian hua 论清政府的信守条约方针及其变化 [On the policy of honoring treaties of Qing Government and its changes]." Jin Dai Shi Yan Jiu, No. 2 (2004): 45-90.

solely highlights the Qing government's behaviour per se.[33] After suffering a series of rebellions (Taiping and Nien rebellion) and the Second Opium War from 1856 to 1860, the Qing government made efforts with a Self-Strengthening Campaign aimed at encouraging Western methods and technology and reforming the Qing state's military, diplomatic, fiscal, and educational policies.[34] Yu and Xia claim that the Qing government's diplomatic thought started to become much more rational at this stage compared to their previous diplomatic policy of blind exclusion.[35] Other Chinese scholars endorsed this idea. They defined China's foreign policy as the thought of He Rong [cementing relations with western countries] and Zi Qiang [self-strengthening].[36] These two terms derive from the Qing government's Self-strengthening Campaign. Current literature seems to simplistically describe the Qing government's foreign policy and neglect the transformation of their diplomatic idea and the reason behind it. Therefore, the transformation of diplomatic ideas from an isolationist worldview to the diplomatic principle of good faith and its reason seems deserving of discussion.

The emergence of modern sovereignty and national state consciousness enabled the Qing state and, following the Chinese government [Republic of China], to gradually join in foreign affairs and abandon traditional diplomatic thinking. Recent literature ascribes this transformation to the Qing state's failure in the first Sino-Japanese war. During the first Sino-Japanese war, the Qing suffered a crushing defeat, but it also changed the European perception of the East, in that the Qing state was much weaker than they had previously thought.[37] This failure dramatically stimulated the need to raise the national self-respect of the Chinese at that time. The failure of the first Sino-Japanese war in 1895 was widely recognised as the fuse of the Hundred Days' Reform in 1898. Li claimed that the failure of the first Sino-Japanese war forced the Qing's officials and their Confucian scholars to lose their cultural superiority towards China's neighbours completely.[38] Some scholars even believed that the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-95 convinced many Chinese that only by becoming a nation-state could China successfully catch up with the tide of world development.[39] After the nationalistic debate between 1905 and 1907, the connotation of the nation of China gradually converged and became the regular discourse basis of different factions, and the Chinese nation thus became the primary expression of constructing China.[40] The

---

[33] "郭嵩焘 曾纪泽". Li, Yumin. 李育民. Lun qing zheng fu de xin shou tiao yue fang sheng ji qi bian hua 论清政府的信守条约方针及其变化 [On the policy of honoring treaties of Qing Government and its changes]. *Jin Dai Shi Yan Jiu*, No. 2 (2004): 45-90.

[34] Smith, R. J. Foreign-Training and China's Self-Strengthening: The Case of Feng-huang-shan, 1864-1873. *Modern Asian Studies* [Online] *10*(2), (1976). 195-223.

[35] Yu, L & Xia, Y. yang wu yun dong zhong li hong zhang dui wai zhu zhang zhi de shi yan jiu 洋务运动中李鸿章对外主张之得失研究 [Study on the gain and loss of Li Hongzhang's foreign propositions in the Westernization Movement]. Liaoning Shi da Xue Bao. Liaoning Shida Xuebao. *She Hui Ke Xue Ban* 34, No. 6 (2011): 134-137.

[36] "和戎，自强". Wu Tong. Li hong zhang wai jiao si xiang tan xi李鸿章外交思想探析Analysis of Li Hongzhang's diplomatic thought. *Time Report*, no. 16 (2017, 96).

[37] Paine, S. C. M. *The Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895: Perceptions, Power, and Primacy*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003.

[38] Li Yumin 李育民. Zhong Guo Fei Yue Shi 中国废约史 [The History of Treaty Abolition in China]. Beijing: Zhong Hua Shu Ju, 2005.

[39] Ma, Y. jia wu zhan zheng yu min zu guo jia gou jian 甲午战争与民族国家构建 [The Sino-Japanese War and nation-state Construction]. *National Human History*, No. 14 (2014): 78-82.

[40] Li, J. From 'Yi Xia' to 'Zhonghua ':cong yi xia 'dao' zhong hua'; 'zhong hua min zu 'guan nian xing cheng shi qi de si xiang zhuan hua 从 '夷夏'到 '中华'： '中华民族'观念形成时期的思想转化 [From 'Yi Xia' to

_____

emergence of a different notion of the Chinese nation gave rise to the collapse of the Qing dynasty in the Revolution of 1911. Michael explains that the Chinese intelligentsia deemed their primary task to be that of redefining China's role in the modern world by reinventing its ideological, political, social, and economic structures to suit this role.[41] This ideological transformation in the Chinese intelligentsia gave legitimacy to the new regime of the Republic of China while divesting the Qing government of its legitimacy, just as China as a national state appeared on the international stage.[42] Xu suggests that the revolution of 1911 was perceived as the signal that the Chinese had completely abandoned the traditional worldview.[43] However, this viewpoint seems to overlook the concrete process from the gradual awakening of the Chinese national consciousness to the complete abandonment of the traditional worldview. Many still claimed that the Qing government proactively sought to revise the unequal treaties and gradually abolish the European power's privilege after the First Sino-Japanese war in 1895.[44] During this period, Chinese people also launched a series of campaigns to safeguard China's sovereignty, such as the Boxer rebellion in 1900 and the Bao Lu Yun Dong [Railway Protection Movement] in 1911, wherein the Railway Protection Movement was one of the crucial factors that led to the Qing government's collapse.[45] Existing literature seldom explores Chinese intellectuals' and people's transmutation of thought from 1895 to 1911. Therefore, the ideological evolution of Chinese intellectuals and people during 1895-1911, which influenced the foreign policy of the late Qing Dynasty and the Republic of China, is worth studying.

4. Recent discussion

A wide range of literature has discussed the changes in China's foreign relations (1840 to 1914). Wherein, the most cross-sectional points are three theories. Fairbank broaches the model of "impact-response", that modern Chinese history is better perceived as a series of responses to Western impact, claiming that modern China's modernisation could not have been internally engendered per se and needed to be influenced by the outside shock from the West.[46] Fairbank also argues the reason why ancient China kept an unchanged status was that the Western world was the cradle and inventor of the world-shaking technological and other advances since the first industrial revolution started in the 1760s, so it was able to modernise from its civilisation while China could only achieve modernisation with the help of external forces.[47] According to Fairbank's description, he thought that ancient China's cultural factors were one of the primary factors that hindered China's modernisation. Furthermore, the Fairbank's viewpoint overly attached

_____

'Zhonghua': The Ideological transformation during the Formation of the Concept of 'Chinese nation]". Xi Nan Min zu Da Xue Xue Bao. *Ren Wen She Ke Ban* 39, No. 1 (2018): 22-27.

[41] Michael, G. *Chinese Intellectuals and the Revolution of 1911: The Birth of Modern Chinese Radicalism* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1969), 248.

[42] Levenson, J. R. *Confucian China and its modern fate: A trilogy*. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. (1958).

[43] Xu, Guoqi. *China and the Great War: China's Pursuit of a New National Identity and Internationalization*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005.

[44] Li Yumin 李育民. Zhong Guo Fei Yue Shi 中国废约史 [The History of Treaty Abolition in China]. Beijing: Zhong Hua Shu Ju, 2005.

[45] "保路运动". Charles H. Hedtke. The Szechwanese Railroad Protection Movement: Themes of Change and Conflict. 近代史研究所集刊, no. 6 (1977).

[46] Teng, Ssü-yü, and John King Fairbank. *Research Guide for China's Response to the West: a Documentary Survey 1839-1923*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1954.

[47] Ibid.

importance on the western impact on ancient China's change. The theory of the impact-response claims that emerging European countries challenged China's established order in any area, including political and economic and ideological processes; thus, China's progress in these areas was driven by the invasion of the more robust foreign countries.[48] Put differently, Fairbank attributes ancient China's changes to western influence, one-sidedly stereotyping Chinese culture as the hurdle of China's modernisation process.

However, Fairbank's viewpoint is challenged by some scholars. Hevia tries to situate Fairbank's points in the context of the times. The international relations based on international law that exist today are a product of Europe's global expansion since the 16th century, and naturalized hegemonic discourse was forged during this process.[49] Hevia explains this naturalized hegemonic discourse as the accepted common sense driven by emerging European countries that nations should interact with each other, and these countries have the right to decide whether to associate with other countries or not since the signing of the Westphalia Treaty in 1648.[50] The establishment of the modern diplomatic office stretches back to the Westphalia Treaty in 1648. This treaty set a precedent of diplomatic peace and a nascent system of political order in Europe based on the notion of coexisting independent states.[51] After the signing of the Westphalia treaty, the system of permanent diplomatic representative offices began to be established in Europe, and diplomatic envoys were generally established to carry out foreign affairs.[52] Based on the historical background, Hevia claims that Fairbank's model of impact-response seems to entail the preconceived notion that the western world was advanced while Qing China was backward.[53] Unlike Fairbank's viewpoint, Hevia's seeks to construe the factor informing the transformation of diplomatic ideas in the late Qing dynasty as the collision of entirely different systems of thought. He further explains that this collision was made between the Britain government's foreign idea of sovereign equality and the Qing government's world view of hierarchical inclusion.[54] Hevia proposes two perspectives to interpret Qing governments' world view of hierarchical inclusion; on the one hand, he highlights the multitude of lords in the Qing government who might have influenced the existence of the imagining of the Qing empire in the Qing rulers' perception rather than the tributary system, on the other hand, he took a stab at understanding the transformation of diplomatic factors from the Qing government's foreign etiquette [Bing Li], that is, the shift of the Qing government's foreign etiquette [Bing Li] not only reflected principles and ways of dealing with foreign relations of the Qing Court but also embodied a corollary of the Qing China's worldview.[55] He used the visit of George Macartney Diplomatic Corps to the Qing state as the typical example that the Qing China's court and the English envoys collided over the traditional way of paying tribute to the three kneels and nine knocks when having an audience with the Qian

---

[48] Ibid.

[49] Hevia, James Louis. *Cherishing Men from Afar: Qing Guest Ritual and the Macartney Embassy of 1793*. Durham, N.C.; Duke University Press, 1995.

[50] Ibid.

[51] Patton, S. The Peace of Westphalia and its Effects on International Relations, Diplomacy and Foreign Policy, *The Histories*: Vol. 10: Is. 1, Article 5 (2019).

[52] Anne, K. & Edmund, W. Westphalia, Treaty of (1648). *A Dictionary of World History*. Oxford University Press, (2015).

[53] Hevia, James Louis. *Cherishing Men from Afar: Qing Guest Ritual and the Macartney Embassy of 1793*. Durham, N.C.; Duke University Press, 1995.

[54] "宾礼" Ibid.

[55] Hevia, James Louis. *Cherishing Men from Afar: Qing Guest Ritual and the Macartney Embassy of 1793*. Durham, N.C.; Duke University Press, 1995.

_____

Long emperor in 1793.[56] Therefore, Hevia thinks that Qing China's foreign etiquette [Bing Li] could be a microcosmic perspective regarding the diplomatic factors' transformation in the late Qing dynasty.

