



Center for Open Access in Science

Open Journal for
Studies in Philosophy

2024 • Volume 8 • Number 1

<https://doi.org/10.32591/coas.ojsp.0801>

ISSN (Online) 2560-5380

OPEN JOURNAL FOR STUDIES IN PHILOSOPHY (OJSP)

ISSN (Online) 2560-5380

<https://www.centerprode.com/ojsp.html>

ojsp@centerprode.com

Publisher:

Center for Open Access in Science (COAS)

Belgrade, SERBIA

<https://www.centerprode.com>

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Predictability and Liberty

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Received: 31 December 2023 ▪ Revised: 18 April 2024 ▪ Accepted: 24 April 2024

Abstract

Predictability tends to elicit a clear behavioral response and hence, for humans, it is a basic need in both their physical and social environment. However, the liberty inherent in a democratic society makes life essentially unpredictable and, in this sense, may create a sense of unease in its citizens who then may strive for stability in dogma. Dogmatism, however, is antithetical to democratic liberty. Once we take up this Janus focus of democracy, i.e., that it can lead to the best of times and the worst of times, it becomes clear that, to preserve democracy, we must educationally invest in anchoring predictability in the individuals rather than in the environment in which they subsist, and that we can achieve this (i) by explicating clearly to young citizens that the chaos of reasons doing battle is fundamentally different from the chaos of persons doing battle, and (ii) by shoring up what Charles Taylor (1989) calls strong evaluation, i.e., shoring up the ability to confidently and independently judge the worth of any proposed action and how it reflects on one's ideal self. We will argue, perhaps counterintuitively, that this confidence in the predictability of one's capacity for independent thought can best be achieved through an education that affords frequent engagement in "truth-seeking" interpersonal inquiries of the sort frequently utilized the practice of Philosophy for Children, but one that is buttressed by reinforcing the belief in Truth and, as well, by exposing participants to "truth-seeking" interpersonal dialogues that are focused on genuine, relevant, and difficult moral quandaries.

Keywords: predictability, liberty, strong evaluation, Philosophy for Children, democracy, reasoning.

1. Introduction

Predictability tends to elicit a clear behavioural response and hence, for humans, it is a basic need in both their physical and social environment. However, the liberty inherent in a democratic society, though to many an ideal state, makes life essentially unpredictable and, in this sense, may create a sense of unease in its citizens who then may strive for stability in dogma. Dogmatism, however, is antithetical to democratic liberty.

This paradox, that liberty on the one hand seems like a basic goal for most humans but, on the other, brings with it an environment that is anathema to many, may ultimately undermine the viability of democracy, particularly, again paradoxically, when that democracy is not under external threat, since an external threat creates a clear predictable call to arms. This

itself gives birth to a further paradox and that is that, though conflict with an external power is clearly unpredictable, the internal matrix of the society in times of conflict is stable.

On the assumption that most democracies do not want to depend on an external invasion to stabilize their internal matrix—though Irshad Manji wonders if we should pray for intergalactic aliens to storm Planet Earth so we can all act together in fear of the new “them” (2019, p. 130)—we suggest that educators take seriously the unease citizens often feel when subjected to democratic chaos, and that they recognize that the battlefield tactics often used to bring everyone in line in such situations are, at their core, a yearning for predictability. On the assumption that such battlefield tactics undermine the possibility of democratic dialogue and hence the viability of a democratic way of life, it will be argued that the goal of educators ought to be twofold: (i) to explicate clearly to young democratic citizens that the chaos inherent in a democracy is essentially different than chaos *per se*, i.e., that *reasons* doing battle is fundamentally different from *persons* doing battle in that, while the outcome is unpredictable, the process ought not to be, and (ii) to assuage the need for predictability by relocating it internally, hence dissipating the urgency to create external predictability through attempts at forced conformity while at the same time, arming young citizens with the necessary tools to engage in democratic often chaotic dialogue while avoiding battlefield tactics.

Here it is being suggested that shoring up the predictability of an individual’s internal environment requires an education that nurtures what Charles Taylor (1989) calls *strong evaluation*, i.e., the ability to confidently and independently judge the worth of any proposed action and how it reflects on one’s ideal self.

While it may initially seem counterintuitive to some, we will argue that this ability to confidently and *independently* judge the worth of any proposed action and how it reflects on one’s ideal self requires an education that affords frequent engagement in “truth-seeking” *interpersonal* inquiries that are focused on genuine, relevant, and difficult moral quandaries in which participants have something at stake. These are the sorts of inquiries that frequently transpire within the context of Philosophy for Children¹ that utilized the Community of Philosophical Inquiry (Kennedy & Kennedy, 2011), as its prime pedagogical format. However, we suggest, in addition, (i) and in concert with the unlikely ally of Michel Foucault, that internal predictability requires a special emphasis on *truth*, since truth will be the guiding light that affords the sense of predictability, and (ii) that the topics under inquiry are specifically focused on *genuine, relevant, and difficult moral quandaries in which participants have something at stake*, since participants will need frequent practice in changing their minds in the face of “truthier” options so that, in the real world, they do not become disoriented when reason requires that they toss tried and true assumptions and opinions into the dustbin.

2. Predictability is a basic need

For all organisms, predictability is a basic need. Being able to model the environment in way that affords a clear response is crucially important because it maximizes our chances of survival and the pursuit of desirable ends. Gardner, in her article, “Education in the context of Uncertainty” (2023), refers to this need for predictability as the “will to stability” and notes that,

“as anyone with any knowledge of animals will tell you, lack of predictability is the source of extreme anxiety. Better to know that that is a predator, than to not be sure. A clear stimulus elicits a clear response. Ambiguity can leave us paralyzed” (pp. 166-7).

¹ <https://www.icpic.org/>.

Humans, however, are in a more dire predicament than nonhumans. Aside from always being on the lookout for what supports or hinders *bodily integrity*, humans also need to be on the lookout for what supports or hinders what might be termed *self-integrity*. Thus, Charles Taylor, in his book, *Sources of The Self* (1989) argues that,

“the difference between humans and non-humans is that the former live within a framework or horizon, i.e., that the question arises as to the worth of your life, that you live in a public space and may be spotlighted with respect or contempt” (p. 25).

Taylor argues that predictability within the human *evaluative* environment can, aside from the physical environment, likewise be considered a basic need. He claims, for instance, that an “identity crisis” results when people feel they occupy a space of radical uncertainty, when they “lack a frame or horizon within which things can take on a stable significance, within which some life possibilities can be seen as good or meaningful, others bad and trivial” (p. 27). Adding to this is Erich Fromm’s (1941) observation that in addition to meeting their physiological needs, humans need a sense of belonging and stable relationship to the social world in which they live (*Escape from Freedom*, p. 15). When individuation is pushed to its limits, primary ties are severed and the individual feels isolated, anxious, and paralyzed (p. 17, 20).

3. Democratic chaos gives rise to “A will to dogma”

When Alexis de Tocqueville (1835) spoke about the democratic atmosphere in his book *Democracy in America*, he used the choice words of “disorder,” “agitation,” “conflict” and “confusion” (p. 21). Twenty-four years later, John Stuart Mill (1859) published *On Liberty in* which he argued that, despite its often-unpleasant nature, democracy—and the conflicting ideas it gives rise to—are the very foundation of freedom, and what allow us to test the stalwartness of our ideas.

If Mill is correct in his assessment regarding the importance of this conflict quagmire, this fact does nothing to downplay or mitigate the psychological pains experienced by those in the midst of it. In his (1941) book *Escape from Freedom*, Erich Fromm argues that most peoples’ experience of democratic freedom is exhausting and agonizing rather than liberating because it severs primary ties, demands that one take responsibility for their choices, puts one into conflict with others in pursuit of their own ends, and is often rife with unpredictability (p. 17, 21). As he puts it, “Freedom, though it has brought [man] independence and rationality, has made him isolated and, thereby, anxious and powerless” (p. 9). In response to this angst, Fromm argues that ideological dogma and authoritarianism appear as welcome havens and sources of reprieve (p. 131, 134). As Fromm writes, by allying oneself to such forces “One also gains security against the torture of doubt” (p. 134).

Similarly, in his 1999 book *Maps of Meaning*, psychologist Jordan Peterson argues that the temptation to surrender one’s individuality and freedom is ever-alluring because it presents itself as the promise of certainty and security (p. 378). The inclination to not take any unnecessary risks is evolutionarily advantageous for one’s bodily integrity, but evolutionarily disastrous for one’s self-integrity, as it saps one of their creativity, foments resentment, and, as the next section will outline, predisposes one to danger brought on by willful blindness.

4. But democratic chaos is a safeguard against dogmatic blindness

Democracy only works if agents take responsibility for critically evaluating the actions of the society in which they live. This critical evaluation, from persons of different political persuasions and convictions, helps to create a cross-elimination of error (Surowiecki, 2004). In

the absence of such rigorous evaluation, a society is left vulnerable to ideologies, i.e., myopic and rigid misconceptions of the world that oversimplify and misassign value.

In his book *Beyond Order* (2021), author Jordan Peterson argues that one must be wary of ideology because it puts one at risk of serious miscalculation and error. In Peterson's words, ideology is a "fatal attraction" because it "hypersimplifies" existence (p. 169). The antidote to ideology, in turn, is to treat problems at the right level of focus with the care that they deserve. In other words, we must abandon thumbnail images for highly-pixelated renderings if we are to adequately understand and address the problems polluting our social environment.

Democratic debate, of the right kind, helps ensure that issues are pushed beyond a superficial rendering and adequately explored and discussed. This, in turn, helps minimize the blindness that ideology and dogmatism give rise to because democracy allows for the cross-elimination of error through falsification and perspective-exposure. This is not a new point, and one that harkens back to Socrates, Plato and others who pointed out the power of logos to illuminate the right way of living. Most poignantly, John Stuart Mill (1859) articulated this idea in his work *On Liberty*. Mill writes,

"He who knows only his own side of the case knows little of that. His reasons may be good, and no one may have been able to refute them. But if he is equally unable to refute the reasons on the opposite side, if he does not so much as know what they are, he has no ground for preferring either opinion [...] Nor is it enough that he should hear the opinions of adversaries from his own teachers, presented as they state them, and accompanied by what they offer as refutations. He must be able to hear them from persons who actually believe them [...] he must know them in their most plausible and persuasive form" (p. 36).

Mill's point takes aim at the false sense of confidence and security many have in views not yet challenged or exposed to critique. Importantly, this preference for one's own views is not rational, as the strength of any position can only be determined by testing it against the viewpoints of others. This, crucially, is why democracy is so important: it provides the environment in which the process of error-elimination can transpire.

While the process of exposing one's viewpoints to others feels tumultuous, as it is inevitably accompanied by cognitive dissonance (Heine & Proulx, 2006), insecurity (Peterson, 1999), and doubt (Fromm, 1941), it is ultimately in the best interest of the selves, as it helps ensure they have ridded their maps of inaccuracies and tested their ideas through dialogue. The alternative, to this course, though often not articulated, is to learn what ideas are sound and misguided through pain and disaster.

5. The difference between democratic chaos and battlefield chaos

Democratic governance is chaotic in the sense that one can never be sure of the outcome when people of different persuasions engage in dialogue, nor, of course, can one be sure of the results of any given election. On the other hand, it needs to be recognized that democracy is not intended to be chaotic in the same way that chaos *per se* reigns, for example, on the battlefield since in the former, it is presumed that the battle is fought with reasons, unlike the latter in which the battle is fought between persons.

However, it is critical that in order for *reasons* rather than *persons* to do battle, participants must recognize the fundamental difference between the two, and the mark that participants have indeed recognized that this is a battle of reasons and not persons is, at least according to Stephen Darwell (2006), that they engage with one another in what he refers to as "the second-person stance"; that in making claims and demands of one another, they presuppose that they share a common second-personal authority, competence, and responsibility simply as

free and rational agents (p. 5) and in this sense, they show one another reciprocal respect (p. 21); that they accept that the reasons they offer are grounded in something that is independent of their stance, that they are believer-neutral (p. 56); that they recognize that this process is *fundamentally different from coercion* in that it seeks to direct the other through her own free choice and in a way that recognizes her status as a free and rational agent, with the goal, in other words, being to *guide rather than goad* (emphasis added, p. 49). It is, thus, in this sense that, while the *outcome* of “democratic chaos” may be unpredictable, the *process*, at least insofar as it remains under second-personal authority, ought to not to be.

However, according to Darwell, there is a distinct downside to this form of interpersonal negotiation and that is that we must give up on focusing *how we want the world to be* and instead recognize that what is important is *how we relate to one another* (p. 38). And to Darwell’s claim it might be added that we ought to give up focusing on trying to *persuade* the other on what we *know* to be the case, and instead recognize that, in gaining a glimpse of how it is possible—curiously—that another reasonable being sees the issue in a completely different way, we will thereby gain a significantly *deeper understanding* of the issue at hand—like talking to others each of who have access to different parts of the elephant.

But, wanting the world to be x or not-x and wanting others to see the world the same way we do sometimes become so overwhelming that “so-called” reasoners revert to battlefield tactics of ad hominem attacks and outright falsifications with such force that democratic chaos regresses into battlefield chaos which, in turn, instigates widespread fear of the unpredictability to which it gives rise, thus instigating a negative feedback loop. In the process, individuals lose their own agency as critical reflectors and evaluators and become, instead, dogmatic propaganda factories seeking forced agreement.

6. Relocating predictability internally through educating for strong evaluation.

For democracy to survive, clearly it is imperative that democratic citizens be educated so as not to fear democratic chaos. Such an education, we suggest, must focus on helping young citizens understand that they do not need a predictable external environment as long as they have absolute confidence in the stability of the internal environment, i.e., in their capacity to evaluate and respond effectively to the questions that their lives ask of them (Frankl, 1984). As Fromm (1941) writes, “the real aim of education is to further the inner independence and individuality of the child, its growth and integrity” (p. 209).

In describing this capacity, Charles Taylor, in his book *Sources of the Self* (1989) describes the human predicament as “a space of questions” (p. 29) and he argues that being able to confidently answer these questions is necessary to provide “the horizon within which we know where we stand, and what meanings things have for us” (p. 29).

What is particularly interesting about Taylor’s analysis is that he says this “horizon” is one that made up of strong evaluations (p. 29) and that this framework of strongly valued goods is necessary for agency (p. 31). In other words, we don’t have selves in the way that we have hearts and livers. We are only selves only insofar as we move in a certain space of questions, as we seek and find an orientation of the good (p. 34).

Elsewhere, in his book *Human Agency and Language* (1985), Taylor argues that the goal for each self is to become a “*strong evaluator*” (p. 23), i.e., an individual who can envision alternatives through a rich linguistic matrix, and so decide the best course of action utilizing a *vocabulary of worth* (p. 24), as opposed to one of *simple desires*. This is similar to Harry Frankfurt’s (1971) notion of accessing second order desires, i.e., having the capacity to make qualitative characterizations of desires as higher and lower, noble and base.

It is important to note that, when Taylor describes the goal of selves is to become *strong* evaluators, he is not saying that we need to *strongly* stick to our own values. On the contrary. A strong evaluator is someone who remains strongly committed to the *process* that results in the emergence and continual honing of the values that guide their decisions and choices. It is a form of practical reasoning which he describes as

“reasoning in transitions. It aims to establish, not that some position is correct absolutely, but rather that some position is superior to some other. It is concerned, covertly or openly, implicitly or explicitly, with comparative propositions. We show one of these comparative claims to be well founded when we can show that the *move* from A to B constitutes a gain epistemologically” (Taylor, 1989: 72).

The nerve of the rational proof in practical reasoning thus consists in showing that this is an error-reducing move (p. 72).

In focusing on the dynamics of practical reasoning in interpersonal space, a process described by Habermas as communicative action (1992), it is important not to overlook that Taylor is also making the claim that having a rich linguistic matrix is equally vital for becoming a strong evaluator since it enables us to see the world through high-value glasses. That is, instead of viewing potential motivations entirely in terms of the attraction of their consummations, motivations are also judged in terms of the kind of life and the kind of subject that they properly belong to (Taylor, 1985: 25). A strong evaluator thus asks, “In doing this, what kind of person do I become?” It is seeing the world through this additional dimension that such reflections take us to the center of our existence as agents (p. 26).

In summary, then, an education for withstanding, indeed embracing, democratic chaos requires that young citizens have extensive practice in utilizing, withdrawing, and reworking strong evaluative predicates within the context of hard-nosed interpersonal practical reasoning about issues in which they have something at stake. It is only in this way that they will develop the confidence that, regardless of the interchange, they can predict that they will be able to hold onto the rudder that points to the best versions of themselves. And, as long as they have a strong sense of predictability in their practical reasoning, they will be less inclined to try to force predictability onto the environment in which they move.

We suggest that an education that enables young citizens to maintain their bearings within democratic chaos can emerge within the practice Philosophy for Children.² However, in order to strongly anchor the sense of internal predictability, we suggest that it ought to be buttressed with two educational pillars. These pillars, we would argue are:

1. A belief in truth,
2. Practice in engaging in “truth-seeking” interpersonal dialogue that are focused on genuine, relevant, and difficult moral quandaries.

We will deal with these in turn.

7. Two specific educational pillars for internal predictability

7.1 *A belief in truth*

Clearly even animals depend on truth. They develop all their learned responses because of their innate belief in the truth of reality. For humans, however, this anchoring dependence is threatened, on the one hand by the contemporary cynical relativist notion that truth

² <https://www.icpic.org/>.

is just a matter of power, and on the other by an absolutist notion that truth is an ironclad concept, and since truth is always changing, there can be no truth.

But if there is no truth, there is no possibility of believing that there is any point in engaging practical reasoning. This is so because believing that practical reasoning has any worth is dependent upon the unshakable belief that through *error-reducing* second-personal dialogue, we are better able to decide which of competing alternatives is the least-worst (Gardner, 2000: 28-31) and so move ever closer to a more adequate understanding or “truthier” position.

To those of a post-modern bent, the claim that we ought to have an unshakable belief in our capacity to journey *toward* truth may seem highly contentious, even ludicrous and to think otherwise is heretical. However, Bruce Moghtader, in his book, *Foucault and Educational Ethics* (2015) argues that, contrary to contemporary assumptions, Foucault, the standard bearer of post-modernism, was passionate about truth.

Foucault, of course, did indeed worry about truth claims, but his critique was aimed at our lackadaisical attitude toward truth claims, i.e., that we tend to be happy to let others do the heavy lifting and thus, are often content to just accept what others tell us is true. But the biggest problem for Foucault was that, in terms of truth, we are looking in the wrong *direction*, i.e., for Foucault, our most important task in life is to see the truth about *ourselves*, rather than primarily focusing on the truth about what’s out there.

Thus, Foucault differed from Kant in that he suggested that “a critique” should not be a critical philosophy that seeks to determine the condition and the limits of our possible knowledge of the object, but a critical philosophy that seeks the condition and the indefinite possibilities of transforming the subject, of transforming ourselves (Moghtader, 2015: 20); that the main interest in life and work is to become someone else that you were not in the beginning (p. 36); that the pivotal question that we ought to face is how we move from being determined by others and cultural practices to being self-determining (p. 36).

This movement toward self-determination, according to Foucault, requires that we engage in a process of problematization—a process that poses rather than answers ethical questions (Moghtader, 2015: 72), and, in so doing, we come to set rules of conduct for ourselves (p. 72) in recognizing our moral obligation as members of a human community (p. 73). According to Foucault, this process, requires a severe form of self-discipline or *askesis* (p. 73, p. 77), something that is best developed under the direction of a teacher who helps us to self-examine our day-to-day conduct and nudges us towards self-mastery (p. 81). This teacher must be a *parrhesiast* or one who uses frank speech—a truth teller, who does not *show* the other self-awareness but *leads* the interlocutor to *internalize* the parrhesiastic, i.e., the truth telling, struggle (p. 83).

Parrhesia, as the activity of telling the truth, hearing the truth and establishing a relationship to the truth, is an educational practice that evokes care and curiosity in studying (Moghtader, 2015: 100), so that one may think differently again and again in steady transformation. This “care of the self” (p. 102), this “subjectivation” (p. 73), is an avenue of forming and reforming the truth about ourselves (p. 102).

This notion of parrhesia of forming and reforming the truth thus mirrors Taylor’s (1989) description of the strong evaluator as reasoning in transitions; as aiming to establish, not that some position is correct absolutely, but rather that some position is superior to some other; as concerned, covertly or openly, implicitly or explicitly, with comparative propositions; as knowing that one of these comparative claims is well founded when the *move* from A to B constitutes an epistemological gain (Taylor, 1989: 72).

In understanding this notion of parrhesia, of forming and reforming what ought to be counted as true, young democratic citizens will be able to not only appreciate the fecundity of democratic chaos, but as well, will be able to maintain their bearings in what may seem like

democratic pandemonium. They will also be armed with dealing with the relativist, the arch enemy of predictability, who might say, “Why should I listen to you? Afterall, everyone’s opinion is as good as everyone else’s. In any case, there is no such thing as truth.”

Such comments, though seemingly innocent on the surface and apparently democratic in orientation, are, in fact, dangerous, damaging, and destabilizing since the assumption that everyone’s opinion is as good as anyone else’s signals that success in dialogue can thereby only be a function of force and deviousness. It thus serves as a call to the parapets and forecasts the inevitable unpredictability of battlefield chaos.

In understanding the nature of truth, the parrhesiast can redirect the energy of the relativist’s comment by responding that “of course, you are right, I cannot know ‘Truth’ when I see it, but I can most certainly detect when the reasoning that supports any position is faulty. Absolute Truth is like absolute cleanliness. For all practical purposes there is no such thing. However, from that admission, it does not follow that we therefore should not engage in “truth-processing” any more than it means that we should not wash” (Gardner, 2009: 35-6).

7.2 Practice in engaging in “truth-seeking” interpersonal dialogue that are focused on genuine, relevant, and difficult moral quandaries in which participants have something at stake.

Engaging young people in “truth-seeking” interpersonal dialogue is what Philosophy for Children (P4C) (and its pedagogical touchstone the Community of Philosophical Inquiry (CPI)) is all about. And many practitioners have argued that a good question is pivotal to a good inquiry (Cam, 2006; Turgeon, 2015; Worley, 2015; Weber & Wolf, 2017). However, we would like to add that not sufficient emphasis is being put on subjecting young people to genuine, relevant, and difficult moral questions.

That this hasn’t been recognized as a necessary condition is hardly surprising. Since one of the ways that P4C first gained prominence in the 1980’s was through its accurate claim that it promoted good thinking skills (Shipman, 1983), it has tended to focus on questions that seem ripe for gathering multiple responses without too much tension. Thus, the following sorts of questions are often considered not only adequate but often superlative since these are the sort that are often tackled in the parent discipline (note: many of the questions below come from IAPC manuals).

What is art?

Is the ship of Theseus the same ship at the end of the voyage as it was at the beginning?

Can you step into the same river twice?

What is time?

Was electricity discovered or invented?

What is thinking?

What is the difference between wishing and hoping?

Are words things?

Is possible to “hear” colours?

What is the difference between an ordinary tree and a beautiful tree?

Are numbers real?

All of the above are fascinating questions and may lead to lively discussions that may foster good thinking skills. However, we would suggest that they are less than they could be because participants don't really care what the answer is, and hence don't really mind which opinions seem strongest. For that reason, they won't feel the difficulty of having to leave an old and trusted opinions behind. But having practice in dealing with this feeling of uncertainty when an old and trusted opinion is left behind is precisely what is necessary for them to recognize that they can still have faith in their capacity to move boldly forward even if they change their minds.

We need to remember that old opinions are like old furniture in your mind. They provide a reliable compass for negotiating interpersonal interactions. Thus, giving up on one of these reliable friends is a lot like moving the furniture in a blind person's home: it can signal lack of predictability.

But students need practice is tolerating this kind of unpredictability so that they can more easily engage in its trigger, i.e., changing their minds, even when it seems that "what seems like" their wellbeing is at stake. If young people are frequently faced with such question as, e.g., Are you a coward if you don't say anything when a classmate cheats on a quiz? Are you unethical if you try to convince your teacher that you ought to have a higher grade on an assignment? Are you unethical if you buy more than you really need? Is it wrong to bring your cell phone to a dinner table? Are you being unethical if you don't volunteer to do chores at home? Are you unethical if you don't always do your best in your academic pursuits? etc., they will not only be more inclined to be invested in the inquiry, but they will also, with practice, not become disoriented when reason seems to pressure them to change their minds.

In their book, *Philosophy with Teenagers: Nurturing A Moral Imagination for the 21st Century* (2009), Hannam and Echeverria argue that:

"In the old ways of learning, in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, we were preparing young people for a different kind of world. In the old ways of learning young people were being prepared for working in factories, where they needed to be able to follow instructions. . . (But) In the new globalized world there will be many uncertainties; there will be a need to develop new kinds of skills and competences" (p. 60).

They go on to argue that, in such uncertain times as ours, when there are conflicting messages and sometimes, even conflicting moralities, it is not always clear which way we should go but that, with a participatory democratic education that is afforded through participation in communities of philosophical investigation, young people can develop the skills needed to bring about another kind of shared understanding where all can flourish (p. 61); the confidence that they will be able to refine and renew of the world's problems and the ongoing changes in all societies (p. 62). They argue that this is not only good for society but also for the individuals as it is through the *process* of thinking philosophically "that we can grow and develop into moral beings capable of grasping the future" (p. 62).

We concur with the above message but would add that, for the process of thinking to anchor predictability, and hence for young people to the grow and develop into capable moral beings, they must have frequent exposure to facilitated communities of inquiry that focus on genuine, relevant, and difficult moral quandaries anchored in the unshakeable belief that they have the capacity to move toward truth.

