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2024 - Volume 8 - Number 2

Metaphysical and Moral Questions About the Initial State of Human Mind/Machine

Richard Taye Oyelakin
Obafemi Awolowo University, Department of Philosophy, Ile-Ife, NIGERIA

Olusola Victor Olanipekun * ORCID: 0000-0003-1371-4961
Obafemi Awolowo University, Department of Philosophy, Ile-Ife, NIGERIA

Open Journal for Studies in Philosophy, 2024, 8(2), 79-88 * https://doi.org/10.32591/coas.ojsp.0802.01079o
Received: 3 September 2024 ▪ Revised: 16 November 2024 ▪ Accepted: 21 November 2024

LICENCE: Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.

ARTICLE (Full Text - PDF)

ABSTRACT:
The claim that machine table begins from State A has raised the question of the equivalent state in human mind. Putnam’s initial position, although already repudiated, is that human mental state is equivalent to machine state. By implication, everything which is true of a state of machine table is also true of human mental state. Turing likens this initial state in human mind to the state of the mind of a child at birth. However, upon the fact that fetus has been implementing some programs before birth might challenge Turing claim. But then, this might raise some metaphysical and ethical questions. For instance, which is the initial State in human mind? What is the implication of the initial State on the anti and pro abortionists’ debate? This study, employing the debate between the pro and anti- abortionists, argues that this state might not be so easily defined as it seems. This study connects the issue of discourse with how questionable it is that Turing’s view holds the primitive view of time. We are taking side with Putnam concluded that the issues of time, and initial state will only be resolved when language is much developed and become more technicalized. This study adopts philosophical argumentation and critical analysis as methodology.

KEY WORDS: Putnam, mental state, machine, mind, pro-abortionist, anti-abortionist.

CORRESPONDING AUTHOR:
Richard Taye Oyelakin, Obafemi Awolowo University, Department of Philosophy, Ile-Ife, NIGERIA.

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