Actually, Hevia's viewpoints seem to have their limitations. Initially, Hevia neglects the importance of the tributary system in the late Qing dynasty. Existing literature suggests that ancient China utilised the Confucianism of hierarchical order to run its tributary system. Specifically, ancient China established the Hua-Yi order in East Asia. In ancient China's writings, the Hua-Yi hierarchy was established, with ancient China being referred to as Hua, which means ancient China, and the vassal nations being referred to as Yi, which signified marginal foreign states administered by Central ancient China.[57] Ancient China centred around itself and built the tributary system to maintain this Hua-Yi order. One of the contributing factors that led to the emergence of this system was its distinctive geographical factors. East Asia has become a relatively independent and closed region because of its unique geographical environment.[58] Chinese historians described this partial international system as the tributary system [Chao Gong Ti Xi], this tributary system was generally counted as starting in the third century BC until the end of the 19th century, based on the "tributary relationship" formed in ancient East Asia, Southeast Asia, and Central Asia.[59] Fairbank also describes this view of the world system as the Chinese world order.[60] Moreover, this Chinese world order was interpreted as a particular form of ethnocentrism, as centripetal hegemony.[61] This tributary system was a hierarchical network political order system with the Central Plains Empire as the primary core, which initially connected the nations of East and Southeast Asia.[62] Fairbank claims that the tributary system created the sense of superiority in central kingdom from a cultural perspective, and this superiority, rooted in its Confucianism, led to the emergence of Sino-centrism, and could explain why Qing officials had an arrogant and stubborn attitude when solving foreign relations.[63] Nevertheless, Hevia articulates that the Qing conception of the empire was based on the idea that the Qing's world was made up of lords over whom Manchu emperors strove to place themselves as overlords.[64] His viewpoint does not seem to recognise that the tributary system also existed for more than one thousand years, trying to explain Qing rulers' worldview from its Manchu tribal customs. Ancient China's dominant position in this regional international system also hinged upon China's massive influence on Confucian culture. Through the tributary system, Chinese Confucian culture gradually spread to China's neighbours and neighbouring countries; these neighbouring countries thus have established official apparatus and dress style as well as a cultural custom which were analogous to those of

_____

[56] Hevia, James Louis. *Cherishing Men from Afar: Qing Guest Ritual and the Macartney Embassy of 1793*. Durham, N.C.; Duke University Press, 1995.

[57] Han, D. Y. (2020) The Rise and Fall of the Hua-Yi System in East Asia. *Journal of Chinese Humanities* (Leiden). [Online] 2019 (2), 200–214.

[58] Cui, S. P. Supranational and Vassal Systems: The functioning and characteristics of the International Order in Ancient East Asia. *Journal of Humanities and Social Sciences*. *37*(2), (2017). 35-42.

[59] "朝贡体系". Jian, J. X. Qian tan chao gong ti xi 浅谈朝贡体系 [On tribute system]. (24), 41-42. (2016).

[60] Fairbank, J. K. *The Chinese World Order: Traditional China's Foreign Fairbank Relations*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1968.

[61] Andornino, G. *The Nature and Linkages of China's Tributary System Under the Ming and Qing Dynasties*. Department of Economic History, London School of Economics and Political Science, (2006).

[62] Eszterhai, V. Searching for an Alternative Global Order: The Qing Tributary System and the Mechanism of Guanxi. *Fudan Journal of The Humanities and Social Sciences*. [Online] *11*(4), (2017). 499-513.

[63] Fairbank, John King. *The Chinese World Order: Traditional China's Foreign Relations*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1968.

[64] Hevia, James Louis. *Cherishing Men from Afar: Qing Guest Ritual and the Macartney Embassy of 1793*. Durham, N.C.; Duke University Press, 1995.

Ancient China such as Korea, Japan and Vietnam.[65] Therefore, Hevia's point appears not to realise that this tributary system was embedded in ancient China's Confucianism and was not a Qing dynastical product.

Furthermore, Hevia's microcosmic perspective of the Qing government's foreign etiquette [Bing Li] might plausibly have used a fragmented detail to regard the change of the whole of the Qing's diplomatic factors in the late Qing dynasty. Although Hevia ex post facto researches Bing Li [Qing China's foreign etiquette] from George Macartney Diplomatic Corps' visit to China in 1793, he attaches too much importance to the collision of Qing China and European countries' customs and etiquette and extends the Qing government's foreign etiquette to a whole worldview concept of Qing China. Hevia's points about Qing China's diplomatic factors may have lapses of orientation. Existing literature proves that Qing China had five etiquettes with the importance of the foreign etiquettes [Bing Li] ranked the fourth among these five etiquettes.[66] Qing government documents explains of the foreign etiquette that "whether it was a vassal state of the Qing dynasty or a state dealing with ancient China, they were all guests of the Qing dynasty whenever they came to the Qing Dynasty. As the host of the reception, the Qing government did everything it could, which was called foreign etiquette [Bing Li]."[67] Ancient China and Qing China seemed to utilise a series of Confucian etiquettes to reinforce its divine right of emperors and increase its legitimacy.[68] It can be seen that the ancient China subordinated foreign etiquette [Bing Li] to their feudal etiquette, even the Qing government's diplomatic organs also playing only a minor role in its domestic official apparatus. Current literature suggests that the Ministry of Rites in feudal China [Li Bu] and the Board of vassal states' affairs [Li Fan Yuan] were the primary governmental apparatus that was responsible for solving foreign issues.[69] The Ministry of Rites in feudal China [Li Bu] was responsible for internal affairs such as external etiquette, tribute and imperial school examinations, and played a role in foreign receptions.[70] The board of vassal states' affairs [Li Fan Yuan], which was built in 1639, became the organ in charge of the affairs of ethnic minorities in and out of Mongolia, Qinghai, Tibet, Xinjiang, Korea, Ryukyu and southwest China, and also handled part of the foreign trade and foreign affairs.[71] Both in the importance ranking of Qing

---

[65] Jian, J. B. zhong hua chao gong ti xi: guan nian jie gou yu gong neng 中华朝贡体系: 观念结构与功能 [Chinese Tributary System: Conceptual Structure and Function]. *International Political Studies*, (1), 132-143. (2009).

[66] "吉、嘉、军、宾、凶". Wang Xiuling 王秀玲. qing dai guo jia ji si ji qi zheng zhi yu yi 清代国家祭祀及其政治寓意 [State sacrifice in qing Dynasty and its political implication]. *Frontiers*, No. 6 (2016): 103-107.

[67] "无论属国、与国，要之，来者皆宾也。我为主人，凡所以将事，皆宾礼也". Zhao, E. X. 赵尔巽. Qing Shi Gao, Juan Jiu Shi Yi 清史稿 卷九十一 [Manuscript of the Qing Dynasty: The 91th Chronicle]. China: Historical Museum of the Republic of China. 1914.

[68] Ibid. Wang Xiuling 王秀玲. Qing dai guo jia ji si ji qi zheng zhi yu yi 清代国家祭祀及其政治寓意 [State sacrifice in qing Dynasty and its political implication]. *Frontiers*, No. 6 (2016): 103-107.

[69] "理藩院，礼部". Zhang, J. 张季. cong zong li ya men dao wai wu bu ——Qing ji bu yuan yong ren ti zhi gai ge chu tan从总理衙门到外务部——清季部院用人体制改革初探 [From the Prime Minister's Yamen to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs: A preliminary study on the Reform of the Staffing system in the Qing Dynasty]. *Li Shi Dang An*, No. 2 (2014): 91-96.

[70] Zhou, X周翔. cong Qing chao wai jiao ji gou de bian hua tan zhong guo wai jiao jin dai hua从清朝外交机构的变化谈中国外交近代化 [On the modernization of Chinese diplomacy from the Change of Diplomatic Institutions in Qing Dynasty]. *Frontiers*, No. 1 (2014): 215-216.

[71] Zhao, Y. T. 赵云田. Qing chao de li fan yuan 清朝的理藩院 [The Board of Vassal states in Qing Dynasty]. *Beijing Observation*, No. 5 (2013): 72-75.

_____

China's national etiquette and the importance of diplomatic organs in its official apparatus, Hevia adopts the microcosmic perspective to observe Qing China's worldview from its foreign etiquette [Bing Li] and extends this lens to observe the transformation of diplomatic factors during the whole of Qing China, seeming to disregard a holistic picture and the cultural background in examining this shift and seeming to be unaware of the importance of Qing China's home politics and Confucian tradition.

In a similar vein, Levenson advances the notion of the tradition-modernity model that only western countries can achieve modernity while China merely followed western countries' route from the traditional world to the modern world, that China had to fall into the dynastic cycle in China's history before western countries' invasion.[72] Levenson placed Chinese tradition and Western modernity in binary opposition, one-sidedly emphasising the influence of European countries' modernisation on Qing China. Compared to Fairbank's viewpoint about the transformation of diplomatic idea impacting on the modern Chinese history (1840 to 1914), Levenson argues that the Qing government's Self-strengthening Campaign and the establishment and evolution of the Qing's diplomatic organs would be doomed, because western science and modernisation were incompatible with ancient China's political system.[73] Compared to Fairbank's emphasis on China's cultural factors, Levenson regards Confucianism as the ideological basis of ancient China's imperial system and one-sidedly regards the European developmental route as the only way to modernise ancient China. Actually, after the First Opium War, advanced European weapons and unequal treaties led Qing Confucian intellectuals to consider why China had been left far 'behind' the European powers. Many advanced Confucian intellectuals opened their eyes to observe the world.[74] Compared to two previous scholars' points, Peck raises the theory of imperialism conceiving imperialism as the leading cause of the changes in modern Chinese history and attributing the main reason for China's backwardness in modern times to the West.[75] Peck's point neglects how so-called imperialism impacted the transformation of diplomatic idea factors, and how imperialism brought change to the Qing government and their diplomatic institutions. These three main theories once dominated the primary interpretation of modern China studies.

However, these three theoretical perspectives seem to be typically Eurocentrist. Rinke defines eurocentrism as the paradigm of viewing the whole world in the context of a European perspective (and also America and later Japan), subconsciously bearing the European sense of superiority toward the rest of the world.[76] Eurocentrists claim that European civilization has always represented the most progressive civilization globally, while those countries outside Europe can only learn from Europe and develop along its path.[77] Eurocentrism appeared in the mid- to late eighteenth century and developed in the nineteenth century after the first industrial revolution when emerging European countries were forging a capitalist world system and putting themselves at the centre of this world system.[78] Thus, Eurocentrist thinking sought to explain the

_____

[72] Levenson, J. R. *Confucian China and its modern fate: a trilogy*. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. (1958).

[73] Levenson, Joseph Richmond. *Confucian China and Its Modern Fate a Trilogy*. 1st combined ed. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1968.

[74] Zhao, N. 赵宁. Qian xi jin dai kai yan kan shi jie de bi ran xing 浅析近代开眼看世界的必然性 [On the necessity of seeing the world in modern times]. *Education*, No. 1 (2016): 133-133.

[75] Peck, J. The roots of rhetoric: the professional ideology of America's China watchers. Bull. of Concerned Asian Scholars (October). (1969).

[76] Rinke, S. Eurocentrism. *Encyclopaedia of Early Modern History Online*. Leiden, Koninklijke Brill NV, (2015).

