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2025 - Volume 9 - Number 2

A Critical Assessment of Internalist Theory of Epistemic Justification

Olusola Ayomide Asaju * ORCID: 0009-0000-5887-5617
Obafemi Awolowo University, Department of Philosophy, Ile-Ife, NIGERIA

Open Journal for Studies in Philosophy, 2025, 9(2), 51-64 * https://doi.org/10.32591/coas.ojsp.0902.01051a
Received: 15 June 2025 ▪ Revised: 19 August 2025 ▪ Accepted: 8 November 2025

LICENCE: Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.

ARTICLE (Full Text - PDF)

ABSTRACT:
The paper examines Internalism as a theory of epistemic justification. Internalism in epistemology is the view that the basic requirement for knowledge justification is in the epistemic agent internal factor. The paper examines two of the mainstream objections against this theory of epistemic justification which are “The Problem of Stored Belief and The Problem of forgotten Evidence.” The paper then use one of the variants of internalism which is mentalism to provide a way out for internalism as a theory of epistemic justification as these two salient objections.

KEY WORDS: internalism, mentalism, justification, internal, external.

CORRESPONDING AUTHOR:
Olusola Ayomide Asaju, Obafemi Awolowo University, Department of Philosophy, Ile-Ife, NIGERIA.

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