8. Conclusion

We are certainly not the first to suggest that a certain kind of education is necessary for the maintenance of democracy. John Dewey (2007) famously argued that "fuller, freer, and more fruitful association and intercourse of all human beings with one another must be instilled

as a working disposition of mind” (p. 76) if we are to expect democracy to survive. It should be noted that this claim comes immediately after his comment that “It is not enough to teach the horrors of war and to avoid everything which would stimulate international jealousy and animosity.” The juxtaposition of these two assertions, interestingly, suggest why Dewey’s admonition that education for more fruitful dialogue was rarely taken seriously. Given that most of the 20th century had democracies experiencing “the horrors of war” (both hot and cold, both weaponized and economic), it is not surprising that educators have been more focused on ensuring that democratic citizens are equipped to do their part to ensure the survival of their nation through being superlative economic contributors, and so would tend to completely ignore Dewey’s warning that they ought to “beware of disciplinary training rather than personal development” (p. 73) or that “Education in a democracy cannot be justified solely by its potential for material output” (p. 93).

None of this is to suggest, of course, that we ought to denigrate “material output.” While clearly capitalism has many faults (Hellwig, 2021), that it has produced the kind of material output that has hitherto kept most democracies safe should not be overlooked. However, we suggest that our concern about the viability of democracy like our concern for the maintenance of predictability, is over-focused on what is happening on the outside. The liberty that we so treasure must be buoyed by an education that renders its citizens worthy of that liberty—a message echoed by Victor Frankl (1984) who suggested that a Statue of Responsibility be built on the west coast of America so that a deeper meaning can be given to the Statue of Liberty on the east coast (p. 156).

Citizens who have confidence that they can reason objectively and know that they will not lose their bearings if they change their minds as a function of the strongest reasons, even on issues in which they have something at stake, will rarely become disoriented when the landscape (either external or internal) becomes unpredictable. Such citizens will be able to shoulder the responsibility of being effective participants in a democratic setting—a social environment that is essentially unpredictable.

Educators who value democracy must see it for what it is—a Janus social environment. Looking at it one way, the liberty that democracy affords makes it seem like the best of all possible social arrangements. Looking at it the other way, democracy’s essential unpredictability makes it the worst of all possible social arrangements, particularly for beings who abhor unpredictability.

Once we take up the Janus focus, it becomes clear that we must invest in anchoring predictability in the *individuals* rather than in the *environment* in which they subsist, and that we can achieve this by linking predictability to *process* rather than *product*, by offering an education that embraces democratic chaos utilizing the practice Philosophy for Children that is buttressed by reinforcing the belief in Truth and exposing participants to “truth-seeking” interpersonal dialogues that are focused on genuine, relevant, and difficult moral quandaries.

In this way, we will nurture the capacity for strong evaluation, and so, in the process nurture both strong moral individuals—parrhesiasts—and strong moral democracies—where parrhesiasts flourish. Indeed, the core of what we “truth-seeking folks” are suggesting, and in so doing channeling Foucault, is that democracy will falter if its education system does not focus on producing parrhesiasts.

Erich Fromm (1941) makes a similar point in writing: “We forget that, although each of the liberties which have been won must be defended with utmost vigor, the problem of freedom is not only a quantitative one, but a qualitative one; that we not only have to preserve and increase the traditional freedom, but that we have to gain a new kind of freedom, one which enables us to realize our own individual self; to have faith in this self and in life” (p. 91).

If we hope to preserve the liberty of society, in other words, it is in our interest to ensure the “process of the self” is a predictable bastion to which we can reliably return.

Acknowledgements

This research did not receive any specific grant from funding agencies in the public commercial, or not-for-profit sectors.

The authors declare no competing interests.

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The KMT's Shifting Approach to the Outside World during the 1920s: A Reinvention of Chinese Confucianism

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Received: 26 January 2024 ▪ Revised: 24 April 2024 ▪ Accepted: 11 May 2024

Abstract

Through a Confucian lens, this research explores the transformation of the Kuomintang's (國民黨; KMT) foreign policy during the 1920s. It examines the shift in the KMT's foreign policy from Sun Yat-sen's 孫逸仙 (1866-1925) "Allying with Soviet Russia" (lian'e 聯俄) stance to Chiang Kai-shek's 蔣介石 (1887-1975) prioritization of Western relations around 1927. The study highlights the reintroduction of Confucianism in the KMT's foreign policy during this period, considering the conventional Confucian education of KMT leaders. Unlike previous studies analyzing this shift from political or historical perspectives, this study provides a chronological analysis that centers around the change to Confucianism. It addresses a significant research vacuum in the existing literature and uses archival analysis to examine the evolution of the KMT's foreign policy. The study examines primary sources such as Sun's speeches, Chiang's diary, and contemporaneous memoirs. The study comprises three chronological sections. The first section (1920–1924) explores the influence of Confucianism on Sun's alignment with Soviet Russia due to commonalities between Confucianism and Communism. The second section (1924–1927) examines how Confucianism shaped the KMT's Western-oriented shift. The third section (1928–1930) delves into the philosophical basis of the Treaty Revision Movement (Gaiding xinyue yundong 改訂新約運動) and the adoption of 'keeping good faith and pursuing harmony' (Jiangxin xiumu 講信修睦) as the foreign policy principle. This research concludes that Sun, inspired by Confucian-Communist parallels, initially aligned with Soviet Russia but that later, under Chiang's leadership, the KMT used "The Confucianisation of the Three People's Principles" (Sanminzhuyi 三民主義) in its consolidation of a power shift towards the West and adopted Confucian principles to further legitimize its rule by promoting the New Treaty Movement.

Keywords: KMT, Confucianisation, foreign policy, Chiang Kai-shek, Sun Yat-sen.

1. Introduction

"When our [nationalist] party aligns with the spirit of Soviet Russia, it is in our joint struggle for oppressed nations."

本黨與蘇俄精神合一處，乃在同為壓迫民族奮鬥¹

¹ Sun Yat-sen, *Dayuanshuai yu benbao jizhe zhongyao tanhua* 大元帥與本報記者重要談話 (Grand Marshal's important talk with our correspondent), Shanghai, Republic of China Daily, 29 February 1924, P. 12.

In 1911, Sun Yat-sen 孫逸仙 (1866-1925), the founder of the Kuomintang (國民黨; KMT), established the first presidential country in Asia, the Republic of China (中華民國; ROC), in 1911.² Despite this, Sun did not solicit cooperation with European governments and the United States when facing a series of failures against the Beiyang warlords (北洋軍閥). The Beiyang Warlords, one of the most significant warlord factions during the early years of the ROC, was composed of the primary generals from the Beiyang New Army (*Beiyang xinjun* 北洋新軍), a force established initially by Yuan Shikai 袁世凱 (1859-1916).³ The Beiyang Warlords emerged from the power vacuum following the fall of the Qing Dynasty in 1912, and they were military leaders who gained control over key regions, particularly in northern China.⁴

However, following Yuan’s death in 1916, no one could effectively lead the entire Beiyang army and regime, which ultimately led to the fragmentation of leadership amongst the regional leaders and plunged these local warlords into warlordism as they fought for territory.⁵ Sun confronted the Beiyang Warlords after Yuan’s death, launching military campaigns to unify China under the KMT’s rule, but it ended in failure.⁶ This confrontation was part of broader efforts to establish a centralised government and overcome the political fragmentation that followed the end of imperial rule. After confronting the Beiyang Warlords, Sun chose to work collaboratively, from 1918, with the Soviet regime, which was under the leadership of Lenin (1870-1924) at the time (after the 1917 October Revolution in Tsarist Russia).⁷ By 1927, though, Chiang Kai-shek 蔣介石 (1887-1975), in contrast to Sun, reversed policy to embrace the Western world.⁸ Undeniably, the leaders of the KMT were educated in Confucianism; however, few scholars have researched the paradoxical ways in which ancient Chinese Confucianism was used to transform the KMT’s approach to the outside world during the 1920s.

This research divides the decade 1920 to 1930 into three periods. The first section concerns the period 1920 to 1924 and explores the influence of Confucianism on Sun’s proposal to unite with Soviet Russia. The second section focuses on 1924 to 1927, explaining how the KMT’s move towards the West has its roots in Confucianism. During this period, Chiang completed the Northern Expedition (*Beifa* 北伐) and established the KMT government in Nanjing 南京. Specifically, this section attempts to analyse Dai Jitao’s 戴季陶 (1891-1949) aims by promoting the Confucianisation of “The Three People’s Principles.” At the same time, this section explores why Chiang supported this version of Confucianisation. This section further analyses how Daijitaotism (*Dai jitaot zhuyi* 戴季陶主義) enabled the KMT Rightists (*Youpai* 右派) and Chiang to gradually remove the Chinese Communist Party (中國共產黨; CCP) from the KMT’s party organisation, laying the theoretical foundation for Chiang’s 1927 policy of Purging the Party (*Qingdang yundong* 清黨運動). Finally, this section recounts how the Confucianisation of The Three People’s Principles eventually led Chiang to ally himself with the financial oligarchs in Jiangsu 江蘇 and

² Bergère, Marie-Claire, and Janet Lloyd. *Sun Yat-sen*. Stanford University Press, 1998.

³ Jin, Chongji. *The Rule of the Beiyang Warlords*. Survey of Chinese History in the Twentieth Century. Singapore: Springer Nature Singapore, 2023. P. 39-59.

⁴ Fung, Edmund SK. *The military dimension of the Chinese revolution: The New Army and its role in the Revolution of 1911*. Australian National University Press, 1980.

⁵ Shan, Patrick Fuliang. *Yuan Shikai: a reappraisal*. UBC Press, 2018.

⁶ Yang, Guangbin. *The Beiyang Government in the World Political System: The Second Failure of the State. The Historical Dynamics of Chinese Politics*. Singapore: Springer Nature Singapore, 2022. P. 89.

⁷ Carr, E. H. & Davies, R. W. *The Russian Revolution: From Lenin to Stalin (1917-1929)*. London: Macmillan, 1979.

⁸ Tsui, B. K. H. *China’s Forgotten Revolution: Radical Conservatism in Action, 1927-1949*. Columbia University, 2013.

Zhejiang 浙江, leading him to depose the Union of Soviet Socialist Republic's (蘇聯; USSR) advisers and the CCP and turn towards the West. The last section examines the Confucian philosophical arguments behind the KMT's 'Treaty Revision Movement' (*Gaiding xinyue yundong* 改訂新約運動) from 1928 to 1930. During this period, Chiang had nominally unified China. This section seeks to analyse the KMT's abandonment of Sun's anti-imperialist diplomatic line in favour of seeking reconciliation with the West. Specifically, the section analyses why and how the Confucianised Three People's Principles became the unified national ideology of the ROC during this period and discusses the link with the sentiment of nationalism in Qing China. At the same time, this section sheds light on the change in the KMT's role at the domestic level: the KMT needed to counter the spread of Communism and enhance the legitimacy of the ROC government to promote the Treaty Revision Movement. This section also investigates the reasons for adopting a different approach to the "anti-imperialist ideology" of the Northern Expedition as the KMT sought to avoid violence or mass movements as it began to revise its treaties with the countries that had previously signed agreements with the Qing Dynasty. Finally, this section analyses how Chiang's regime promoted the "Treaty Revision Movement" by using the Confucian concept of 'keeping good faith and pursuing harmony' (*Jiangxin xiumu* 講信修睦) as the guiding principle in foreign relations.

2. The influence of Confucianism on Sun's 'uniting with Soviet Russia' policy from 1920 to 1924

In his testament, Sun declared, "I have dedicated myself to the National Revolution for forty years. The goal is to seek freedom and equality for China" (余致力國民革命，凡四十年。其目的在求中國之自由平等)。⁹ Sun's guiding principle was the Three People's Principles (*Sanminzhuyi* 三民主義), Nationalism (*Minzu* 民族), civil rights (*Minquan* 民權), and the People's Livelihood (*Minsheng* 民生), which was to become the KMT's basic party outline, proposed in 1905.¹⁰ Sun had initially proposed the Three People's Principles to overthrow the autocracy of the Qing China government. Sun said in the revolution of 1911 that "the revolutionary objective is not solely aimed at the Manchus; its ultimate goal is especially the abolition of despotism and the creation of a republic" (革命宗旨，不專在對滿，其最終目的，尤在廢除專製，創造共和)。¹¹ Before founding the ROC in 1911, Sun led a series of popular movements and military actions to overthrow the Qing government.¹²

After the establishment of the Republic of China (中華民國; ROC) in 1912, Sun Yat-sen's (1866-1925) worldview experienced a shift away from Europe and America and towards the new-born Soviet Russia. This transformation could be ascribed to the difficulties Sun faced when attempting to solicit the cooperation of the warlords in China. The defending-state Movement (*Huguo yundong* 護國運動) led by Sun was a military movement aimed at overthrowing Yuan's establishment of the imperial system because, on 12 December 1915, Yuan formally announced

⁹ General Headquarters of the National Revolutionary Army of the KMT, 1926, p. 46. *Zhongguo guomindang zhongyao xuanyan ji xunling Sun zhongshan yizhu* 中國國民黨重要宣言及訓令《孫中山遺囑》(Important Manifesto and Dictum of the Chinese KMT the Testament of Sun). Series 28. P. 129.

¹⁰ Unification of China Under the Three People's Principles (April 1981): Adopted at the Twelfth National Congress of the Kuomintang of China." *Chinese law and government*. 35, no. 3 (2002): P. 45-50.

¹¹ Zou Lu, *The Draft History of the Chinese Nationalist Party (Zhongguo guomindang shigao* 中國國民黨史稿), Book I, The Commercial Press of Taiwan, 1970. P. 47.

¹² Bergère, Marie-Claire, and Janet Lloyd. *Sun Yat-sen*. Stanford University Press, 1998.

the restoration of the imperial system.¹³ After Yuan died in 1916, no one could lead the entire Beiyang army, so the leaders divided each warlord's area of control according to where their army was stationed; this resulted in splits, with the warlords establishing spheres of influence in their respective regions.¹⁴ In 1918 and 1922, in the Constitution Protection Movement (*Hufa yundong* 護法運動).¹⁵ The Constitution Protection Movement, led by Sun in opposition to the Beiyang government dominated by Duan Qirui 段祺瑞 (1865-1936), aimed to defend the Provisional Covenant Law (*Linshi yuefa* 臨時約法) of the ROC, and establish the Military Government for the Protection of the Law (*Hufa junzhengfu* 護法軍政府) in Guangzhou. When Sun failed to promote the Constitution Protection Movement to oppose the Beiyang government and establish a separate military government of the ROC in Guangzhou 廣州 in 1918, he concluded, "The great peril of our country lies nowhere greater than in the strife for supremacy among warriors; the rivalry between the Southern and the Northern warlords is like that between raccoons on the same hill" (吾國之大患，莫大於武人之爭雄，南與北如一丘之貉).¹⁶ As a result of his failures in the Constitution Protection Movement, which he saw as the result of a lack of consideration of the unique perspective of the indigenous background of the Chinese philosophy, Sun began to theorise Confucian ideals in his Three People's Principles.

When Sun talked to Communist representative Henk Sneevliet 馬林 (1883-1942) in 1921, Sneevliet took the initiative to establish direct communication with Sun on behalf of the Comintern (*Gongchan guoji* 共產國際).¹⁷ Sun claimed, "In China, there is a tradition passed down successively through Yao, Shun, Yu, Tang, King Wen of Zhou, King Wu of Zhou, Duke of Zhou, and Confucius. The foundation of my thoughts is to inherit this tradition and to carry it forward and promote its greatness" (中國有一道統，堯、舜、禹、湯、文武、周公、孔子相繼不絕。我的思想基礎，就是繼承這一道統，而要把它發揚光大耳).¹⁸ The consensus in academia is that Sun's Three People's Principles derived originally from the modern European Enlightenment.¹⁹ However, Sun sought to integrate traditional Confucianism into the Three People's Principles so that they might align more closely with what he saw as China's unique and specific situation. Ergo, Sun's preconceived worldview appears to have been shaped by the conventional values of Confucianism.

When military resistance to the warlords initially failed, Sun became acutely aware that achieving victory in China necessitated coupling The Three People's Principles with traditional practices in China. He attributed one of the ideological roots of the Three Principles of the People to traditional Chinese culture. In 1923, Sun claimed, "In my plan for the revolution in China, the principles I uphold include those inherited from our country's existing thoughts, those influenced by the doctrines and achievements of European governance, and those conceived

¹³ Qidong, Zheng, Qian Suqin, Zheng Qidong, and Qian Suqin. The Beiyang Government, Local Warlords and Inflation. In *Brief History of Inflation in China*. Routledge, 2013. P. 123.

¹⁴ Zarrow, Peter. From the Military Dictator to the Warlords. In *China in War and Revolution, 1895-1949*, Routledge, 2006. P. 98.

¹⁵ Kayloe, Tjio. The unfinished revolution: Sun Yat-Sen and the struggle for modern China. Marshall Cavendish International Asia Pte Ltd, 2017.

¹⁶ Shang Mingxuan, Sun-Zhongshan zhuan 孫中山傳 (*A Biography of Sun*), edited by Beijing Publishing House, 1982, P. 211.

¹⁷ Saich, Tony, and Fritjof Tichelman. Henk Sneevliet: A Dutch revolutionary on the world stage. *Journal of Communist Studies* 1.2 (1985): P. 170-193.

¹⁸ *The Origin of Chinese Orthodoxy, Controversies and Transformations in Confucianism*. Soochow Journal of Political Science. No. 199501 (4 issues) Published by Institute of Political Science, Soochow University in China. 1995, P. 241-266.

¹⁹ Bhattacharya, Bijoy. The Tragedy of Sun: San Min Chu I (The Three Principles of the People) by Sun, Da Capo Press, 1975. *China Report* (New Delhi) 14, no. 4 (1978): P. 91.

uniquely by myself” (余之謀中國革命，其所持主義，有因襲吾國固有之思想者，有規撫歐洲之學說事跡者，有吾所獨見而創獲者).²⁰ Sun attempted to find theoretical justifications for the Three People’s Principles within traditional Confucianism during this process. Sun’s ideas about civil rights may have influenced Confucianism’s people-oriented philosophy (*Minben* 民本). He claimed that “Confucius and Mencius, from two thousand years ago, advocated for people’s rights” (兩千年前的孔子、孟子便主張民權).²¹ At the political-institutional level, Sun localised the Western concept of the separation of powers – executive, legislative, and judicial – through his theory of the Five-Power Constitution (*Wuquan xianfa* 五權憲法). The theoretical underpinnings of the Five-Power Constitution can be traced back to traditional Confucianism; Sun claimed, “Since the Tang and Song dynasties in China, there have been two powers that can break away from royal authority and stand independently: namely, impeachment and examinations” (中國自唐、宋以來，便有脫出君權而獨立之兩權：即彈劾、考試是也).²² It can be argued that Sun’s democratic ideas initially had European origins but were later amalgamated with Chinese ideas rooted in people-oriented Confucianism. Within Confucianism, the people-oriented philosophy emphasises that “the people are the foundation of the state; when the foundation is solid, the state is at peace” (民惟邦本，本固邦寧).²³ Consequently, Sun realised that the Three People’s Principles needed to be grounded in Confucianism for successful application in China.

From 1920 to 1924, Sun sought to blend the distinction between “Kingly and Tyrannical Rules” (*Wangba zhibian* 王霸之辨) with The Three People’s Principles, hoping to build a new international order of equality and mutual assistance. The “Kingly and Tyrannical Rules” arose in the Spring and Autumn Period (770BC-403BC), as well as the Warring States Period (404 BC-221 BC), a time of great turmoil when the feudal system collapsed, when rites and music deteriorated (*Libeng yuehuai* 禮崩樂壞), constituting a reflection of Confucianism on the two ways of governance, the kingly and the tyrannical way.²⁴ Typically, Confucianism defined the Kingly Rules (*Wangdao* 王道) as the political idea of governing the world with benevolence and justice and persuading people with virtue.²⁵ In the scope of ancient China’s relations, Mencius 孟子 (372BC-289BC) elevated Kingly Rules to a political concept, proposing that the king should govern with benevolence and justice and convince others with virtue in handling relations between states

²⁰ Sun Yat-sen, *Zhongguo geming shi* 中國革命史 (*History of the Chinese Revolution*), January 29, 1923”, *The Complete Works of Sun*, vol. 7, China Bookstore, 1985, P. 60. vol. 9, P 262,

²¹ Sun Yat-sen. *The Complete Works of Sun* [Sun Zhongshan quanji 孫中山全集], China Book Bureau, 1986.

²² Sun Yat-sen. *Xiugai dangzhang de shuoming — zai shanghai zhongguo guomindang benbu huiyi de yanshuo* 修改黨章的說明——在上海中國國民黨本部會議的演說 (*Notes on the Revision of the Party Constitution – Speech at the Meeting of the Chinese Nationalist Party Headquarters in Shanghai*). *Selected Works of Sun Wen*, November 4, 1922 (in Chinese), Guangzhou: Canton People’s Publishing House, 2006. P. 11.

²³ Zhou Shuhuai. Sun zhongshan de geming sixiang yu zhongguo chuantong wenhua 孫中山的革命思想與中國傳統文化 (Sun’s revolutionary thought and traditional Chinese culture). *Journal of Guizhou Normal University: Social Science Edition*, 2002 (1): P. 55.

²⁴ Wang Xiaolei. *Lun Sun zhongshan dui ruxue sixiang de jicheng yu gaizao* 論孫中山對儒學思想的繼承與改造 (*On Sun’s Inheritance and Transformation of Confucianism*). Northwestern University Publishing House, 2022. P. 16.

²⁵ Lu Hua, *Yi e weishi”: shijie zhi xu chongtu xia de guomindang lian’e* 以俄為師：世界秩序衝突下的國民黨連俄 (1917-1925) (*Taking Russia as a teacher”: the KMT’s alliance with Russia under the conflict of world orders*). Publication house at East China Normal University, 2019. P. 62.

to win the support of the people and unify the country.²⁶ Opposing Kingly Rules, Tyrannical Rules (*Badao* 霸道) refer to the rule of a state through force and power.²⁷ The distinction between kingly and tyrannical rules was thus defined as an ancient Chinese debate about two distinct methods of governance. Traditional Confucianism countenanced Kingly Rules and rejected Tyrannical Rules, and Sun sought to analyse the difference between Kingly and Tyrannical Rules to put China’s foreign policy towards the West into perspective. Sun advocated in 1924 that:

“Oriental culture follows the Kingly Rules, while Western culture follows the Tyrannical Rules. Advocating the path of kings emphasises benevolence, righteousness, and morality, and it seeks to influence people through justice and fairness. Advocating the path of dominance emphasises utility and power and seeks to oppress people with guns and cannons.”

東方的文化是王道，西方的文化是霸道；講王道是主張仁義道德，講霸道是主張功利強權。講仁義道德，是由正義公理來感化人；講功利強權，是用洋槍大炮來壓迫人。²⁸

Sun argued that it was necessary to promote Great Asianism (*Dayazhou zhuyi* 大亞洲主義) to address the common challenge of European industrial civilisation. In early 20th century China, Great Asianism emerged as a response to the geopolitical challenges posed by imperial powers and sought to foster a sense of solidarity among Asian nations²⁹. Greater Asianism is integral to Sun’s nationalist thought system and political philosophy. It stems from his assessment of the political landscape in China, Asia, and the world during the late 19th and early 20th centuries.³⁰ Greater Asianism refers to the international political idea of uniting and leading the colonially oppressed nations and peoples of Asia to free themselves from the Great Powers’s bullying and to establish a new global order of equality and mutual assistance.³¹ Sun’s Great Asianism, to some extent, represented the nationalism of The Three Peoples’ Principles, aiming to inspire the other Confucianist countries in East Asia to achieve national independence.³² Sun spoke to the Japanese in 1924:

²⁶ Kim, Sungmoon. Politics And Interest in Early Confucianism. *Philosophy East & West*, 64, no. 2 (2014): p. 425.

²⁷ Zou Yonghou. *Sun zhongshan daode lixiangguo de goujian yu kunjing* 孫中山道德理想國的構建與困境 (*The Construction and Dilemma of Sun’s Moral Ideal State*). Shandong University Publication House, China, 2016.

²⁸ Sun Yat-sen. *Dui shenhu shangye huiyi suodeng tuanti de yanshuo* 對神戶商業會議所等團體的演說 (*A Speech to the Kobe Commercial Conference House and Other Groups*), Sun, *The Complete Works of Sun*, vol. 11, China Bookstore, 1986, P. 407.

²⁹ Saaler, Sven. The construction of regionalism in modern Japan: Kodera Kenkichi and his “Treatise on Greater Asianism” (1916). *Modern Asian Studies*, 41.6 (2007): P.1261.

³⁰ Weber, Torsten. & Torsten, Weber. & Beck, Embracing Asia' in China and Japan. Palgrave Macmillan, 2018.

³¹ Fossgard, Ole Peder Frantzen. *The Creation of a Modern Chinese National Identity: Sun’s Discourse on Race and Nation*, 2002. P. 86.

³² Smith, Craig A. Chinese Asianism in the Early Republic: Guomindang intellectuals and the brief internationalist turn. *Modern Asian Studies*, 53.2 (2019): P. 582.

“As a Japanese nation, you have inherited the dominating culture of Europe and America while possessing the essence of Asian Kingly Rules. Henceforth, regarding the future of world culture, it is up to you, the Japanese people, to carefully examine and choose whether you will serve as the lapdogs of Tyrannical Rules or stand as the bastions of Eastern kingly Rules.”