[77] Wijesinghe, Sarah N. R., Paolo Mura, and Harold John Culala. Eurocentrism, Capitalism and Tourism Knowledge. *Tourism Management* (1982) 70 (2019): 178-187.

[78] Mazower, M. The End of Eurocentrism. *Critical Inquiry*, 40, no. 4 (2014): 298-313.

outside European world by basing their case studies on the supposed superiority of its religion, race, and culture.[79] From this perspective, it is clear that Fairbank's model of impact-response and Levinson's traditional-modernity approach are also influenced by Eurocentrism as they attribute China's reform and modernisation to exogenous shocks from European countries and the US. These two models follow Eurocentrist thinking and regard ancient China as a stubborn and stationary political entity. These theories do not probe into the change of Qing officials' diplomatic philosophy and its reasons but consider that the motivating force of modern China's reform came from the West. Although Peck's imperialism model recognises the negative influence that imperialism brought to China, he also implies that China was unable to effect any fundamental change on its own. His thought also neglects the transformation of Chinese diplomatic ideas and institutional reform.

It can be seen that many contemporary international historians continue to espouse eurocentrist views. Hevia's book puts Britain at its core of the thesis, seeking to put modern China's historical events in the context that global power relations were in flux where the deleveraging triggered by technological and industrial development ushered in a new era of European and American imperial expansion.[80] He primarily puts forward the idea that European countries provided a process of de-territorialisation and re-territorialisation to Qing China. That is, Britain government forced the Qing government to trade in Opium and easily destroyed the Qing government's defence system, then brought Qing China into the global communicational circle and instilled the idea of European sovereignty in the Qing regime.[81] He suggests that European countries influenced the Qing government to reform itself in accordance with the European and American nation-state model. During this process, the foreign treaties and missionary organizations, commercial enterprises, and diplomatic groups are reputed to have progressively transformed the Qing government's political system.[82] Hence the aim of the British government diplomatic treaties was to educate the Qing court in proper diplomatic methods, these British lessons even stimulated the self-strengthening campaign.[83] Hevia's viewpoint even claims that the British influence spurred the shift of diplomatic factors in the late Qing dynasty. The British 'pedagogy' enabled Qing Confucian officials to think about the weapons gap between the Qing government and European countries and officials, like Li Hongzhang and Zeng Guofan, gradually started to learn from the European countries.[84] On the one hand, they studied the intricacies of international law and diplomacy at the provincial officials' level while the central government also allocated resources for advanced weapons from Europe.[85] Compared to previous European scholars, Hevia seems to notice the link between the transformation of diplomatic factors and the Self-strengthening Campaign in the late dynasty and concretely analyses Qing Dynasty officials' change of diplomatic ideas. Nevertheless, Hevia's points appear to only summarise this shift as anchored in the short period of the two opium wars, mostly ignoring how this shift influenced the Qing government's foreign practice and institutional changes. Above all, the whole book stands on the British government's position and speaks for European countries' expansion, highlighting that British pedagogy brought order and maintained justice in Qing China.

[79] Kayaoglu, T. Westphalian Eurocentrism in International Relations Theory. *International Studies Review* 12, no. 2 (2010): 193-217.

[80] Hevia, James Louis. *English Lessons: The Pedagogy of Imperialism in Nineteenth-Century China*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2003.

[81] Ibid.

[82] Hevia, James Louis. *English Lessons: The Pedagogy of Imperialism in Nineteenth-Century China*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2003.

[83] Ibid.

[84] "李鸿章 曾国藩". Ibid.

[85] Ibid.

_____

It is observed that this book ignores Qing China's subjectivity and unilaterally underlines the British government's political clout in connection with Qing China's modernisation campaign. Hevia's book is still stuck in the narrative of Eurocentrism.

This Eurocentrist thinking is also embodied in contemporary international historians' translations and wordings of China's diplomatic history in modern times. International historians use colonial thinking to understand China's diplomatic history from their own perspective. Initially, this cognitive bias is apparent in translations of the Qing government's diplomatic institutions. Li Fan Yuan [the board of vassal states' affairs] was translated into 'the court of colonial affairs.[86] It can be observed that Fairbank regards the Qing state's suzerain-vassal relationship as a type of colonial relationship. This translation actually misreads the China's tributary system from an Eurocentrist angle neglecting ancient China's cultural background. And Fairbank seeks to explain the tributary system as China's hegemonic system saying that this system was based on retaining Chinese dominance in the region while their tributaries accepted the relationships for trade considerations.[87] However, his analysis solely highlights the commercial relations and lacks the Confucian cultural background. The tributary system was founded on the prevailing morality in Chinese society, which was to maintain peace and order, interacting based on the preservation of stability and peace in East Asia.[88] Another translated misconception influenced by Eurocentrism regards the Yi. Liu's book recalls the dispute between Qing officials and British envoys on the translation of Yi, because in the British's eyes, 'the Yi' was translated as 'the barbarians.[89] Thus, in the 1858 Sino-British Treaty of Tianjin, the British coerced the Qing Dynasty to permanently ban the Chinese character Yi from any official documents.[90] Actually, translating 'the Yi' as 'the barbarians' misinterprets China's cultural background. This translation wrongly enabled China's Confucian order to appear tantamount to the western world system.[91] Although Liu's book realises that Yi was wrongly translated into barbarians from the racial perspective, Liu does not extrapolate on the change of diplomatic factors in the late Qing dynasty based on these translated distinctions but concentrates solely on how the collision of imperial will and competing interests led to the emergence of eastern and western conceptions.[92]

Under the influence of Eurocentrism, racial historical thinking has affected the European's perception of the late Qing dynasty. One of the most striking examples is the idea of the 'yellow peril'. Lovell researches the transformation of diplomatic factors in late Qing dynasty through disproving the yellow peril. In the 19th century, because Asia and African countries failed to resist European countries' invasion when confronting advanced science and technology,

_____

[86] Fairbank, J. K, and S. Y. Teng. On The Ch'ing Tributary System. *Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies*, 6, no. 2 (1941): 135-246.

[87] Ibid.

[88] Jeyakumar, Uthra. Chinese Tributary System- the Way of Maintaining Order and Stability. *Academia Letters*, n.d. https://doi.org/10.20935/AL2886

[89] "夷". Liu, Lydia He. *The Clash of Empires: The Invention of China in Modern World Making*. Cambridge, Mass.; Harvard University Press, 2004.

[90] Ibid.

[91] Fang Weigui 方维规. "yi" "yang" "xi" "wai" ji qi xiang guan gai nian -lun 19shi ji han yu she wai ci hui he

gai nian de yan bian "夷""洋""西""外"及其相关概念-论19世纪汉语涉外词汇和概念的演变 ["Yi", "Foreign", "Western", "Foreign" and their Related Concepts -- On the evolution of Chinese foreign-related Vocabulary and Concepts in the 19th Century], Journal of Beijing Normal University (Social Science Edition), no. 4, 2013, pp. 60-61.

[92] Liu, Lydia He. *The Clash of Empires: The Invention of China in Modern World Making*. Cambridge, Mass.; Harvard University Press, 2004.

European theorists sought to find a pervasive theory to prove its supremacy.[93] They framed the world as a racial typology formed by immutable features with the white race apparently at the top, and the yellow people and black people at the bottom, because the popularity of opium among the Chinese became a testament to the moral inferiority and insensitivity of this alien, inexplicable race.[94] Under this background, the narrative of the yellow peril was created, and the yellow peril theorists believed that the yellow people would be a threat to the white race and would engulf western civilized society.[95] Lovell's book repudiates this point, claiming that the biggest problem with the yellow peril theory is its credibility, historically, as this "problem" was formed in isolation from China's own ideas and historical reality.[96] However, Lovell only sporadically mentions the shift of diplomatic factors from 1840 to 1914. For example, she mentions the change of Guo Songtao's diplomatic idea and his suffering in the Qing state.[97] And Yan Fu was another typical example where Lovell identifies Yan as a major representative of the first generation of Chinese who have undergone profound reflection after the opium war.[98] Nevertheless, Lovell does not thoroughly investigate the process how Yan Fu and Guo Songtao's diplomatic thinking transformed. She also mentions that the failure of the Sino-Japanese war enabled the concept of the Chinese nation coming into being. In the similar vein, these narratives are devoid of the support of primary sources and only scratch the surface of the transformation of diplomatic factors from 1840 to 1914.

Furthermore, during the era of republic of China, Eurocentrist thinking even affected several Chinese scholars' viewpoints of China's transition in the late Qing era. One of the most representative interpretations was Te-Kong Tong's *The Historical Three Gorges of China's History* [Li Shi San Xia Lun].[99] *The Historical Three Gorges of China's History* vividly takes China's Three Gorges Dam in the Yangtze River to illustrate the transformation of China's social and political system in China's history.[100] Tong divides the changes of China's political and social institutions since the pre-Qin period (221 BC) into three major stages: feudalism, monarchy, and government by the people.[101] According to Tong, the second great transformation, initiated after the Opium War in 1840, will take at least 200 years and, if it goes well, will be completed by the middle of the twenty-first century.[102] It is evident that Tong summarises the secondary transformation as starting from the First Opium War in 1840 as the process from monarchy to the government by the people. Compared to Fairbank and Levinson, Tong notices that China's reform and historical development are dynamic; ancient China had been reforming and transforming rather than being in a state of rigid stillness. Furthermore, Tong even delves into the transformation of China's political system, highlighting that ancient China's political system might

---

[93] Cheuk, Ka-Kin. "Yellow Perils: China Narratives in the Contemporary World. Edited by Franck Billé and Sören Urbansky." *Pacific Affairs*, 93, no. 2 (2020): 415-417.

[94] Lovell, Julia. *The Opium War: Drugs, Dreams and the Making of China*. London: Picador, 2012.

[95] Schuyler, George Samuel. The Yellow Peril. [First electronic edition]. Alexandria, VA: Alexander Street Press, 2004.

[96] Lovell, Julia. *The Opium War: Drugs, Dreams and the Making of China*. London: Picador, 2012.

[97] Ibid.

[98] Ibid.

[99] '历史三峡论'. Tong, T. K. 唐德刚, Wan Qing Qi Shi Nian 晚清七十年 [70 years of late Qing Dynasty]. Yuelu Bookstore, (1998).

[100] Ibid.

[101] Ibid.

[102] Tong, T. K 唐德刚. Yuan Shi Dang Guo 袁氏当国 [When Yuan Shikai controls China]. Guangxi Normal University Press. (2004).

have been a complicated historical process and even suffering a series of backlashes.[103] However, Tong attributes the shift of China's political system and bureaucracy as a prompted and forced course of history by western powers after the first opium war in 1840.[104] Although Tong indeed explores the root reason why ancient China's experienced the reform of the diplomatic bureaucracy, it becomes clear that his theory also ascribes the impetus of the reform as the result of oppression by Western powers. He also does not connect the transformation of diplomatic idea factors with the change of the diplomatic apparatus during the modern Chinese history but solely attributes these changes to external stimuli. Therefore, Tong's theory of the historical three gorges of China's history appears to be syill located within the scope of a Eurocentric mentality.

