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2025 - Volume 9 - Number 1


More than Words Can Settle

Omobola Badejo * ORCID: 0000-0002-2537-3650
Obafemi Awolowo University, Department of Philosophy, Ile-Ife, NIGERIA

Open Journal for Studies in Philosophy, 2025, 9(1), 19-32 * https://doi.org/10.32591/coas.ojsp.0901.02019b
Received: 15 January 2025 ▪ Revised: 27 April 2025 ▪ Accepted: 1 July 2025

LICENCE: Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.

ARTICLE (Full Text - PDF)


ABSTRACT:
How to explain how objects persist from one-time location to the other within a metaphysical framework is known as the problem of persistence. Superficialism, relying on alternative argument, argues that the problem of persistence is a mere verbal dispute. This study identified the absurdity and inconsistencies in the alternative language. This is to show that superficialism is self-stultifying. The study showed, contrary to the claim of superficialism, that the alternative language argument is not a sufficient ground to dismiss the debate between endurantism and perdurantism and consequently other debates in philosophy as a non-substantive metaphysical debate. The paper also found the alternative argument of superficialism unreliable and absurd.

KEY WORDS: superficialism, metaphysics, persistence, endurantism, perdurantism, alternative language.

CORRESPONDING AUTHOR:
Omobola Badejo, Obafemi Awolowo University, Ile-Ife, NIGERIA


 

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