你們日本民族既得到了歐美的霸道的文化，又有亞洲王道文化的本質，從今以後對於世界文化的前途，究竟是做西方霸道的鷹犬，或是做東方王道的幹城，就在你們日本國民去詳審慎擇。³³

Sun categorised Kingly Rules in Confucianism as those in East Asian countries, while he saw Tyrannical Rules as manifest in European countries: he introduced “the distinction between Kingly and Tyrannical Rules” to construct the idea of Asianism in China’s foreign policy.³⁴ It is apparent from the content of Sun’s speech that he was proposing a “distinction between Kingly and Tyrannical Rules” and integrated it into The Three People’s Principles, regarding it as a way of fomenting Asian countries’ nationalism in other Confucianist countries oppressed by European countries.

In addition, the idea of Universal Harmony (*Datong* 大同) was also incorporated into Sun's international view. Universal Harmony refers to the period of peace and prosperity envisioned by Confucian scholars in which all people on earth are treated as one family, equal, friendly, and helpful to one another.³⁵ The Confucian *Book of Rites* (*Liji* 禮記) specifically explains Universal Harmony as:

“The way of the great virtue follows the principle of making the world as one’s public. Select the talented and capable, promote trust, and foster harmony. Hence, people do not merely favour their own family, nor do they only raise their own children. The elderly have a means of support, the strong have a role to play, the young have an opportunity to grow, and the disabled and lonely are taken care of. All have their needs met [...] This is what the Universal Harmony means.”

大道之行也，天下為公。選賢與能，講信修睦。故人不獨親其親，不獨子其子，使老有所終，壯有所用，幼有所長，矜寡孤獨廢疾者，皆有所養 [...] 是謂大同。³⁶

Sun explained civil rights in the Three People’s Principles as the world belonging to all the people.³⁷ The New Culture Movement (*Xinwenhua yundong* 新文化運動) is a cultural movement that began in 1915 to promote democracy and science.³⁸ The May Fourth Movement (*Wusi yundong* 五四運動) was a Chinese youth student movement that saw students in Beijing 北京 marching and demonstrating on May Fourth 1919, to protest the Paris Peace Conference (*Bali hehui* 巴黎和會) resolution on Shandong 山東, as Shandong was ceded to Japan, where they urged the then Beiyang government not to sign the contract and demanded that the officials involved

³³ Sun Yat-sen. Dui shenhu shangye huiyi suo deng tuanti de yanshuo 對神戶商業會議所等團體的演說 (A Speech to the Kobe Commercial Conference House and Other Groups), Sun, *The Complete Works of Sun*, vol. 11, China Bookstore, 1986. P. 407.

³⁴ Li, Benyi. *Lun Sun zhongshan de dayazhou zhuyisi sixiang* 論孫中山的大亞洲主義思想 (*On Sun Yat-sen's Ideology of Greater Asianism*). Jiangnan Forum 11 (2005): P. 83.

³⁵ Chen, A, H, Y. *The concept of “Datong” in Chinese philosophy expresses the idea of the common good: Chinese and American perspectives*. Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands, 2013: P. 8.

³⁶ Dai Sheng. *Li ji. liyun pian* 禮記，禮運篇 (*The Book of Rites*), Beijing, China Book Bureau, 2014, P. 961.

³⁷ Zhang Chunguang. *Sun Zhongshan kexue sixiang yanjiu* 孫中山科學思想研究 (*A Study of Sun Yat-sen's Scientific Thought*). Shandong University Publication House, China, 2012.

³⁸ Forster, Elisabeth. *1919 – the Year That Changed China: A New History of the New Culture Movement*. Berlin: De Gruyter Oldenbourg, 2018.

should be punished.³⁹ The outbreak of the May Fourth Movement led the Chinese intellectuals of the time to seek a way to save the country, and Marxism began to spread into China.⁴⁰ The eruption of the October Revolution in 1917 enabled Sun to reach out to Marxism in Europe. The October Revolution was an armed uprising led by a Bolshevik school under the leadership of Lenin (1870-1924), and it established the Soviet regime.⁴¹ The May Fourth Movement and the New Culture Movement articulated the Chinese as keeping abreast of Marxism and Socialism.⁴² In conclusion, Sun also adapted the idea of Universal Harmony into his Three People’s Principles and then gradually gained credibility in disseminating Marxist ideas in China.

Influenced by the victory of the Russian October Revolution in 1917, Sun conceived that Marxism had an affinity with Confucianism. Sun claimed that “the People’s Livelihood is Socialism, also known as the Communism, which is the idea of Universal Harmony” (民生主義就是社會主義，又名共產主義，即是大同主義).⁴³ Sun drew a direct line connecting the Three People’s Principles with Communism; meanwhile, the idea of Universal Harmony in Confucianism is, to some extent, how Sun understood Communism. Based on the similarities between Communism and the People’s Livelihood, Sun regarded Soviet Russia as China’s constructive partner. Sun said in 1922, “It was only recently that I learned that Soviet Russia was a country China could trust. If the ROC and Soviet Russia were to form an offensive and defensive alliance, there would be no country in the world that [China] can fear” (到最近，才了解到蘇俄是中國可以信賴的國家。中俄兩國若結成攻守同盟，則世界上沒有任何國家足以畏懼).⁴⁴ Sun drew on the work of Stalin’s (1879-1953) Two Camp theory, which states that the world is divided into two camps: the camp of the civilised few, who own the financial capital and exploit the vast majority of the global population, and the camp of the oppressed and exploited people of the colonised and dependent countries, who make up the majority.⁴⁵ Sun argued that Lenin’s theory could make China strong so that China could achieve independence at least.⁴⁶ A Greater Asianism based on national liberation would require China first to unite itself and then unite the weaker peoples of Asia and the world “to break the power politics with justice” (共同用公理去打破強權).⁴⁷ Moreover, Sun’s ideas sought to construct a more egalitarian international order, and Sun’s Three People’s Principles were not confined to China or Asia but were figured as a form of progress and liberation for all humankind based on the Universal Harmony. Sun’s philosophy was to promote

³⁹ Zhou, Cezong. *The May Fourth Movement: Intellectual Revolution in Modern China*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1960.

⁴⁰ Ling, Samuel, D. *The Other May Fourth Movement: The Chinese “Christian Renaissance”, 1919-1937*. Temple University, 1981.

⁴¹ Graziosi, Andrea. “A Century of 1917s: Ideas, Representations, and Interpretations of the October Revolution, 1917–2017.” *Harvard Ukrainian Studies*, 36, no. 1/2 (2019): P. 44.

⁴² Chow, Tse-tsung. *The May fourth movement: Intellectual revolution in modern China*. Harvard University Press, 1960.

⁴³ Sun Yat-sen. *Sun Zhongshan quanji 孫中山全集 (The Complete Works of Sun)*. Beijing: China Book Bureau, Volume 9, 1986. P. 355.

⁴⁴ Sun Yat-sen. *Yu riben guanggao bao jizhe de tanhua 與《日本廣告報》記者的談話 (A Conversation with a Reporter from the Japanese Advertiser (November 26, 1922))*. *The Complete Works of Sun*. China Book Bureau, 2017, P. 128.

⁴⁵ Stalin, J. V. *Foundations of Leninism*, Lulu. Com, 2019.

⁴⁶ Riegel, Klaus-Georg. *Transplanting the Political Religion of Marxism-Leninism to China: The Case of the Sun Yat-sen University in Moscow (1925–1930)*. *Chinese Thought in a Global Context*. Brill, 1999. P. 327.

⁴⁷ Sun Yat-sen. *Minzu zhuyi disan jiang 民族主義第三講 (The Third Lecture on Nationalism)*, *The Complete Works of Sun*, Volume 9, P. 220.

the “unity and liberation of the oppressed nations” (被壓迫民族的聯合與解放).⁴⁸ Accordingly, Sun may have seen similarities between Confucianism and Marxism, leading him to gradually see Soviet Russia as a reliable partner in achieving China’s independence and reunification.

With similar views, Sun began to learn from and seek cooperation with Soviet Russia. He undertook to reasonably comprehend the development of Soviet Russia as the logic of Confucianism, saying, “As for Soviet Russia, it has even more progressive goals, aiming to ensure that everyone enjoys economic equality and happiness without any inequality. When discussing its ultimate achievement, it is comparable to what is called Confucianism” (至若俄國則更進步，其目的在使人人享受經濟上平等之幸福，而無不均之患。語其大成，則與所謂孔子相類).⁴⁹

Simultaneously, Sun’s Three People’s Principles became gradually characterised as “anti-imperialist” after its coupling with Confucianism in the first place. As Sun said in 1923:

“We are among the weak nations, and we should collectively strive to resist the plunder and oppression of imperialist countries. Imperialist nations form an imperialist united front, not only to suppress the freedom and national movements of China but also to suppress the freedom and national movements of weaker nations in Asia and even to oppress the freedom and national movements of weaker nations worldwide.”

我等同在弱小民族之中，我等當共同奮鬥，反抗帝國主義國家之掠奪與壓迫。帝國主義國家形成帝國主義聯合戰線，不但為壓製中國自由運動及國民運動而奮鬥，亦不但為壓製亞洲弱小民族自由運動及國民運動而奮鬥，且亦為壓迫世界弱小民族自由運動及國民運動而奮鬥。⁵⁰

In 1923, The Canton Customs Crisis (*Guanyu Shijian* 關餘事件) erupted, enabling Sun to accelerate cooperation with Soviet Russia. The Canton Crisis refers to the conflict between the Canton Revolutionary government, led by Sun, and Western countries on using the Canton tariff balance.⁵¹ The Beiyang government and foreign missions in Beijing protested Sun’s actions, foreign missions in Beijing protested Sun’s actions, and the United States sent two warships into Guangzhou.⁵² The outcome of the Canton Crisis forced Sun to move entirely away from hope in the European Powers and the US, which gradually solidified the line of alliance with Soviet Russia. In his speech in late 1923, Sun said, “I no longer sought the support of the Western powers, and my face turned to Russia” (我不再尋求西方列強的支持，我的臉轉向了俄國).⁵³ On January 16, 1923, Sun and Joffe 越飛 (1883-1927), Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR, met in Shanghai上海 to discuss the cooperation between the two parties of China and the USSR and

⁴⁸ Dai Jitao. *Sunwen zhuyi zhi zhaxue de jichu* 孫文主義之哲學的基礎 (*The Philosophical Foundations of Sun’s Three People’s Principles*). Edited and printed by the History of Modern Chinese Political Thought, Department of Party History, Renmin University of China. Selected Materials on Sun Wenism, 1982 edition, P. 45.

⁴⁹ Sun Yat-sen. *Sun Zhongshan quanji* 孫中山全集 (*The Complete Works of Sun*), Volume 8, Canton Academy of Social Sciences, Historical Research Office, and others (co-editors), Beijing: China Book Bureau, 2011 edition, P. 349.

⁵⁰ Sun Yat-sen. *Sun Zhongshan quanji* 孫中山全集 (*The Complete Works of Sun*), published by the China Book Bureau, 1985 edition, vol. 9, P. 23.

⁵¹ George, Brian T. The State Department and Sun Yat-sen: American Policy and the Revolutionary Disintegration of China, 1920-1924. *Pacific Historical Review* 46.3 (1977), P. 408.

⁵² Braisted, William Reynolds, “The Canton Customs Crisis”, *Diplomats in Blue: U.S. Naval Officers in China, 1922-1933* (Gainesville, FL, 2009; online ed., *Florida Scholarship Online*, 14 Sept. 2011).

⁵³ Sun Yat-sen. *Sun Zhongshan nianpu changbian* 孫中山年譜長編 (*The Long Chronicle of Sun*), edited by Chen Xiqi, (Beijing) China Book Bureau, August 1991. P. 1781.

jointly issued the declaration, which emphasised efforts to promote the unification of the ROC.⁵⁴ With the help of the USSR’s advisers, Sun and the other KMT leaders drafted the 1924 Declaration of the First National Congress of the KMT and the new KMT party platform. This manifesto stated that the KMT’s doctrine was the Three People’s Principles advocated by Sun, wherein the nationalism in the Three People’s Principles aimed to help the KMT eliminate the Northern Warlords’ rule over China.⁵⁵ Sun summarised why the KMT had previously failed to launch waves of uprisings, saying it was because the KMT lacked guiding principles while Soviet Russia had managed to win the domestic revolution and expel foreign intervention forces. He said:

“The [KMT] Party’s restructuring this time is modelled after the Soviet Union, attempting a fundamental revolution for success, switching to party members collaborating with the military to strive. Using this method, Russia resisted the invasion of major powers precisely during the initial success of the Russian Revolution, and Russian party members were able to overcome it. The reason lies in the members’ commitment to the ideology.”

吾[國民]黨此次改組，乃以蘇俄為模範，企圖根本的革命成功，改用黨員協同軍隊來奮鬥。俄國以此能抵抗列強之侵迫，其時正當俄國革命初成功，而俄黨人竟能戰勝之，其原因則由黨員能為主義的奮鬥。⁵⁶

At the suggestion of the CCP, Sun decided to reorganise the KMT with the help of the USSR’s advisers and to reunite most of China from its southern Canton base through the Northern Expedition.⁵⁷ Sun attributed the hurdle of China’s unification to the warlords’ secession. At the time, China was dominated by the fractious Beiyang warlords, each of whom had a different Western country behind them.⁵⁸ He claimed that “the fundamental cause of China’s turmoil at present [1924] lies in the warlords and the imperialists who support them. Our mission in addressing China’s issues at the National Assembly is, first and foremost, to eliminate the warlords and, second, to break the support of the imperialists for the warlords. Only by eliminating these two factors can China achieve peace and unity” (中國現在[1924年]禍亂的根本，就是在軍閥和那援助軍閥的帝國主義者。我們這次來解決中國問題，在國民會議席上，第一點就要打破軍閥，第二點就要打破援助軍閥的帝國主義者。打破了這兩個東西，中國才可以和平統一)。⁵⁹ With the CCP and Soviet Union’s help, Sun and the KMT established the Whampoa Military Academy (*Huangpu junxiao* 黃埔軍校) and paved the way for the Northern Expedition.⁶⁰ Therefore, Sun grew closer

⁵⁴ Chan, F. Gilbert. An Alternative to KMT-Communist Collaboration: Sun and Hong Kong, January-June 1923. *Modern Asian Studies*, 13, no. 1 (1979): 127–139. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/312357>. [Accessed 8 Jul. 2023]

⁵⁵ Li Songlin. *Zhongguo guomindang shida cidian* 中國國民黨史大辭典 (*Dictionary of the History of the Chinese Kuomintang*). Anhui People’s Publishing House. 1993. P. 279.

⁵⁶ Sun Yat-sen. *Dangyi zhansheng yu dangyuan fendou* 黨義戰勝與黨員奮鬥 (The Triumph of Party Righteousness and the Struggle of Party Members), in *The Collected Recent Speeches of Dr. Sun*, edited by the Propaganda Department of the Central Executive Committee of the Chinese Nationalist Party (Guangzhou, July 1924).

⁵⁷ Zhang Daokui. *Minguo shiqi guojia yishi xingtai de bianqian* 民國時期國家意識形態的變遷 (*The change of state ideology during the Republican period*). Shandong University Publication House, China. 2018.

⁵⁸ Jin, Chongji. *The Rule of the Beiyang Warlords. Survey of Chinese History in the Twentieth Century*. Singapore: Springer Nature Singapore, 2023. P. 59.

⁵⁹ Sun, Yat-sen. *Beishang xuanyan* 北上宣言. *The Complete Works of Sun* (Vol. 11) (Declaration of the Northward Movement). Beijing: China Book Bureau, 1986: P. 294.

⁶⁰ Li Hui. *Sun zhongshan de xin sanmin zhuyi zai diyici guogong hezuo* Zhong de zuoyong 孫中山的新三民主義在第一次國共合作中的作用 (The Role of Sun’s New Three People’s Principles in the First Nationalist-

to Soviet Russia based on their consensus of anti-imperialism and the correlation between Confucianism and Communism.⁶¹ This idea was embodied in the Three People's Principles, which then became the KMT's guiding ideology.⁶² Sun cooperated with the CCP and the USSR, establishing the military academy to commence the Northern Expedition and the unification.

This section examines the process of Sun's Confucianisation of the Three People's Principles and how it influenced his international outlook. Sun found that Chinese Confucianism shared much in common with the Three People's Principles regarding the People's Livelihood and nationalism. At the level of foreign relations, Sun attempted to fuse the distinction between Kingly and Tyrannical Rules with the Three People's Principles to establish a new international order of equality and mutual assistance. He also incorporated the idea of Universal Harmony into his global outlook.

Sun interpreted civil rights in the principles of the Three People's Principles as the Confucian idea that the world is public, meaning that the people should own the state.⁶³ His international perspective extended from Greater Asianism to all oppressed peoples and nations, and the October Revolution of 1917 enabled him to access European Marxism. Sun advocated that Communism was somewhat in line with Confucianism and sought to enlist the help of Soviet Russia to complete China's national unification. On the advice of the CCP, Sun decided to reorganise the KMT with the help of Soviet advisers and attempted to unify much of China through the Northern Expedition. Sun's understanding of Soviet Russia was based on the anti-imperialist consensus of Confucianism and Communism, in which Sun's Three People's Principles gradually became the guiding ideology of the KMT.

3. The role of Confucianism in the KMT's move towards the West from 1924 to 1927

"After the passing of the Premier [Sun], Mr Dai [Jitao], realising that the CCP intended to undermine our party, obstruct the national revolution, and harm our nation and people, at that time, the misguided propaganda of the CCP misled many young people. They had a vague understanding of the Premier's ideology and, as a result, were adrift without guidance and even went down the wrong path, causing a perilous situation."

在[孫]總理逝世以後，戴[季陶]先生鑒於共產黨蓄意破壞本黨，阻礙國民革命，危害我們的國家民族，當時一般青年為共產黨乖謬的宣傳所迷惑，對於總理的主義認識不清，因而徬徨無主，甚至誤入歧途，造成非常危險的現象。⁶⁴

These words were spoken by Chiang Kai-shek (1887-1975) in 1927 when he aimed to illuminate Dai Jitao's 戴季陶 (1891-1949) interpretation of the Three People's Principles and contain the spread of Communism among young Chinese. Dai was a KMT veteran and theory propagandist; Dai was Sun's secretary and Director of the Political Department of the Whampoa

Communist Cooperation). *Journal of Yunnan Normal University: Philosophy and Social Sciences*, 2002, 34(3): P. 62.

⁶¹ Zhao, Xuduo. *Between Communism and Nationalism (1923-1928). Heretics in Revolutionary China*. Brill, 2023. P. 221.

⁶² Wu, Ellsworth Tien-wei. *The Chinese nationalist and communist alliance, 1923-1927*. University of Maryland, College Park, 1965.

⁶³ Wang, Enbao, and Regina F. Titunik. *Democracy in China: The theory and practice of minben. China and Democracy*. Routledge, 2014. P. 88.

⁶⁴ Chiang Kai-shek. *Jiang jieshi quanji 蔣介石全集 (The Complete Works of Chiang Kai-shek)*, volume 2. Zhengzhou, Henan People's Publishing House, 1996, P. 137.

Military Academy.⁶⁵ Chiang ruptured the cooperation with the CCP in 1927 and launched the campaign of Party purge (*Qingdang* 清黨) on the CCP on April 12, halting Sun's policy of uniting with the CCP to complete China's National Revolution and banning the USSR's advisers.⁶⁶ Under Chiang's leadership, KMT ultimately achieved China's unification by defeating the Beiyang warlords and completing the Northern Expedition at the end of 1928.⁶⁷ At this stage, the influence of Confucianism still pushed the KMT's foreign policy towards the West.

Dai promoted the Confucianisation of the Three People's Principles. Historical circles in China commonly described Dai's Confucianisation of the Three Peoples' Principles as Daijitaotaoism (*Dai Jitao zhuyi* 戴季陶主義). Mainland China's scholars concretely defined Daijitaotaoism as the term that constructed the theory of opposing Marxism, class struggle, and cooperation between the KMT and the CCP.⁶⁸ Foremost, Dai tried to utilise the benevolence of Confucianism to replace the influence of Communism in China. Dai claimed that "it is not necessary to fight for the interests of the workers and peasants in the form of class struggle, because human beings are benevolent and we can move the capitalists to respect the interests of the workers and peasants by being benevolent" (擁護工農群眾的利益，不需要取階級鬥爭的形式，因為人類是具有仁愛性能的，可以仁愛之心感動資本家，使之尊重工農群眾的利益).⁶⁹ Moreover, Dai further linked the Sun's Three People's Principles to Confucianism, trying to justify the Sun's Three People's Principles. Dai advocated that "Mr. [Sun] Yat-sen's fundamental ideas are entirely rooted in the Confucian Doctrine of the Mean, representing mainstream Chinese orthodox thought. Mr. [Sun] is a great sage in Chinese moral and cultural heritage, carrying a legacy beyond Confucius" ([孫]中山先生的基本思想，完全淵源於中國正統思想的中庸之道。[孫]先生實在是孔子以後中國道德文化上繼往開來的大聖).⁷⁰ Crucially and in direct contradiction to Sun, Dai's Confucianisation of the Three People's Principles sought to exclude Communism and Marxism from the KMT and decouple the CCP from the KMT for the sake of the KMT's survival.⁷¹ Dai proposed to establish the pure Three People's Principles as the supreme principle of the KMT, to promote the Three People's Principles vigorously, and to oppose the tearing apart of social strata caused by class struggle; Dai Jitao advocated the establishment of a pure KMT, and the purging of the party's ill-willed atmosphere.⁷²

⁶⁵ Scott, Gregory Adam. The Buddhist Nationalism of Dai jitao. *Journal of Chinese Religions*, 39, no. 1 (2011): P. 55.

⁶⁶ Wu, Tien-Wei. A Review of the Wuhan Debacle: The KMT-Communist Split of 1927. *The Journal of Asian Studies* 29, no. 1 (1969): P. 143.

⁶⁷ Zhu Youqing, Zhao Bojun. *Guomindang "guanfang ruxue" de yuanyuan, xingcheng yu fazhan xilun — yi Sun Zhongshan, Dai jitao he Jiang jieshi de sanminzhuyi s xiang jiangou weili* 國民黨“官方儒學”的淵源，形成與發展析論——以孫中山，戴季陶和蔣介石的三民主義思想建構為例 (An analysis of the origin, formation, and development of the "official Confucianism" of the KMT: the construction of the Three People's Principles by Sun, Dai, and Chiang Kai-shek). *Taiwan Studies*, 2020.

⁶⁸ Lu Hua, *Yi'e weishi": shijie zhixu chongtu xia de guomindang lian'e* 以俄為師：世界秩序沖突下的國民黨連俄 (1917-1925) (*Taking Russia as a teacher": the KMT's alliance with Russia under the conflict of world orders*). Publication house at the East China Normal University, 2019.

⁶⁹ Dai Jitao. *KMT Guomin geming yu zhongguo guomindang* 國民革命與中國國民黨 (*The National Revolution and the Chinese*). Shanghai Publishing House China Cultural Service. 1946.11, P. 121.

⁷⁰ Dai Jitao. Sunwen zhuyi zhi zhexue de jichu 孫文主義之哲學的基礎 (The Philosophical Foundations of Sun Ye- Sanism), *Minzhi Shuppan*, 1927, P. 65.

⁷¹ Yu, Weijun. Lun rujiahua sanmin zhuyi de shengcheng 論儒家化三民主義的生成 (On the Generation of Confucianised the Three People's Principles). *Journal of Shandong Youth Politics College*, 29.2 (2013). P. 15.

⁷² Zhang, Xingjiu. *Zhongguo zhengzhi sixiang shi* 中國政治思想史 (*History of Chinese Political Thought*). Wuhan: Wuhan University Press, 2011. P. 226.

Dai thus tried to look for a justification for the leadership of a national revolution led by the KMT to purify the KMT. This justification was based on Sun's Three People's Principles rather than on the ideals of Communism. He claimed in 1924 that "China's politics should be firmly held in the hands of the Chinese youth who believe in the Three Principles of the People. Only in this way can we establish a solid foundation for the Republic based on the Three Principles of the People (中國的政治，應該要完全握在信奉三民主義的中國青年手裏，才可以建設起鞏固三民主義的民國基礎)".⁷³ Dai's Confucianisation of the Three People's Principles appealed to historical Confucian orthodoxy as a reason to defy the CCP's influence within the KMT and in China in general.

Chiang shored up and was privy to Dai's Confucianisation of the Three People's Principles. On the one hand, Chiang was motivated by the need to maintain his political status, and he saw Sun's alliance with Soviet Russia as a tool-based strategy to augment China's revolutionary forces. Chiang claimed in 1925, "Here we must make it clear that the Father of Nations [Sun Yat-sen]'s policy of aligning with Russia is based on a nationalist stance, not on the belief that communism is feasible in China. Furthermore, one should not succumb to the Communist Party's threats for the sake of aligning with Russia, nor should there be any appeasement towards the Communist Party" (在此我們必須明白指出，就是國父[孫中山]的聯俄政策，是基於民族主義的立場，而不是認為共產主義可行於中國，更不應該為了聯俄而受共黨的要挾，或對共黨有所姑息).⁷⁴ Chiang advocated that uniting with CCP and Soviet Russia was merely a strategy of Sun's to pool the support from different classes and groups in Chinese society. He said, "We understand that the policy of the Father of Nations [Sun Yat-sen] at that time, aligning with Russia and accommodating communism, was for the concentration of the revolutionary forces in China and the unity of their will" (我們了解，國父[孫中山]當時聯俄容共的政策，乃是為中國革命力量的集中和意誌的統一).⁷⁵ Chiang served as the principal of Whampoa Military Academy from 1924 to 1927, when he established the Nanjing-based government of ROC.⁷⁶ Chiang needed to strengthen his authority because he was the only military leader within the KMT who represented the interests of the right wing of the KMT. When Chiang occupied Nanjing, the left wing of KMT established the Wuhan KMT Government (*Wuhan guomin zhengfu* 武漢國民政府).⁷⁷ Chiang wanted to assert his ideological authority to counter the Wuhan government's influence.⁷⁸ At that time, Chiang did not have a set of mature theories, so he chose the approach that best suited his

⁷³ Dai Jitao. *Guomin geming yu zhongguo guomindang* 國民革命與中國國民黨 (*The National Revolution and the Chinese KMT*). Shanghai Publishing House China Cultural Service. 1946.11, P. 130.