Tsiang Tingfu is another Chinese historian susceptible to Eurocentrist thinking. As a politician and high-level diplomat in Chiang Kai-shek's government, Tsiang proposed the modernization narrative to shed light on the factors involved in the transformation of diplomatic ideas in the late Qing dynasty.[105] Tsiang claimed that ancient China could still exist in the dynastic repetition and autocratic monarchy, but that nevertheless, Britain and the European countries were capable of promoting its capitalist expansion before and after two industrial revolutions, and Qing China thus was drawn in the international system driven by European countries.[106] It was worth noting that ancient China should proactively blend in the trend of internationalisation and guide its citizens to embrace global integration as quickly as possible, then ancient China could achieve its industrialisation. It could be observed that Tsiang's viewpoint was deeply influenced by modernisation theory. This theory argued that western imperialism offered modernization to China, and that China's Confucian culture and political system prevented its answer to the world.[107] Like the Fairbank, Tsiang claimed that ancient China's patriarchal clan idea and family values influenced whether Qing China could get out of the backward mediaeval state and a become modern national state to some extent.[108] Furthermore, Tsiang sought to illuminate the transformation of diplomatic factors from the domestic perspective of Qing China. He argued that the Qing government wasted 20 years in vain after the failure of the First Opium War in 1840, until the Second Opium War, when Qing China's intellectuals and officials' diplomatic idea factors altered.[109] However, since the First Opium War in 1840, Qing officials' and intellectuals' foreign idea factors seemed to have altered. For example, Wei Yuan proposed the view of beating foreigners by learning from their advantages in 1852.[110] Tsiang one-sidedly thought that as long as

---

[103] Tong, T. K. 唐德刚, Wan Qing Qi Shi Nian 晚清七十年 [70 years of late Qing Dynasty]. Yuelu Bookstore, (1998).

[104] Tong, T. K 唐德刚. Yuan Shi Dang Guo 袁氏当国 [When Yuan Shikai controls China]. Guangxi Normal University Press. (2004).

[105] Tsiang Tingfu 蒋廷黻. Zhong Guo Jin Dai Shi Da Gang 中国近代史 [The Outline of Modern Chinese History]. Taiwan Qiming Book Company, 1949.

[106] Ibid.

[107] Teng, Ssü-yü, and John King Fairbank. *Research Guide for China's Response to the West: A Documentary Survey 1839-1923*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1954.

[108] Tsiang Tingfu 蒋廷黻. Jin dai zhong guo wai jiao shi zi liao ji yao 近代中国外交史资料辑要 [A summary of modern Chinese diplomatic history] Tai bei; Shang wu yin shu guan Taipei 台北：商务印书馆 The Commercial Press, 1958.

[109] Tsiang Tingfu 蒋廷黻. Jin dai zhong guo wai jiao shi zi liao ji yao 近代中国外交史资料辑要 [A summary of modern Chinese diplomatic history] Tai bei; Shang wu yin shu guan Taipei 台北：商务印书馆 The Commercial Press, 1958.

[110] "师夷长技以制夷". Wei, Yuan 魏源 (1852): Hai Guo Tu Zhi 海图国志 [Atlas of the Sea and the Kingdom], vol. 19. Chen Hua et al. Annotation, Yuelu Publishing house, 1998.

Qing China was incorporated into the international system, China could synchronously follow the western countries' developmental pace.[111] From his viewpoint, it can be found that Tsiang's view seemed to continue the world system theory and seek to put Qing China in the world system, attributing Qing China's internal change to the idea that it was being driven by the world system. A conception of the capitalist world system was proposed by Wallerstein. In it he suggests that this has a massive structure with many political centres and a complicated division of labour along an axis between the core, semi-periphery, and periphery, as well as commercial interchange (to benefit the core at the expense of periphery).[112] According to his theory, the clash between China and European countries eventually resulted in China's forced inclusion as a periphery nation in the capitalist world economy, and China's tributary system was bankrupted as the Qing state was integrated into the global economy during this process.[113] Obviously, Tsiang's viewpoint was seemingly inherited from Wallerstein's theory of world system, blindly regarding the participation in the western world system as the impetus which influenced China's internal change, pinning China's industrialisation onto the capitalist world system's gift, even if he more or less mentioned China's domestic situation and development. Therefore, Tsiang did not elucidate the change of diplomatic ideas in the late Qing dynasty from a macro standpoint.

After the 1970s, Eurocentric thinking was called into question, while the China-centred approach sparked discussion. Cohen approached this China-centred approach in 1984, and this approach openly articulated that researching ancient China's history and its reform should not have interpreted China from Eurocentrism thinking because the model of impact-response, the notion of the tradition-modernity and imperialism model may have a pervasive and robust ethnocentric bias towards modern China history and its institutional reform.[114] As the alternative research method, Cohen was inclined to adopt the China-centric approach, in which historians understand Chinese history on their terms, paying close attention to the trajectory of Chinese history and how Chinese people view their problems per se.[115] Cohen and Swisher describe the encounter between ancient China and western powers as an interactive process, arguing that ancient China's development and political reform and European countries' external impact mutually influenced each other in contrast with to Fairbank's impact-response model.[116] This China-centred approach and reflections on Eurocentrism actually were echoed by other contemporary scholars. Saïd proposed that the Orient might be not real, but created by Western imagination and writing. Given the impact of *Orientalism*, many European sinologists began to reflect on Eurocentrism and emphasise the importance of internal factors in non-western countries.[117] Kuhn sought to discuss the formation and development of local armed activities under the influence of the First Opium War in 1840, starting with analysing the internal structure and

---

[111] Tsiang Tingfu 蔣廷黻. Jin dai zhong guo wai jiao shi zi liao ji yao 近代中国外交史资料辑要 [A summary of modern Chinese diplomatic history] Tai bei; Shang wu yin shu guan Taipei 台北: 商务印书馆 The Commercial Press, 1958.

[112] Wallerstein, I. M. *The Modern World System*. New York; Academic Press, (1974).

[113] Wallerstein, I. M. *Historical Capitalism: with Capitalist Civilization. Eleventh impression*. London: Verso, (2003).

[114] Cohen, P. A. *Discovering History in China: American Historical Writing on the Recent Chinese Past*. New York: Columbia University Press, (1984).

[115] Ibid.

[116] Cohen, P. A. and Swisher, E. China and Christianity: The Missionary Movement and the Growth of Chinese Antiforeignism, 1860-1870. *The American Historical Review*. The Macmillan Company, (1964).

[117] Said, E. W. (Edward William), and Eric Mottram. *Orientalism*. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, (1979).

_____

system of Chinese society.[118] Based on the China-centred approach, he also argued that the start of modern Chinese history began with the Taiping rebellion (1851-1864), which led to more than 20 million deaths in Qing China, rather than the First Opium War in 1840. Indeed, a series of China-centred approaches heed China's in-house factors during modern Chinese history and the interactive relations between ancient China and the western world. However, Cohen does not profoundly probe into ancient China's interaction with diplomatic ideas from China's internal perspective when encountering the Europeans. Kuhn also does not research the evolution and change of ancient China's diplomatic institutions, even if he notices changes in Qing institutions and structures from China's perspective since the First Opium War in 1840. It is worth mentioning that the large issue of Sino-centred approach might have been to instrumentalise the western countries. The most representative view might be Hevia's. Hevia suggests that a Sino-centred approach tends to situate the mutual relations between Qing China and European countries as the background even if a Sino-centred approach highlights China's view.[119] In Cohen's discourse, the European world was conceived as an ever-objectified tool to analyse modern Chinese history.[120] The Sino-centred approach does not seem to delve into European countries' features and development.

From China's home perspective, the nascent People's Republic of China's government adopted a kind of revolutionary narrative to interpret the shift of diplomatic idea factors in the late Qing dynasty since 1949. China's mainstream narrative about the shift of diplomatic idea factors in the late Qing dynasty was occupied by Marxism which highlights western countries' oppression of and exploitation of ancient China. Marxist ideas suggest that foreign invasion entrenched existing feudalism and destroyed China's indigenous handicraft industry.[121] For example, The European countries took advantage of the provisions of the Treaty of Shimonoseki on Japan's opening of factories in China and began to invest and build factories and banks in China on a large scale.[122] Foreign factories had a large production scale and output and low cost, and their products were in a dominant position in the Chinese market, and a large number of farmers, small and medium-sized business people, transport and handicraft workers went bankrupt and lost their jobs.[123] This seriously affected the development of China's national capitalism. China has upheld historical materialism as a Marxist-Leninist country when explaining the Qing China's suffering in its historical textbooks. Historical materialism is a doctrine of determinism, which explains all historical events according to the material and economic living conditions in a particular historical period.[124] Therefore, China's official historical narratives emphasize the "fight against imperialism and feudalism" and the transition to socialism as the only answer to China's issues in the modern age, assuming foreign capitalist powers, Manchu emperors, and later Chinese

_____

[118] Kuhn, Philip A. *Rebellion and Its Enemies in Late Imperial China Militarization and Social Structure, 1796-1864*. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, (1980).

[119] Hevia, James Louis. *English Lessons: The Pedagogy of Imperialism in Nineteenth-Century China*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2003.

[120] Ibid.

[121] Marx, K. & Engels, F. *The communist manifesto*. Auckland, New Zealand: The Floating Press. 1888.

[122] Kerr, A. & Wright, E. (2015) Shimonoseki, Treaty of (17 April 1895). *A Dictionary of World History*.

[123] Cai, W. Z. lun ma guan tiao yue 、xin chou tiao yue dui hai guan zhi du de ying xiang 论马关条约和辛丑条约对海关制度的影响 [on the influence of Shimonoseki treaty and Xinchou Treaty on customs system]. *International Business: Journal of the University of International Business and Economics*. (3), 1989. 45-49.

[124] Rupert, M. & Hazelle, A. (2016) *Historical materialism and globalization*. London, [England]; Routledge.

warlords as the key hurdles to China's growth.[125] Mao also utilized the image of the "three great mountains" to describe these three obstacles in modern Chinese history. [126] With the modernization in modern Chinese history, the late Qing state took a stab at promoting the process of China's modernization. After suffering a series of rebellions (Taiping and Nien rebellion) and the Second Opium War from 1856 to 1860, the Qing government made efforts in the Self-Strengthening Campaign which aimed to bring in Western methods and technology, reforming Qing state's military, diplomatic, fiscal, and educational policies.[127] From this dimension, Chinese government's traditional revolutionary history adopted a class analysis method to evaluate historical figures and the Qing government. The Qing government was described as a Manchu, feudal, autocratic government in China's official narrative.[128] The ministers of the Qing dynasty were described as feudal officials or landlord class.[129] China's scholars adopted a thinking mode of binary oppositions to look at the change of diplomatic factors in the Qing dynasty. On the one hand, China's scholars regarded Qing officials as tools of the feudal Qing government. Many scholars argued that the class nature of the landlord class in feudal society was to exploit the peasants to the utmost and feudal state' officials were the political representatives of the landlord class and the tools of the feudal state to suppress and exploit the working people.[130] They even categorised the Qing government and foreign invasion in one bracket, that is, Qing government colluded with the western imperial countries and suppressed the people's uprising. For example, official narratives often used this rhetoric that Qing feudal and comprador forces colluded with foreign invaders to strangle the Taiping revolution when analysing the failed reason of Taiping rebellion.[131] The Qing government and its officials were regarded as the western imperialists' dependencies in this context. Ergo, the shift of diplomatic factors in the late Qing dynasty were blurred by this rhetoric. On the other hand, the Chinese government and the dominant discourse of the historical academia always distinguished several Qing officials and Confucian intellectuals from the feudal Qing government. Although Chinese historians also claimed that Qing officials belonged to the realm of landlord which suppressed the peasant class, they differentially treated these officials, who resisted foreign invasion and promoted the self-strengthening campaign, as

[125] Li, H. (2010) from revolution to modernization: the paradigmatic transition in Chinese historiography in the reform era. *History and Theory*. [Online] 49 (3), 336-360.