⁷⁴ Chiang Kai-shek. *Su e zai zhong guo* 蘇俄在中國 (*Soviet Russia in China*), Taipei: Central Heritage Supply House 1956, P. 35.

⁷⁵ Chiang Kai-shek. *Su e zai zhong guo* 蘇俄在中國 (*Soviet Russia in China*), Taipei: Central Heritage Supply House 1956, P. 25.

⁷⁶ Zhang Naikeng. *Xin shenghuo yundong yu ruxue sixiang yanjiu* 新生活運動與儒學思想研究 (*Research on the New Life Movement and Confucianism*). Shandong University Publication House, China, 2018.

⁷⁷ Yao Xichang. *Xin sanmin zhuyi de cha sheng yu xinminzhu zhuyi jiben sixiang de chubu xingcheng* 新三民主義的產生與新民主主義基本思想的初步形成 (*The Emergence of New Sanminism and the Initial Formation of the Basic Ideology of New Democracy*). *Journal of Xinxiang Normal Higher College*, 2007, 21(4): P. 7.

⁷⁸ Loh, Pichon, P. Y. The politics of Chiang Kai-shek: A reappraisal. *The Journal of Asian Studies*, 25.3 (1966): P. 451.

political standpoint.⁷⁹ Chiang thus tried to use Daijitaism to consolidate his authority as he moved from a military leader to a political leader.⁸⁰

Chiang tried to use the Confucianisation of the Three People’s Principles as an instrument to fight against Communism. Chiang’s speech at E’mei Military Training Corps (*e’mei junxun tuan* 峨嵋軍訓團) deemed the Three People’s Principles to be a counterweight when confronting the rapid development of the CCP, saying, “Promote the ideology of the Premier [Sun] to ensure that the general youth have a clear understanding of the Three Principles of the People, strengthen their faith in the Premier’s ideology, resist the seduction of Communist Party fallacies, and remain loyal to the revolutionary cause of the Three Principles of the People, in order to achieve the goal of saving the country and the people” (闡揚總理主義，藉使一般青年對於三民主義有明確的認識，堅定其對於總理主義的信仰，不受共產黨邪說的蠱惑，而忠於三民主義的革命事業，以達救國救民的目的).⁸¹ Chiang and Dai shared an understanding of the need to stem the power of the CCP. Chiang conceived of eliminating Communism in the ROC as a way of signalling the solidification of the KMT government. Chiang claimed in 1929 that “waiting until, within a certain period, all theories, and methods of the [Chinese] Communist Party are completely eliminated, Chinese society stabilises, our party’s foundation becomes solid, and then we can proceed to realise the final steps of the Three Principles of the People. This is to achieve the complete success of the national revolution” (等到在一定時期內，把[中國]共產黨的一切理論和方法全數刪除了，中國社會穩定了，本黨基礎穩固了，然後我們便來實現三民主義最終的步驟，以求國民革命的全部完成).⁸² Meanwhile, Daijitaism saw the People’s Livelihood as the core concept of the Three People’s Principles; in contrast, the other two elements, Nationalism and Civil rights, were only seen as the working method. Furthermore, Dai interpreted the People’s Livelihood in the Three People’s Principles as a guiding principle to improve people’s livelihood, saying, “It is necessary to build all cultures on the moral foundation of China’s inherent benevolence and love” (必須要以中國固有的仁愛思想為道德基礎).⁸³ Dai forcefully opposed the theory of class struggle in Marxism. Marx had claimed that the whole of society was increasingly divided into two hostile camps, into two classes in direct opposition to each other: the bourgeoisie and the proletariat.⁸⁴ Dai advocated that the Three People’s Principles suited China’s national conditions because Chinese Confucianism was one of the origins of Sun’s Three Principles of the People. He said:

“The class conflict is a pathological condition of society, not its normal state. This condition is not the same in every country, so the treatment methods cannot be the same for all. In China’s society, if there is no clear-cut class conflict nationwide, we cannot adopt a revolutionary approach based solely on class conflict, nor should we wait until there is a clear class conflict to initiate a revolution. The confrontation in

⁷⁹ Fu Jing. *Yishi xingtai yu jindai zhongguo shehui biange* 意識形態與近代中國社會變革 (*Ideology and Social Change in Modern China*). Shandong University Publication House, 2005.

⁸⁰ Liu Jiuyong. Dai jitaizhuyi sixiang pingxi 戴季陶主義思想評析 (A Commentary on Dai Jitaism Thought). *Peking University Graduate Journal*, 4 (2011): P. 69.

⁸¹ Chiang Kai-shek. *Jiang jieshi quanji* 蔣介石全集 (*The Complete Works of Chiang Kai-shek*), vol. 2. Zhengzhou, Henan People’s Publishing House, 1996, P. 137.

⁸² Chiang Kai-shek. Qin Xiaoyi, ed. *Xian zongtong jiangong sixiang yanlun zongji* 先總統蔣公思想言論總集 (*The General Collection of Thoughts and Speeches of the late President Chiang Kai-shek*), vol. 10, P. 367.

⁸³ Wang Xin. *Xuejie dui Sun Zhongshan “xin saimin zhuyi sixiang yuan yuan” de yan jiu zongshu* 學界對孫中山“新三民主義思想淵源”的研究綜述 (*An overview of academic research on the origin of Sun’s New Three People’s Principles*). [Modern Women (late), 2014, P. 5.

⁸⁴ Marx, Karl, Friedrich Engels, and Jodi Dean. *The Communist Manifesto*. London: Pluto Press, 2017.

China's revolution between the forces of revolution and counter-revolution is a confrontation between the awakened and the unawakened, not a class conflict. Therefore, our goal is to awaken the entire nation's consciousness, not the consciousness of a single class.”

階級的對立，是社會的病態，並不是社會的常態，這一種病態，即不是各國都一樣，所以治病的方法，各國也不能同。中國的社會，就全國來說，即不是很清楚的兩階級對立，就不能完全取兩階級對立的革命方式，更不能等到有了很清楚的兩階級對立才來革命。中國的革命與反革命勢力的對立，是覺悟者與不覺悟者的對立，不是階級的對立，所以我們是要促起國民全體的覺悟，不是促起一個階級的覺悟。⁸⁵

Based on this antithetical standpoint on class struggle, Chiang drew on Daijiao-ism to counter the spread of Marxist ideas after the Northern Expedition in 1926. Simultaneously, Dai's further explanation of the Three People's Principles provided a theoretical basis for KMT's policies of the KMT "party purge" of the CCP in 1927. Dai's incorporation of the Three People's Principles as a tenet of KMT policy highlighted its ideological exclusiveness. In Dai's discourse, "The Three Principles of the People are the principles of national salvation. What is a principle? A principle is a kind of thought, a kind of belief, and a kind of power" (三民主義就是救國主義。什麼是主義呢？主義就是一種思想、一種信仰和一種力量).⁸⁶ Moreover, Dai distorted Sun's cooperation policy with the CCP as a CCP conspiracy, "The collective joining of the Chinese Communist Party into the Chinese KMT is a form of parasitic policy" (中國共產黨集體加入中國國民黨，是一種寄生政策).⁸⁷ The KMT's rightists countenanced Daijiao-ism and briefly proposed that "[KMT members] genuinely regard the Three Principles of the People as the sole theory and the KMT as the only party for saving the country" ([國民黨員]要真把三民主義認為唯一理論，把國民黨認為唯一救國的政黨).⁸⁸ Under the influence of Daijiao-ism, the KMT set strict limits on CCP members who joined the KMT in the name of individuality.⁸⁹ In May 1926, during the KMT's authoritarian rule in Guangzhou, the Second Plenary Session of the Second Central Committee of the KMT adopted the "Organising of Party Affairs" policy (*Zhengli dangwu jueyi an* 整理黨務決議案), which rigorously constrained the quantity and authority of CCP members.⁹⁰ After the "Organising of Party Affairs", KMT rightists gradually began to control the KMT's party machine. Chiang became the highest military leader when the KMT's National Revolutionary Army (*Guomin gemingjun* 國民革命軍) occupied Shanghai in 1927. As the workers' movement and strikes organised by the CCP affected the interests of the local triads in Shanghai, Chiang bribed

⁸⁵ Dai Jitao. *Sunwen zhuyi zhi zhaxue de jichu* 孫文主義之哲學的基礎 (*The Philosophical Foundations of Sun Moonism*). Edited and printed by the History of Modern Chinese Political Thought, Department of Party History, Renmin University of China. Selected Materials on Sun Wenism, 1982 edition, P. 65.

⁸⁶ Sun Yat-sen. 1924 Lecture on Nationalism, in the collection of the Memorial Hall of Sun's Former Residence, Shanghai. Huang Yan, ed. *Selected Works of Sun Wen (first volume)*, Guangzhou: Guangdong People's Publishing House, 2006. P. 11.

⁸⁷ Zhang Daokui. *Minguo shiqi guojia yishi xingtai de bianqian* 民國時期國家意識形態的變遷 (*The change of state ideology during the Republican period*). Shandong University Publication House, 2018.

⁸⁸ Xiao Chunv. *Guomin geming yu zhongguo gongchandang* 國民革命與中國共產黨 (*Introduction to The National Revolution and the Chinese Communist Party in 1925*). Selected Materials for the Study of Daijiao-ism. China Book Bureau, Beijing.

⁸⁹ Peng, Lü. Chapter Two 1912–1927: Disarrangements of Power and New Intellectual Trends. In *A History of China in the 20th Century*. Singapore: Springer Nature Singapore, 2023. P. 293.

⁹⁰ Yang Tianshi. Beifa shiqi zuopai liliang tong Jiang jieshi douzheng de jige zhongyao huihe 北伐時期左派力量同蔣介石鬥爭的幾個重要回合 (Several important rounds in the struggle between the leftist forces and Chiang Kai-shek during the Northern Expedition). *Studies in Chinese Communist Party History*, 1990 (1): P. 43.

armed members of the local triads to pose as workers managed by the CCP and to launch attacks on the CCP members stationed at various locations.⁹¹ Under the KMT rightists' control, Chiang launched the coup d'état of April 12, 1927, leading the right wing of the KMT, with the help of the Shanghai local gangs, to arrest en masse and execute members of the CCP and some of the leftists (*Zuopai* 左派) in the KMT, and to ban the USSR's advisers.⁹² Dai's illustration of the Three People's Principles in Confucianism enabled KMT rightists and Chiang to marginalise the CCP and lay the theoretical foundation for Chiang's policy of party purging progressively.

Chiang allied with financial oligarchs from Jiangsu and Zhejiang and deposed other USSR advisers and the CCP. When the KMT's armies controlled Shanghai in 1927, the Northern Expeditionary Army (*Beifajun* 北伐軍) occupied half of China south of the Yangtze River.⁹³ At this time, the CCP launched three armed workers' riots in Shanghai, mainly inhabiting the non-concession areas of Shanghai.⁹⁴ Financial oligarchs from Jiangsu and Zhejiang (*Jianghe caifa* 江浙財閥) were thought to be connected to the groups of Jiangsu and Zhejiang businessmen and bankers who dominated Shanghai's business community, most of the Jiangsu and Zhejiang consortia developed from the compradors cultivated by European countries and Japan, USA.⁹⁵ One of the financial oligarchs was Chiang's Friend, Yu Qiaqing 虞洽卿 (1867-1945), who visited Chiang to represent these businessmen in Shanghai.⁹⁶ In the meantime, Chiang hoped to acquire economic funding from these financial oligarchs to confront the Wuhan KMT government. Under the premise of demilitarising the armed workers led by the CCP, these financial oligarchs, like Yu, promised to subsidise Chiang.⁹⁷ Given that the Wuhan KMT government, led by KMT leftists, was funded by the USSR, Chiang established the Nanjing KMT government and united with the European and American countries in his bid for power.⁹⁸ The Nanjing Government, controlled by Chiang, issued the bulletin that the Nanjing National Government would join the European and American forces in imposing an economic blockade on the Wuhan Government.⁹⁹ At this stage, Dai Jitao-ism became the guiding ideology of the KMT Nanjing government, and Chiang's regime used it to consolidate the orthodoxy of his regime, purging the CCP in China and uniting with the European and American powers to take over the power from the Wuhan KMT government supported by the USSR in 1927; Chiang used the Confucianisation of the Three People's Principles to counter the ideology of communism.

Daijitaotao-ism aimed to seek the orthodoxy of the Three People's Principles in Confucianism and Chinese history, as it was more compatible with China's indigenous Confucian

⁹¹ Stranahan, Patricia. *Underground: the Shanghai Communist Party and the politics of survival, 1927-1937*. Rowman & Littlefield, 1998.

⁹² Wu, T. W. Chiang Kai-shek's March Twentieth coup d'état of 1926. *The Journal of Asian Studies*, 1968, 27(3): P. 602.

⁹³ Geisert, B. K. From Conflict to Quiescence: The KMT, Party Factionalism and Local Elites in Jiangsu, 1927–31. *The China Quarterly*, 1986, 108: P. 703.

⁹⁴ Yi S. Between Arrogance and Despondency: The Shanghai Workers, the Communists, and the Strikes at the Japanese Cotton Mills of 1926. *International Labor and Working-Class History*, 2022: P. 25.

⁹⁵ Fang, X. C. Between Left and Right: cooperation and the split between Yu Qiaqing and the CCP during the era of the Northern Expedition. *Journal of Modern Chinese History*, 2010, 4(2): P. 193.

⁹⁶ Pan, X. A Study of the Jiangsu–Zhejiang Consortium, by Tao Shuimu et al. 2013. P. 76.

⁹⁷ Köll E. A Fine Balance: Chinese Entrepreneurs and Entrepreneurship in Historical Perspective. In *The People's Republic of China at 60*. Harvard University Asia Center, 2011: P. 193.

⁹⁸ Wu, Tien-wei. A Review of the Wuhan Debacle: The Kuomintang-Communist Split of 1927. *The Journal of Asian Studies*, 29.1 (1969): P. 143.

⁹⁹ Niu, D. Y. yingguo dui hua zhengce yu guomin geming de weiji 英國對華政策與國民革命的危機 (British Policy Towards China and the Crisis of the National Revolution). *Historical Studies*, 1991, P. 4.

culture than Communism, to counteract the spread and influence of the CCP in the KMT and China. Chiang supported the Confucianisation of the Three People's Principles to maintain his political status and rule. Specifically, Chiang saw Sun's alliance with Soviet Russia as a strategic means to strengthen the revolutionary forces in China. Chiang also tried to use Daijitaism to consolidate his authority from military to political leader. On the other hand, Chiang attempted to see the Confucianisation of the Three People's Principles as an anti-communist tool. At the same time, Dai's further interpretation of the Three People's Principles provided the theoretical basis for the KMT's policy of "purging the Party" and the massacre of the CCP in 1927. Under the influence of Daijitaism, the KMT imposed strict restrictions on CCP members who joined the KMT as individuals and established the Nanjing Government, which was controlled by the right wing of the KMT. Chiang received vast amounts of aid from the Jiangsu and Zhejiang financial oligarchs. The Daijitaism influenced the Nanjing KMT government, and Chiang purged the CCP in southern China and joined forces with the European and American powers to seize power from the Soviet-backed Wuhan KMT government in 1927; the Nanjing KMT gradually moved closer to the West during this period.

4. The Confucian argument behind the KMT's "Treaty Revision Movement" from 1928 to 1930

"With all haste, abolish the unequal treaties to grant Chinese citizens freedom and equality."

從速撤廢不平等條約，俾中國國民，獲得自由平等。¹⁰⁰

This statement was excerpted from Huang Fu's 黃郛 (1880-1936) speech in his inauguration ceremony when Huang was nominated as the ROC's foreign minister in 1928. It shows that the KMT government aimed to cancel or amend the unequal treaties they had previously signed with European powers. This slightly conciliatory statement was distinguished from Sun's statement of anti-imperialism, reflecting a clear shift away from revolutionary diplomacy to diplomacy abiding by peace in the 1920s.¹⁰¹ In the historical context, the KMT, led by Chiang Kai-shek (1887-1975), ultimately achieved a series of significant triumphs in the Chinese Civil War, culminating in Chiang's successful unification of the ROC.¹⁰² The KMT Army continued its northward march, joining warlord Feng Yuxiang 馮玉祥 (1882-1948) in north-western China and warlord Yan Xishan 閻錫山 (1883-1960) in Shanxi 山西 before capturing Beijing in June 1928.¹⁰³

On 29 December 1928, Zhang Xueliang 張學良 (1901-2001) announced by telegram that he accepted the rule of the KMT government in Nanjing and announced that the northeastern army had joined the KMT en masse and believed in the Three People's Principles.¹⁰⁴ At that time, Zhang, a general of the "Fengtian Clique" (*Fengxi junfa* 奉繫軍閥) faction who ruled northern east China, replaced the five-coloured flag of the Beiyang government with the blue sky, white sun and

¹⁰⁰ Huang Fu. Huangfu jiuzhi xiangbao 黃郛就職詳報 (Huang Fu's Detailed Report on Taking Office), *Ta Kung Pao* (Tianjin), 23 February 1928.

¹⁰¹ Sun, Youli. China's International Approach to the Manchurian Crisis, 1931-1933. *Journal of Asian History*, 26.1 (1992): P. 42-77.

¹⁰² Zarrow, Peter Gue. *China in War and Revolution, 1895-1949*. London: Routledge Curzon, 2005.

¹⁰³ Underhill, William. China's Northern Expedition. (Brief Article). *Newsweek*, 155, no. 12 (2010): P. 6.

¹⁰⁴ Itoh, Mayumi, and Mayumi Itoh. First KMT-CPC United Front and Assassination of Zhang Zuolin. In *The Making of China's War with Japan: Zhou Enlai and Zhang Xueliang*, (2016): P. 55-84.

red ground flag of the KMT government.¹⁰⁵ Henceforth, after the Northern Expedition, the Chiang's KMT Government completed the formal reunification of China and became the only regime representing China internationally.¹⁰⁶ Thus, Chiang became the ROC's nominal national leader even though other warlords were still entrenched in North-East China and South China.

The Three People's Principles progressively became the state ideology, further combining with domestic nationalism in China. The current body of literature generally concurs that modern China's humiliating experiences are related to Chinese nationalism and that the rise of nationalism is connected to humiliating experiences.¹⁰⁷ A series of coercive treaties that Qing China was compelled to sign in response to advanced scientific technologies and weapons caused the East Asian tributary system to disintegrate in imperial China.¹⁰⁸ When KMT nominally unified the ROC in 1928, it sought to solicit theoretical weight from the Three People's Principles aimed at national salvation. The Confucianisation of the Three People's Principles promoted by Dai was intended to save the Chinese nation and revitalise China. Because Dai's Confucianisation of the Three People's Principles became the ROC's national ideology after the KMT's Northern Expedition in 1926, Daijiao-ism needed to be coupled with China's nationalism to underpin the KMT's rule. Chiang sought to use Confucianism as a bridge between China's ancient traditions and China's national strength. Chiang claimed 1928 that “the fundamental spirit of the historical and cultural tradition is the nation's soul. The strength or weakness of this soul directly impacts a nation's prosperity or decline” (歷史文化之傳統的根本精神，就是國家的靈魂。這個靈魂的強弱興替，就直接影響一個國家的盛衰).¹⁰⁹ The Three People's Principles are derived from the quintessential part of China's traditional culture. As Chiang said:

“What is China's inherent national character? What has traditionally been the spirit of founding a nation? What is needed now? The Premier [Sun] has clarified that it is the “Three Principles of the People.” What is the “Three Principles of the People”? Ethically and politically, it is based on “loyalty, filial piety, benevolence, love, faith, and peace.” Pragmatically, it is a revolutionary philosophy of “knowing the difficulties and executing the easy.” Now, as we restore our national spirit for the revival of the Chinese nation, we must first revive China's inherent national morality of loyalty, filial piety, benevolence, love, faith, and peace.”

中國固有的民族性是什麼？從來立國的精神是什麼？現在需要的又是什麼？[孫]總理已經寫的明白，就是“三民主義”。“三民主義”是什麼呢？在倫理和政治方面講：就是“忠孝仁愛信義和平”來做基礎；在方法實行上講：就是『知難行易』的革命哲學。現在我們恢復民族精神，要中國的國家民族復興，就先要恢復中國固有的忠孝仁愛信義和平的民族道德。¹¹⁰

¹⁰⁵ Kwong, Chi Man. *War and Geopolitics in Interwar Manchuria: Zhang Zuolin and the Fengtian Clique During the Northern Expedition*. Leiden, [Netherlands]; Brill Nijhoff, 2017.

¹⁰⁶ Jordan, Donald A. *The Northern Expedition: China's National Revolution of 1926-1928*. Honolulu, Hawaii: University of Hawai'i Press, 2018.

¹⁰⁷ Zhang Daokui. *Minguo shiqi guojia yishi xingtai de bianqian* 民國時期國家意識形態的變遷 (*The change of state ideology during the Republican period*). Shandong University, China. 2018.

¹⁰⁸ Ren, Z. *Tributary System, Global Capitalism and the Meaning of Asia in Late Qing China*. ProQuest Dissertations and Theses. 2012.

¹⁰⁹ Chiang Kai-shek. *Xiandai guojia de shengmingli* 現代國家的生命力 (*The vitality of the modern state*). Chiang Kai-shek. *The Complete Works of the late President Chiang Kai-shek*. Taipei: Chinese Culture University Publishing Department, 1984, P. 126.

¹¹⁰ Chiang Kai-shek. *Geming zhexue de zhongyao* 革命哲學的重要 (*The importance of revolutionary philosophy*). Song Zhongfu, Zhao Jihui, Pei Dayang. *Confucianism in Modern China*. Zhengzhou: Zhongzhou Guji Publishing House, 1991.

It can be said that the KMT authorities attempted to merge the concept of the Chinese nation with nationalism. More precisely, they aligned the Three Principles of the People with the moral and political tenets of traditional Chinese Confucianism while attributing the revival of Chinese history to the philosophical traditions of ancient China. At this stage in the KMT's discourse, Sun's Three People's Principles appeared to inherit a series of positive Chinese traditional virtues, the Three Peoples' Principles empowering the Chinese people's traditional Confucianism values regarding ethical and political values and, in practice. Achieving China's rejuvenation seemed to involve regaining the traditional Confucianism of ancient Chinese culture. According to the ideological propaganda in ROC, the Three People's Principles inherited the essence of archaic Chinese Confucianism.¹¹¹ Hence, after the establishment of the Nanjing KMT government in 1927, Chiang devoted himself to generalising the ethical construction in Confucianism. As Chiang claimed, "Confucianism ethics is the building of national morality, the most important foundation of all our construction" (倫理建設就是國民道德建設, 是我們一切建設最緊要的基礎).¹¹² Thus, at this stage, The KMT government, in response to the growing influence of communism, employed the Confucianised Three Principles of the People as a nationalist ideology to garner broader public support for the KMT regime. The ROC government carried out the morphological inculcation of the Three People's Principles by promoting the construction of Confucian ethics and combining nationalism with the Three People's Principles.

At the domestic level, this explained how the KMT's political role changed from that of a revolutionary party to the ruling party after the nominal unification of China in 1928; from an in-country perspective, the KMT needed to improve its legitimacy. Initially, the KMT was required to continue to fight against the CCP: after the KMT's party purge in 1927, the CCP used military insurrection to establish the Chinese Workers' and Peasants' Red Army in eight provinces in southern China.¹¹³ Chiang stated in his opening address to the Fourth Plenary Session of the KMT, which took place from 2 to 7 February 1928, that "We must oppose not only the doctrine of the Communist Party but also its theories and methods" (我們不僅要反對他的主義, 而且要反對他的理論與方法).¹¹⁴ Chiang and the KMT also sought to publicise the Three People's Principles as an instrument for thought control, using its ideological propaganda to confront the spread of Communism.¹¹⁵ KMT even asked Chinese people, "All our citizens should sincerely believe in the Three Principles of the People and support the KMT. They should not unwisely believe in heretical doctrines, be incited by the Communist Party, nor should they covet small gains and be tempted by Communist bandits." (凡我民眾均應切實信仰三民主義, 擁護國民黨。不宜妄信邪說, 為共產黨所煽動, 更不宜貪圖小利, 為共產匪徒所誘惑).¹¹⁶ Accordingly, when the KMT became the governing party after 1928, promoting the Three People's Principles as an ideological indoctrination against the red armies led by the CCP further strengthened its legitimacy.

¹¹¹ Wang, Linzhu. "The Nation of China." *Self-determination and Minority Rights in China*. Brill Nijhoff, 2018. P. 13-44.

¹¹² Chiang Kai-shek. *Xian zongtong jiangong quanji* 先總統蔣公全集 (*The Complete Works of the First President Chiang Kung*). Edited by Chih-Yun Chang. The Chinese Culture University, Taiwan, October 1984 edition, P. 1283.

¹¹³ O'Ballance, Edgar. *The Red Army of China: A Short History*. London: Faber and Faber, 1962.

¹¹⁴ Chiang Kai-shek. Wei chufa jiaofei gao xiang'e, gan minzhong shu 為出發剿匪告湘、鄂、贛民眾書 (Letter to the people of Xiang, E and Gan for setting out to suppress the bandits). 1928. *Rong Mengyuan: Materials from the Chinese KMT Congresses and the Central Committee Plenum*, Guangming Daily Press, October 1985, P. 507.

¹¹⁵ Wu, Ona. *Winning the hearts and minds of the Chinese people: a study of Japanese, American, Kuomintang and Communist propaganda, 1937-1945*. Diss. Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1992.

¹¹⁶ *Ibid.*

At the external level, Sun and the other KMT leaders upheld the convention of revolutionary diplomacy, regarding the European countries and the US as objects to be overthrown or rebelled against. The idea of revolutionary diplomacy can be traced back to the May Thirtieth Massacre by the British. In 1925, on the eve of the Northern Expedition of KMT’s Armies, the shooting of over 40 protesters by the British military and police in Shanghai became a national tragedy called the “May Thirtieth Massacre” (*Wusa canan* 五卅慘案), and it triggered the biggest protest in China since the May Fourth Movement.¹¹⁷ The KMT unexpectedly found a popular mood within China before the Northern Expedition, so it used this as the backbone for a new concept of “revolutionary diplomacy” (*Geming waijiao* 革命外交), officially becoming the primary diplomatic strategy of the KMT Government. Zhou defined “revolutionary diplomacy” as, firstly, “breaking all traditions and existing rules” (打破一切傳統和既存的規則) and second, “harnessing the power of the people [against imperialism]” (利用民眾勢力).¹¹⁸ Under the influence of this guidance, one of the purposes of the Northern Expedition was dismantling the foreign concessions in China. The Declaration of the Northern Expedition of the National Revolutionary Army in 1924 clearly stated that the Northern Expedition was to “eliminate the warlords, expel the powers, regain the concessions and recover all sovereignty” (消滅軍閥、驅逐列強、收復租界、收回一切主權).¹¹⁹ When the KMT’s National Revolutionary Army occupied Wuhan 武漢 in 1927, the Wuhan KMT Government sent troops and workers’ pickets into the British Concession in Hankou 漢口 and Jiujiang 九江, and Britain was forced to sign an agreement with the Wuhan KMT Government to return the British concessions in Hankou and Jiujiang to the KMT government.¹²⁰ One scholar of the time described the KMT’s diplomacy as “[using the method of dealing with] rogues is the most effective diplomatic method of dealing with the governments of the imperialist powers” ([對付]流氓的方法，實在是對待帝國主義列強政府最有效的外交方法).¹²¹ Revolutionary diplomacy also emphasised the use of popular strength when KMT troops occupied areas in southern China as the Wuhan KMT government had followed the Sun’s policy of uniting with the CCP Before July 15, 1927. Although the Nanjing KMT government had initiated the campaign to purge the CCP on April 12, 1927, the Wuhan KMT continued to advocate cooperation with the Communists and the implementation of Sun’s anti-imperialist ideology. This period became known as the “Nanjing-Wuhan split” (*Ninghan fenlie* 寧漢分裂) and marked a division within the KMT.¹²² The split pitted the purging communist forces, led by Chiang in Nanjing, against the more accommodating communist forces, led by Wang in Wuhan, during the KMT’s Northern Expedition in 1927.¹²³ During this period, the CCP was a branch of the Comintern, an international association of

¹¹⁷ Li Enhan. *Beifa qianhou de geming waijiao* 北伐前後的革命外交 (1925-1931) (*Revolutionary Diplomacy before and after the Northern Expedition*). Institute of Modern History, Academia Sinica, 1993.

¹¹⁸ Zhou Gesheng. *Geming de waijiao* 革命的外交 (*The Diplomacy of the Revolution*). Shanghai: Pacific Bookstore, 1928. P. 1215.

¹¹⁹ The KMT Government. *Guomin gemingjun beifa xuanyan* 國民革命軍北伐宣言 (Declaration of the Northern Expedition of the National Revolutionary Army), issued on 6 July 1926, 15th year of the Republic of China (1926), *Selected Sources of Modern Chinese History (II)*. People’s University of China Press, 1988.

¹²⁰ Cong, W. *Chinese populism in the 1920s, extraterritoriality and International Law*. *Braz. J. Int’l L.*, 2020, 17: P. 139.

¹²¹ Zhou Gensheng, *Geming de waijiao* 革命的外交 (*The Diplomacy of the Revolution*), Shanghai Pacific Bookstore, 1928, P. 11.

¹²² Wu, Tien-wei. A Review of the Wuhan Debacle: The Kuomintang-Communist Split of 1927. *The Journal of Asian Studies*, 29.1 (1969): P. 125.

¹²³ Ke-Wen, W. The Left Guomindang in Opposition, 1927-1931. *Chinese Studies in History*, 1986, 20(2): P. 3-43.

Communist parties and organisations under the leadership of the USSR.¹²⁴ The Comintern directed the CCP to mobilise all available forces, cooperating with the KMT's military efforts to unify China.¹²⁵ Specifically, the Comintern urged the CCP to “rely on the masses of peasants, workers, intellectuals, and industrial and commercial sectors in China to combat world imperialism and its vassal states and to strive for China's independence” (依靠國內廣大的農民、工人、知識分子和工商業者各階層，為反對世界帝國主義及其走卒、為爭取中國獨立而鬥爭).¹²⁶ The influence of the CCP may have contributed to the KMT's emphasis on harnessing popular support during the Northern Expedition.¹²⁷ Notably, the KMT government's foreign policy perpetuated Sun's anti-imperialist stance, and this revolutionary diplomacy became the KMT's means of garnering support from various social classes in China. This strategy ultimately allowed the KMT to achieve the unification of China during the successful Northern Expedition.

However, from 1928 to 1930, the KMT started to abandon its revolutionary diplomacy, employing the diplomatic concept of faith and friendship to promote its Treaty Revision Movement after 1927, finally trying to gain legitimacy by amending treaties. This could be attributed to the shift of KMT's role from an opposition party to a ruling party. Given that the KMT had nominally unified China at the end of 1928, Chiang and Dai then conducted the Confucianisation of nationalism in the Three People's Principles to strengthen its legitimacy.¹²⁸ Unlike the previous revolutionary diplomacy, the KMT, the ROC's ruling party, could no longer adopt the Bolshevik style to solve foreign affairs. The KMT government thus used the Confucianist concept of “keeping good faith and pursuing harmony” [*Jiangxin xiumu* 講信修睦] as the guiding principle in foreign relations.¹²⁹ Concretely, when Huang was nominated as the foreign minister of the KMT government by Chiang in 1928, he declared that “following diplomatic procedures, the KMT Government is prepared to maintain and enhance goodwill relations with all friendly countries to rectify unequal treaties to obtain China's rightful equality in the international arena” (按照外交手續，與各國厘正不平等條約，期獲得中國在國際上應有之平等地位，國民政府準備與各友邦維持並增進其親善關係).¹³⁰ Although the KMT government discarded the previous revolutionary diplomacy, it still sought to rectify the unequal treaties signed by the Qing China government since 1840 and acquire an equal status in the international order. In the KMT's discourse, the nationalism in the Three People's Principles emanated from Confucianism and

¹²⁴ Garver, J. W. The origins of the second united front: The Comintern and the Chinese Communist Party. *The China Quarterly*, 1988, 113: P. 59.

¹²⁵ Garver, J. W. The origins of the second united front: The Comintern and the Chinese Communist Party. *The China Quarterly*, 113 (1988): P. 29.

¹²⁶ Communist International. Gongchan guoji zhixing weiyuanhui zhuxituan guanyu zhongguo minzu jiefang yundong he guomindang wenti de jueyi 共產國際執行委員會主席團關於中國民族解放運動和國民黨問題的決議 (Resolution of the Bureau of the Executive Committee of the Communist International on the Chinese National Liberation Movement and the KMT Question) (28 November 1923) *Selected Documents of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China*, Volume I (1921-1925). contributor, Central Archives; Publisher, Party School of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China Press, 1989. P. 231.

¹²⁷ Waldron, Arthur. Government Power and the Chinese Student Movement: The Warlords, the KMT, and the CCP. *Chinese Studies in History*, 25.3 (1992): P. 71.

¹²⁸ Kelkar G S. The KMT: An Inquiry into the Political Unification of China: 1928-1930. *China Report*, 1974, 10(4): P. 59.

¹²⁹ Dai Sheng. *Liji. liyun pian* 禮記，禮運篇 (*The Book of Rites*). Beijing, China Book Bureau, 2014, P. 961.

¹³⁰ Huang Fu. Nanjing guomin zhengfu waijiaobuchang huangfu fabiao de duiwai xuanyan 南京國民政府外交部長黃郭發表的對外宣言 (Foreign Declaration issued by Huang Fu, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the National Government of Nanjing), on 21 February 1928, *Selected Materials on the Diplomatic History of the Republic of China 1911-1931*. P. 412.

achieving independence and egalitarianism was, indeed, one of the primary purposes of KMT, “The revolutionary aim of the KMT is to seek freedom and equality in China” (中國國民黨之革命目的，為求中國之自由平等)。¹³¹ The KMT and its Nanjing Government gained authority from Dai’s Confucianisation of the Three People’s Principles. The Declaration of the KMT government in Nanjing on 20 September 1927 clearly stated the need to “carry out the abolition of unequal treaties to restore the independence and freedom of the national state to its equal status” (貫徹廢除不平等條約主張，以恢復民族國家獨立自由之平等地位)。¹³² It was pointed out that:

“In our country’s eighty years, we have experienced the constraints of unequal treaties imposed by imperialists. From the arrogant display of military power, bureaucratic corruption, economic bankruptcy, and the hardships of the people’s livelihood, to the loss of our national rights and the oppression of our compatriots, there is none that is not caused by unequal treaties. Therefore, the Prime Minister [Sun]’s dying wish is to abolish unequal treaties, strive to implement it thoroughly, and restore the equality of [our] international status.”

吾國八十年來，歷受帝國主義者不平等條約之束縛。舉凡軍國囂張，官僚腐敗，經濟破產，民生困窮，與吾國國權之喪失、僑胞被壓之苦痛，蓋無一而非不平等條約所致。故[孫]總理遺囑，對於廢除不平等條約，力求貫徹，以恢復國際地位之平等。¹³³

Based on these declarations, the KMT government blamed unequal treaties for China’s problems. By amending treaties with foreign countries, the KMT government gained legitimacy. After the unification of ROC in 1928, the KMT needed to structure its nation-state legitimacy, seeking theoretical support from nationalism in the Three People’s Principles.

Therefore, the Nationalist government began to promote the Treaty Revision Movement. Considering the KMT government’s pro-Western attitude after 1927, Chiang adopted different ways to amend the treaties with those countries that signed the agreements with the Qing China government. That is, abandoning any violent or mass movement to amend treaties with foreign nations, Chiang stated that “the policy set by the KMT Government is not to use force or any mass uprising to change the status of the concessions” (國民政府所訂之政策，為不用武力或任何群眾暴動，以改變租界之地位)。¹³⁴ Furthermore, The KMT Government pursued “only the peaceful method of consultation” (和平方法即協商的方法) to amend the problem of leased territory and foreign treaties in China.¹³⁵ During this period, the KMT government abandoned its earlier diplomatic stance and political standpoint of anti-imperialism while employing a pragmatic attitude in promoting the amendment of treaties with foreign countries. At the level of specific methods, the KMT government resorted to amending foreign treaties based on internationally accepted principles of diplomacy. As Chiang instructed in 1928, “the KMT government resolved the issue of treaty amendment following generally recognised principles of public international law and recent international practice” (依照普通承認的國際公法原則及近代國際慣例解決之)。¹³⁶ Regarding the aim of the Treaty Revision movement, the KMT government abandoned its previous radical slogan of “downing with the Foreign Powers” (*Dadao lieqiang* 打倒列強) while seeking

¹³¹ Chiang Kai-shek. *Wen Gongzhi*, ed. *A Complete History of the Revolution in the Republic of China*, Shanghai Yixin Bookstore, 1939, P. 1.

¹³² The KMT Government. Nanjing guomin zhengfu xuanyan 南京國民政府宣言 (The Declaration of the Nanjing National Government). Pang Ming, ed: *Selections from Modern Chinese History*. vol. 3, P. 9.

¹³³ *Ibid.*

¹³⁴ Chiang Kai-shek. *Institute of Modern History, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences. History of the Republic of China – Biography*. Beijing: China Book Bureau. 2011. P. 79.

¹³⁵ *Ibid.*

¹³⁶ Chiang Kai-shek. *Zhongguo zhi mingyun* 中國之命運 (*The Fate of China*), Zhengzhong Shuji 1943, P. 63.

equity and mutual respect.¹³⁷ It stated, “At the current moment when the reunification of China is achieved, one should take further steps in accordance with proper procedures, implement the revision of new treaties [...] to fully achieve the goal of equality and mutual respect for sovereignty” (今當中國統一告成之際，應進一步而遵正當之手續，實行重訂新約[...]以副完成平等及相互尊重主權之宗旨).¹³⁸ The KMT government thus advanced its Treaty Revision Movement from 1928. Regarding tariff autonomy, from the second half of 1928, the Nanjing KMT government concluded new treaties on customs duties with 12 countries: the United States, Germany, Italy, Britain, France, Norway, Belgium, Denmark, the Netherlands, Portugal, Sweden, and Spain. This led to an increase in customs duty rates.¹³⁹ Regarding the abolition of consular jurisdiction, the KMT government concluded new treaties with Italy, Belgium, Portugal, Denmark, Spain and other countries whose Qing China’s treaties had expired, and the KMT government repossessed the Belgian concessions in Tianjin 天津 on 31st October, the British concession in Zhenjiang 鎮江 on 31 October, the British military concession in Weihaiwei 威海衛 on 18 April in 1930, and the British concession in Xiamen 廈門 on 17 September in 1930.¹⁴⁰ Before 1931, the KMT government promoted its Treaty Revision Movement, which aimed to abolish consular jurisdiction and strive for tariff autonomy.

In this section, after the Northern Expedition in 1928, Chiang’s Nanjing KMT government completed the formal reunification of China and became the sole regime representing China internationally. The Confucianised Three People’s Principles gradually became the ideology of the ROC state, further combining it with Chinese nationalism. By promoting traditional Confucianism, the ROC government combined nationalism with the Three People’s Principles, which were ideologically inculcated. This seems to be explained by the need to increase the legitimacy of the KMT from a domestic perspective as its political role shifted from a revolutionary party to a ruling party following the nominal reunification of China in 1928. At the domestic level, Chiang’s Nanjing KMT Government needed to continue to fight against the CCP and related military insurgencies in China. At the external level, from 1920 to 1927, Sun and other KMT leaders adhered to the conventions of revolutionary diplomacy as soon as possible, treating European countries as objects to be overthrown or rebelled against. From 1928 to 1930, however, the KMT abandoned its line of revolutionary diplomacy in favour of a diplomatic philosophy of faith and friendship to promote its treaty revision campaign, ultimately attempting to gain legitimacy through treaty changes. This was probably due to the change in the role of the KMT from opposition to the ruling party and the pro-Western attitude of the KMT government after 1927. The KMT government thus advanced its New Treaty campaign from 1928 onwards, and some progress was made regarding tariff autonomy and the abolition of the consular jurisdiction.

¹³⁷ Cheng Dautian. A Re-conception of the Nanjing National Government’s “New Treaty Movement”. *Climbing: Philosophy and Social Science Edition*, 2006, 25(3), P.107.

¹³⁸ Huang Fu. *Dui nanjing guomin zhengfu “gaiding xinyue yundong” de zairenshi* 對南京國民政府“改訂新約運動”的再認識 (*Selections from the Diplomatic History of the Republic of China (1919-1931)*). *Zhonghua minguo waijiaoshi ziliao xuanbian* (1919-1931), 中華民國外交史資料選編 (1919-1931), edited by Cheng Daode and Zheng Yueming, Beijing University Press, 1985, P. 414.

¹³⁹ Ch'en, J. *China and the West: society and culture, 1815-1937*. Routledge, 2018.

¹⁴⁰ Chan, C. K. M., Chang. V. An Ignored supporting actor in the drama of imperialism Dutch imperialism and China (1919-1931).

5. Conclusion

This study aims to shed light on how Sun's allying with Soviet Russia policy from 1920 to 1924 was influenced by Confucianism. After that, the study investigates the impact of Confucianism on the KMT's movement toward the West between 1924 and 1927 and then analyses the philosophical justifications for the Treaty Revision Movement of the KMT between 1928 and 1930.

From 1920 to 1924, Sun chose an alliance with Soviet Russia because of the similarity between Confucian views and Communism and embarked on a Northern Expedition with the CCP. Sun's Three People's Principles initially derived from modern European Enlightenment thought. However, when Sun suffered successive defeats in the Chinese Revolution, he began incorporating the Three People's Principles into China's national context, specifically Confucianism. In the process, Sun tried to find the theoretical basis for the Three People's Principles in traditional Confucianism. The idea of civil rights in Sun's Three People's Principles may have originated from Confucianism's people-centred thinking; Sun's idea of Civil rights originated in Europe and was then localised and put into practice in conjunction with the people-centred review of Confucianism in China. At the level of foreign relations, Sun attempted to fuse the "Kingly and Tyrannical Rules" with the Three People's Principles to establish a new international order of equality and mutual assistance. To confirm this international order of equality, Sun saw the need to promote Greater Asianism to meet European industrial civilisation's challenges. At the same time, the idea of Universal harmony was also incorporated into Sun's international outlook. After being influenced by the victory of the October Revolution in Russia, Sun saw significant similarities between Confucianism and Marxism. This led Sun to gradually see Soviet Russia as a reliable partner in achieving China's independence and to try to enlist the help of Soviet Russia to complete China's national unification. The outbreak of the Guangzhou customs crisis in 1923 led Sun to accelerate his cooperation with Soviet Russia. On the advice of the CCP, Sun decided to reorganise the KMT with the help of Soviet advisers and attempted to unify much of China from its base in southern Canton through the Northern Expedition. Sun attributed the obstacles to the unification of China to the divisions amongst the Beiyang warlords. Sun's understanding of Soviet Russia was based on the anti-imperialist consensus of Confucianism and Communism, of which Sun's Three People's Principles gradually became the guiding ideology of the KMT.

Later, Dai Jitao's Three People's Principles Confucianisation allowed Chiang's Nanjing government to provide orthodoxy in its governance from 1925 to 1927. Chiang used Daijitaotao-ism to consolidate his political power, removing CCP forces and uniting with Europe and the United States to seize power from the Soviet-backed Wuhan KMT government in 1927, during a period when the Nanjing KMT government was gradually making ties with the West. Chiang, in 1927, broke off cooperation with the CCP, launched the Party purge campaign, stopped Sun's policy of uniting with the CCP to complete the Chinese domestic National Revolution, and banned the USSR advisers. Under Chiang's leadership, the KMT eventually unified China by defeating the other Northern Warlords and completing the Northern Expedition at the end of 1928. During this phase, the influence of Confucianism propelled the KMT's foreign policy towards the West. The Confucianisation of Dai's Three People's Principles is known as Daijitaotao-ism. Chinese scholars have specifically defined Daijitaotao-ism as constructing a theory of opposition to Marxism, class struggle and cooperation between the KMT and the CCP. Dai's aim in Confucianising the Three People's Principles was to find orthodoxy in Confucianism and Chinese history to counteract the influence of the CCP within the KMT and in China as a whole. At the time, Chiang did not have a well-established theory to consolidate his political power, so he had to retreat to the second-best theory that suited his political stance. As a result, Chiang tried to use Daijitaotao-ism to consolidate his authority from a military leader to a political leader. On the other hand, Chiang attempted to see the Confucianisation of the Three People's Principles as a tool for anti-communism. Dai's further interpretation of the Three People's Principles provided the theoretical basis for KMT's

policy of “purging the Party” of the CCP in 1927. Dai’s explanation of Confucianism’s Three People’s Principles may have led the KMT rightists and Chiang to ostracise the CCP, and it may have provided the theoretical basis for Chiang Kai-shek’s policy of purging the Party and the massacre of the CCP in 1927. Specifically, Chiang saw Sun Yat-sen’s alliance with Soviet Russia as a strategic means of strengthening China’s revolutionary power. Chiang also attempted to use Daijitaism to consolidate his power from military to political leadership. On the other hand, Chiang tried to see the Confucianisation of the Three People’s Principles as an instrument for anti-communism. Under the influence of Daijitaism, the KMT imposed strict restrictions on CCP members who joined the KMT as individuals and established the Nanjing government, which was controlled by the right wing of the KMT. Chiang received substantial assistance from the Jiangsu and Zhejiang financial oligarchs. Daijitaism influenced the KMT Nanjing government, and Chiang purged southern China of the CCP and joined forces with the European and American countries to seize power from the Soviet-backed Wuhan KMT government in 1927, a period in which the Nanjing KMT gradually drifted towards the West.

From 1928 to 1930, during this period, after the Northern Expedition in 1928, Chiang’s Nanjing government completed the formal reunification of China. It became the only regime representing China internationally. The Three People’s Principles gradually became the ROC state’s ideology and was further integrated with Chinese nationalism. The ROC government combined nationalism with the Three People’s Principles by promoting Confucian ethics, which it ideologically inculcated into the Three People’s Principles. At the domestic level, the KMT’s political role shifted from a revolutionary party to a ruling party after the KMT nominally unified China in 1928; from a domestic perspective, the KMT needed to increase its legitimacy as the KMT continued to struggle against the CCP and related military insurgencies within China. At the external level, the KMT government used the Confucian concept of “keeping good faith and pursuing harmony” as a principle for its external relations. It attempted to make the KMT gain legitimacy to govern by amending its treaties with foreign countries. Thus, the KMT government began to promote the New Treaty Movement. Considering the pro-Western attitude of the KMT government after 1927, Chiang took a different approach to revising treaties with those countries that had signed agreements with the Chinese Qing government and made some progress in terms of tariff autonomy and the abolition of consular jurisdiction.

Acknowledgements

This research did not receive any specific grant from funding agencies in the public commercial, or not-for-profit sectors.

The author declares no competing interests.

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Robust Moral Realism and the Supervenience Argument

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Received: 20 April 2024 ▪ Revised: 2 July 2024 ▪ Accepted: 23 July 2024

Abstract

The paper examines the supervenience argument advanced by the robust moral realists in defense of moral realism. How defensible is the supervenience argument? The paper argues that answer to this question is not as straight forward as the proponents of the robust realism assumed. It argues that defending supervenience argument without paying proper attention to details about the main tenets of moral realism in relation to “is and ought” gap that exists between natural and non-natural properties is largely responsible for why moral realists assume that up till now, there is no demonstrative argument to show that their supervenience argument had been persuasively refuted. This paper does not intend to fill the traditional gap in favor of moral realism. Instead, it intends to challenge such assumption. The paper concludes that the supervenience argument is not as defensible as the proponents of the theory have claimed.

Keywords: moral realism, supervenience, moral properties, natural properties, moral facts.

1. Introduction

In meta-ethical inquiry, it is often argued that the supervenience of moral properties on natural properties is one of the central and indispensable features of moral realism. This view is often defended by the scholars who subscribe to the non-naturalistic/robust version of the moral realism.¹ As a matter of fact, moral realism as a meta-ethical theory has two major arguments developed by its proponents to defend its thesis against the opponents. These arguments include first; the supervenience argument (the general claim by the moral realists that the moral supervenes on the natural. That is, moral properties supervene on natural properties). The second is the argument from the phenomenology of moral discourse (the claim that our day-to-day talk supports the ontological status of moral facts). The concern of this paper is the former. Meanwhile, the later will be discussed somewhere else. Before moving further, it is imperative as a matter of

¹ Moral Realism comes in variants. There is the naturalist/non-robust version and the non-naturalist/robust version. The former states that moral facts are reducible to natural facts, while the latter states that moral facts are not reducible to natural facts. Our focus in this paper is the non-naturalist/robust version. The reason is because naturalist version does not have serious problem with supervenience argument like the non-naturalistic/robust version. In fact, the robust version of realism championed the view that non-natural properties supervene on natural properties. For details, See Wilson Mendonca “Dreier on the supervenience argument against robust realism,” *Unisinos Journal of Philosophy*, vol. 18, No. 3, (2017): 167. Also, Joshua Schechter, “Five kinds of epistemic arguments against robust moral realism” in Paul Bloomfield and David Copp (Eds.) *The Oxford Handbook of Moral Realism*, Oxford: Oxford, 2023, p. 345.

necessity, to first of all clarify what I mean by realism in general and moral realism in particular in order to situate my discussion in a proper context.

What are the major tenets of moral realism, or what do moral realists stand for? In today's world, there is a moral need to locate the theoretical foundation of most of the challenges we are confronted with. For instance, child-marriage is a controversial moral issue currently. But, are there moral facts about child marriage? Is the wrongness (in case it is wrong) of same sex marriage objective? Is the step being taken by the Lagos State Government of Nigeria to ban public smoking wrong? Is the act wrong because the government forbids it or would be wrong even if there is no law against it? For instance, in Alabama and 14 other States in the United States of America, all abortion services have been ceased. Meanwhile, Alaska and some other States allow abortion. But, are there moral facts about abortion? Is the rightness or wrongness of abortion dependent on or independent of the individual making the value judgment? Are there human actions that are wrong or right no matter what? Most people or even culture condemn incest but is the act wrong because most people condemn it, or would the act still be wrong even if no person on earth is aware of it? Meta-ethical theorists engage in debates as regards how to address some of the above moral questions.