[126] "三座大山". Mao, Ze. Dong. 毛泽东 (1949). Zai Jin Sui Jie Fang Qu Gan Bu Hui Yi Shang De Jiang Hua在晋绥解放区干部会议上的讲话 [Speech at a conference of cadres in Shansi-Suiyuan liberated area], https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/mao/selected-works/volume-4/mswv4_35.html (1 April 1948).

[127] Smith, R. J. Foreign-Training and China's Self-Strengthening: The Case of Feng-huang-shan, 1864-1873. *Modern Asian Studies*. [Online] 10 (2), 1976. 195-223.

[128] "满清封建专制政府" Zhang Hua 张桦. chuan tong wen hua yu jing xia de wan qing xian zheng yu fu qiang zhi lu 传统文化语境下的晚清宪政与富强之路 [Constitutionalism and prosperity in the Late Qing Dynasty in the Context of Traditional Culture]. Southwest University of Political Science and Law, 2012.

[129] "封建官员 地主阶级"Su Shuangbi 苏双碧. bi guan zi shou he di zhu jie ji di kang pai de jue qi 闭关自守和地主阶级抵抗派的崛起 [Isolation and the rise of resistance of the landlord class]. Tianjin Shehui Kexue, No. 3 (1986): 57-62.

[130] Zhao Keyao 赵克尧, Liu Jingcheng 刘精诚. Lun qing guande ben zhi he zuo yong 论清官的本质与作用 [On the essence and function of honest and upright officials]. Xueshu Yuekan, No. 12 (1965): 24-30.

[131] He Guichun 何桂春. shang hai zhong wai hui fang ju ji qi fan ge ming huo dong 上海中外会防局及其反革命活动 [The Defense Bureau of the Chinese and foreign Association in Shanghai and its counter-revolutionary activities]. Fujian Shi Fan da Xue Bao. *Zhe Xue she Hui Ke Xue Ban*, No. 3 (1978): 76-82.

_____

the patriotic officials and enlightened members of the landlord class.[132] For example, Lin Zexu was portrayed as the patriotic official and national hero who stood up to the foreign invasion in the First Opium War in 1840.[133] Mao even claimed that "new-born China's democratic revolution started from Lin Zexu's opium suppression movement in 1840."[134] Under this revolutionary narrative, the shift in Qing official's foreign idea factors were always overlooked and a few Qing official's enlightened actions were viewed as the patriotic officials' individual behaviours. For example, the Self-strengthening Campaign was presented in the governmental textbook as the movement of landlord intellectuals in the feudal ruling class to save the Qing government from the ruling.[135] Therefore, before the 1980s, Chinese government and its mainstream discourse overly used the class analysis method to research modern Chinese history and did not dig deep into the how internal factors influenced the shift of diplomatic ideas in the late Qing dynasty.

After the 1980s, traditional Chinese government's revolutionary discourse about the modern Chinese history and the opium wars have been re-assessed by Chinese historians. Mao Haijian is representative of the famous historians who studied modern Chinese history at this time. With the end of the cultural revolution, conventional revolutionary historiography based on Marxist methodology and adopting rebellion and revolution as the topic of modern Chinese history experienced a paradigm shift in the 1980s and 1990s, with the new paradigm of modernization seemingly influencing the conventional revolutionary historiography.[136]. In the past, the previous Chinese historians often labelled historical figures as patriots or traitors when evaluating historical figures' historical responsibilities. Mao objectively looked at historical figures, even paying attention to the shift of diplomatic factors in the late Qing dynasty from primary sources and archives. From a micro point of view, Mao realised that the Qing officials' diplomatic idea factors changed and this change was demonstrated throughout the First Opium War. For example, during the First Opium War, many Qing officials, like Qi Shan and Yi Libu, once harboured the hawkish attitude and advocated the war before confronting the British armies, then becoming the peace group and even proactively seeking to sign peaceful treaties after experiencing the war with British armies.[137] And Mao started with the historical archives and did not align with the Chinese government's tone on these reasons for the defeat of the Qing Army. Mao did not attribute Qing troops' failure to the treachery of a few officials in the Qing government but realised that Qing troops were corrupted and that the Qing officials' idea of celestial empire

_____

[132] "地主阶级的爱国和开明人士" Su Shuangbi 苏双碧. bi guan zi shou he di zhu jie ji di kang pai de jue qi 闭关自守和地主阶级抵抗派的崛起 [Isolation and the rise of resistance of the landlord class]. *Tianjin Shehui Kexue*, No. 3 (1986): 57-62.

[133] Wang Zhixian王之宪. jie chu de min zu ying xiong lin ze xu ——ji nian ya pian zhan zheng 150 zhou nian 杰出的民族英雄林则徐——纪念鸦片战争150周年 Lin Zexu, an outstanding national hero -- commemorating the 150th anniversary of the Opium War. *Dongbei Lin Ye Da Xue Xue Bao*, No. S1 (1990): 48-50.

[134] "我们的民主革命从林则徐算起，一直革了一百多年". Mao, Zedong 毛泽东. Mao Ze Dong Xuan Ji Di Wu Juan 毛泽东选集第五卷 [Selected Works of Mao Zedong volume 5]. People's Publishing House. 1977, 490.

[135] Deng Zihan 邓梓晗. Qian tan yang wu yun dong de xing zhi 浅谈洋务运动的性质 [On the nature of westernization Movement]. *Youth*, No. 31 (2017): 9-16.

[136] Li, H. (2010) from revolution to modernization: the paradigmatic transition in Chinese historiography in the reform era. *History and Theory*. [Online] 49 (3), 336-360.

[137] "琦善, 伊里布". Mao H. J. 茅海建 (Translated by Lawson J, ed). Tian Chao De Ben Kui 天朝的崩溃 [The Qing Empire and the Opium War: Collapse of the Heavenly Dynasty]. Cambridge University Press, 2016.

exacerbated the vigilance of Qing officials against the British.[138] Mao also explained this shift as the forced compromise when these Manchu officials faced British armies' ships and armaments, because they realised the generation gap in the weapons.[139] In addition, Mao claimed that the Chinese nation did not have the problem of national consciousness awakening because Chinese (mainly Han Chinese) had long already recognized themselves as a separate nation. The question was how modern nationalism with an international conception was generated after the First Opium war in 1840.[140] However, Mao's research sphere was restricted to around the time period of the First Opium War, did not take the change of diplomatic concept in the late Qing Dynasty from 1840 to 1914 as a whole. Besides, though Mao recognised the emergence of Chinese international conception, he also did not systematically analyse the emergence and transformation of Chinese international conception after the First Opium War.

In the 1990s, Leung, in his book, *the significant changes of Modern Chinese diplomacy: a study of the diplomatic system and the change of Sino-foreign relations,* assigned China's domestic factors at least as much importance as the external impact. Leung not only claims that western imperialism's invasion seemed to change China's modern diplomacy to some extent because western imperialisms' invasion had become the driving force and catalyst for changes in China's modern diplomacy, but he also highlights that ancient China had its initiatives to fit into the international order actively and modify its diplomatic ideas and behaviours because ancient China was positively resistant to imperialist aggression.[141] Leung thus concretely analyses how the Qing state suffered from the Western powers' influence.[142] On the one hand, Western powers indeed brought disasters to ancient China after the First Opium War in 1840; on the other hand, these Western powers' negative influence also enabled ancient Chinese to learn from Western powers and proactively trigger ancient Chinese patriotism.[143] In contrast to previous scholars, Leung noticed ancient China's internal factors and how China positively reformed its diplomatic organs when the Qing state entered the late Qing dynasty. However, Leung's thought might be deeply influenced by Marx and Chinese governmental narratives that regarded emerging European countries' influences as the imperialists' invasion, because in China's official traditional narratives, foreign imperialist and invading countries pushed ancient China to sign many unequal treaties in which China gave up many of its sovereign rights in terms of territory and commerce.[144] Nevertheless, this thought was refuted by the modernisation theory that imperialism objectively offered modernisation to China.[145] Furthermore, Leung's points also do not analyse the link between the shift of ancient Chinese diplomatic idea factors and the Qing government's diplomatic reform.

---

[138] Mao H. J. 茅海建 (Translated by Lawson J, ed). Tian Chao De Ben Kui 天朝的崩溃 [The Qing Empire and the Opium War: Collapse of the Heavenly Dynasty]. Cambridge University Press, 2016.

[139] Mao H. J. 茅海建 (Translated by Lawson J, ed). Tian Chao De Ben Kui 天朝的崩溃 [The Qing Empire and the Opium War: Collapse of the Heavenly Dynasty]. Cambridge University Press, 2016.

[140] Ibid.

[141] Leung, E. 梁伯華. jin dai zhong guo wai jiao de ju bian wai jiao zhi du yu zhong wai guan xi bian hua de yan jiu 近代中国外交的巨变外交制度与中外关系变化的研究 [The great changes of Modern Chinese diplomacy: a study of diplomatic system and the change of Sino-foreign relations], Hong Kong Commercial Press, (1990).

[142] Ibid.

[143] Ibid.

[144] Wang, J. *Unequal treaties and China* (2-volume set). Vol. 1. Honolulu, HI: Enrich Professional Publishing. (2015).

[145] Shepherd, R. Human Rights, Modernization Theory, and China. *Critical Asian Studies*, 50, no. 3 (2018): 484-492.

_____

During the same period, Chen proposed the model of challenge-response [Tiaozhan Huiying Moshi] seeking to answer the transformation of China's diplomatic factors from 1840 to 1914. Chen identifies the challenge-response model as the conception that Qing China confronted dual challenges from European countries, those are invasive Europe and advanced Europe.[146] On the one hand, he agrees with Leung that European invasion negatively affected Qing China after 1840.[147] Unlike Leung's viewpoint that one-sidedly highlighted the European countries adverse influence on Qing China, such as ceding territory, paying indemnities and the unequal treaties, Chen also emphasizes the modernization that European countries brought to Qing China.[148] When Qing China was grappling with these dual challenges, Qing China provided three responses: isolationism, dependency, and the patriotism of both resistance toward European countries and learning from European countries.[149] Chen specifically explains Qing China's backwardness in modern Chinese history through these three responses: the Qing's foreign policy of isolationism, the Qing government's collaborationist behaviour and willingness to be European countries dependency after suffering a sequence of military defeats. Qing Confucian and scholars' patriotic response was to learn from European countries science and technology and synchronously oppose the European countries invasion.[150] In his book, he claims that these responses were demonstrated throughout modern Chinese history and even that they gave rise to the emergence of China's national consciousness.[151] Although Chen's challenge-response model seems to divide the Qing's response into three perspectives, he still does not break away from the spectrum of Fairbank's impact-response model that European countries' influence resulted in Qing China's response. Furthermore, Chen's viewpoint falls under the dichotomy, mechanically categorizing the European influence into negative and positive kinds and following the Chinese government's narrative that was attributes treachery to the Qing government's compromise and the signing of unequal treaties. Chen also neglects the transformation of diplomatic idea factors in the Late Qing Dynasty and does not detail Qing officials and Confucian scholars' change of the diplomatic ideas, solely regarding Qing China's response as the state action.