This paper intends to achieve at least two things. First, an examination of the main tenets of moral realism. Two, a critical assessment of the supervenience argument shall be considered.

2. Analyzing the main tenets of moral realism

Moral realism is a meta-ethical theory that affirms the existence of moral facts. It suggests that moral facts exist independently of individual minds. It is the view that in certain regard, there is an objective moral reality. Moral realists make the following claims that:

- i. There are moral facts; moral facts exist in the world irrespective of whether or not they are perceived (Railton, 1986: 165).
- ii. Certain sentences and mental representations purport to represent moral facts (Schechter, 2023: 346).
- iii. Moral facts are objective.
- iv. Some basic moral properties and relations are exemplified (Schechter, 346).
- v. Moral properties and relations are not identical with, reducible to, or fully grounded in natural properties and relations (Schechter, 2023: 346); and
- vi. Moral facts are discoverable just like scientific facts (Railton, 1986: 165).

One way to separate the robust moral realism from the naturalist version is to consider what each of them accept. While the naturalist moral realists accept i, ii, vi, the non-naturalist/robust moral realists accept i, ii, iii, iv, v. In any case, if moral realists' claims above are true, then it would be possible to arrive at moral decisions about certain human actions. If moral realism is true, then the wrongness of human actions like killing, rape, stealing, and arson will be objectively true. To be consistent, a moral realist is likely to hold the view that it is possible to objectively determine the wrongness of stealing. However, there is a little worry as to whether or not the wrongness of stealing or rape could be objectively determined. Can we objectively determine the wrongness of rape in marriage? This is controversial. In agreement with moral anti-realism, certain actions that are generally regarded as objectively wrong may not, after all be wrong. Before the evaluation of the act of rape, it is necessary to know how the notion of rape is generally understood. Rape occurs when a man or a woman forcefully (without consent) engages in sexual activities with a woman or a man, as the case may be. If rape is defined the way it has just been defined, then is the act always wrong in marriage? Imagine a wife raped by her husband

or a husband raped by his wife due to the fact that one party (husband or wife) consistently denies the other party of sex.

Someone may argue that the act is wrong since the consent of the wife or the husband is not sought. This may even not be true. The issue really is that the consent is always sought by one of the parties but not granted by the other. So, the consent is sought but not granted. All the same, there is an absence of consent. On the other hand, the consistent denial of sex within marriage is a breach of contract. One of the main reasons for marriage is the satisfaction of sexual urge of the husband and wife. In this case, there is a clash of consent and contract. So, if rape is viewed from the point of view of consent it could be said to be wrong. On the other hand, if viewed from the terms of contract in marriage, it could be declared right. With this example, the moral realists point about the objective wrongness of rape has to be taken with a pinch of salt.

What about stealing? Are there moral facts about stealing right there in the world that makes it wrong at all times? This is equally controversial. Stealing is generally defined as the act of taking something that belongs to another person without his or her consent. For the sake of argument, let us imagine that Mr. X takes an inhaler from Mr. Y's store to save a life of an asthmatic patient, since the latter's consent could not be obtained as at the time of the urgent need. Just like the first example, there is a moral clash between Mr. X's property right and the moral need to save human life. The implication of the moral clash is that, the moral realist claim about the objectivity of the wrongness of stealing could be wrong. Moral anti-realist denial of such objectivity appears more convincing (Olanipekun, 2024: 65).

According to Jonathan Dancy, moral realism suggests that moral thought has its own subject matter, distinct from science and all-natural inquiries (Dancy, 1998: 535). Second, the theory also affirms that moral judgment is an attempt to determine a matter of fact that is independent of any beliefs we might have about it. The fact is one thing, and what we think about it is another thing (Dancy, 535). Generally, moral realists support the objectivity of ethics. Moral realists are of the view that moral facts can be discovered within the structures of the universe since such moral facts are parts of the structures of the world. For moral realists, the truth of moral beliefs is independent of personal and private feelings of approval or disapproval of an individual. Moral realists are of the views that it is possible to conclusively determine the rightness or wrongness of certain actions. If an action is right, then its rightness has nothing to do with personal feelings or approval of the individual. Moral realism is the idea that "moral truth is grounded in the nature of things (moral claims) rather than in subjective and variable human reactions to things (the moral claims) (Blackburn, 2005: 253).

In the light of the above view, Richard Werner argues that, there are moral facts just as there are scientific facts and the point about justification in ethics is as legitimate and objective as we have in science (Warner, 1983: 653). What does this imply? Moral realists are of the view that we are justified in our belief about the independent existence of moral entities and facts just as we are justified in claiming the existence of scientific entities such protons, neutrons and others. The moral realists claim that there are moral facts that are part of the structures of the universe is a thesis in ontology, the study of what is. William Tolhurst presents the moral realist ontological thesis thus: "Moral realists hold that morality is objective, that moral facts are discovered not legislated or created, the truth of our moral beliefs is independent of our evidence for them and independent of our feelings of approval or disapproval. They are objective truth" (Tulhurst, 1986: 43). Furthermore, William Boyce also states the moral realist ontological minimum claims below: "An objectivist theory is one in which ethical assertions are not believed to be mere statements of attitude, but rather are held to reflect an "objective" transcendent moral truth that is independent of anyone's feelings" (Boyce & Jenson, 1976: 64). This is a denial of all appearance of emotivism.

As mentioned above, moral realist's ontological thesis is a direct denial of moral anti-realist claims about the relevance of attitudes to the truth or falsity of ethical statement. In a way,

moral objectivism projects the view that the actual moral wrongness or rightness of an act transcends and independent of any of the feelings of a moral agent towards such act. For Gensler, the objective view (also called-moral realism) claims that some things are objectively right or wrong, independently of what anyone may think or feel (Gensler, 1998: 15). For Geoffrey Sayre-McCord, moral realism holds that the appropriate truth-conditions make no reference to anyone's subjective states or to the capacities, conventions, or practices of any group of people (Sayre-McCord, 1988: 20). For Sayre McCord, it is surely a strange reversal of the natural order of thought to say that our admiring an action either is, or is what necessitates, its being good. We think of its goodness as what we admire in it, and as something it would have even if no one admired it, something that it has in itself (Sayre-McCord, 1988).

For Richard Boyd, the associated rational supervenience of moral facts and moral opinions upon non-moral factual properties or opinion indicates that, by contrast, there is an alternative realist explanation for divergence and intractability which is ratified by all the currently plausible moral theories (Boyd, 1988: 223). Essentially, the realists projected the supervenience argument as a strong argument which makes their theory attractive. However, what does supervenience argument entail? The next section will address this pivotal question.

3. What is this supervenience argument?

Starting with two senses of the term, supervenience as a philosophical term has been given different interpretations among the robust moral realists. From ontological point of view, Ausonio and Yli-Vakkuri conceived supervenience argument to mean the view that; "All properties (non-physical properties) strongly supervene on physical properties. In other words: necessarily, for all properties P, all objects x, and all times t: if x has P at t, then, for some physical property P', x has P' at t and, necessarily, for all y and all times t', if y has P' at t', then y has M at t'" (Ausonio & Yli-Vakkuri, 2008: 103). In this case, the relation between physical properties and non-physical properties was established, with non-physical supervening over physical. Let us consider the example of relation between natural and non-natural properties given by Dreier for a better understanding:

Consider the relation between the sentence "John drank some water" and the sentence "John drank some H₂O." If the first is true, the second must be. Any possible world in which John drank some water is a world in which John drank some H₂O. That's because water is H₂O. As we might say, the property of being water is identical with the property of being H₂O. Or anyway, so many philosophers are happy to say since Kripke explained rigid designation in Naming and Necessity. The expressions "water" and "H₂O" rigidly designate the same natural kind. Now suppose something like that is true of the pair of expressions, "good" and "producing the greatest happiness of the greatest number" (or some other naturalistic predicate). They designate the same property in every world (Drier, 1992: 19).

The above explanation by Drier is not too different from Ausonio and Yli-Vakkuri's position. In ethics, it is frequently claimed that the term "supervene" was first used in its contemporary philosophical sense by R. M. Hare, who used it to characterize a relationship between moral properties and natural properties (Hare, 1952: 145). When Blackburn saw how the moral realists were using the supervenience argument in a confusing manner, he argued that to tell which moral quality results from a given natural state means using standards whose correctness cannot be shown by conceptual means alone.

Furthermore, we are also considering two kinds of relations that hold between, for example, moral properties and natural ones. In Drier's analysis of Blackburn's interpretation of the supervenience argument, Drier summarized the general argument presented by Blackburn this way. The view is that, a certain supervenience claim, one connecting the moral realm to the

natural, is true. But a contrary claim is false. The realist cannot explain why the weaker connection should hold, given that the stronger one does not, while the anti-realist can easily explain this. So, realism accrues a debt of explanation which it cannot discharge (Drier, 1992: 14).

Basically, the claim that moral anti-realism is more plausible than moral realism does not mean that moral realism as a theory is not attractive in any way. There are certain positive arguments such as the phenomenological argument in support of moral realism which make the theory attractive. This means, moral realism receives its support from the nature and structure of human language. Human expressions seem to support moral realism. Our up-bringing, cultural beliefs and disbeliefs, practices seem to support the existence of certain moral facts. There are certain actions we disapprove because they are wrong and such actions are not wrong because of the disapproval. It would be very difficult to produce arguments that will approve unprovoked killing. Suppose x kills y and the former is asked to justify the killing of the latter. The justification "I kill y because I do not like his or her face" will not be acceptable. If this is so then, there are facts about the wrongness of unprovoked killing. Therefore, the wrongness of unprovoked killing could be objective.

Besides, the reality of moral deliberations confirms the possibility of moral facts. Our moral deliberations will be an exercise in futility if such deliberations are not aimed towards certain facts that are right there in the world. Carl Wellman in "Emotivism and Ethical Objectivity" offers strong arguments in support of the objectivity and reality of moral facts. According to Wellman, there are moral facts "when one speaker says "this is good" and another says "no, it is bad", their utterances certainly seem to be incompatible" (Wellman, 1968: 90). If ethical sentences are expressions of emotion, then there will not be contradictions in ethics. However, there are contradictions in ethics and so two different ethical sentences do clash. One of the best arguments offers by Wellman in support of the objectivity of ethics is stated thus: In ordinary English, we frequently speak of ethical sentences as true or false...the language of ethics includes questions. A factual question expresses doubt about the nature of reality and is a request for information (Wellman, 1968: 90).

As mentioned earlier, another important point in support of moral realism is the argument about the supervenience of moral facts on natural facts. Even though this is not without flaws, the argument is meant to bridge the traditional gap between "is" and "ought."² Generally, moral anti-realism partly derived its strength from the gulf claimed to exist between what is the case and what ought to be the case. It has been argued that an evaluative conclusion cannot be derived from factual premises due to the unbridgeable gap between them. The argument from supervenience seems not to meet the challenge. The robust moral realists need to understand that relationship between the statement of fact and statement about value is not exhaustively explained by the supervenience relationships. Let us move to the next section for details.

4. How plausible is moral realists' supervenience argument?

Having considered the main tenets of moral realism in relation to "is and ought" gap that exists between natural and non-natural properties, the next equally important question is

² "Is" and "Ought": "Is" (statements about facts about the world) and "Ought" (statements about moral facts). The history of the relationship or gap between "Is" and "Ought", was articulated by David Hume. Hume argued that there is no legitimate logical transition between "Is" and "Ought". This discussion has generated a debated because some scholars believe that "Ought" can be reduced to "Is", while some others strongly objected to this reduction by claiming irreducibility of the sphere of "Ought". For details, see Szymon Osmola and Wojciech Zaluski, "'Is' and 'Ought' in Hume's and Kant's Philosophy" in M. Sellers, and S. Kirste (Eds.), *Encyclopedia of the Philosophy of Law and Social Philosophy*, Springer Science, 2017, pp. 1-7.

that; how can moral realism convincingly account for the supervenience of non-natural moral properties on natural properties? Answer to this question is not as straight forward as moral realists assumed. Given that bridging the traditional gap between “is” and “ought” is a serious business for philosophers especially in moral domain, let us first consider two passages from Blackburn for better understanding. This will enable us to see how and why believed that the only reason why supervenience argument could appear to be conceptually true is merely based on the way we use our language.

It seems to be a conceptual matter that moral claims supervene upon natural ones. Anyone failing to realize this, or to obey the constraint, would indeed lack something constitutive of competence in the moral practice. And there is good reason for this: it would betray the whole purpose for which we moralize, which is to choose, commend, rank, approve, or forbid things on the basis of their natural properties (Blackburn, 2005: 97).

It should be noted that Blackburn had emphasized something similar to the view expressed above even a decade earlier. According to him, our purpose in projecting value predicates may demand that we respect supervenience. If we allowed ourselves a system which was like ordinary evaluative practice, but subject to no such constraint, then it would allow us to treat naturally identical cases in morally different ways (Blackburn, 1984: 186).

What is the import of the above quotations? Even though Blackburn’s seems to agree that the plausibility of supervenience argument is founded on mere ordinary evaluative practices, we should be skeptical about whether the moral realists would accept Blackburn’s submission. In my view, the problem is not really about whether the realists would accept that their position is faulty or not. The problem is about whether the plausibility of the supervenience argument is truly founded on mere linguistic usage or not. Let us call this a linguistic constraint. To buttress Blackburn’s allegation, Russ Shafer-Landua also toes the same path going by his explanation. According to him, if the moral fails to supervene on the non-moral, then the non-moral world does not control the moral world. But if that world does not control the moral world, then the moral world is out of control. Moral assessments would be arbitrary (Shafer-Landua, 2005: 258). As a build-up on the above, Shafer-Landau submitted that “I think that reflection on these matters reveals what many philosophers have claimed: that the moral, as a matter of conceptual truth, supervenes on the descriptive. We cannot conceive of a plausible moral order that licenses different moral ascriptions for situations that are in all other respects identical” (Shafer-Landua, 2005: 258).

Shafer-Landau’s view is a build-up on Blackburn’s claim by introducing the notion of conceptual truth. I choose to call this a conceptual constraint. Meanwhile, Matthew Kramer contends that one should agree with Blackburn that supervenience is a foundational property of morality, and one can concur *arguendo* with his explanation of its status as such a property (Blackburn, 2009: 348). For the exponents of supervenience arguments, there are moral facts because the relationship between moral facts and natural facts is similar to the relationships between natural objects and their atomic properties. The argument from supervenience starts with the initial assumption about the reality of certain material properties. Besides material properties, there are non-material properties. The nonmaterial properties supervene on or are dependent on material properties.

Among the non-material properties are moral properties which though not like material properties in certain respect, but owe their existence to the reality of material properties. Every property, i.e. biological social, psychological, and moral properties are different parts of the same property (Brink, 1984: 120). The argument from supervenience is fascinating. The notion of supervenience is well stated by R.M. Hare. If two material objects share the same properties, then it is not possible to maintain that the first is good while the other is not good. The impossibility is due to the fact that the evaluative remark depends on the material properties of the two objects

(Hare, 1952: 145). How Plausible is the supervenience argument? How much support does it offer moral realism? As already hinted earlier, moral realism may be plausible in certain regard but our thesis is that, it is not plausible in some other regards. Let us briefly examine the supervenience argument in support of moral realism stated above.

Though, moral realism is said to have some degree of plausibility, some of the arguments in its support appear not really strong. The moral anti-realists argue that the claim that existence of moral beliefs support the existence of moral fact is rejected (Graig, 1998: 538). As Edward Craig hinted, it has been argued that we do not need to infer a separate existence of moral facts from the reality of moral beliefs. Moral beliefs are explanatorily sufficient to explain our moral convictions (Graig, 538). The above point by Edward Craig casts doubts on realists' supervenience argument. This is because, robust moral realists' argument lacks convincing account of how and why moral beliefs are necessary for proper understanding of moral facts. The lack of convincing account is a major challenge to moral realism.

Now, are moral realists stuck? There appear to be a way out for moral realism. Moral realists might however, argue that at least, the facts explain the beliefs. Therefore, the argument about the link between moral facts and moral beliefs is still germane. While reacting to moral realists' defense, in *The Nature of Morality*, a non-realist such as Gilbert Harman responded that the beliefs can be equally well explained in other ways without making reference to moral facts. It is quite possible to trace the origin of moral beliefs to human upbringing and education. Thus, our reference to beliefs to explain moral facts may not be necessary since there is an alternative explanation (Harman, 1977: 7).

Furthermore, J. L. Mackie is a strong opponent of moral realism. Mackie's argument from queerness dealt a deadly blow to moral realism as well as their supervenience argument. For Mackie, values, if they existed, would be very peculiar things, unlike anything else in the universe; so queer are they that, if they existed, we would need a special faculty of moral perception or intuition to perceive them (Mackie, 1998: 11). Mackie rejects moral facts thus: We ordinarily say, for instance, that an action was wrong because it was cruel. But "just what in the world is signified by this *because*"? not only is there the wrongness and the cruelty, but also a totally mysterious "consequential link" between the two (Mackie, 1977: 41). Just as the moral facts are strange to Mackie, in moral discourse, supervenience argument will also be strange.

Arising from the above, Mackie argues that "is-ought" distinction is real and any attempt to bridge the gap creates strange entities called moral facts (Mackie, 1977: 41). In this respect it seems moral anti-realist denial of moral facts/value is strong. There are no moral facts because moral judgments depend on individual point of view. The implication is that if there are no moral facts as mentioned by Mackie, the supervenience argument will be useless and unnecessary. One question that comes to mind is that; will there be moral facts in a world populated by zero human beings? This is not likely to be the case. If this is so, then moral judgments as maintained by moral anti-realists, depend on individual point of view. Such moral facts are not part of the structure of the universe and the supervenience argument will be a baseless fabrication. Even though the supervenience argument is one of the strongest weapons adopted by moral realists in support of their thesis, I still doubt whether that argument is as strong as it is generally believed.

In another development, if the moral realists agree that the paradigm justification for moral knowledge is based on intuition or *a priori* awareness of moral properties as G. E. Moore maintains, consequently, they have to reject causal reductionism, according to which the causal power of the supervening moral facts are entirely reducible to that of natural facts. Otherwise, by implication, the epistemological thesis of the moral realists stands to undermine their earlier upheld metaphysical proposition. In other words, can moral property be reduced to non-moral

property the same way water is reduced to H₂O when we analyze its chemical property? This is controversial.

Another possible quick response to supervenience argument defended by the moral naturalist-realists is this. It can be argued that moral realists cannot hold on to their position that there are moral facts, by claiming that the ontological status of moral facts could be demonstrated on the ground that moral facts supervene on, or are the consequences of natural facts. In Tweyman's account of David Hume, "no set of non-moral premises can entail a moral conclusion, ...there can be no demonstrative arguments to prove, that those instances of which we have had no experience resemble those of which we have had experience" (Tweyman, 1995: 490).

In other words, there is no situation in which a description of natural qualities is supposed to give rise automatically to an ethical conclusion. In the light of this, it is not only the case that moral realists are wrong for holding moral beliefs about things because of their naturalistic property, the question can also be raised that, why should a realists theory such as supervenience thesis accept that things believed to be naturally alike cannot be believed to be of distinct worth? The realists as we have seen, offer no explanation of why this sort of inconsistency in moral belief.

In addition, another problem that poses a serious challenge to the moral realists over their celebrated supervenience thesis is the "question/problem of relation". The problem is this: How do we explain the mysterious connection they claim to exist between the natural facts and moral facts? Or what does this "supervenience/ consequent upon" mean? Thus, the problem with the realists is that there is no convincing explanation on how to bridge this wide gulf between "is" and "ought" as well as facts/value distinction.

On a critical note, one possible counter objection against the realists' supervenience argument is this. There is a suspicion that the moral realists have a tendency to fall victim of the naturalistic fallacy of G. E. Moore if care is not taking. The reason is because, any attempt to argue that non-natural or moral property supervene on natural property will amount to making a mistake that all metaphysical ethicists (moral realists inclusive) are often accused of making. Anyway, moral realists might defend themselves that they are not guilty of the naturalistic fallacy. They might argue that the claim that they commit naturalistic fallacy is not accurate because G. E. Moore's definition of naturalistic fallacy does not capture the concept of "supervenience".

In the final analysis, this paper is not a total denial of moral realism. In fact, it was pointed out that the theory is plausible in some respects. But, having examined the realist's supervenience argument and the objections against their position, I want to conclude this paper by contending that the supervenience argument is not as defensible as the proponents of the theory have claimed. due to certain constraints identified in the paper.

5. Conclusion

This paper examined through critical analysis, philosophical argumentation and conceptual clarification the supervenience argument advanced by moral realists. Scholars such as Simon Blackburn (1971, 1984 & 2005), and James Dreier (1992) have made considerable effort to champion and analyze this argument against the position of the realists. However, little attention is paid to the proper analysis of the main tenets of moral realism in relation to "is and ought" gap that exists between natural and non-natural properties. This lacuna enabled moral realists to assume that up till now, there is no demonstrative argument to show that their supervenience argument had been persuasively refuted. This paper challenged such assumption. The paper concluded that the supervenience argument is not as defensible as the proponents of the theory have claimed. In this paper, I have been able to achieve at least three things: first, the examination of the minimum claims of moral realism; two, clarification of what the supervenience argument

entails, and third, I have concluded this paper with a critical assessment of the supervenience argument of the non-naturalist moral realism.

Acknowledgements

This research did not receive any specific grant from funding agencies in the public commercial, or not-for-profit sectors.

The author declares no competing interests.

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The Meaning of Using Children's Names by Their Fathers in the Bible in the Book of Genesis in the Jewish Bible According to Jewish Religious Literature

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Received: 7 May 2024 ▪ Revised: 2 July 2024 ▪ Accepted: 6 August 2024

Abstract

In this article, we will provide interpretations regarding fathers naming their sons by name and we will summarize the main points of their statements that have been brought forward so far. The scripture mentions that Adam called his third son by his name, even though it has already been mentioned that Eve called her son by his name. For example, the Ramban claims that the scripture emphasizes that the calling by name is precisely for those who will continue the chain of generations, the Melbim points to the same principle and says that it was appropriate to mention from whom the kingdom of the house of David will come.

Keywords: Judaism, Abraham, Noah, Lot, Malbim, Rambam, Bible, Jewish literature.

1. Adam and Eve

In the bible, God called Adam by name, as it is written: "This is the book of Adam's history on the day God created man in the image of God He made him. Male and female, he blessed them and blessed them and called their names Adam on the day of God" (5:1-2).

Contextual proximity to the word "earth" cannot be ignored, as the connection and connection between man and the earth is described several times: "And the Lord God formed man from the dust of the ground..." (2:7) as well as: "By the sweat of your nose you shall eat bread until you return to the earth because from it you take it ..." (3:19; Sutzkover, 2012).

We have already seen in the midrash above that a person is named after the soil from which he was created. The Radak explains the meaning of this a person is created from a body and a soul, the soul is a part of God from above, while the body is created from the earth. Man is named after the earth, after the physical part of him to remind him that if he chooses to follow the nature of the physical, he will only be like the earth, and will not be recognized as the spiritual part of it. From this, we learn that a person has the choice to direct his life to the satisfaction of physical needs and thus incline to the earthly side of him, or in his ability to follow the spiritual qualities that are unique to him, and thus to resemble his Lord who created him. Both the male and the female are called "Adam", and this reading distinguishes Those of the other animals who were also created from the earth and this is a name-calling for all of humanity. The Maharal links man and the earth not only in the aspect of matter and creation, that man was created from the earth, but

sees a common feature and that is the power inherent in both man and the earth that he brings out of the power into action. The soil has the power to grow plants that are not the soil itself, and similarly, man has hidden powers to create new things (Kimhi, 2005).

Another noun that defines a man is “Adam” (A “Man”). In this, there is a difference between the male and the female who are both called Adam, but the male is called “Ish” and the female is called “Woman”. The man named the woman after she was created from his rib, and hence the name of the man was also derived “for this shall be called a woman because she takes it from a man”. The scripture did not mention before that the human being is called an “Adam”, and it is he who gives her uniqueness as a woman, thus distinguishing between the woman’s purpose and the man’s purpose. As a “person”, different from the animals, the male, and the female are equal in purpose, yet in their essence, they are different from man and woman. The woman is the last creation created, and perhaps hence it is necessary to call her by a name that distinguishes her from the man from whom she was created. As mentioned, reading a name is like reading an essence, and therefore reading her name “Asha” expresses a change in the relationship between the man and the woman. This is repeated after receiving the punishment for the sin of eating from the Tree of Knowledge, the person changes the woman’s name once more and from “Woman” she becomes “Eve”. Although she is still called “Woman” because this name is inclusive of all human females, Eve is the first name of Adam’s wife, in meaning her being the “mother of all living” that animates humanity. A person recognizes her animal power, and to strengthen it he changes her name, thus inciting her connection from sin, temptation, and death to her ability to grow and create life (Smet, 2009; Galily & Petkova, 2022).

Sutzkober sees the change of Eve’s name from “Adam” to “Woman” and then to “Eve”, as Adam attempts to control his anger over her. She notices that the name changes are made after an event in which the female occupies a central place: after her uniqueness and creation from man, man calls her woman and emphasizes that she was created by him, and after eating from the tree of knowledge and falling from its roots, man changes her name to Eve, thus defining her role as a mother only. Sutzkober tries to prove that the name Eve came to command the language of experience, and according to this to explain that man shows his superiority over her and what he expects from her. We do not think it is reasonable to accept this explanation, because the word “Hava” is from the word “animal” since it is known that the letters V and V alternate, and what is more, Adam himself says about Eve that she is “the mother of all living”. Therefore, it seems to us that calling a woman’s name comes from admiration and appreciation for her figure and her abilities, which are different from a man’s, and not from laziness about a person (Sutzkober, 2012).

Eve is called by four names: Adam, female, woman, and Eve, with each name pointing to a different quality inherent in her. The multitude of names indicates its importance. Adam is an inclusive name for humanity, this name reveals the uniqueness of man over the animals and his role to control them. Man is also an animal and therefore he is derived from a male and a female, thus expressing their wonderful ability to bring life into the world and to be partners in creation, but they must remember that first they are human before being animals and they are assigned a role in their creation to be above the animal. The woman is taken from the man, and he is the one who calls her by her name. Man discovers that a woman has her personality and has unique qualities. The name Eve is a teacher of the experience. The woman can create an experience from every action she does, thereby elevating her actions spiritually. The woman’s worship of God is more internal than the man’s and therefore she does not need external signs to worship the Creator. The woman is able, while doing her routine work, to ascend and communicate with God.

To understand the meaning of calling by name, we started in this article with the first sources in the Torah in which calling by name appears. The first name was given by God himself in the creation of the day. G-d created the light and calls it “day”. We concluded that the calling by name is a continuation of the creation of the creature, but we realized that G-d did not call names to all His creatures but assigned this significant role to His handiwork – man. We discussed the

role of man vis-à-vis the animal and concluded that in the reading of the name, there is a dimension of recognition that stems from a spiritual force capable of deepening and adapting it to the physical attributes of the creature. In addition to this, we found that there is a connection and assimilation of essence and function in the act of giving the name. From these words, we concluded that beyond the spiritual connection between the giver of the name and the one called by name, there is also an assertion of authority and the establishment of the sovereignty of the one who calls by name over the one called by name.

So far, we have seen that the reading of the name is a significant matter both in terms of the authority and power of the giver of the name and the consequences that the name has on its subject. We deepened our understanding of the name "Adam" given by the Holy One, blessed be He, and we also saw that Adam could adapt his name to himself based on the understanding of his essence and abilities.

Later we found the difference between the name "Adam" and "Ish" by reading the name of the "woman" and tried to stand for the differences, and we increased the veil of distinction even more when Adam gave the woman her name: "Hava".

Cain's birth symbolizes the final act of creation. Eve, the mother of humanity, gives birth to the firstborn and thus ties herself to the act of Genesis, and she perpetuates this by calling her son's name (Samuel, 2003).

2. Parents call by name

About three hundred and thirty names of people are mentioned in the book of Genesis. Only in thirty-eight of them does the scripture indicate the act of reading the name, and only in thirty of them does the scripture reveal who it is that gave the name.

Since the act of reading is not regularly mentioned, and the scripture found it appropriate to specify only in certain cases who gave the name and why he was called by that name, we decided to deepen our investigation on the matter and detail it to other branches. We found that the reading of the names is divided mainly between the parents and in special cases, God participates in the reading of the names.

"Shem" expresses a nickname for a person in the family aspect, and it seems that the name is a means of publishing the result, this means that the newborn son carries the memory of his father in his very being, just as the meaning of the term "recognizing a name" is to recognize his memory and including the existence of the father, like the prophecy of Isaiah: "And I gave Babylon a name and a rest and a grandchild and a grandchild" or the motive "that his name may not be blotted out of Israel," regarding the daughters of Tzel and fear (Segal, 1938).

Considering this, it is understandable why the reading of the names is, for the most part, given by the parents, since the parent determines how his memory will be preserved. The parent preserves his memory by giving birth and seals his memory by naming the child.

Already in biblical times, giving a name was not only to identify the individual, but also express and indicate cultural-religious aspects, and according to Fleishman, calling a name even creates a connection between the person and everything related to his name. Hence, a person's name in the biblical period belonging to a specific culture and society, and we can dare to say that giving the name creates the child's belonging to the society in which he grew up, and even more, giving the name indicates the parents' belonging to this culture (Segal, 1938; Fleischman, 2001).

From another point of view, Sutzkober sees as a rule the granting of a name as an expression of power, which is even more expressed between the parents. There may be some truth in her words in some cases, and this can be seen even nowadays, but forcefulness is a symptom of

a failed system of connection between parents and their children or between the parents themselves. Failed relationship systems have always existed in every culture, and probably will continue to exist, but as a rule, we refrain from generalizing and stating that our ancestors had failed marital relationships, without necessarily saying so, because an important pillar in the study of the Torah is the positive learning from our ancestors, since they were special personalities and had other Spirit they were chosen to be the leaders and fathers of the nation (Sutzkober, 2012).

3. Adam: shet – Enosh

As we have already mentioned, Cain was named by his mother. The fact is interesting that in the second son born to Adam and Eve, it is not stated who called his name and why. It is possible that the Bible chose to omit this fact, knowing that this child has no significance for the rest of history, just as its name indicates its lack of purpose – “vanity”. Some point to the difference in Eve's direction and claim that after her strength was revealed in the birth of Cain, the birth of Abel is secondary to her and involves a lot of trouble. It is difficult for us to accept this opinion, as it greatly lowers the rest of the spirit of the first creatures and brings them closer to animal qualities than to human or moral qualities that are revealed through physical phenomena.

Be that as it may, at the birth of the third son the reading of the name is double. In chapter 4 it appears that Eve is the one who calls Seth by name, but this time she brings God into the act: “God gave me another seed...” while in chapter 5 it appears that man calls Seth by name: “...and he called his name Seth.” Sutzkober, according to her method, sees this as a control struggle between Adam and Eve. In the first son, Eve usurped the ownership of Cain and the procreation, in the birth of Abel, Adam did not want to recognize his son, and both saw his birth as a mere nuisance, and only in the birth of the third son is he the one who finally calls out the name, thereby imposing his guilt on both Eve and the next generation. It seems right to us to believe that there is control and authority in the calling of the name, but it is not reasonable to generalize and turn every calling of the name into a forceful struggle for destructive control, without the meaning of the readings guiding us to say yes (Sutzkober, 2012).

The Ramban interprets that the scripture emphasizes the birth and the calling of Seth’s name by Adam, since the continuation of human history will be through him, therefore, to clarify the essence of choice the scripture adds that Adam called the name of Seth. From this, the assumption is strengthened that all newborns were called by name, and the scripture is this who chose to emphasize chosen people who were assigned a role in a certain period, and this emphasis is expressed by the calling by name. To emphasize the continuation of the dynasty that came from Seth and not from Cain and Abel, the scripture also indicates the calling of Anush’s name by his father, Seth (interpretation of the Ramban, 2005).

4. Lemach: Noah

The tenth generation to the first Adam is Noah and the reading of his name is mentioned by his father Lamech. Noah also marks the closing of an era, and the special role assigned to him to renew humanity after the flood is known. Interesting is the fact that when Lamech explains the name, the explanation is given in the plural and not the singular: “It will comfort us from our pain and irritate our hand...” which might have emphasized the universal role assigned to it.

Rashi mentions in the midrash that Noah invented the plow that relieved his generation of the curse of the first Adam after his sin in the Garden of Eden, and because of the relative rest that the plow has, it is called Noah. This midrash is puzzling because even if Noah

invented the plow, it was over many years, and how did his father name him after an event that hadn't happened yet?

It seems that it is possible to trust the words of the Hazekoni for verse 99 which says that Noah was born immediately after the death of Adam, who was “Cursed is the ground for your sake all the days of your life” and for that reason they saw his birth as a correction to the act of the first Adam, and if so the saying “this will comfort us” was said as a hope. This interpretation also explains the meaning of the saying in the plural, because a whole generation stands and waits for the curse to be lifted from the earth (Hezkoni Commentary, 2005).

On the other hand, the Radak interprets that Noah's name came to Lamech in prophecy and not out of conjecture and hope. Lamech by the power of his prophecy knew that this son would bring comfort to his generation and therefore called his name Noah. According to his words, Lamech places his son as a witness to the correctness of his prophecy and is not satisfied with the revelation of the prophecy that through his son the benefit from the work of the land will come to the next generation, but leaves its mark on his son and thus also creates a more solid commitment to the fulfillment of the word of the prophecy (Kimhi, 2005).

5. Yehuda: Ar, Peretz and Zarah

In Genesis, the story of Judah and Tamar is told, which by all accounts is complex from a family, constitutional, moral, and national point of view. In the story of this act, the Torah does not cover up the characters and does not cover up their names. Furthermore, precisely in the birth of the children of Yehuda, the text specifies and emphasizes the very act of calling the name (Caspi, 1991).

The Radak does not see a repetition of the calling by name for emphasis but explains that this was the custom in the order in which the names were called: the first son was called by the father, the second by the mother, the third by the father and God forbid. This is how he explains why Yehuda calls his firstborn by name while the second is Named by the mother, and although the third son should have been named by the father, it is the mother who calls the son by his name because Yehuda was not present at the time of birth. Its meaning sheds light on the time of giving the name, which is given near birth, and strengthens the connection between the calling of the name and the beginning of his essence in the world (Kimhi, 2005).

The Malbim writes that it was appropriate to mention the calling of Ar by name, as Judah's firstborn, because from him a kingdom would come, and the same is true regarding the birth of Peretz and Zarah, from Perez the kings of the House of Judah came. The mention of their name serves as a kind of emphasis on the kingship that will come from him (Malbim, 1956).

6. Joseph: Manasseh and Ephraim

Ibn Ezra interprets Manasseh's name from the language of mercy, that God blessed Joseph with all the good things he showered upon him, according to which it seems that the names of Manasseh and Ephraim symbolize Joseph's recognition of the good that God has done with him (Ibn-Ezra Commentary, 2005).

Rabbi Hirsch follows a different path and gives two interpretations, one in the meaning of forgetfulness, according to which Yosef claims before God that he forgot his family from him, but he rejects this interpretation since the scripture does not want to categorize Yosef as being heartless. Therefore, Rashar gives a second interpretation that “Nashni” is from the word creditor-debtor, and according to this Yosef turns to G-d and thanks him for the reality he is in, after all, he is indebted to his family who brought him without first thinking, to the situation he is

in Now kosher and ruler in Egypt. This interpretation does not mean that Yosef ignores his past, but rather he sees his past as a tractate of events that it was precisely the disasters that befell him that caused his wealth and happiness (Hirsh, 2002).

The interpretation of the Melbim continues the educational line that outlines the names of Yosef’s sons and explains that each of Yosef’s sons is a memory of a different period in his life. The elder Menashe symbolizes the worry he had during his poverty, while Ephraim symbolizes the fruitful and flourishing period of his life. His two sons were born a ruler in Egypt and yet he does not forget that his good days followed his bad days and they depend on them “that poverty caused his greatness” (Malbiim, 1956).

7. Conclusion

In this article, we have provided interpretations regarding fathers calling their sons by name and we will summarize the main points of their statements that have been brought forward so far. The scripture mentions that Adam called his third son by his name, even though it has already been mentioned that Eve called her son by his name. The Ramban claims that the scripture emphasizes that the calling by name is precisely for those who will continue the chain of generations, the Melbim points to the same principle and says that it was appropriate to mention from whom the kingdom of the house of David will come (Melbim, 1956).

The Radak, on the other hand, does not see the marking of name-calling as a special matter that the Torah emphasizes and says that the order of name-calling between the parents was an accepted and clear matter of who the father calls and who the mother calls by name. The names given by ancestors come to express different things. Rashi’s interpretation explains that the names can express hope, and Radek explains that the hope that arises precisely in a certain name stems from a spiritual manifestation that was upon the father and the reading of the name comes to strengthen faith in his prophecy (Kimhi, 2005).

The Hezkoni sees the reading of the name to express a mark of a significant event from which a change stands out. Ebaz through the names of the sons of Yosef shows that reading the names of the sons was a way of expressing gratitude to G-d and in a similar way Rabbi Hirsch interprets that the reading of the names itself is a call and an appeal to G-d (Hezkoni Commentary, 2005).

Acknowledgements

This research did not receive any specific grant from funding agencies in the public commercial, or not-for-profit sectors.

The author declares no competing interests.

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Greco-Hyperborean Contacts in Antiquity

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Received: 20 April 2024 ▪ Revised: 2 July 2024 ▪ Accepted: 14 August 2024

Abstract

The Hyperboreans appeared at key moments in the history of Ancient Greece, bringing innovations to its culture and helping in time of need. They had important dealings with the Greeks until historical times. This study presents some of their contacts, mainly focusing on the Hyperborean maidens and the philological interpretations of Herodotus (4.35). Special attention is given to pseudo-Plato's account of Opis and Hecaergus (Agre) having brought sacred bronze tablets with eschatological teachings from the Hyperboreans to Delos, which remarkably resemble the Orphic gold tablets. Olen, although being from Lycia, is also mentioned, in the context of Pausanias (10.5.7-8) account, where the poet seems to have close connections with the Hyperboreans.

Keywords: Hyperborea, Hyperborean maidens, Olen, mythology, Ancient Greece, history of religion.

1. Introduction

Hyperborea is one of the most interesting and mysterious aspects in the history of the ancient world. It has remained a legitimate subject of scientific interest in historiography, archeology and linguistics, despite all speculations and attempts to be appropriated by various racial and nationalist theories, ideologies and pseudoscientific doctrines (Palavestra, 2016: 121).¹ For the Greeks Hyperborea was a completely real, although extremely difficult to reach territory – “neither by ships nor on foot” (Pind. *Pyth.* 10.29).² Hyperborea was an otherworldly paradise, a mythical utopia, which was both part of the mythical past and ever present in Greek literature (Bridgman, 2005: 3).

Apollo's mother – Leto, was born in Hyperborea (Diod. 2.47). When Apollo was born, his father – Zeus gave him a chariot pulled by swans and sent him to Delphi “to expound justice and law to the Greeks” from there (Himer. *Orat.* 48.10). But Apollo got on his chariot and flew to his favorite place – Hyperborea. When Zeus killed Apollo's son, Asclepius, because he was afraid that men might learn the art of medicine from Asklepius and help each other out, this angered Apollo who in turn killed the Cyclopes who made the thunderbolts for Zeus (Apollod. 3.121). Later,

¹ For an overview of pseudoscientific doctrines see Edelstein, 2006, Arnold, 2018, Mosionjnic, 2012: 81-86, Matveychev, 2018, Roling, 2019.

² For a full overview on the Hyperborean myth and its further development refer to my forthcoming paper *Hyperborea on Maps – Always to the North* (2023).

according to Eratosthenes, Apollo had to hide his arrow in Hyperborea (ps.-Hyginus, *Astronomica* 2.15).

- Legrand suggests a different translation of Herodotus 4.35.
- The Delos purification of 426 BC, the preserved inscriptions from the 4th century BC and the 1920s excavations seem to suggest that some mythological stories could originate in authentic memories.
- The supposed “Orphic-Hyperborean connection” is an echo of another connection – between Abaris and Pythagoras.

2. Contacts

The Hyperboreans bring innovations to ancient Greeks culture, revealing the mysteries of the universe and helping in time of need. According to Pausanias (1.4.4), during the defense of Delphi against the Gauls who intended to plunder the treasures of Apollo, two warriors came from the Hyperboreans to help the Greeks – Hyperochus and Amadocus. Sandin (2014: 216) notes the story is later repeated by Pausanias (10.23.2), but Amadocus is called Laodocus instead. The warriors have been conjectured to originate in the poem of Boeo (Paus. 10.5.7), but the names may also connect them with the maidens Hyperoche and Laodice mentioned by Herodotus (4.35).³

3. The Hyperborean maidens

Herodotus (4.32-36), clearly reporting on the Delian strand of the Hyperborean myth, was the first extant Greek author to mention sacred offerings, sent by the Hyperboreans to Delos by way of Scythia, the Adriatic, Dodona, the Malian Gulf, Euboea, Carystus and Tenos. As Delos was one of the most sacred and important religious shrines in Greece and was dedicated to Apollo, Herodotus was connecting Apollo with the Hyperboreans, agreeing with Pindar’s (*Pith.* 10.35) testimony that the Hyperboreans were fervent worshippers of Apollo. He continues the Hyperborean story by giving details of the legend: the Delians reported that two Hyperborean maidens, called Arge and Opis, accompanied Leto to Delos, while she was with child by Zeus, and were present when the divine twins were born on the island (Hdt. 4.35). Arge means “bright”, “white”, “rapid” and “agile” in Greek; Opis means “divine providence,” “protection of the gods” (Bridgman, 2005: 36).

As Sandin (2014: 210) notes, it is uncertain what Herodotus (4.35) means exactly by Arge and Opis coming “at the same time as the gods themselves”. Legrand (1938: 231) ingeniously suggested that ἀντοῖσι τοῖσι θεοῖσι (“the gods themselves”, referring to Apollo and Artemis) should be read as ἀντῆσι τῆσι θεοῖσι, “the goddesses themselves” (see also Gagné, 2021: 118) – Leto, who came to Delos to give birth to Apollo and Artemis, and Eileithyia, who came to assist. This possibility is supported by Pausanias (1.18.5). Both goddesses are said to have come from the Hyperboreans. Approximately the same sense may perhaps be intended by the reading of the manuscripts, if sound. The masculine gender then implies that Herodotus includes Apollo (and Artemis) in the number of gods who “came” to Delos, in this case brought *in utero*, in order to be born. This is in accordance with a version of the myth preserved in a few sources, which has the elder Hyperborean maidens nursing the infants Apollo and Artemis, hence giving their own names as epithets to the gods.⁴

³ The names are indeed absolutely consonant: Hyperochus/Hyperoche and Laodocus/Laodice.

⁴ Cf. Sale 1961: 82-83. He comments the possibility of the maidens and both goddesses not arriving together and delivering the twins on the very same day, but only in the same general timeframe (as opposed to the

The other pair of maidens were Hyperoche and Laodice, accompanied by five Hyperboreans to protect the girls on their dangerous trip. All maidens could not return home and died on Delos.⁵ For that reason the Hyperboreans started sending gifts to the temple of Apollo on Delos not in person, but through intermediaries.⁶

Preserved inscriptions from the 4th century BC record that the temple of Apollo on the island of Delos received gifts, apparently symbolical sacrificial offerings, from somebody referred to as the Hyperboreans (Sandin, 2018: 14; see Coupry, 1972). The historical reality of the gifts of the Hyperboreans was thus confirmed. In 426 BC, a purification took place on Delos as a response to an oracle. All dead bodies in the area of the sanctuary, save those believed to be those of the Hyperborean maidens, were dug up and transported off the island, as the oracle had said there should be neither births nor deaths on Delos (Thuc. 1.8, 3.104; Diod. 12.58). The Hyperborean legend and the story of the Hyperborean maidens coming to Delos would seem to be a very strong and important myth for the Greeks to go against an oracle by leaving the graves of the Hyperborean maidens on the island while all others had to be removed (Bridgman, 2005: 39).

4. "Hyperborean" eschatology

In the 1st century BC pseudo-Platonic *Axiochus* (371-2), Opis and Hecaergus (Agre) are said to have brought sacred bronze tablets from the Hyperboreans to Delos, containing elaborate descriptions of the underworld and the place where the soul continues its journey after death:

371. [...] after the soul was released from the body, it departed to the uncertain spot, and some dwelling under ground, where is the royal palace of Pluto, not less than the hall of Zeus, inasmuch as the earth possesses the middle portion of the world, and the pole (of heaven) is spherical; of which the gods of heaven have obtained by lot one portion of the hemisphere, and the gods below the other, being some of them brothers, and others the children of brothers; and that the propyla before the road to Pluto's domain are fast bound by iron locks and keys; and that the river Acheron receives him, who has opened them, and, after it, Cocytus, both of which it is necessary for him to pass over, and to be led to Minos and Rhadamanthus, (where is) what is called the plain of Truth. There are they seated as judges to sift each of the comers as to what life he had led, and in what pursuits he had dwelt in the body; and that to tell a falsehood is out of his power. On such then as a kind daemon has breathed during life, these are located in the region of the pious. There without stint the seasons bloom with every kind of produce, and fountains of pure water flow; and

much later Hyperoche and Laodice). As Sandin (2008) suggests, Herodotus may have been intentionally vague: if he knew of a legend depicting the physical delivery of gods in the presence of mortals, he may have considered explicit mention of it as improper, just as he consistently avoids mentioning the death of gods when treating foreign myths and ritual.

⁵ According to Herodotus, the grave of Hyperoche and Laodice stood on the left at the door to the temple of Artemis (4.34); Opis' and Arge's grave was behind the sanctuary (4.35). The graves were identified and excavated in the 1920s by French archaeologists (Courby, 1921, Picard, 1924). The tomb of Hyperoche and Laodice was a carved into the ground platform, surrounded by a wall. Near the tomb were found fragments of pottery from the 16th-15th century BC. Arge and Opis were buried in a Mycenaean type tomb with a wide dromos. In Hellenistic times the tomb was surrounded by a wall. In front of the wall a rectangular slab was found which is believed to have been the base of an altar. This grave contained human remains and two Cycladic and three Mycenaean pottery. Both graves were places of veneration of the Hyperborean maidens, whose cult was not interrupted on Delos during the Greek Dark Ages in 12th-8th century BC (Kolosovskaya, 1982: 66-67; cf. Burkert, 1985: 49).

⁶ The origin of the Hyperborean gifts is to be found in the thank offering for the birth goddess Eileithyia for her role in the birth of Artemis and Apollo. Thus, the original gift was not to Apollo, but became associated with his cult (Bridgman, 2005: 40).

every where are meadows made beautiful by flowers of varied hues, and places of discussions for philosophers, and theatres of poets, and cyclic choirs, and the hearing of music, and elegant banquets, and feasts self-furnished, and an unmixed freedom from pain, and a delightful mode of living. Nor is produced there violent cold or heat, but a well-tempered air is diffused around, mixed with the sun's mild beams. There is the seat of honour to those, who have shared in the Mysteries; [...] But they, whose life has been passed in a course of evil doings, are driven by the Furies to Erebus and Chaos through Tartarus, where is the region of the impious, and the unfilled urns of the daughters of Danaus, and the thirst of Tantalus! and the entrails of Tityus, and the uncompleted stone of Sisyphus, To whom begins again his labours end.

372. There too are persons licked round by wild beasts, and terrified by the torches of the Furies glaring around them; and enduring every kind of ignominious treatment, they are by eternal punishments worn down. (Borges)

The supposed Hyperborean belief of afterlife brings close connections with the Orphic gold tablets which serve as a guide for the soul in the afterlife. The Orphic tablet from Hipponion, Italy, 4th century BC:

This is the work of Memory, when you are about to die down to the well-built house of Hades. There is a spring at the right side, and standing by it a white cypress. Descending to it, the souls of the dead refresh themselves. Do not even go near this spring! Ahead you will find from the Lake of Memory, cold water pouring forth; there are guards before it. They will ask you, with astute wisdom, what you are seeking in the darkness of murky Hades. Say, "I am a son of Earth and starry Sky, I am parched with thirst and am dying; but quickly grant me cold water from the Lake of Memory to drink." And they will announce you to the Chthonian King, and they will grant you to drink from the Lake of Memory. And you, too, having drunk, will go along the sacred road on which other glorious initiates and bacchoi travel. (Graf, 2007: 5)⁷

According to Herodotus (2.81) Orphic practices are close to the Pythagorean.⁸ So it should not surprise us that this supposed "Orphic-Hyperborean connection" is an echo of another intentionally created connection – between Abaris and Pythagoras in Iamblichus' *The Life of Pythagoras* (see Zhmud 2016: 6-16). The legend has here been incorporated into that of Pythagoras in a cultic identity as "the Hyperborean Apollo".⁹ The Neopythagoreans invoke the testimony of the Hyperborean Abaris as a verification of this pretension (Iambl. *VP* 19.90-93; 28.135, 138, 140-41, 147), Abaris in effect playing the part of predecessor (as John the Baptist to Christ) to the divine protagonist (Sandin, 2014: 207).

Sandin (2018: 30) concludes that "the myth of Abaris could originate in authentic memories of remarkable pilgrims from the north". According to Hippostratos (Harpocration, s.v. Abaris), Abaris came to Athens in the fifty third Olympiad (568 BC). Others (Harp., s.v. Ab.) dated Abaris in the twenty first Olympiad (696 BC). But Pindar (fr. 270), he adds, makes Abaris a

⁷ "Memory" is Graf's preferred translation of "Mnemosyne" – the goddess of memory and remembrance. In Orphic notions Mnemosyne possesses a lake of living water and awakens the memory of past rebirths (Yordanova, 2004: 86). Orphic texts are undoubtedly influenced by the Egyptian Book of the Dead, with common plots being: quenching the thirst of souls with cold water, a ban on passing certain paths, guards asking questions, underground kings (Merkelbach, 1999: 5ff). The guidance of the soul after death is also the purpose of the Tibetan Book of the Dead.

⁸ According to Kindstrand (1981: 18), "it is notable that when barbarians, known for their wisdom, arrive in Greece, they always come from the North and their wisdom is displayed in the religious sphere, connected in most cases with the cult of Apollo. We may here recall Orpheus who came to Greece from Thrace". For the life of Orpheus refer to Bondzhev 2022.

⁹ In Aelian's *Varia Historia* (2.26) Aristotle claims that the followers of Pythagoras considered their master to be "the Hyperborean Apollo".

contemporary of king Croesus of Lydia (585-546 BC). Which is more in harmony with 568 BC. If the lexicographer cites accurately, Abaris is then the Hyperborean individual mentioned first in known Greek sources, while at the same time being one of the youngest of the known Hyperboreans, belonging in the historical rather than mythical age. And it makes the contact between Abaris and Pythagoras plausible.