The overriding problem might be that these previous scholars formalistically demarcate Qing China. They adopt the conventional period from the First Opium War in 1840 to research China's transformation of diplomatic concept factors, viewing 1949 as the end of the modern Chinese history. This time compartmentalisation fails to spot the importance of the year 1914. According to Xu's book in 2005, *China and the Great War: China's Pursuit of a New National Identity and Internationalization*, the period from 1840 to 1914 is suggested as the transition period from ancient diplomacy to modern Chinese diplomacy, and the year of 1914 as a turning point for China's desire to join and change the international system.[152] Xu expresses specific concern about China's internationalisation after the First Sino-Japanese war in 1895,

_____

[146] "挑战回应模式". Chen, Shengli. 陈胜粦. Dui Xi Fang Tiao Zhan De Shou Ci Hui Ying: Ya Pian Zhan Zheng 对西方挑战的首次回应：鸦片战争 [The first response to the Western challenge: the Opium Wars]. Heritage Publishing House, 1990.

[147] Ibid.

[148] Ibid.

[149] Ibid.

[150] Chen, Shengli. 陈胜粦. Ya Pian Zhan Zheng Qian Hou Zhong Guo Ren Mian Dui Fang Shuang Chong Tiao Zhan De Hui Ying 鸦片战争前后中国人面对西方双重挑战的回应 [The Chinese response to the Twin Challenges of the West before and after the Opium War]." Journal of Sun Yat-sen University. *Philosophy and Social Sciences*, no. 1 (1991): 8-21.

[151] Ibid.

[152] Xu, Guoqi. *China and the Great War: China's Pursuit of a New National Identity and Internationalization*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005.

emphasising that the formation of Chinese national identity would link China's domestic order and international order.[153] Xu explains that the failure of the First Opium War in 1895 resulted in the crisis of Chinese national identity; the Chinese overturned the Qing state and built the Republic of China in 1911 out of this crisis.[154] The government of the Republic of China began to propose independent diplomacy in 1914 when confronting the pressure of being coercively forced to sign twenty-one demands by the Japanese government in 1914. However, Xu's book may overlook the specific process of the gradual awakening of Chinese national consciousness to the complete abandonment of the traditional world outlook from 1895 to 1914. Furthermore, Xu's book places particular research on China's national identity and the demand for internationalisation in the first world war in 1918. Thus, his book does not systematically delve into the evolution of diplomatic idea factors and diplomatic organs influenced by modern Chinese history in the late Qing dynasty since the First Opium War in 1840, giving little retrospective analysis of modern Chinese history.

5. Conclusion and emerging research gap

A large and growing body of literature has investigated the shift of diplomatic idea factors influenced by modern Chinese history in the late Qing dynasty (1840-1914). Existing literature defines modern Chinese history as the period from 1840 to 1949. Admittedly, the eruption of the First Opium War was perceived as the start of modern Chinese history because the British government used the gun-boat policy to open ancient China's gate. It is noteworthy that the year 1914 was chosen as the end of the study period because the most recent literature suggests that 1914 was the origin of the new Chinese diplomacy because the Chinese took the initiative to join the international system and improve China's international status in 1914. Thus, this research selected the year 1914 as the endpoint.

Evidence from existing literature proves that traditional Chinese diplomatic ideas might have been influenced by the Ancient Chinese "under heaven view" (Tian Xia Guan). For traditional Chinese Confucian intellectuals and officials, China was at the centre of the world. However, this long-standing sense of superiority, once dominant in ancient China, had cumulatively changed during the late Qing dynasty. Qing governmental foreign policy experienced the evolution from an isolationist worldview to diplomatic compliance with treaties, even launching the Self-strengthening Campaign to learn from the emerging European countries. After the failure of the first Sino-Japanese war in 1895, with the emergence of modern sovereignty and nation-state consciousness, the Qing government and the Chinese government (the Republic of China) gradually set foot in diplomacy and abandoned traditional diplomatic thinking and had a new Chinese diplomacy by 1914. The centre of the tributary system turned to the periphery of the capitalist world system. Furthermore, numerous current studies discuss the transformation of diplomatic factors in the late Qing dynasty from 1840 to 1914. Fairbank proposes the model of impact-response, understanding the change in modern Chinese history as the negative response towards western impact because ancient Chinese Confucian culture hampered China's modernisation. Hevia questions Fairbank's viewpoint because Hevia thinks Fairbank's idea may have acquiesced to the idea that those European countries were advanced while ancient China was backward. Hevia, though, seeks to interpret this shift of diplomatic factors as the collision of the ideological system between ancient China and European countries. And Hevia tries to understand this shift of diplomatic factors from the change of the Qing government's foreign etiquette [Bing

_____

[153] Ibid.

[154] Xu, Guoqi. *China and the Great War: China's Pursuit of a New National Identity and Internationalization*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005.

_____

Li]; Hevia also attempts to explain Qing rulers' worldview through Manchu tribal customs rather than the tributary system. Hevia's research perspective has its limitations because he ignores the importance of the tributary system in the late Qing Dynasty, and this tributary system existed for about one thousand years. Moreover, the Qing government's foreign etiquette [Bing Li] might have played a subordinate role in the Qing government's court etiquette. After Fairbank, Levinson broaches the traditional-modernity approach that only European countries could realise modernity, while China just moved from the traditional world to the modern world according to western countries' routes. Levinson places Chinese tradition and Western modernity in binary opposition and unilaterally emphasises the influence of the modernisation of European countries on Qing China. Unlike Levison and Fairbank, Peck proposes the theory of imperialism model that imperialism was the main reason for China's modern historical change, and the main reason for China's modern backwardness is attributed to the West. His point neglects how imperialism affected the transformation of diplomatic concepts and the changes imperialism brought to the Qing government and its diplomatic institutions.

Above all, Fairbank, Levison, and Peck's ideas are Eurocentrist. Fairbank and Levison attribute China's reform and modernisation to exogenous shocks from European and American countries. Peck's model of imperialism also neglects China's internal reasons for the transformation of diplomatic ideas and apparatus. This Eurocentrist thinking still influences contemporary historians. Hevia emphasises that the lessons of Britain brought order and justice to the Qing Dynasty. Hevia's book neglects the subjectivity of Qing China and unilaterally emphasises the political influence of the British government on the modernisation movement of Qing China. In addition, many historians, like Liu and Fairbank, try to understand China's diplomatic history from its perspective with colonial thinking. These are manifest in the translation of Li Fanyuan [The board of vassal states] and Yi [foreigners]. Racial thinking also once dominated the European perception of the late Qing Dynasty, such as in the idea of the "yellow peril". Lovell refutes the credibility of "yellow peril" and mentions the shift in diplomatic elements between 1840 and 1914. However, her analysis only sporadically focuses on Confucian scholars in the Qing dynasty.

Numerous Chinese historians of the Republic period from 1911 to 1949 also accommodate Eurocentrisy thinking. Te-Kong Tong's created *The Historical Three Gorges of China's History* [Li Shi San Xia Lun] to attribute the transformation of China's political system and bureaucracy to a historical process pushed and forced by Western powers after the First Opium War in 1840. Tsiang Tingfu was another Chinese historian who succumbed to Eurocentrism. He blindly took participation in the western world system as the driving force influencing China's internal reform, and China's industrialisation was entrusted to the gift of the capitalist world system. These two-mainstream discourses during the Republic of China from 1911 to 1949, are still working withing Eurocentrist ideas.

After the 1970s, eurocentric thinking was questioned, while the China-centric approach sparked discussion. Cohen prefers using a China-centric approach, in which historians understand Chinese history from their point of view, paying close attention to the trajectory of Chinese history and how Chinese people conceive the issue itself. Cohen and Swisher describe the encounter between ancient China and western powers as an interactive process and believe that ancient China's development and political reform interacted with the external influence of European countries. And this China-centric approach maybe resonated with many European scholars, such as Kuhn. Cohen does not delve into the interaction of ancient Chinese diplomatic thought when Qing Chinese encountered Europeans from an internal Chinese perspective, nor does Kuhn study the evolution and changes of ancient Chinese diplomatic institutions, and the China-centric approach may have been an attempt to instrumentalise the European countries. Ergo, the China-centred approach does not seem to answer this research question.

After establishing the People's Republic of China in 1949, the Chinese government and its narrative discourse adopted a revolutionary narrative to interpret the transformation of diplomatic ideas in the late Qing Dynasty since 1949. Chinese scholars used the thinking mode of binary opposition to view the changes in diplomatic factors in the Qing Dynasty. On the one hand, Chinese scholars regard Qing officials as tools of the feudal Qing government. On the other hand, the dominant discourse of the Chinese government and historians always has distinguished Qing officials and Confucian intellectuals from the Qing government, describing those officials who rebelled against the European countries' invasion and promoted the Self-strengthening Campaign as patriotic and enlightened officials. Under this revolutionary narrative, the transformation of the external concept factors of the Qing officials appears to be consistently ignored, and the enlightened behaviours of some Qing officials were regarded as the personal behaviours of patriotic officials. Therefore, before 1980, the Chinese government and its mainstream discourse overused class analysis in the study of modern Chinese history instead of deeply exploring how internal subjects affected the change of diplomatic concept factors in the late Qing Dynasty.

After the 1980s, Chinese historians' views about how diplomatic factors transformed in the late Qing dynasty from 1840 to 1914 change again. The scope of Mao's research is limited to the period before and after the First Opium War, and he does not consider the changes of diplomatic concepts in the late Qing Dynasty from 1840 to 1914 as a whole. Leung claims that the invasion of western imperialism seems to have changed China's modern diplomacy to some extent because the invasion of western imperialism had become the driving force and catalyst of China's modern diplomacy reform and emphasises that ancient China had the initiative to adapt. In ancient times, China actively resisted imperialist aggression, actively integrated itself into the international order, and changed its diplomatic philosophy and behaviours. However, Leung also perceives the influence of the new European states as an imperialist invasion. Chen creates the challenge-response model [Tiaozhan Huiying Moshi] to explain how China's diplomatic factors changed from 1840 to 1914. Chen describes the challenge-response paradigm as the belief that Qing China faced twin challenges from European countries, invading Europe and advanced Europe. Chen's argument seems to fall into a dichotomy, dividing European influence mechanically into negative and positive aspects. Notably, previous scholars used the conventional period of the First Opium War in 1840 to study the transformation of China's diplomatic concept factors and regarded 1949 as the end of China's modern history, and this division fails to recognise the significance of 1914. According to Xu Guoqi's book, 1914 was a turning point for China's entry into and transformation of the international system. Nevertheless, Xu also did not systematically attach importance to diplomatic thought factors and diplomatic organs that have influenced China's modern history since the Opium War in 1840. As a result, the study's analytical questions may be summarised as follows:

(1) From 1840 to 1916, How did the concept of diplomacy change?

(2) During the period from 1840 to 1914, how has the Chinese concept of the international system changed? Moreover, how did this change affect China's diplomatic institutions?

(3) From 1840 to 1914, how did external shocks and their factors influence the transformation of diplomatic ideas in modern Chinese history?

The next portion of this dissertation will outline the research methodologies to analyse the archival sources to have a thorough grasp of this subject.

_____

References

Andornino, G. *The Nature and Linkages of China's Tributary System Under the Ming and Qing Dynasties. Department of Economic History*, London School of Economics and Political Science, (2006).

Anne, K. & Edmund, W. *Westphalia, Treaty of* (1648). *A Dictionary of World History*. Oxford University Press, (2015).

Beauclair, I. Liang Chia-pin, Kuangtung Shihsan Hang K'ao (The Thirteen Hongs of Canton) (Book Review). *Pacific Affairs*, 13(1), p.102. (1940).

Cai, W. Z. lun ma guan tiao yue 、xin chou tiao yue dui hai guan zhi du de ying xiang 论马关条约和辛丑条约对海关制度的影响 [on the influence of Shimonoseki treaty and Xinchou Treaty on customs system]. *International Business: Journal of the University of International Business and Economics*. (3), 1989. 45 -- 49.

Charles H. Hedtke. The Szechwanese Railroad Protection Movement: Themes of Change and Conflict. 近代史研究所集刊, no. 6 (1977).

Chen Yibao 陈义报. cong 'man han 'dao 'zhong xi':min chu qing yi min shi ye zhong de hua yi zhi bian 从'满汉'到'中西':民初清遗民视野中的'华夷之辨 [From 'Manchu and Han' to 'Chinese and Western' : The Differentiation of 'Chinese and Foreigners' in the Vision of the Remnant of qing Dynasty in the Early Republic of China] Ningbo da Xue Xue Bao. Ren Wen Ke Xue Ban 32, No. 4 (2019): 87-94.

Chen, Shengli. 陈胜粦. Dui Xi Fang Tiao Zhan De Shou Ci Hui Ying: Ya Pian Zhan Zheng 对西方挑战的首次回应：鸦片战争 [The first response to the Western challenge: the Opium Wars]. Heritage Publishing House, 1990.

Chen, Shengli. 陈胜粦. Ya Pian Zhan Zheng Qian Hou Zhong Guo Ren Mian Dui Fang Shuang Chong Tiao Zhan De Hui Ying 鸦片战争前后中国人面对西方双重挑战的回应 [The Chinese response to the Twin Challenges of the West before and after the Opium War]. *Journal of Sun Yat-sen University. Philosophy and Social Sciences*, no. 1 (1991): 8-21.

Cheuk, Ka-Kin. Yellow Perils: China Narratives in the Contemporary World. Edited by Franck Billé and Sören Urbansky. *Pacific Affairs*, 93, no. 2 (2020): 415-417.

Cohen, P. A. and Swisher, E. China and Christianity: The Missionary Movement and the Growth of Chinese Antiforeignism, 1860-1870. *The American Historical Review*. The Macmillan Company (1964).

Cohen, P. A. *Discovering History in China: American Historical Writing on the Recent Chinese Past*. New York: Columbia University Press, (1984).

Cui, S. P. Supranational and Vassal Systems: The functioning and characteristics of the International Order in Ancient East Asia. *Journal of Humanities and Social Sciences*, *37*(2), (2017). 35-42.

Deng Zihan 邓梓晗. Qian tan yang wu yun dong de xing zhi 浅谈洋务运动的性质 [On the nature of westernization Movement]. *Youth*, No. 31 (2017): 9-16.

Esherick, Joseph, Hasan Kayalı, and Eric Van Young. *Empire to Nation: Historical Perspectives on the Making of the Modern World*. Lanham, Maryland; Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2006.

Eszterhai, V. Searching for an Alternative Global Order: The Qing Tributary System and the Mechanism of Guanxi. *Fudan Journal of The Humanities and Social Sciences*. [Online] 11 (4), (2017). 499-513.

Fairbank, J. K, and S. Y. Teng. On The Ch'ing Tributary System. *Harvard journal of Asiatic studies,* 6, no. 2 (1941): 135-246.

Fairbank, J. K. *The Chinese World Order: Traditional China's Foreign Fairbank Relations*, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1968.

Fang Weigui 方维规. "yi ""yang ""xi ""wai "ji qi xiang guan gai nian -lun 19shi ji han yu she wai ci hui he gai nian de yan bian "夷""洋""西""外"及其相关概念-论19世纪汉语涉外词汇和概念的演变 ["Yi", "Foreign", "Western", "Foreign" and their Related Concepts -- On the evolution of Chinese foreign-related Vocabulary and Concepts in the 19th Century], *Journal of Beijing Normal University* (Social Science Edition), no. 4, 2013, pp. 60-61.

Han, D. Y. (2020) The Rise and Fall of the Hua-Yi System in East Asia. *Journal of Chinese Humanities* (Leiden). [Online] 2019 (2), 200-214.

He Guichun 何桂春. shang hai zhong wai hui fang ju ji qi fan ge ming huo dong 上海中外会防局及其反革命活动 [The Defense Bureau of the Chinese and foreign Association in Shanghai and its counter-revolutionary activities]. Fujian Shi Fan da Xue Bao. Zhe Xue she Hui Ke Xue Ban, No.3 (1978): 76 -- 82.

Hevia, James Louis. *Cherishing Men from Afar: Qing Guest Ritual and the Macartney Embassy of 1793*. Durham, N.C.; Duke University Press, 1995.

Hevia, James Louis. *English Lessons: The Pedagogy of Imperialism in Nineteenth-Century China*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2003.

Jeyakumar, Uthra. Chinese Tributary System - the Way of Maintaining Order and Stability. *Academia Letters*, n.d. https://doi.org/10.20935/AL2886

Jian, J. B. 简军波. 中华朝贡体系: 观念结构与功能zhong hua chao gong ti xi : guan nian jie gou yu gong neng [Chinese Tributary System: Conceptual Structure and Function]. *International Political Studies*. (1), 132-143 (2009).

Jian, J. X. Qian tan chao gong ti xi 浅谈朝贡体系 [On tribute system]. (24), 41-42 (2016).

Kayaoglu, T. Westphalian Eurocentrism in International Relations Theory. *International Studies Review*, 12, no. 2 (2010): 193-217.

Keller, Wolfgang, Ben. Li, and Carol H. Shiue. *China's Foreign Trade Perspectives from the Past 150 Years*. Cambridge, Mass: National Bureau of Economic Research, 2010.

Kerr, A. & Wright, E. (2015). Shimonoseki, Treaty of (17 April 1895). *A Dictionary of World History*.

Kitson, P. J. The Last War of the Romantics: De Quincey, Macaulay, the First Chinese Opium War. *The Wordsworth Circle,* 49, no. 3 (2018): 148-158.

Kuhn, Philip A. *Rebellion and Its Enemies in Late Imperial China Militarization and Social Structure, 1796-1864*. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, (1980).

Leung, E. 梁伯華. jin dai zhong guo wai jiao de ju bian wai jiao zhi du yu zhong wai guan xi bian hua de yan jiu 近代中国外交的巨变外交制度与中外关系变化的研究 [The great changes of Modern Chinese diplomacy: a study of diplomatic system and the change of Sino-foreign relations], Hong Kong Commercial Press, (1990).

Levenson, J. R. *Confucian China and its modern fate: a trilogy*. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. (1958).

_____

Levenson, Joseph Richmond. *Confucian China and Its Modern Fate a Trilogy. 1st combined* ed. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1968.

Li Yumin 李育民. Zhong Guo Fei Yue Shi 中国废约史 [The History of Treaty Abolition in China]. Beijing: Zhong Hua Shu Ju, 2005

Li, H. (2010) from revolution to modernization: the paradigmatic transition in Chinese historiography in the reform era. *History and Theory* [Online], 49 (3), 336-360.

Li, J. From 'Yi Xia' to 'Zhonghua ':cong yi xia 'dao' zhong hua'; 'zhong hua min zu 'guan nian xing cheng shi qi de si xiang zhuan hua 从 '夷夏'到 '中华'：'中华民族'观念形成时期的思想转化 [From 'Yi Xia' to 'Zhonghua': The Ideological transformation during the Formation of the Concept of 'Chinese nation]". Xi Nan Min zu Da Xue Xue Bao. *Ren Wen She Ke Ban* 39, No. 1 (2018): 22-27.

Li, Yumin. 李育民. Lun qing zheng fu de xin shou tiao yue fang sheng ji qi bian hua 论清政府的信守条约方针及其变化 [On the policy of honoring treaties of Qing Government and its changes]. *Jin Dai Shi Yan Jiu*, No. 2 (2004): 45-90.

Liu, Lydia He. *The Clash of Empires: The Invention of China in Modern World Making*. Cambridge, Mass.; Harvard University Press, 2004.

Lovell, Julia. *The Opium War: Drugs, Dreams and the Making of China*. London: Picador, 2012.

Ma, Y. jia wu zhan zheng yu min zu guo jia gou jian 甲午战争与民族国家构建 [The Sino-Japanese War and nation-state Construction]. *National Human History*, No. 14 (2014): 78-82.

Mao H. J. 茅海建 (Translated by Lawson J, ed). Tian Chao De Ben Kui 天朝的崩溃 [The Qing Empire and the Opium War: Collapse of the Heavenly Dynasty]. Cambridge University Press, 2016.

Mao, Ze. Dong. 毛泽东 (1949). Zai Jin Sui Jie Fang Qu Gan Bu Hui Yi Shang De Jiang Hua在晋绥解放区干部会议上的讲话 [Speech at a conference of cadres in Shansi-Suiyuan liberated area], https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/mao/selected-works/volume-4/mswv4_35.html (1 April 1948).

Mao, Zedong 毛泽东. Mao Ze Dong Xuan Ji Di Wu Juan 毛泽东选集第五卷 [Selected Works of Mao Zedong volume 5]. People's Publishing House. 1977, 490.

Marx, K. & Engels, F. *The communist manifesto*. Auckland, New Zealand: The Floating Press. 1888.

Mazower, M. The End of Eurocentrism. *Critical Inquiry,* 40, no. 4 (2014): 298-313.

Michael, G. *Chinese Intellectuals and the Revolution of 1911: The Birth of Modern Chinese Radicalism* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1969), 248.

Motegi, Toshio. Yan, Li, Foreign Policy in Regard to Japan and Consciousness of the Japanese Language in the Late-Qing: Caught between Tribute and Treaty. *Study of Economic History* (Keizaishi Kenkyu) 14 (2011): 233-243.

Naraoka, S. *Chapter 3 Japan's Twenty-One Demands and Anglo-Japanese relations*. Taylor & Francis. (2017).