But than, on the other hand, we have the account of Herodotus (4.36), who is more than sceptic about the the Hyperborean topic. He is the first to reveal concrete details of the legend about Abaris, dismissing it as unworthy of his attention (cf. Gagné, 2020: 243):

Thus, much then, and no more, concerning the Hyperboreans. As for the tale of Abaris, who is said to have been a Hyperborean, and to have gone with his arrow all round the world without once eating, I shall pass it by in silence.¹⁰ (Rawlinson, 1910)

5. Olen

The legendary poet Olen is another example of someone bringing knowledge to ancient Greece. We find information about him in only three ancient sources – Herodotus (4.35), Callimachus (*Del.* 305) and Pausanias (5.7.8, 8.21.3, 9.27.2), and all of them consider him a Lycian. But in Pausanias (10.5.7-8) we read the following: “Boeo, a native woman who composed a hymn for the Delphians, said that the oracle was established for the god by comers from the Hyperboreans, Olen and others...”, “After enumerating others also of the Hyperboreans, at the end of the hymn she names Olen...”

Olen, according to Boeo, was not only the first prophet of Apollo, but also the only male oracle in Delphic history.¹¹ He was also the first to utter his prophecies in hexameter, thus becoming the first poet to invent the very form of poetry.¹² Generally presented as older than Orpheus or Pamphos, and thus much older than Homer and Hesiod, Olen is cast as the primordial poet of Archaic and Classical Greece. All the hymns of Olen sing of female figures, such as Hera. His songs were sung by the women of Delos, and he was himself sung by Boeo. The Hyperborean Maidens Opis and Arge, the First Maidens, were prominently linked to the birth of Apollo and Artemis in Olen’s verses.

It can be illuminating to briefly contrast Olen’s hymn to the *Homeric Hymn to Apollo* (156-176). In the Homeric Hymn, the voice of the poet directly addresses the chorus of Delian

¹⁰ Dodds (1973: 141) comments, that Abaris was so advanced in the art of fasting, that he had learned to dispense altogether with human food. Could we find a link with the orphic and later – ascetic practices? Macurdy (1920: 139) describes Abaris as a Sun-priest, like Orpheus. His magic arrow and his purity of life are the most striking points in the legend, and these may well bring him into connection with the Thracian Sun-worship, which produced Orpheus.

¹¹ In all other traditions only women speak the oracles. Here again the evidence, such as it is, shows only an original male prophet succeeded by the Pythia and not a Pythia who speaks on a tripod and a prophet who announces the message orally or in writing to the enquirer. According to Fontenrose (1978: 215), “Olen is really a Delian figure: he came to Delos from Lycia and first sang hexameters there. Boeo’s story has a Delian myth transferred to Delphi.” Cf. Laidlaw, 1933: 12.

¹² Cf. Jacoby (1954: 477): “The lines from the hymn quoted by Pausanias [10.5.7] pursue a very definite tendency: they are to prove the antiquity of male divination at Delphi, and in order to do so they replace Phemonoe by Olen who is made a Hyperborean.” Page (1955: 248) calls him “the earliest singer of Apolline hymns”. Pausanias, when it came to ancient hymns, still had some real access to the hymns of Olen. Kalkmann (1886: 244-245) believed that his knowledge was filtered through Alexander Polyhistor, which is possible, but hardly demonstrable. Gagné (2021: 118) notes, that what seems more crucial to him, is that Pausanias’ testimony is largely independent of Herodotus.

Maidens, and that dialogue famously establishes his authority over every song (Gagné, 2021: 117, 127; see also Peponi, 2009, Nady, 2013):

And besides, this great wonder, the fame of which will never perish: the Maidens of Delos, the servants of the Far-shooter, who, after first hymning Apollo, and then in turn Leto and Artemis profuse of arrows, turn their thoughts to the men and women of old and sing a song that charms the peoples. They know how to imitate all people's voices and their babble; anyone might think it was he himself speaking, so well is their singing constructed. But now, may Apollo be favorable, together with Artemis, and hail, all you Maidens! Think of me in future, if ever some long-suffering stranger comes here and asks, 'O Maidens, which is your favorite singer who visits here, and who do you enjoy most?' Then you must all answer with one voice (?), 'It is a blind man, and he lives in rocky Chios; all of his songs remain supreme afterwards.' And we will carry your fame wherever we go as we roam the well-ordered cities of men, and they will believe it, because it is true. (West, 2003: 83)

The maidens of the Homeric hymn are cast as the arbiters of all hymns, the masters of mimesis and poetic embodiment, and the mortal reflection of the paradigmatic chorus of Muses, led by Apollo himself. What they are not is Hyperborean, or singers of the hymns of Olen. That is a striking difference.¹³ Eileithyia doesn't come from Hyperborea in the Homeric hymn, but from Olympus, and she is the daughter of Zeus. In Olen's song, the sanctuary projected itself on the world through the chorus (Gagné, 2021: 128).

6. Conclusion

In Antiquity the Hyperboreans – living in an otherworldly paradise, a mythical utopia, which is both part of the mythical past and ever present in Greek literature – were thought to have traversed Greece during its mythical prehistory and to have left their mark on some of its innermost and sanctified places, thus helping to create, and sometimes to maintain, important values in Greek thought, such as justice, right and moral purity (Bridgman, 2005: 3, 71). The godlike Hyperboreans seem to outshine the Greeks at every turn (Romm, 1992: 61). The Delos purification of 426 BC, the preserved inscriptions from the 4th century BC and the 1920s excavations seem to suggest that some stories that we accept as pure mythology, might require reassessment. Sandin (2018: 30) concludes that “the myth of the Hyperborean maidens could originate in authentic memories of remarkable pilgrims from the north”.

Acknowledgements

This research did not receive any specific grant from funding agencies in the public commercial, or not-for-profit sectors.

The author declares no competing interests.

¹³ Here Gagné makes a note, that the, generally unexamined, idea that the Homeric Hymn to Apollo gives us or reflects the “original, local traditions” of Delos and Delphi, against which all other “traditions” are to be read as deviations, remains the default position of much scholarship on the question. With the evidence we have, and the unresolvable issues of relative chronology at hand, I do not believe a case for direct influence can be demonstrated in one direction or another.

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Globalizing Society and the Cosmopolitan Personality

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Received: 22 June 2024 ▪ Revised: 15 August 2024 ▪ Accepted: 23 August 2024

Abstract

The global changes in the 21st century regarding human populations speak of the changed position regarding the nation-state and the attempts of its institutions to control social, economic, and political life, as it has been done for centuries. In itself, this is a symptom of serious changes in the relationship between man and the world. The process of globalization, related to the crisis that the nation-state is going through, does not necessarily mean a finding of its decline. Rather, it expresses the fact that in the state of globality, the nation-state finds itself in a completely changed environment to which it must find ways to adapt to be able to define itself anew. The process of cosmopolitanism can be accepted as one of the options for this self-determination. Regionalism as a socio-structural phenomenon is limited at certain times by the social space and the individuals in it. Rationalism is a form of glocalization, while cosmopolitanism allows for this mobility, both of and in the social, and for the formation of a specific, cosmopolitan worldview on the part of the individual. Today, we as “mobile people” are characterized not only by our technological mobility (owning and carrying with us various technological gadgets) but also by our extremely flexible and (if we wish) full awareness of what is happening around us. Another question is, however, whether the setting of internal limitations by the person himself in front of himself, and of what he will undertake as an action, will be realized as an intention or will have the strength to set before himself as a goal to overcome and extinguishes the risky situations that await him in the future. Even if cosmopolitan in spirit, individual human subjectivity will always be the bearer of concrete facts such as origin, bioanthropological characteristics, value, and moral specifics, but they are not the leading ones. The individual specifics are the individual nuances in the rich originality that represents the cosmopolitan personality. Cosmopolitanism as the current and future social trajectory of humanity must be and lead to the absence of antagonistic, separating boundaries that are embedded in our human nature.

Keywords: Globalizing society, the cosmopolitan personality, philosophy.

“Nationalism is an infantile disease.
It is the measles of mankind.”

Albert Einstein

1. Introduction: The cosmopolitan outlook and its contours in global society

One of the ways that a variant of this self-determination can be adopted is the process of cosmopolitanism. With all the possible ideas about globalization and the contradictions of the accompanying anxieties and hopes, a common root can be recognized in them. It is related to the crisis of the main organizational form of and in the modern era – the nation-state.

This form of unification in a globalized world encounters more and more contradictions arising from the ever-greater opportunities that globalization provides to the individual personality, in terms of individual, private life. These greater opportunities increasingly lead to non-compliance with the boundaries of the nation-state and a search for ways to overcome its hegemony. All this makes it difficult to conduct a closed cultural and social policy on the part of the national state and leads to the questioning of the extent to which its homogeneity is possible.

On the other hand, the ultra-aggressive nationalist movements of the late 20th and early 21st century show the randomness of any national ossification. In itself, it can be detrimental to the state itself, because it as a form is doomed to self-isolation.

The global changes regarding human populations speak of the changed position regarding the nation-state and the attempts of its institutions to control social, economic, and political life, as it has been done for centuries. This is a symptom of serious changes in the relationship between man and the world (Galily, 2023).

If we do not reduce the idea of globality to one or another of its dimensions, but understand it as a complete change in the conditions of human existence, let us allow ourselves to describe this change as a *state of globality*.

Martin Olbrow summarizes this state of globality as a readiness for a cardinal change in human beings as follows (Olbrow, 2001):

- Globality in terms of common human actions and facing environmental problems that problematize the future existence of man on Earth;
- Globality in the sense of losing the sense of security in the presence of weapons of mass destruction and the possibility of terrorist attacks;
- Globality of economic markets and processes beyond the control of individual countries or leading exchange centers;
- Globality in terms of the ability to quickly move to any part of the world (global transport) and global information technologies and communications (internet, online communication of any kind);
- Globality is the bearer of a specific value system in which people and social groups of all kinds perceive the globe as a field for the expression of their beliefs.

The important thing here is that none of the mentioned points represent the whole idea of globalization. That is, for it to be fully interpreted, the other points or moments in it must also be taken into account. Globalization presumptively carries each of these moments within it.

Interpreted in this way, globalization processes will say that they do not happen by themselves, in the sense that they are not independent of human thought and action.

The targeted processes are perceived as conditions for the independent existence of man and his understanding of his Self in the modern world.

The process of globalization, related to the crisis that the nation-state is going through, does not necessarily mean a finding of its decline. Rather, it expresses the fact that in the state of globality, the nation-state finds itself in a completely changed environment to which it must find ways to adapt to be able to define itself anew.

The process of cosmopolitanism can be accepted as one of the options for this self-determination. Regionalism as a socio-structural phenomenon is limited at certain times by the social space and the individuals in it. Rationalism is a form of globalization, while cosmopolitanism allows for this mobility, both of and in the social, and for the formation of a specific, cosmopolitan worldview on the part of the individual.

Cosmopolitanism is a state of mind that challenges any territorial, nation-state, or geographical confinement. It denotes a sense of belonging to the world and empathy for universal values. About the nation-state, cosmopolitanism today in the world is presented in the form of transnational corporations, markets, social and non-governmental organizations, etc., which form a new transnational civil society.

Transnational civil society steps on the foundations of already established civil societies in liberal democracies, especially in terms of the defense of private civil interest outside state power, as well as the defense of civil rights.

Cosmopolitanism, projected by global changes, turned the individual into a citizen of the world, a so-called cosmopolitan. In what way is this cosmopolitanism presented in the individual human being, in what way is this cosmopolitanism presented in the individual human being?

Ulrich Beck writes the following: “The nationalist perspective – which equates society with the nation-state – blinds us to the nature of the world in which we live. To truly understand the interconnectedness of people and populations across the globe, we need a cosmopolitan perspective. The terminological common denominator of our densely populated world is “cosmopolitanization”, which means the blurring of distinct boundaries separating markets, civilizations, cultures and, last but not least, the life worlds of different peoples. To be sure, the world is still not without borders, but the borders themselves are becoming blurred and unclear, permeable to flows of information and capital. However, they are significantly less permeable to flows of people: tourists – yes, immigrants – no. In national and local life worlds, as well as in institutions, a process of internal globalization is taking place. This changes the conditions under which social identity is formed – it is no longer so necessary that it be defined by the negative opposition between “us” and “them”. For me, it is important to emphasize that cosmopolitanization does not take place on some abstract or global level, outside and above people’s heads, but in their everyday lives (“secular cosmopolitanization”). The same is true of domestic policy operations, which are already global at any level, even at the level of domestic politics, because they must constantly take into account the global dimensions of various political dependencies, currents, networks, threats, etc. (“global domestic politics,” see Beck, 2006).

Baumann states the following thesis. The nation-state loses its functions. Its status is breaking down to be a shaping factor in terms of accounting reports and a source of effective political initiatives to facilitate a transnational exchange. He calls the current state of the world a “new world disorder.” All these problems in all human spheres of action and interaction causing global disorder are the fruit of a changing intelligent humanity. Bauman accepts that the most distinct role of the nation-state today is characterized by purely administrative functions, or that it has become simply an instance that has the right to impose laws and norms, sanctions, and rules. The main task of the national state is to prepare a working budget that ensures stronger state intervention in support of business and the protection of the population from the consequences of the more tangible market anarchy.

Bauman is skeptical about the cosmopolitan future of the nation-state to the extent that Beck presents his expectations.

2. Does being universalized mean being globalized?

With all the definitions and conclusions about “what is globalization?” it is necessary to present the conclusion that: it is a process in which things and events are left or out of control. The idea of universalization to a certain extent brings hope for the introduction of the sought “order” or the finding of a “sustaining center,” but the positive pole of universality in dynamic global processes cannot be found everywhere. We don’t all always act together or in tandem in a

positive direction. Precisely because of the fact of its total multidirectional and polarity, the effects of globalization can be negative and retrograde – in the words of Giddens: “wildness after conquest and domestication.”

Beck outlines this cosmopolitanism in terms of a “polygamy of place.” “The globalization of personal biography means that the world’s contradictions and dilemmas are not happening outside, but at the center of our own lives – in our multicultural marriages, relationships, families, in the enterprise, in our circle of friends, in the microworlds we form with the people around us” (Beck, 2002).

Man today is socially, politically, and economically mobile. Our status is no longer settled, it is life on the road and somehow it seems that our homes are supposedly furnished, but in “refugee style.”

Today, more than any other time, a person can feel like he is “at home” everywhere, because the things he uses, which somewhat create this feeling of home comfort, are found both in the space of the hotel room and in the boarding house, both in remote underdeveloped countries and in highly developed social market economies. Our lives on the road are supported, both emotionally and materially, by mass media communication: from the cell phone, through the Internet, to our credit cards.

On the other hand, this polymerism, transnationality, and the globalization of our biography are the main reasons for the undermining of the nation-state and the revival of nation-state sociology: the connection between place and community/society is breaking down.

According to Beck (2002), mass media technologies are everyday mediators for overcoming time and space. The main reason why personal biography is not tied to a specific place is advanced modernization.

In contrast to external mobility, internal mobility refers to a degree of mental and physical mobility that is necessary or desirable to master everyday life between different worlds. The limits of internal mobility are also expressed in this: they arise not only due to difficulties of social coordination and mastering everyday life but are predetermined by age, disability, illness, etc. These different worlds are potentially present in one place, depending on the available sources of information, on the diversity of intercultural relations, on migration, on foreign laws, etc.

When one’s own life is stretched between several places, it can mean that this biography takes place in the common space, for example, stations, subways, airports, and hotels, which are everywhere the same or similar, therefore deprived of place, of specific individuality. These common spaces carry an emerging universality. One keeps liking new and new places, but they seem to start to resemble each other, which helps one not to have to get used to the differences. Thus, places become renewed spaces for trying out chances to reveal and try out some particular sides of one’s personality that one could not realize before. Living in many places means rather something new that awakens or can awaken a curiosity to decipher his world, as well as to form a cosmopolitan worldview.

3. How did cosmopolitanism create a global culture in a global social space?

The path that will lead us to the answer to this question starts with postmodern culture and its reminiscences in the overall socio-ideological world of modern man. As the most characteristic feature of postmodernism, we can point to the mixing, or mash-up, of “high” and mass culture with elements heterogeneous in spirit and origin. Anthony Smith writes: “On the one hand, we are flooded with a torrent of standardized mass goods, uniformly packaged for mass consumption; on the other hand, these commodities – from furniture and construction to television films and advertisements – derive their content from revived or earlier peoples or

national motifs or styles, removed from their authentic context, anesthetized, or presented in a fantastical or satirical spirit. From Stravinsky and Poulenc in the 1920s to Hockney and Kittinge today, this pastiche of parodied styles and themes defends the possibility of a postmodern, even pseudo-classical culture” (Smith, 2006: 212).

In contrast, however, to the above-described post-cultural modernism, for which the most characteristic thing is that, nevertheless, at its core, its ideas before being collaged into any forms, have their roots as arising in a certain ethnic time and place, the new cosmopolitan global culture is universal and timeless. Because of its eclecticism, this culture is indifferent to spatial place and time. It is fluid and formless. Although currently centered in the West, this cosmopolitan culture is broadcast by mobile and multimedia communications around the world. It is here and now, everywhere in space, with no time limits on access to it. It is not historically encumbered and thus cannot serve as a background for one or another political ideology, scientific or technical culture oriented towards today or tomorrow.

This cosmopolitan global culture differs from all others so far not only in our instantaneous mode of dissemination but also in its self-awareness (in the sense of self-determination and self-sufficiency), criticality, and even self-parody.

Cosmopolitanism is eclectic in spirit: its forms of expression are constantly changing; it is decentered, i.e., the self is present in the concrete discourse with and as a kind of conventional center; the self is a center that is also in constant motion.

On the other hand, the idea of a global cosmopolitan culture has been heavily criticized on its very foundations as a possibility, and hence the very idea of cosmopolitanism:

- The attempt to build a global culture would fail because it would emphasize the multiplicity of folk memories and traditions, customs, manners, memories, and identities, which in the global culture are “almost” “looted” to realize the cosmopolitan global cultural collage;
- Behind the idea of global culture stands the idea of culture as a construct of human imagination and art, i.e. of the limits of human possibilities for “construction” and “deconstruction”.

This means the following, on the one hand, we have argued up to this point that whatever cultures they have some kind of root, and with it the history and historicity belonging to it, and however mixed up they are in the postmodern pastiche, they could still be layered, separated or reduced to their sources. Applied to the social space, this would mean the following: no matter how mixed today’s communities are, in all the variety of their multiculturalism, these same communities could under certain conditions be stratified, rezoned, or even extremely localized to their historical roots, even if not to there, but to some encapsulated communities under a more symbolic principle. Here is one of the manifestations of mobility in mobile citizenship.

On the other hand, comparing the global cosmopolitan culture that uses this mixing of ethnocultural reminiscences (which are somehow never connected to anything from the previous world, and have their own identity) translated and projected in space using telemass media technologies, and science, it turns out that this global cosmopolitan culture seems to “stand in the air.” I.e., what this culture could give as a filling to a cosmopolitan society would not be fully identified with anything. This is also one of the criticisms regarding the nascent cosmopolitan culture. In turn, this culture continues to be the same myths, values, memories, symbols, and traditions that form the cultures and discourses of each “nation” and ethnic community.

The thesis that it is precisely these myths, values, memories, symbols traditions, etc. that set the historical limits and feed the national discourse, which is supported by the nation-

state, is fully justified. Yes, the nation-state is also supported by another major mediator in society, and that is the common language as a code of communication that feeds cultural identity.

The criticism of the global cosmopolitan community is that it is not enough to simply imagine it, to give it volume with an imagined shaped cosmopolitan culture that is propagated by the various tele, info, and mass media mediators. And humanity must lay the serious foundations of wider political associations in more and different types of cultural communities.

Indeed, the process of cosmopolitanization is in its infancy and, in general, it is irreversible in its idea. This process is and will be accompanied by inevitable contradictions and difficulties in many directions. Some of the issues are related to:

- Post-nationalist movements and the confrontation they instill in social communities;
- Ethnic xenophobia;
- Insurmountable and uncharacteristic prejudices on a historical basis for people living in the 21st century;
- With the fact that in reality globalization in its economic aspect is not so fully applicable to the whole world. Unfortunately, one of the negative features of the globalization process is that the distance between rich and poor societies is increasing more and more drastically. Or we can talk about globalization at different speeds, and that because of the speed with which events are happening in the richer societies, a large part of the poorer regions remain completely isolated, or become depopulated as the population living in them immigrates, but not every time its integration where it decided to “stay” is successful.

For Bauman, about the process of cosmopolitanism and globalization, there is another important term that affects globalization processes. The term is “space-time contraction,” which encompasses the complete transformation of the human life situation in modern times. Global processes generally lack the universally assumed unity and equal power in their degree of influence. The approach and mechanisms for the use of space and time are sharply differentiated and differentiating. “Globalization divides as much as it unites; it divides, uniting the causes of division coincide with the causes that contribute to the unification of the world. Along with the emergence of the planetary dimension of business, of the financial, commercial, and informational flow, a “localizing”, the place-fixing process was also set in motion. Between these two closely related processes, the existential conditions of whole generations and the various segments in each of them are sharply distinguished. What appears as globalization for some is localization for others; signaling a new freedom for some, for many others, it becomes an uninvited and cruel lot.” (Bauman, 2000: 22).

Bauman also notes one of the most important characteristics of globality about the human being, and that is its mobility (change of residence, work, ability to travel).

Bauman emphasizes the fact that in the globalization process, to remain “local” or “native” means to socially degrade or suffer unjustified deprivation.

When the personality is excluded from the public space, it loses its ability to reflect on what is happening in real life. This leads to the conclusion that against the backdrop of increasingly unified intellectual or financial elites, to localize or to be “native” is to suffer deprivation.

Cosmopolitanism is the answer to the question: What kind of society should man build for his future? Whether he will be able to do so is the dilemma that will predetermine the existence of humanity in the future.

The cosmopolitan personality will have to deal with or limit the processes related to environmental problems, and the dramas surrounding finding ways to build a cosmopolitan identity.

4. The cosmopolitan identity

According to Jason Damian Hill, the main characteristics of this identity are the cosmopolitan spirit, which is the bearer of independence, and moral responsibility to one's own "I" and to the world as a whole.

Bauman gives another relevant example of the dimensions of globalization, of the emerging new sociality of (part of) modern people. He quotes Agnes Heller, who in turn tells of a businesswoman who speaks five languages and owns three apartments in three different locations. "The kind of culture he participates in is not the culture of the place, it is the culture of the time. This is the culture of the absolute present. Let us accompany her on her constant travels from Singapore to Hong Kong, London, New Hampshire, Tokyo, Prague, etc. She stays at the same Hilton hotel, eats the same sandwiches for lunch, or, if she wants, eats Chinese food in Paris and French food in Hong Kong. It uses faxes, telephones, computers, watches the same movies, and discusses the same problems with the same people" (Bauman, 2000: 114-115).

Modern man, although perhaps not on the scale of Bauman's character, frees himself from the locality and his "statehood", gradually acquiring a cosmopolitan consciousness. I.e. such a state of consciousness that challenges any territorial, nation-state, or geographical confinement.

Cosmopolitan identity is a sign of the moral maturity of humanity, which has overcome the limitations and intolerance of its antipodes racism, irrational patriotism, and nationalism. The cosmopolitan personality is committed to common human causes, on the other hand, this worldview is a sign of deep respect and recognition of existing diverse cultural practices.

A major problem towards and before the achievement of cosmopolitan identity is the insurmountable ethnocentrism and disregard for foreign cultural values, knowledge, and achievements.

In modern times, we are talking about an emerging cosmopolitan society; for a global culture that is transmitted and reaches every point on the planet where homo sapiens live through the virtual space of the global network (Internet); we are also talking about the emerging mobile man.

Cosmopolitanism is not necessarily a theory of national nihilism, kinshiplessness, or indifference to local achievements and characteristics of individual human subjectivity. This is a progressive idea of the functioning of the global social space, and more importantly: a suitable and sufficiently accessible way for the individual human subjectivity to feel unrestricted, but responsible and open to the new.

Will these global societies of ours manage to keep their "open societies" or will they fail to overcome their selfishness and continue to encapsulate themselves in self-eating communities, conquered by the spirit of consumerism and national-political-religious extremism? These are questions that we will be able to answer in the future. Positive answers in this direction will be possible only when humanity finds the balance in relationships, manages to overcome differences, and turns the borders between different societies into bridges.

5. Conclusion

Today, we as “mobile humans” are characterized not only by our technological mobility (owning and carrying with us various technological gadgets) but also by our extremely flexible and (if we wish) full awareness of what is happening around us.

We also have one of the most important characteristics for the modern man – to move in space without problems (with the help of fast-moving means of transport), saving part of his time and using the latter more fully for other activities, thanks to the high speeds, and with the incredible freedom to be present wherever he wishes in the world without feeling politically, religiously, territorially or emotionally bound, by any territoriality. All this is possible thanks to the common will of humanity for a single, global world.

Another question is, however, whether the setting of internal limitations by the person himself in front of himself, and of what he will undertake as an action, will be realized as an intention or will have the strength to set before himself as a goal to overcome and extinguishes the risky situations that await him in the future.

Even if cosmopolitan in spirit, individual human subjectivity will always be the bearer of concrete facts such as origin, bioanthropological characteristics, value, and moral specifics, but they are not the leading ones. The individual specifics are the individual nuances in the rich originality that represents the cosmopolitan personality.

Cosmopolitanism as the current and future social trajectory of humanity must be and lead to the absence of antagonistic, separating boundaries that are embedded in our human nature.

Acknowledgements

This research did not receive any specific grant from funding agencies in the public commercial, or not-for-profit sectors.

The authors declare no competing interests.

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