Paine, S. C. M. *The Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895: Perceptions, Power, and Primacy,* New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003.

Patton, S. The Peace of Westphalia and it Effects on International Relations, Diplomacy and Foreign Policy. *The Histories*: Vol. 10: Is. 1, Article 5 (2019).

Peck, J. *The roots of rhetoric: the professional ideology of America's China watchers*. Bull. of Concerned Asian Scholars (October). (1969). *Philosophy and Social Sciences*, no. 1 (1991): 8-21.

Rinke, S. Eurocentrism. *Encyclopaedia of Early Modern History Online*. Leiden, Koninklijke Brill NV, (2015).

Rupert, M. & Hazelle, A. (2016). *Historical materialism and globalization*. London, [England]; Routledge.

Said, E. W. (Edward William), and Eric Mottram. O*rientalism*. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, (1979).

Schuyler, George Samuel. *The Yellow Peril*. [First electronic edition]. Alexandria, VA: Alexander Street Press, 2004.

Shepherd, R. Human Rights, Modernization Theory, and China. *Critical Asian Studies,* 50, no. 3 (2018): 484-492.

Smith, R. J. Foreign-Training and China's Self-Strengthening: The Case of Feng-huang-shan, 1864-1873. *Modern Asian Studies*. [Online] 10 (2), (1976). 195-223.

Su Shuangbi 苏双碧. bi guan zi shou he di zhu jie ji di kang pai de jue qi 闭关自守和地主阶级抵抗派的崛起 [Isolation and the rise of resistance of the landlord class]. Tianjin Shehui Kexue, No. 3 (1986): 57-62.

Teng, Ssü-yü, and John King Fairbank. *Research Guide for China's Response to the West: A Documentary Survey* 1839-1923. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1954.

Tsiang Tingfu 蒋廷黻. Jin dai zhong guo wai jiao shi zi liao ji yao 近代中国外交史资料辑要 [A summary of modern Chinese diplomatic history] Tai bei; Shang wu yin shu guan Taipei 台北: 商务印书馆 The Commercial Press, 1958.

Tsiang Tingfu 蒋廷黻. Zhong Guo Jin Dai Shi Da Gang 中国近代史 [The Outline of Modern Chinese History]. Taiwan Qiming Book Company, 1949.

Wallerstein, I. M. *Historical Capitalism: with Capitalist Civilization. Eleventh impression*. London: Verso, (2003).

Wallerstein, I. M. *The Modern World System*. New York; Academic Press, (1974).

Wang Rixuan. Gu yanwu de tian xia guan ji qi xian dai xing zhuan hua顾炎武的'天下观'及其现代性转化 [Gu Yanwu's view of the world and its transformation of modernity] Journal of Chaohu University 22, No. 1 (2020): 17-24.

Wang Xiuling 王秀玲. qing dai guo jia ji si ji qi zheng zhi yu yi 清代国家祭祀及其政治寓意 [State sacrifice in qing Dynasty and its political implication]. Frontiers, No. 6 (2016): 103-107.

Wang Zhixian王之宪. jie chu de min zu ying xiong lin ze xu ——ji nian ya pian zhan zheng 150 zhou nian 杰出的民族英雄林则徐——纪念鸦片战争150周年 Lin Zexu, an outstanding national hero -- commemorating the 150th anniversary of the Opium War. Dongbei Lin Ye Da Xue Xue Bao, No. S1 (1990): 48-50.

Wang, H. tan xi ya pian zhan zheng dui zhong guo she hui fa zhan de ying xiang 探析鸦片战争对中国社会发展的影响 [Explored the influence of opium War on China's social development]. *Modern Educational Science: Middle school Teachers*, (6), 144-144 (2012).

Wang, J. *Unequal treaties and China* (2-volume set). Vol. 1. Honolulu, HI: Enrich Professional Publishing. (2015).

Wei, Yuan 魏源 (1852): Hai Guo Tu Zhi 海图国志 [Atlas of the Sea and the Kingdom], vol. 19. Chen Hua et al. Annotation, Yuelu Publishing house, 1998.

Wijesinghe, Sarah N.R, Paolo Mura, and Harold John Culala. Eurocentrism, Capitalism and Tourism Knowledge. *Tourism Management* (1982) 70 (2019): 178-187.

William C. K. Traditions of Centrality, Authority, and Management in Modern China's Foreign Relations, in Thomas W. Robinson and David L. Shambaugh. eds. *Chinese Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice* (Oxford University Press, 1994), 17.

Wu Tong. Li hong zhang wai jiao si xiang tan xi李鸿章外交思想探析Analysis of Li Hongzhang's diplomatic thought. *Time Report*, no. 16 (2017, 96).

Xu, Guoqi. *China and the Great War: China's Pursuit of a New National Identity and Internationalization*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005.

_____

Yan Tang 汤岩, gu dai zhong guo zhu dao de guo ji fa: li nian yu zhi du 古代中国主导的国际法：理念与制度 [International Law dominated by Ancient China: Ideas and Institutions]. *Journal of Central South University (Social Science)* 21, No. 5 (2015): 99-104.

Yi, S. Y. zhong ri zai chao xian de jing zheng yu jin dai dong ya chao gong ti xi de bian qian 中日在朝鲜的竞争与近代东亚朝贡体系的变迁 (1876-1910) [Competition between China and Japan in Korea and the Evolution of tributary System in Modern East Asia (1876-1910)]. Xiangtan University, (2018).

Yu, L & Xia, Y. yang wu yun dong zhong li hong zhang dui wai zhu zhang zhi de shi yan jiu 洋务运动中李鸿章对外主张之得失研究 [Study on the gain and loss of Li Hongzhang's foreign propositions in the Westernization Movement]. Liaoning Shi da Xue Bao. Liaoning Shida Xuebao. *She Hui Ke Xue Ban* 34, No. 6 (2011): 134-137.

Yue Huankuan. Qian tan kong zi de min zu guan 浅谈孔子的民族观 [A Brief discussion on Confucius' national view]. *Heilongjiang shi zhi*, no. 23 (2010).

Zhang Hua 张桦. chuan tong wen hua yu jing xia de wan qing xian zheng yu fu qiang zhi lu 传统文化语境下的晚清宪政与富强之路 [Constitutionalism and prosperity in the Late Qing Dynasty in the Context of Traditional Culture]. Southwest University of Political Science and Law, 2012.

Zhang, J. 张季. cong zong li ya men dao wai wu bu ——Qing ji bu yuan yong ren ti zhi gai ge chu tan从总理衙门到外务部——清季部院用人体制改革初探 [From the Prime Minister's Yamen to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs: A preliminary study on the Reform of the Staffing system in the Qing Dynasty]. *Li Shi Dang An*, No. 2 (2014): 91-96.

Zhang, S. M. A Historical and Jurisprudential Analysis of Suzerain–Vassal State Relationships in the Qing Dynasty. Frontiers of history in China. [Online] *1*(1), 124-157. (2006).

Zhao Keyao 赵克尧, Liu Jingcheng 刘精诚. Lun qing guande ben zhi he zuo yong 论清官的本质与作用 [On the essence and function of honest and upright officials]. *Xueshu Yuekan*, No. 12 (1965): 24-30.

Zhao, E. X. 赵尔巽. Qing Shi Gao, Juan Jiu Shi Yi 清史稿 卷九十一 [Manuscript of the Qing Dynasty: The 91th Chronicle]. China: Historical Museum of the Republic of China. 1914.

Zhao, N. 赵宁. Qian xi jin dai kai yan kan shi jie de bi ran xing 浅析近代开眼看世界的必然性 [On the necessity of seeing the world in modern times]. *Education*, No. 1 (2016): 133-133.

Zhao, P. fen xi qing chao de bi guan suo guo zheng ce de bu li ying xiang 分析清朝的闭关锁国政策的不利影响 [Analysis of the adverse effects of the closed policy of the Qing Dynasty]. *Journal of Nanchang Institute of Education*, No. 6 (2013): 58-59.

Zhao, Y. T. 赵云田. Qing chao de li fan yuan 清朝的理藩院 [The Board of Vassal states in Qing Dynasty]. *Beijing Observation*, No. 5 (2013): 72-75.

Zhou, X周翔. cong Qing chao wai jiao ji gou de bian hua tan zhong guo wai jiao jin dai hua从清朝外交机构的变化谈中国外交近代化 [On the modernization of Chinese diplomacy from the Change of Diplomatic Institutions in Qing Dynasty]. *Frontiers*, No. 1 (2014): 215-216.

AIMS AND SCOPE

The OJSH, as an international multi-disciplinary peer-reviewed *online open access academic journal*, publishes academic articles deal with different problems and topics in various areas of history (prehistory, ancient history, post-classical history, modern history, contemporary history, world history, regional history, people's history, military history, cultural history, economic history, political history, intellectual history, history of science, history of arts, counterfactual history, comparative history, psychohistory, philosophy of history, historiography, historical methodology, critical theory, archeology, palaeography, palaeoanthropology, history and related disciplines, etc.).

The OJSH aims to publish articles, reviews of recent historical literature, review essays, summaries of books, etc. A broad range of historical approaches is accepted, including social, economic, political, diplomatic, intellectual and cultural.

The OJSH is already indexed in Crossref (DOI), BASE (Bielefeld Academic Search Engine), Google Scholar, J-Gate, ResearchBib and WorldCat-OCLC, and is applied for indexing in the other bases (Clarivate Analytics – SCIE, ESCI and AHCI, Scopus, ERIH Plus, Ulrich's Periodicals Directory, Cabell's Directory, SHERPA/RoMEO, etc.).

The authors of articles accepted for publishing in the OJSH should get the ORCID number (www.orcid.org).

The journal is now publishing 2 times a year.

PEER REVIEW POLICY

All manuscripts submitted for publishing in the OJSH are expected to be free from language errors and must be written and formatted strictly according to the latest edition of the APA style. Manuscripts that are not entirely written according to APA style and/or do not reflect an expert use of the English language will *not* be considered for publication and will *not* be sent to the journal reviewers for evaluation. It is completely the author's responsibility to comply with the rules. We highly recommend that non-native speakers of English have manuscripts proofread by a copy editor before submission. However, proof of copy editing does *not* guarantee acceptance of a manuscript for publication in the OJSH.

The OJSH operates a double-blind peer reviewing process. The manuscript should not include authors' names, institutional affiliations, contact information. Also, authors' own works need to be blinded in the references (see the APA style). All submitted manuscripts are reviewed by the editors, and only those meeting the aims and scope of the journal will be sent for outside review. Each manuscript is reviewed by at least two reviewers.

The editors are doing their best to reduce the time that elapses between a paper's submission and publication in a regular issue. It is expected that the review and publication processes will be completed in about 2-3 months after submission depending on reviewers' feedback and the editors' final decision. If revisions are requested some changing and corrections then publication time becomes longer. At the end of the review process, accepted papers will be published on the journal's website.

_____

OPEN ACCESS POLICY

The OJSH is an open access journal which means that all content is freely available without charge to the user or his/her institution. Users are allowed to read, download, copy, distribute, print, search, or link to the full texts of the articles, or use them for any other lawful purpose, without asking prior permission from the publisher or the author. This is in accordance with the BOAI definition of open access.

Center for Open Access in Science